P-47N Thunderbolt vs. F4U-4 Corsair - Which was superior?

[DAVIDICUS]

Could there be some disparity because many of the Corsair pilots were getting hit as opposed to a less number of Navy guys in their Hellcats, possibly due to their attempt to get closer and deliver the ordinance on target with a higher probability???

I addressed that excellent point earlier. Under the same conditions, flying in comparable operations, the two aircraft received about the same number of hits per sortie. Differences in daring low level attacks, approach speed, plane size, etc. should have manifested itself in a fewer hits per sortie suffered by Hellcat pilots.

Note (e), Page 79:

...when flown under the same conditions. Receiving about the same number of hits per sortie in comparable operations, the F6F had a far lower rate of loss per plane hit.

Interesting other points that have been raised.

 

[JoeB]

Ditto the F4U vs F6F. I suppose the USN may have had some sense of the mission profiles but it would be interesting for example to look at losses at Okinawa where the AA was heavy and the fighters were at very low level. Were more F6F's flying CAP for the fleet while the Corsairs were getting singed on the deck?

The figures are damaged suffered and losses per sortie encountering AA. So it should basically correct for mission profile differences. It wouldn't include pure air to air sorties, nor total milk run ground attack sorties. And 1945 carrier sorties only, so cuts out a lot USMC operations on Okinawa (which I doubt was heaviest AA loss environment anyway, that would probably have been going after airfields in Japan, as it had similarly been in ETO). And as mentioned already stats are given for both a/c damaged and lost, and rate of damage was similar, undercutting any assumption of a hidden difference in average mission profile or tactics between the two types on 'sorties encountering AA'. The main difference was % of a/c hit by AA which didn't make it back, which was much higher for the F4U, and that's actually the succinct point made in the notes to the NASC table, as quoted above.

Joe

 

[Amsel]

Marine pilots are Marines first. They tend to get in much closer for air supprt, and stick around much longer then their counterparts, due to really wanting to protect the grunts. This may have a small factor in the numbers as well.

 

[JoeB]

Marine pilots are Marines first. They tend to get in much closer for air supprt, and stick around much longer then their counterparts, due to really wanting to protect the grunts. This may have a small factor in the numbers as well.

First statement is true*, but at risk of endless repetition, the statistical disparity can be boiled down to % of a/c hit by AA which were then lost, noticeably higher for F4U's than F6F's (64% more), in side by side carrier operations in 1945. The rate at which F4U's and F6F's were hit by AA, on sorties encountering AA, was about the same (only 4% more for F4U's). So we can state as fact that whatever organization differences existed between F6F and F4U units (many of which were USN anyway) on carriers in 1945, they did not have a significant effect on how often each type got hit by AA when they faced AA. And I see no plausible organizational explanation for a big differences in % of hit a/c which were lost. That pretty much had to be caused by differences in the planes themselves.

*although, the corollary to that which is often assumed, that close support is the primary mission of Marine aircraft, is mainly a post WWII thing, and it's even overstated for post WWII sometimes. Close support of Marines on the ground was a relatively unusual mission for USMC a/c in WWII. Landbased ops on Okinawa were an exception, but among 1945 Marine F4U carrier ops, stats being considered, 17% were from CVE's much of which was off Okinawa. But the rest was aboard the big carriers, along with USN F4U units, where the most common strike target in that period was Japanese airfields. The losses to AA divided by all sorties was actually significantly higher in CV than CVE operations for Marine F4U's in 1945, even though likely a higher % of the CVE missions were strike. Airfields were typically among the most dangerous targets for ground attacking fighters when it came to AA. See NASC Table 15.

Joe

 

[DAVIDICUS]

JoeB, Where does the 64% figure come from?

I thought the disparity was 58%. The 41% vs. 26% loss rate for Corsairs vs. Hellcats when actually hit by AA in the same time period, flying from the same ships and flying missions under the "same conditions" in "comparable operations" where the two aircraft received "about the same number of hits per sortie."

Incidentally, the USAAF appears to have also kept tabs on fighter aircraft lost to combat damage broken down by fighter type. The Report of Joint Fighter Conference 1944 mentioned that they had collected data on the ability to suffer combat damage and still return to base.

If there is interest, I will dig out my book and post the discussion which, as I recall, was brief.

 

[MikeGazdik]

Yes sir. I enjoyed the book everytime I read it.

QUOTE]

Bud just passed away in late 2005. He was a very good friend of my father and was very complimentary of dad in the book.

Bud got his only score in a P-47 in the last mission he flew in a P-47 on March 6.. all the rest were in 51's.

Bud also was one of several pilots in the 355th that 'wrung out a D-9 in rat races with 51's while at Gablingen at the end of his tour. He and dad came home together

Sorry If I have missed it before, your fathers name? I didn't realize he was in the book. Sorry to hear Fortier has passed. I thought the story he told of his brother's B-17 mission was also incredible. Bud seemed to really like the security of the P-47, but it is obvious from the book he loved the Mustang. It is the first hand accounts like in this book, that despite tables and graphs, show the Mustang was THE fighter. Have you ever had a chance to visit thier base (or where it was) in England?

 

[JoeB]

JoeB, Where does the 64% figure come from?

I thought the disparity was 58%. The 41% vs. 26%

Same info, I was just dividing one loss rate on sorties encountering AA by the other 2.3 per 100 /1.4 per 100=1.64 rather than ratio of % lost of those hit 41/26=1.58. Let's call it 'around 60%'

Joe

 

[drgondog]

Sorry If I have missed it before, your fathers name? I didn't realize he was in the book. Sorry to hear Fortier has passed. I thought the story he told of his brother's B-17 mission was also incredible. Bud seemed to really like the security of the P-47, but it is obvious from the book he loved the Mustang. It is the first hand accounts like in this book, that despite tables and graphs, show the Mustang was THE fighter. Have you ever had a chance to visit thier base (or where it was) in England?

Bert Marshall, Jr.

He was the fastest ace in the group, went from wingman to flight leader in one week, and Squadron exec in four weeks, squadron CO in 7 weeks, Group Exec in 4 months and was Gropu CO at end of war.

And my best man when I got married.

I miss him.

 

[MikeGazdik]

Bert Marshall, Jr.

He was the fastest ace in the group, went from wingman to flight leader in one week, and Squadron exec in four weeks, squadron CO in 7 weeks, Group Exec in 4 months and was Gropu CO at end of war.

And my best man when I got married.

I miss him.

Thank you for that information. Yes indeed, Fortier did speak well of your father. Your dad was quite busy to say the least. He sounded like a great man, pilot, and leader. I just re-read the story about his piggy-back ride home in a Mustang....wow!

 

[Messy1]

Thank you for that information. Yes indeed, Fortier did speak well of your father. Your dad was quite busy to say the least. He sounded like a great man, pilot, and leader. I just re-read the story about his piggy-back ride home in a Mustang....wow!

Do you have the story handy behind the piggy back ride home? Sounds like a very good story!

 

[drgondog]

I'll post a letter to me from Royce Priest detailing the event in a new thread titled "1st piggy back"

 

[Messy1]

Thanks Bill!

 

[Daviducus2]

JoeB,

I think the problem with comparing Hellcat vs. Corsair vulnerability/survivability in the air to air context is that the performance differences in the two planes is quite significant while the performance differences between the two planes in the air to ground realm really isn't.

I know that most fighters that were shot down never saw it coming but once the rounds start whizzing by, the Corsair probably had a good edge in evasive manuevering that exceeded the Hellcat with its markedly superior roll and dive performance.

Assuming the very large differential in survivability between the Corsair and Hellcat from AA was the result of the oil cooling design, do you think that design also presented a significant source of vulnerability for the Corsair in the air to air context which was not shared by the Hellcat? It would seem that a plane attacking from behind and above could reach the oil cooling aparatus with strikes at the leading edges of the wings where a cooling arrangement at the bottom of the cowling could not be reached at all. With the system spread from the leading edges of the wings to the engine, it would also seem to present at least a bigger kill zone to a plane attacking from behind and below too.

Do you have any thoughts on this?

 

[Sweb]

My Pop also flew the N with the 92nd FS, 81st FG after the war in Hawaii. He hated the thing. Called it a blivit (2 lbs of crap in a one pound bag). But, he was a former 51 driver so his critique of the plane as a fighter escort was naturally contrasted to the 51. The one thing that irked him most was the Jug's slow acceleration. He always emphasized that point with an imaginary throwing of the throttle to the stop and then clasping both hands twiddling his thumbs as if waiting for something to happen. Typically, he said, all other types had that advantage over the Jug so the dive/zoom climb was an essential maneuver with the Jug if not a survival tactic against a real enemy. He went back to 51s in during the Korean War.

 

[drgondog]

He went back to 51s in during the Korean War.

which outfit?

 

[JoeB]

JoeB,

I think the problem with comparing Hellcat vs. Corsair vulnerability/survivability in the air to air context is that the performance differences in the two planes is quite significant while the performance differences between the two planes in the air to ground realm really isn't.

I know that most fighters that were shot down never saw it coming but once the rounds start whizzing by, the Corsair probably had a good edge in evasive manuevering that exceeded the Hellcat with its markedly superior roll and dive performance.

Assuming the very large differential in survivability between the Corsair and Hellcat from AA was the result of the oil cooling design, do you think that design also presented a significant source of vulnerability for the Corsair in the air to air context which was not shared by the Hellcat? It would seem that a plane attacking from behind and above could reach the oil cooling aparatus with strikes at the leading edges of the wings where a cooling arrangement at the bottom of the cowling could not be reached at all. With the system spread from the leading edges of the wings to the engine, it would also seem to present at least a bigger kill zone to a plane attacking from behind and below too.

Do you have any thoughts on this?

We'd have to guess almost completely about effect of vulnerability on air-air results, in sharp contrast to the cut and dried figures on AA vulnerability. Maybe buried somewhere, or constructed from individual combat reports, we could find stats on what % of F4U and F6F hit by enemy *aircraft* fire returned, and at what rate each was hit on sorties encountering enemy a/c. But even if we had those stats, air-air has the whole other dimension of offensive effectiveness. To take an easier case, there seems little doubt (except among Thunderbolt true believers) that the P-51D was better at shooting down enemy a/c than the P-47D was, but surely less able to absorb their counter fire. It's still very difficult to quantify those two offsetting factors, though.

To review, F4U's and F6F's showed similar claimed kill ratio's v enemy fighters in all the side by side cases we know. IMO that's probably mainly just because individual pilot capability and other human factors (morale, leadership, tactics) dominated WWII fighter combat results when the a/c were at all similar in capability, and those two a/c were flown by very similar or the same air arms, and just not different *enough* in air combat performance to make any noticeable difference in air combat result. But perhaps an F4U offensive advantage offset a F6F hit taking advantage? could be I guess, just seems hard to prove. The F6F also had the advantage of better visibility over the nose for deflection shooting (as well as carrier landing), there could many subtle factors that all offset one another.

Another USN stat I'd throw in is from Alfred Price "WWII Fighter Conflict" p.59, for the same period as the NASC stats (though I don't see it in that document), where they calculated that across all USN types 85% of those where it could be determined* they'd suffered combat damage in the oil system, did not return. The %'s were generally high for all key systems and the pilot, v just 11% for hits on structure resulting in losses.

*how could they determine it? a source of possible speculation contained in the stats but still interesting IMO.

Joe

 

[DAVIDICUS]

...85% of those where it could be determined* they'd suffered combat damage in the oil system, did not return.

Interesting. Thanks for commenting on this.

 

[Clay_Allison]

I like the P-47 for several reasons:

1. The oil cooler on the F4U was vulnerable to ground fire and caused several casualties from fire as light as .30 caliber machine guns.

2. The P-47 was much much easier to land and had good ground handling characteristics. The F4U was the original ensign eliminator.

3. The P-47 had a turbocharger and it had great all-altitude performance with smooth boost from the ground to 40k feet.

4. The extra two guns gave the P-47 a firepower advantage that many of its pilots thought was significant. It's a shame that they never armed them with cannon but neither was the Corsair until the end of the war.

5. Better downward visibility with the bubble cockpit compared to the F4U, which had very uncomfortable visibility characteristics.

 

[drgondog]

I like the P-47 for several reasons:

1. The oil cooler on the F4U was vulnerable to ground fire and caused several casualties from fire as light as .30 caliber machine guns.

Documented sources? I would believe that any aircraft can be brought down with .30 caliber fire but my difficulty in this statement is visualizing USN damage assessment team behind enemy lines at Okinawa and saying 'yep it was a .30 cal to the cooler"

2. The P-47 was much much easier to land and had good ground handling characteristics. The F4U was the original ensign eliminator.

Would have been interesting to see the Jug land at the same speed, same angle of attack, over the flight deck of a carrier - and be able to make that judgment? That was the issue causing the Ensign Eliminator discussions

3. The P-47 had a turbocharger and it had great all-altitude performance with smooth boost from the ground to 40k feet.

And the F4U was just superb to 25K and still pretty good above that - so what? The Jug was designed for high altitude and the F4U was designed to USN doctrine. The F4U was more agile, could carry the same load or more, had longer range until the N and carried an extra 600-1000 pounds of carrier related weight which the Jug didn't have to match.

4. The extra two guns gave the P-47 a firepower advantage that many of its pilots thought was significant. It's a shame that they never armed them with cannon but neither was the Corsair until the end of the war.

And that made a difference how? The Mustang carried 2 to 4 less .50's than the Jug and destroyed nearly 50% more German fighters in 8 months less operations time.

5. Better downward visibility with the bubble cockpit compared to the F4U, which had very uncomfortable visibility characteristics.

The F4U got a Malcolm Hood like bubble in 1944 which gave the pilot excellent visibility. Both ships had big, long, fat nose/cowlings, big fat wings - neither was exceptional in visibility below the horizon.

 

[Clay_Allison]

Documented sources? I would believe that any aircraft can be brought down with .30 caliber fire but my difficulty in this statement is visualizing USN damage assessment team behind enemy lines at Okinawa and saying 'yep it was a .30 cal to the cooler"

This is from Brassey's Air Combat Reader:

For Dogfighting below 20k feet I'd take the Corsair. For all other things, including ground attack, I'll take the more durable and more versatile Jug.

And that made a difference how? The Mustang carried 2 to 4 less .50's than the Jug and destroyed nearly 50% more German fighters in 8 months less operations time.

IIRC the Jug shot down more enemy aircraft than the Corsair.

I have always attributed some of the Mustang's success in shooting down more planes to its endurance, i.e. its ability to take the fight to the enemy sometimes when and where he least expects it. I think increased range created more opportunity to engage the Germans, more engagements led to more kills.

Both the Corsair and the Jug were equipped with the excellent but fuel hungry R-2800, so I think that's moot.

I can't prove 8 guns made a big difference, but several WWII pilots I've heard interviewed said they thought it did.