Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Adler,
I present sources when asked, go ahead and check. If I'm not asked you cannot blame me for not presenting any. But I can assure you Adler, I do not debate about subjects which I haven't got excellent detailed information on collected over many years.
Soren said:And yes I often do ask for evidence of my claimed patronising, but for once I'd like to actually see some, its very frustrating being accused of something you don't feel is correct and then is offered no proof of it.
On XXI, it easy to claim some successful post-VE-Day engagements but impossible to verify them, because no shots were fired and so no hits to verify the claims. So I don't count them. As I wrote the Type XXI was the base of post-war submarine development, but they missed the war. Or at least they sunk nothing.
You are correct in recognizing that PBB´s were slow and heavily armed and the allied had no use of such a type. But this doesn´t make them less worthy! The allies had no use of a commerce raider BECAUSE there was no large german / italian merchant fleet operating in the Atlantic. The germans, however, had a target rich environment requiring this type of ship. Tonnage sunk vs tonnage laid down is an exceptionally well indicator for the strategic usefulness of a design CLASS. Atlantis was only one ship in a CLASS which didn´t did well at all but the three PBB´s as a CLASS had very positive returns as did the subs (which is exactly why the german navy changed to submarine warfare). I don´t know where You rely on that the PBB´s didin´t well in combat, only one lengthy naval battle emerged in which Graf Spee, despite beeing slower, low on ammunition and outnumbered 3 to 1 did well against 3 RN cruisers. The damage received in this action was not compromising combat abilities of Graf Spee but mislead Langsdorff to enter the wrong harbour, politically.PBB, now they were heavily armed rather slow commercial raiders. Allies had no use of that kind of ships and in seacombat between warships they didn't do exceptionally well. And this tonnage vs sunk tonnage comparison isn't very good indication when comparing combat worth of warships, KM's aux. cruiser Atlantis, Schiff 16, sunk or captured nearly 20 times it's own tonnage, was it clearly better warship than Adm Scheer?
How do You qualify "poor" shooting at Barent Sea. According to every reliable naval history, Hipper did better with her gunnery in worse conditions, compared to other ships operating this day. You may justifiedly blame other aspects, but Hipper particularely was not "poor".PE shooting was exceptionally good during Bismarck cruise, but Hipper's was poor during the battle of Barents Sea, and probably not very good when HMS Glowworm rammed it in April 40, I would say fair during combat with escorts of convoy WS5A on 25 Dec 40.
The USN referred to it as a homing mine. The MK 24 mine was to be dropped by B-24 bombers and activated it´s own powersource only if it found noises in it´s vicinity, a unique weapon. The range at 12 Kts,however was only 4.000 yards (3.66 Km), not 5 1/2 km. The hit rate was ~ 12%. Out of 340 Fidos dropped in 264 attacks, 40 submarines got sunk or damaged. This weapon turned out to be to slow for use against submarines. You need to place the Fido in the very vicinity of the submarine to have a reasonable hit rate (type XXI and XXIII could outpace it).Mk 24 FIDO was a torpedo, slow it was but 12 kts on own power with a range of some 5½ km made it a torpedo not a mine. The mine term was used on it as a cover term but it wasn't a mine. Allies didn't have so desperate need for submarine homing torpedoes and German didn't have so desperate need for A/S homing torpedoes that's why Allies developed FIDO and Germans T5.
Without GPS tracks nobody could doubtless verify how close the subs came (even torpoedoes, had they been launched could have originated from another sub). But this technology doesn´t exist in ww2. You would need to question the submarine CO and officers credibility as eyewitnesses in order to question the events, per se. Which I -in turn- regard as a very questionable approach to the matter.I don't doubt that Type XXIs observed the British formations but how to verify how close they got?
I stand corrected with this. And now show me an allied aux. cruiser, cruiser or any gunfire capital ship-class which sunk that many tonnage as a PBB or an KM aux. cruiser as a class...The 9 disguised aux. cruisers which got to open seas sank altogether 890'000BRT of merchant ships and one light cruiser and one British aux. cruiser. Smallest of these 9 was Komet, 3'287 tonnes and largest Kormoran, 8'736 tonnes. So their average was better than that of best of PBBs in tonnage sunk vs own tonnage.
This is only superficially true, my friend. Graf Spee, following a lengthy south Atlantic cruise was indeed low on the kind of ammo, which was best suited for this engagement: HE rounds. The 11.1" APC went right through the ship as neither of the RN cruisers had armour to stop them (as a matter of fact, even lateral fragmentation of the 11.1" HE round could pierce the turrets from near hits)IIRC Graf Spee wasn't low on ammo at the beginning of the battle, after all it shot away 414 11" shots/shells during the battle but at the end of battle it had run rather low in its ammo and that had an effect on it's CO's later decisions.
I do not doubt that it would have been harder with other CA´s. But the fact still remains: three individual ships against a single, two turretted vessel leaves one ship (at least) unengaged, which is a tactical advantage, worthy beeing mentioned as such. HMS Exeter, effectively driven out of the engagement due to damage received by Graf Spee had a max. displacement of 10.688t.; Ajax and Achilles each a displacement of 9.740t. max while Graf Spee had a max. displacement of 16.020 t., around half as much as the RN ships combined. Not only had the RN ships strategic (Graf Spee has no hope of any assist and the allied presence was growing with Dunkerque and Strassbourg detached), tactical (visibility), numerical, conditional (torpedoes, nearby allies) and force advantage (30.168t. vs. 16.020 t.) but they were also faster than their german counterpart. The RN force thus should have been more than able to sink Graf Spee in this engagement, if Graf Spee is nearly as bad as Your statements imply.Exeter and Ajax and Achilles were "small" CA and CLs, British County class CAs had 33% more 8" guns than Exeter and the new Town class CLs had 50% more 6" guns than Ajax-class CLs. So IMHO Graf Spee would have had harder time against those bigger CAs and CLs.
Compare the number of ammo expanded on Sheffield Jamaica with the number of hits claimed and do the same for Hipper. Quite enlighting as to who had the better hit rate...On Hipper, IMHO it would be difficult to ram well shooting CA. On Hipper's case maybe part of the blame is on overconfident CO and maybe underestimating the fighting spirit of RN. So let's say that Hipper's shooting was not adequate for the CO's needs.
Barents Sea, I think that HMS Jamaica and HMS Sheffield shot better, after all they hit thrice Hipper in 5 minutes and sunk DD Eckholdt in minutes
Fido: 4000 yards @ 12 KtsOn torpedoes, air-launched torpedoes were rather short-ranged, British Mk XII 1,500 yards (1,370 m) / 40 knots 3,500 yards (3,200 m) / 37 knots, Mk XV 2,500 yards (2,290 m) / 40 knots 3,500 yards (3,200 m) / 33 knots, USN Mk 13 6,300 yards (5,760 m) / 33.5 knots. So Mk 24 was slow but longer ranged than air-dropped torpedoes used by RN but had only 2/3 range of USN air-dropped torpedo.
That is true but I added the non US successes of the Fido and hence You should add the 62 non US attacks on submarines with the Fido. That totals to a hit rate of slightly under 15%.And according to Milford only 204 of the 264 attacks were against submarines, so success rate was almost 20%. I don't have success rate of T5, but I doubt it was much better, probably worse.
So back to the original topic? Or is that dead too...
Maby we should stary another best jet of the war topic, or maby worst jet.
So to sum up what I've got, the speeds were about equal ith the 262;s higher crit-mach making it the faster diver. The P-80 had a better dogfighter armament (though the 262 could have had other weapons fitted fairly easily if needed). The P-80 had better initial acceleration with standard load and better normal and max range. The P-80 had a significant ceiling advantage and pressurized cockpit. The P-80 had a computing gunsights. Both had unreliable engines (though partially for different reasons, and only in the early P-80s: J33-A-9 engine had less of a flameout problem and more of a stalling one). The YP-80A had the fuel-pump problem,though the back-up pump allieviated this partially. Some early P-80 pilots underestimated the differences between jets and prop planes and treated it as "just another plane" which contributed strongly to the early accedent rate. (though pilots that had already had conversion training in a P-59 would have had less of a problem, and better if the pilot was fully experienced in the characteristics of the P-80) (the P-80 tended to be a pretty hot aircraft to handel, which showed the need for new trainers, resulting in the T-33)
Unsure: which was more maneuverable (it seems many say it was the P-80 at lower speeds and the 262 at higher speeds, others claim the P-80 was more agile in general) Also unsure of which had better armour...
The range of the P-80 would have made it usable as an escort if the 262's interceptions were persistant though.
In what terms? The only problem the P-80 had was a fuel control problem at full power (which killed Bong and Burcham) and that was rectified by the summer of 45. Not to say that both aircraft had their problems but the P-80 didn't have 25 hour engines and did not have the same engine out on landing problems the 262 had.The difference between the Me-262 the P-80 is that by late 1944-45 the Me-262 was actually safe to fly and the P-80 wasn't.
Sure Soren. Got the stats to back up your statement?The difference between the Me-262 the P-80 is that by late 1944-45 the Me-262 was actually safe to fly and the P-80 wasn't. The P-80 had serious teething problems when first fielded and was quickly deemed unsafe to fly after a series of accidents and was pulled away from service.
In what terms? The only problem the P-80 had was a fuel control problem at full power (which killed Bong and Burcham) and that was rectified by the summer of 45. Not to say that both aircraft had their problems but the P-80 didn't have 25 hour engines and did not have the same engine out on landing problems the 262 had.
Yes the war was over and the fuel pump problem was serious and was rectified. The only why Bong died in the P-80 was because he wasn't aware of the "quick fix" which involved engaging the pump (which I believe was in a wheel well) during his pre-flight. This was told to me by Tony LeVier who also stated that if he had an opportunity to brief Bong before his flight he (Bong) might not of been killed.By summer 45 the war was over, and the fuel pump problem was serious.
From Steinhoff to Galland, every well known pilot who flew the 262 spoke about its limitations during engine out landings - slats weren't going to help you if you couldn't get directional control of the aircraft and that was the problem with the 262.The reliability problem of the Jumo 004's didn't make the Me-262 unsafe to fly, for one it had two of them, secondly everything was done to ensure they didn't fail (Such as for example limiting them to 25 hours of flight time before maintenance). Also if both engine did fail the LE slats coupled with flaps would ensure a slow enough ditching speed to ensure the pilot didn't get hurt - it was actually more unsafe to try and land with only one engine.
Yes the war was over and the fuel pump problem was serious and was rectified. The only why Bong died in the P-80 was because he wasn't aware of the "quick fix" which involved engaging the pump (which I believe was in a wheel well) during his pre-flight. This was told to me by Tony LeVier who also stated that if he had an opportunity to brief Bong before his flight he (Bong) might not of been killed.
From Steinhoff to Galland, every well known pilot who flew the 262 spoke about its limitations during engine out landings - slats weren't going to help you if you couldn't get directional control of the aircraft and that was the problem with the 262.
The 25 hour maintenance was out of necessity and that's if the engine even made 25 hours. No denying the ability of the aircraft but once again you ignore the fact that these aircraft were being built with "substitute" materials and slave labor - accidents waiting to happen.