P-47N Thunderbolt vs. F4U-4 Corsair - Which was superior?

[DAVIDICUS]

The oil tank on the P-47D, all models, was 28.7 gallons - 59% more than the 18 gallon tanks in the Hellcat and Corsair.

 

[Clay_Allison]

I think some people hear desperately want to believe that the Corsair was not more vulnerable to gunfire than the Hellcat (and by implication, the Jug) because the Corsair looks cool and they like it.

 

[renrich]

The P47N, according to "America's Hundred Thousand," restored the P47's POOR climb rate, no doubt because of the additional weight. The early Corsair's wing tanks were not self sealing but had a CO2 purge system. (must have had a huge carbon footprint) That additional fuel was very useful in the early going in the Solomons on land based missions. In "Whistling Death'" by Boone Guyton, there is an interesting story about the CO2 purge system in the Corsair. I urge all who have any interest in the Corsair to get a copy of that book. Guyton was the chief test pilot on the Corsair program and was the fellow who crashed the prototype on a golf course. The proof is in the pudding, the Corsair was judged in the fighter meet as the best fighter bomber, Rex Barber( AAF fighter pilot) stated that if the US had to build one fighter it would be the Corsair and the Navy declared the F4U1D superior to the Hellcat as a fighter and fighter bomber and the Hellcat was replaced. No doubt the P51 was more vulnerable to enemy fire than the P47. That did not keep it from being THE premier AAF fighter.

 

[DAVIDICUS]

I must confess that I do not have Francis Dean's book but I understand that it is excellent. I don't know the context of the restoration of poor climb rate comment in the book. Certainly a plane with an internal fuel capacity of 570 gallons like the P-47N will be hampered in performance over a plane with an internal fuel capacity of just 237 gallons like the F4U-4. That represents a difference in fuel weight of over 2,000lbs. Imagine how the Corsair would climb with a 2,000lb bomb load. I suspect that with a "D" load of fuel, which is still 133 gallons more than than the F4U-4, the "N"'s performance would be a lot closer to the "M" as the empty "N" weighed only 556 lbs more than the empty "M" and had a larger wing area.

The P-47N and F4U-4, as is quite obvious, were machines designed for very different roles. Per design, that extra fuel the "N" carried was necessary to get the Thunderbolt to where it needed to be to destroy enemy aircraft attacking long range bombers. So we have two aircraft with enormous disparities in internal fuel capacity being compared to each other with full internal fuel loads. And we have one with accessories for carrier use and one without. One with accessories for high altitude performance and the other without.

With respect to Corsair v. Thunderbolt, I think that for ground attack, the astonishing vulnerability of the Corsair simply made it unsuitable for ground attack. I think that for low and medium altitude air combat, the Corsair was quite excellent. In think that for high altitude escort work, 25,000ft and above, the Corsair was again unsuitable. Conversely, I think the Thunderbolt was quite excellent for ground attack and higher altitude escort work.

The proof is in the pudding, the Corsair was judged in the fighter meet as the best fighter bomber

The fighter meet? Was that before or after May 1946? Is it just me or wasn't this issue just addressed above? If a decision is made and afterwords data comes to light that calls into question assumptions upon which the decision was based, do we simply look at the decision that was made and exclaim that the decision wouldn't have been made it it were the wrong decision? Wait ... don't answer that.

Did the vote casters know of the glass jaw issue? Do you think that survivability might be a huge factor in evaluating combat effectiveness of a fighter utilized in a low level bomber role? Here's a hint. Even in light of the far superior performance of the Corsair over the Hellcat, the USN declared the Hellcat "slightly superior to the F4U in combat, apparently chiefly because of its greater ability to survive damage." (See NACS, page 58) Also note that this finding was reached with the benefit of data on 22,000 sorties including a well controlled apples to apples comparison between the two aircraft.

[T]he Navy declared the F4U1D superior to the Hellcat as a fighter and fighter bomber and the Hellcat was replaced.

Please tell me that you didn't actually write that ... after you wrote about the proof pudding and after it was previously explained to you that the NACS report was published mid 1946.

Lastly, me thinks that you read far too much purity into the reasons behind production decisions on the part of the military.

 

[Clay_Allison]

I must confess that I do not have Francis Dean's book but I understand that it is excellent. I don't know the context of the restoration of poor climb rate comment in the book. Certainly a plane with an internal fuel capacity of 570 gallons like the P-47N will be hampered in performance over a plane with an internal fuel capacity of just 237 gallons like the F4U-4. That represents a difference in fuel weight of over 2,000lbs. Imagine how the Corsair would climb with a 2,000lb bomb load. I suspect that with a "D" load of fuel, which is still 133 gallons more than than the F4U-4, the "N"'s performance would be a lot closer to the "M" as the empty "N" weighed only 556 lbs more than the empty "M" and had a larger wing area.

The P-47N and F4U-4, as is quite obvious, were machines designed for very different roles. Per design, that extra fuel the "N" carried was necessary to get the Thunderbolt to where it needed to be to destroy enemy aircraft attacking long range bombers. So we have two aircraft with enormous disparities in internal fuel capacity being compared to each other with full internal fuel loads. And we have one with accessories for carrier use and one without. One with accessories for high altitude performance and the other without.

With respect to Corsair v. Thunderbolt, I think that for ground attack, the astonishing vulnerability of the Corsair simply made it unsuitable for ground attack. I think that for low and medium altitude air combat, the Corsair was quite excellent. In think that for high altitude escort work, 25,000ft and above, the Corsair was again unsuitable. Conversely, I think the Thunderbolt was quite excellent for ground attack and higher altitude escort work.

The proof is in the pudding, the Corsair was judged in the fighter meet as the best fighter bomber

The fighter meet? Was that before or after May 1946? Is it just me or wasn't this issue just addressed above? If a decision is made and afterwords data comes to light that calls into question assumptions upon which the decision was based, do we simply look at the decision that was made and exclaim that the decision wouldn't have been made it it were the wrong decision? Wait ... don't answer that.

Did the vote casters know of the glass jaw issue? Do you think that survivability might be a huge factor in evaluating combat effectiveness of a fighter utilized in a low level bomber role? Here's a hint. Even in light of the far superior performance of the Corsair over the Hellcat, the USN declared the Hellcat "slightly superior to the F4U in combat, apparently chiefly because of its greater ability to survive damage." (See NACS, page 58) Also note that this finding was reached with the benefit of data on 22,000 sorties including a well controlled apples to apples comparison between the two aircraft.

[T]he Navy declared the F4U1D superior to the Hellcat as a fighter and fighter bomber and the Hellcat was replaced.

Please tell me that you didn't actually write that ... after you wrote about the proof pudding and after it was previously explained to you that the NACS report was published mid 1946.

Lastly, me thinks that you read far too much purity into the reasons behind production decisions on the part of the military.

Bear in mind that a P-47 on a short range mission would have no more fuel on board than the mission called for.

 

[Focke Wulf Meister]

I would take the P-47. Love the Jug.

Here are some interesting stats on the two planes:

According to Chance Vought, Report No. 7289 dated 21 May 1947 the F4U-4 had a high speed @ airplane critical altitude (29,900 feet) of 383 knots. Its time to climb to 10,000 feet was 3.9 seconds. Time to 20,000 feet was 8.0 seconds.

Initial rate of climb at sea level (feet/min. combat power) was 4,360 f/m. Service ceiling was 40,850 feet. Endurance at high speed at 25,000 feet was 1 hour. Endurance at 60% speed at 21,500 feet was 4.1 hours. Maximum endurance @ 7,000 feet was 6.8 hours. Maximum range @ 7,000 feet was 960 nautical miles.

According to a Republic report dated 15 April 1945, the P-47N-5-RE had a high speed @ airplane critical altitude (32,000 feet) was 467 mph. Time to climb to 15,000 feet was 6.2 seconds. Time to climb to 20,000 was 11.6 seconds under military power.

Service ceiling for the N was 40,400 feet. Its maximum range @ 7,000 feet was 740 nautical miles @ cruising speed.

FLIGHT TEST DIVISION MEMORANDUM
REPORT SERIAL NO. TSFTE-2012
17 September 1946

FLIGHT TESTS OF THE P-47N AIRPLANE
AAF NO. 44-88406

Summary:

The P-47 N airplane has performance and handling characteristics very similar to the early P-47 airplanes, but due to heavier weights caused by greater fuel capacity, performance is lower when using equal power settings. The rate of roll is slower, due to the weight being farther from the longitudinal axis of the airplane.

Control forces are good, but as in the earlier model P-47 airplanes large changes in trim are necessary for a change in airspeed.

 

[marshall]

Its time to climb to 10,000 feet was 3.9 seconds. Time to 20,000 feet was 8.0 seconds.

Time to climb to 15,000 feet was 6.2 seconds. Time to climb to 20,000 was 11.6 seconds under military power.

Man those are some well climbing airplanes...

 

[Catch22]

With respect to Corsair v. Thunderbolt, I think that for ground attack, the astonishing vulnerability of the Corsair simply made it unsuitable for ground attack. I think that for low and medium altitude air combat, the Corsair was quite excellent. In think that for high altitude escort work, 25,000ft and above, the Corsair was again unsuitable. Conversely, I think the Thunderbolt was quite excellent for ground attack and higher altitude escort work.

If you look at the actual history, you'll see that that simply is not the case. The Corsair was an excellent ground attack plane, as it showed in both WWII and Korea. It had its vulnerabilities yes, but to call it unsuitable for ground attack is non-sense. The US Navy and the French Navy sure disagreed with you, as the last Corsair built for the US was completed in 1952, ten years after the first one came out, while the French F4U-7 was last built in 1953, and it was a ground attack version. The Corsairs only real role post-war was ground attack, and I'm certain the Navy wouldn't have chosen it if it was unsuitable for that role.

 

[Daviducus2]

I give up.

 

[R Leonard]

I would take the P-47. Love the Jug.

According to Chance Vought, Report No. 7289 dated 21 May 1947 the F4U-4 had a high speed @ airplane critical altitude (29,900 feet) of 383 knots. Its time to climb to 10,000 feet was 3.9 seconds. Time to 20,000 feet was 8.0 seconds.

According to a Republic report dated 15 April 1945, the P-47N-5-RE had a high speed @ airplane critical altitude (32,000 feet) was 467 mph. Time to climb to 15,000 feet was 6.2 seconds. Time to climb to 20,000 was 11.6 seconds under military power.

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I believe you mean minutes, not seconds. At the Cleveland Air races in November 1946 LCDR Butch Davenport, in an F8F-1, set a piston climb to time record from a dead stop to 10000 feet in 97 seconds; that stood, I believe, into the late 1970's. Neither the P-47 not the F4U could climb faster than an F8F.

 

[JoeB]

If you look at the actual history, you'll see that that simply is not the case. The Corsair was an excellent ground attack plane, as it showed in both WWII and Korea. It had its vulnerabilities yes, but to call it unsuitable for ground attack is non-sense. The US Navy and the French Navy sure disagreed with you, as the last Corsair built for the US was completed in 1952, ten years after the first one came out, while the French F4U-7 was last built in 1953, and it was a ground attack version. The Corsairs only real role post-war was ground attack, and I'm certain the Navy wouldn't have chosen it if it was unsuitable for that role.

It is tempting to give up, but let's go over the simple facts and logic one more time:

-the USN's immediate postwar attitude toward prop fighters was still mainly driven by a perceived air to air role, only naturally. And the F4U-4 was a definitely superior performer to F6F-5.
-therefore there is simply no logic in claiming they wouldn't have chosen the F4U as main prop fighter if it was relatively vulnerable in ground attack missions, because that wasn't necessarily *foreseen* as the main mission, especially not month after month strike against low value targets with almost no air threat and anyway the true air-air role turned over to jets. The Korea scenario was simply not the scenario under with F6F was shunted to reserves immediately postwar.
-the stats proving the F4U it was substantially more vulnerable are very hard to get people here (who presumably view themselves as intelligent and reasonable) to fully digest and pay attention to, though they are simple and convincing to any objective eye. It shows that people can have preconceptions, and difficulty overcoming them in the face of new data. There's no reason to categorically rule out similar gaps in logical thinking as contributing to Navy decisions, though as in the point above that sort of bad decision making wouldn't be necessary to explain the choice. The main reason it's very plausible to say the Navy chose the wrong prop fighter for Korea in 1945, is that they weren't thinking about the Korean War scenario in 1945.

And as the Korean War went on, the naval air services as a whole top to bottom certainly did not agree that the F4U was a fully satisfactory ground attack plane. At the pilot level there was bitterness about the general situation of losses v tactics and modest results achieved, but there are a number of contemporary references to the F4U's specific problems with high loss rate. One was quoted above, a point is made of it in Heinl's "Victory at High Tide" about the Inchon campaign is another that occurs to me offhand, fairly frequently referred to in accounts of F4U ops in Korea.

On versions, almost all of the F4U's used in daylight strike missions in Korea were -4/4B's from wartime contracts. Relatively few 'straight' F4U-5's were built, and that a/c was viewed positively as a dog for the Korea strike mission because of bugs which had crept into the design, and its general optimization for a different (high altitude) mission. Only specialist F4U-5's (-5N and -5P) were commonly used in Korea, among truly postwar F4U's. And the vulnerability of the basic F4U was the reason for the redesigned oil system, and greater armor in the AU. The F4U-7 was basically the AU with the F4U-4's engine, so the French never flew the more vulnerable versions of the F4U, only ex USMC AU's, then F4U-7's.

Joe

 

[Butters]

I'm speculating, but it seems to me that the USN's late-war decision to end Hellcat production and go with the Corsair as the standard long-range carrier fighter-bomber was based on the facts that the Bearcat was ready to take on the role of fleet defense interceptor, and Douglas had demonstrated that the Skyraider was going to be a superb attack bomber. The F6F could not match the air to air performance of the late model Corsairs, nor would it be as capable in attack role as was the AD-1. Add in the production of the F7F, and Grumman seems kind of stretched. So, so long, Hellcat...It just wasn't needed any longer.

Jus' guessin'...

JL

 

[DAVIDICUS]

Interesting how the Navy's Air Combat Statistics and numerous informed accounts just happen to sing in harmony. Quite a coincidence indeed.


From Ron Stout -

"I do recall that the MC [Marine Corps] asked that a F4U version be built for ground attack with the oil cooler relocated to be more immune from ground fire and some additional armor plate. As I remember it was redesignated the AU and also was purchased by the French and designated the F4U-7."

KUNSAN AIR BASE: How It Was - VMF(N)-513 (1951-1954) Page 6 of 9



From F4U Corsair Units of the Korean War, Page 16

1st Lieutenant Lance "Bud" Yount of VMF-323-

I felt the thud from the round [20mm] as it hit. Suddenly there was a puff of smoke in the cockpit, and I watched my oil pressure drop down to 15psi - normal was approximately 80psi. I yelled out that I'd been hit, and was turning to head south. One of the pilots in my division pulled up alongside me and said that he was going to stay with me, and that I should try to fly the aircraft back to the ship. I dropped a few degrees of flap as he flew under my tail searching for the oil leak. Naturally, with the sharp decrease in oil pressure, I was sure my oil cooler had been hit - it was in a very vulnerable spot.



From Crimson Sky, The Air Battle For Korea, page 67

It was the cruelest kind of fluke. Somewhere on the frozen, snow covered ground below, a Chinese soldier lay on his back, his white quilted uniform making him virtually invisible from the air. As the four Corsairs passed overhead with the throaty roar of their Pratt Whitney engines echoing off the winter landscape, the soldier raised his rifle and pulled the trigger. His comrades did the same, throwing up a hail of bullets around the four blue planes.

What are the chances a rifleman could hit such a speeding target? And even if the tiny .30 caliber bullet did connect with a Corsair, what damage could it possibly do? The F4U-4B was not only heavily armed but armored to protect both pilot and plane from ground fire.

Yet one round hit home, probably hitting the Corsair's Achilles Heel, the oil cooler. ... Less that three minutes after he had been hit, his engine seized and he lost power so fast that he had no chance to make a run for the coast.



From Brassey's Ar Combat Reader, Page 174

That decision was coming home to haunt the Corsair pilots. Their airplanes would be hit by nothing more serious than a single rifle bullet, and their engines would seize when all the engine oil leaked from the oil cooler.



From A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World, Page 138 (Research presented at the Fifteenth Military History Symposium, held at the United States Air force Academy, 14-16 October 1992)

The Corsair, an air cooled radial engine aircraft, might have been expected to have a higher survivability than the Air Force's liquid cooled (and hence vulnerable) F-51 Mustang. In fact, insufficient oil cooler and engine protection rendered the Corsair just as susceptible as the Mustang to ground fire.
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[R Leonard]

Jus' guessin'...
JL

Your speculation is correct. VT/VB function combined in the AD, F8F for point defense fighter, F4U as strike fighter.

Rich

 

[Catch22]

I DO understand the vulnerability, my point was that the F4U was far from unsuitable for ground attack. Yes, it was more vulnerable than other planes, but if it was unsuited it probably wouldn't have been used as extensively. I will however admit that I was mistaken when I said that they chose it for its usefulness in the ground attack role over the F6F.

If you look at the actual history, you'll see that that simply is not the case. The Corsair was an excellent ground attack plane, as it showed in both WWII and Korea. It had its vulnerabilities yes, but to call it unsuitable for ground attack is non-sense. The US Navy and the French Navy sure disagreed with you, as the last Corsair built for the US was completed in 1952, ten years after the first one came out, while the French F4U-7 was last built in 1953, and it was a ground attack version. The Corsairs only real role post-war was ground attack, and I'm certain the Navy wouldn't have chosen it if it was unsuitable for that role.

I certainly acknowledged the vulnerabilities in that post! I was not saying anything to the contrary.

 

[DAVIDICUS]

ut if it was unsuited it probably wouldn't have been used as extensively.

Perhaps I should have said "comparatively unsuitable." You go to war with the hardware you have irrespective of the soundness of the decisions that brought you to where you are. No one is saying that the U.S. should not have used its full capacity to wage war on the enemy by using less than all available assets. And if you decide in hindsight that it's acceptable to absorb a much higher loss rate for similar performance in ordinance delivery, then that comfort level will necessarily lead you to conclude that the Corsair was not only suitable but performed very well in the air to ground role against defended targets. There is no established rule of analysis that forces you to take into account the loss side of the ledger. Losses of aircraft and losses of pilots.

Lets say we have two contemporary aircraft that appear to perform similarly in the air to ground role. If it came to your attention that one of those aircraft was 58% more likely to be lost from anti-aircraft fire than the other when actually hit by anti-aircraft fire during the same time period, flying from the same ships and flying missions under the "same conditions" in "comparable operations" where the both aircraft received "about the same number of hits per sortie," would you classify the aircraft that's 58% more likely not to return, leave its pilot dead, behind enemy lines or just somewhere in the water or on the ground as unsuitable in that role?

Put differently, if you could reasonably anticipate losing 16 of one type of aircraft for every 10 of the other type under the apples to apples comparison above, would that move you to declare one of those aircraft as unsuitable? What about if you are a pilot? Do you think you might summarily conclude that one of those aircraft is simply unsuitable in that roll?

There is a certain elasticity to language that often results in disagreements over characterizations. Can we agree that if you were a pilot and were expected to pound defended targets and had a choice between flying a Corsair or Hellcat and knew about the 16:10 loss ratio that you would refuse to go near a Corsair with a 10 foot pole?

We are not talking about an established 12:10 loss ratio here which might lead you to conclude that one appeared to have an edge. A 16:10 loss ratio is a staggering disparity and a frightening reality if you are a pilot.

I know that the P-51 also performed admirably in air to ground operations. In my opinion, if the same defended target could be reached with P-47's for the delivery of the same ordinance, the P-51 would be unsuitable for such operations. I base that opinion on the mere assumption that far fewer Mustangs would return. Now perhaps fewer Mustangs would be hit to begin with. I don't know. Admittedly, I am taking license in engaging in some speculation. With respect to the Hellcat vs. Corsair, we don't need to base such an opinion on assumption and speculation. We have well controlled data establishing clear, bright conclusions.

As I indicated previously, assuming the Corsair's oil cooling design is the culprit responsible for the very large disparity in survivability, in my opinion the Thunderbolt would probably have the same or similar advantage over the Corsair that the Hellcat enjoyed. Just an opinion. To the extent that my opinion is that the Corsair was not well suited to attacking defended targets in relation to the Hellcat, I also hold that opinion about the Corsair in relation to the Thunderbolt. You are, of course, free to refuse to extend the comparison beyond the Hellcat due to the lack of well controlled data between the Corsair and Thunderbolt.

 

[drgondog]

Davidicus - as long as you are delving into statistics - what are your thoughts regarding why 8th AF Mustangs destroyed 50% more aircraft on the ground per Mustang lost to flak than the 8th AF Jugs?

Ground scores
A/c -- dest--lost
P-47 739 200 ----------> loss rate/ac destroyed = .27 or around 1 for 4
P-51 3212 570 ----------> loss rate/ac destroyed = .17 or around 1 for 6
P-38 161 109 ---------------------------------------> = .67 or around 2 for 3

I KNOW the Mustang coolant system was more vulnerable to damage - but the mission was the same for both types of fighters at the same times. Only wild card factor was 51 and 38 hadrange over the 47.
PS - the P-38 by these statistics was by far the most vulnerable - with two engines
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[Catch22]

DAVIDICUS:

Yes, I can agree with you there. And I agree that the P-47 was probably better for ground operations in regards to durability. The one thing I didn't agree with is that the Corsair was unsuitable for ground operations, but that's cleared up now.

 

[DAVIDICUS]

By "mission was the same" do we mean the same type of mission or that both P-47's and P-51's were flying literally against the same targets, at the same time and facing the same defensive fire? Were both types taking about the same number of hits per sortie? Were P-47's more likely to be hit in such missions? Were P-47's more likely to be delivering bombs? Does that matter?

What is the "same time" period that we are taking about?

How do we count "aircraft destroyed on the ground"? Do we mean aircraft that appeared to have been destroyed on the ground as claimed by US fighter pilots flying above? Were any of those "destroyed" aircraft not really destroyed but just damaged? Was it more likely for P-51 or P-47 drivers to actually destroy an aircraft on the ground as opposed to it just appearing to have been destroyed and claiming it to be destroyed? Did the eight gun battery of the P-47's generally inflict more damage per strafing run thus making it more likely that aircraft that appeared destroyed were actually destroyed?

Are we also relying on German data on aircraft destroyed on the ground in a given location at a given time and then trying to match that to US records of claims of aircraft destroyed on the ground at those same locations? Does this pose any problems?

Did more P-51's in a given mission fly against such targets than P-47's? Were larger numbers of attacking aircraft able to neutralize anti aircraft measures to a greater extent than their increased numbers provided additional targets for anti-aircraft gunners? Did larger numbers of attacking aircraft result in multiple claims on the same destroyed aircraft due to more passes on the same grounded aircraft? Were P-51's more likely to re-visit the same targets and thus possibly re-destroy and reclaim some of the same aircraft previously hit and totaled?

How do targets of opportunity fit in where US claims of aircraft destroyed on the ground can't be reliably matched to specific locations for which German data is available? Were P-51's more likely to engage targets of opportunity pursuant to their roving around on longer missions that afforded more targets deeper into enemy territory? Did P-47's have access to those same targets? Do we discount US claims for which we don't have corroborating German data? Would this be more likely to affect P-51 or P-47 claim totals?

It sounds like there are too many "wild cards" and I suspect that you, with your wealth of knowledge, can not only dispel some of the issues I have raised above, but can identify additional issues that would interfere in any evaluation based on the limited parameters you have constructed. I do know, however, that at the Report of Joint Fighter Conference, NAS Patuxent River, MD 16-23 October 1944, the following discussion ensued:

Lieutenant Gavin: "In connection with this discussion by the aircraft manufacturers, on the preference of an engine, I think it would be interesting if we could have comment from some of the Army people here as to relative vulnerability of the liquid-cooled and air-cooled installations based on their experience in Europe."

Colonel Garman: "I can only speak for the African Theater and only for a particular type of operation. The P-38 was used at low level on many occasions and we found that it was quite vulnerable to ground fire - any type of ground fire, even small-arms fire. But the other airplanes also experienced that same ground fire and the radial engines brought the planes home. You can't lay down any hard and fast rule and say the inline is no good at low altitude as far as ground fire is concerned. It all depends on the operation entirely."

Lieutenant Colonel Tyler: "We have data which shows that in the entire European theater the P-47 is much better able to take punishment and return after any sort of mission - either ground attack or any mission which incurs damage. That may be due to the P-47 airplane or due to the air-cooled feature. We don't know which but it certainly can take it better than the other plane types."

It would be interesting to obtain that "data."
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[JoeB]

Yes, unsuitable, it's always a relative term. It's just wordy to say 'relatively unsuitable'. Of course the F4U, and F-51 (as designated by the time of the Korean War), could deliver a reasonable load of ordnance on the target and had good endurance over a target at the prevailing ranges (in either case compared to jets); and both returned their pilots from the vast majority of missions. But both had distinctly elevated loss rates in the ground strike role compared to more or less contemporary a/c in their air services which had been phased out, or close enough to be being phased out that it was decided not to substitute them in Korea, but I say that was in retrospect a mistake in both cases. The F6F and F-47 would have been the better a/c for that war, especially the F6F.

There's no reasonable argument they would have achieved less against targets because not only were the ordnance loads similar in practice, but the main mission in reality was harassing the enemy, whose targets were generally hard to detect and easy for him to repair with masses of cheap labor. And the total of pilots lost would have been dozens fewer, applying the comparative loss rates from WWII*. That's especially clear in the F6F/F4U case where the loss rate comparison in ground strike missions in WWII is so well documented, and where the F6F was also the more operationally suitable airplane (distinctly lower carrier accident rate). In F-47/F-51 case the longer runways required by F-47's would have been a countervailing factor in the F-51's favor in some circumstances.

*the USN lost 130 F4U-4/4B's in Korean War carrier ops to enemy action (2 to enemy a/c, almost all the rest to AA), plus 104 in accidents; the USMC lost 56 (1 to enemy a/c) and 55 -4/4B and 1 and 1 -5's in carrier ops ; 91 and 50 -4/4B's and 9 and 17 -5 's in land based ops, total of 514 day strike F4U's. That doesn't include recon or night fighter F4U's, nor AU's. Apply the differences in loss rate to AA and carrier accidents in 1945 ops and that would be a savings on the order of 150 a/c if F6F's had been used instead, and dozens of pilots would have avoided death or captivity.

Joe