Plan Me-410B.

[davebender]

Mission.
Delay Normandy invasion at least three months (i.e. September 1944 at earliest).

Luftwaffe is willing to lose 1,000 light bombers (Ju-88 or Me-410) to accomplish the mission.

Can it be done?

 

[stona]

Luftwaffe is willing to lose 1,000 light bombers (Ju-88 or Me-410) to accomplish the mission.
Can it be done?

Even if the Luftwaffe is prepared to lose 1,000 bombers and several 1,000 aircrew I still don't believe that the allied invasion plans could have been derailed.

I can see theoretical, if unrealistic, ways in which the aircraft might have been produced but no way in any realistic scenario in which the crews could have been provided for them.

Between January and July 1944 the Luftwaffe lost a total of 2,009 bombers, and a substantial number of aircrew. You've got to replace them and their crews before you even start to embark on an anti invasion campaign. In May 1944 the Luftwaffe still had 1200 bombers of all types and in all theatres, but only about 50% of crews were operationally ready.

Cheers

Steve

 

[silence]

Delay the invasion: no.

But willing to accept a thousand losses or so ON D-Day might be enough to break the landing if they target the beaches themselves.

 

[stona]

But willing to accept a thousand losses or so ON D-Day might be enough to break the landing if they target the beaches themselves.

Even if they had the thousands of aircraft and crews to mount operations on that scale (and even with davebender's programme of bomber construction they are not going to come close) they would still have to run the gauntlet of allied air superiority. That means hundreds of single engine fighters. The bombers are not going to be escorted. To build them fighter production would have been much reduced.
The idea that Luftwaffe formations could remain intact and bomb beaches (which incidentally allied aircraft, flying virtually unopposed singularly failed to hit in a meaningful way) doesn't really hold water. Attacking the invasion fleet and re-supply would have been no easier. The attacks the Luftwaffe did mount were not successful. They had nearly 6,000 ships to aim at and sunk a handful, far more were victims of mines.
The only thing that might have broken the landings was the German Army, and we all know how badly that went wrong!
Cheers
Steve

 

[davebender]

How many Allied single engine fighter aircraft could operate effectively at night?

 

[Shortround6]

Not many but then these hastily trained bomber crews aren't going to hit much of anything at night either.

The Bari raid was planned for UP to 150 bombers only about 105 got airborne, ( a pretty normal ratio for both sides) up to 17 turned back before reaching Bari.
The Dock side lights were turned on at Bari making the flares much less needed/useful.

The Germans hit several ammunition ships and spilled aviation fuel contributed greatly to the losses.

Expecting to achieve the same sort of surprise and success on successive raids is totally unrealistic.

Given the bomb loads of the Me 410 it is even less obtainable.

 

[stona]

How many Allied single engine fighter aircraft could operate effectively at night?

How many Luftwaffe bomber crews could fly at night, much less hit anything?
All the earlier navigational aids had been well and truly countered by the British. The Germans lost the so called "battle of the beams".
Britain was actually running down its air defences by mid 1944, but it still had an integrated, radar guided, interception system and the best night fighter of the war in the Mosquito at the sharp end. There were also considerable anti aircraft defences.
The Luftwaffe had only recently learned just how costly raids on the British mainland could be with unsustainable losses during operation Steinbock.
Cheers
Steve

 

[davebender]

Pre-war Luftwaffe multi-engine aircraft crew were all night qualified. Does anyone know what, if anything had changed by late 1943?

 

[Shortround6]

Yeah, most of the pre-war pilots/crews were dead or wounded or being transferred to fighters.

If fighter pilot training hours were falling by 1943 what makes you think that bomber pilot/crew training hours were staying the same?

And being "qualified" to take-off and land at night doesn't mean you can navigate at night or bomb at night and hit intended targets.
Just look at the RAF night bomber squadrons of 1940.

 

[silence]

According to Price even during the prewar buildup the Germans sacrificed instrument training for their fighter pilots in the interest of getting more pilots to their units.

 

[nuuumannn]

Taken from the link posted by Steve in Post #19

During this stage of the war the German air units had, decreased in strength from 400 early in the year to an average of 100-140 aircraft; losses amounted to 8 to 10. During May the G.A.F. raided Bristol, Portsmouth and neighboring coastal waters, as well as Torquay and Falmouth. The formations showed a further marked decline of between 50 to 100 aircraft.

8.This decline was a clear warning. It showed that the fighting potential of Luftflotte 3 was being sacrificed to retaliation propaganda at a time when the Allies might any day spring the decisive operation of the war. In the place of a planned economy of forces in,attacks on the allied invasion fleet, and instead of building up moans of wireless communication and control, Luftflotte 3 prepared for a possible landing mainly by putting out of action coastal airfields and landing grounds and setting up a "circular system" of defense on other airfields, air force supply depots and ammunition dumps.

The British, on the other hand, made 2-3,000 daily sorties arid kept firmly to their objective. It was hopeless from the outset for Luftflotte 3 to attempt to wrest air supremacy over western France from the Allies with six fighter Gruppen and three night fighter Gruppen as their whole available strength. Towards the end of March, for example, 107 planes were destroyed on the ground in two days. Out of nine railroad bridges between Rouen and Paris only one was fit for use; the junctions in the Paris zone were almost wholly destroyed and the rolling stock had suffered considerable damage; from the end of February to the end of March, 399 railway engines had been totally wrecked. Yet the defense of the Reich would not permit of any change in the allotment of forces in favor of the west.9.From the point of view of the air force there could be only one conclusion, namely, that all the odds were on the side of a successful allied landing operation.

Thus:

a.Allied shipping, air units and troops were assembled and fully prepared for action.

b.G.A.F. striking power was slight, its fighter defense weak and its ground organization badly damaged.

c.German communications in the west and consequently supplies for army, air force and navy, were seriously affected.

d.The Allies possessed absolute air supremacy in the west.

It was therefore extremely probable, given satisfactory weather conditions, that the allies would invade.

Also, how successful do you think this night raiding of the invasion fleets' harbours might be? Not very, if the results of Steinbock are anything to go by.

Placed under the command of Generalmajor (Major–General) Dietrich Peltz, Luftflotte 3 (Air Fleet 3), the Germans assembled 474 bomber aircraft for the offensive. The operation ran parallel to Bomber Command's campaign against Berlin. The attacks were mainly in and around the Greater London area. In Britain, it was known as the Baby Blitz due to the much smaller scale of operations compared to the Luftwaffe's operations over the British Isles in 1940–41.[2]

The operation achieved very little, and the force suffered a loss of some 329 machines during the five months of operations—an average of 77 per month—before it was abandoned. Other senior Luftwaffe commanders, such as Hugo Sperrle, had intended to use the bomber force against the Western Allied invasion fleet, which he predicted would land in Northern France sometime in the summer of 1944.

Eventually, the revenge attacks gave way to attempts to disrupt preparations for the impending Allied invasion of France, codenamed Operation Overlord, but Steinbock had worn down the offensive power of the Luftwaffe to the extent it could not mount any significant counterattacks when the invasion began in June 1944.

Apart from the numbers of conventional medium and heavy level bombers, the Luftwaffe also employed a number of fast bomber types, such as the Ju 88S (a cleaned up and boosted version of the Ju 88A-4) or the Messerschmitt Me 410 Hornisse and a number of fighter-bombers, known as Jabos in the Luftwaffe. These were more difficult to intercept due to their great speed, but carried limited payload and with less accuracy compared to the conventional bombers.

Hitler was reportedly outraged that the Luftwaffe failed to find London though it was only 150–200 km (93–120 mi) from German ground control stations while the British were hitting German towns, not just city targets, from 1,000 km (620 mi) away in bad weather. Peltz responded that the failures owed as much to the Luftwaffe's lack of interference-free radio and navigational aids as to untrained crews, and that the British with their H2S and Gee systems were technologically ahead of the Germans. The lack of dedicated pathfinder units also caused navigational problems, as the few aircraft employed in this role were more at risk from electronic counter-measures and fighter interception. The heavy British defences forced the Luftwaffe to fly meandering 'dog-leg' courses and inexperienced German crews quickly got lost. Reconnaissance flights over England had also stopped, which prevented the Luftwaffe from gathering intelligence on British radar and radio frequency bands.

Taken from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Steinbock

To all intents and purposes, the proposed raid by Me 410s being discussed here would be a disaster and result in even greater losses suffered by the LW.

 

[stona]

Pre-war Luftwaffe multi-engine aircraft crew were all night qualified. Does anyone know what, if anything had changed by late 1943?

Yes. Most blind flying schools were closed in 1942. Many other multi-engine training schools were also closed. The instructors were sent to the fronts, often to fly air lifts, particularly the bad weather efforts on the eastern front. Consequently many of them were lost.
The pre-war and early war Luftwaffe crews were very highly qualified, arguably the best trained corps of airmen in the world at that time. This was no longer so by 1943/4.
For Steinbock (and without looking it up, feel free to correct me) the Luftwaffe managed to muster something around 400/500 adequately trained crews. It then promptly lost a decent percentage of them. Now, months later, it has to produce well over a thousand crews for massed attacks on the invasion assembly ports.
Cheers
Steve

 

[davebender]

Presumably those operations would be cancelled so Germany could assemble enough aircraft, crews and fuel for the large scale spring 1944 effort. Just as fall 1944 Germany husbanded aircraft for Operation Bodenplatte.

 

[stona]

Presumably those operations would be cancelled so Germany could assemble enough aircraft, crews and fuel for the large scale spring 1944 effort. Just as fall 1944 Germany husbanded aircraft for Operation Bodenplatte.

Well you'd have to talk to a certain A. Hitler about that
Cheers
Steve

 

[davebender]

1 April 1936. Enlistment in Luftwaffe. Lehrgant I training.
Recruit training similar to Heer.

7 August 1936.
Lehrgant II training.
Basic and advanced flight training.

15 September 1936.
Alleinflug. First solo flight.

Late 1936.
Night training begins. This qualifies pilot for their "B" license.

4 February 1937.
Motorcycle accident. Broken right upper leg.
Serious enough to prevent flying for 5 months.

15 July 1937.
Helmut Lent cleared to resume flight training.

19 October 1937.
Helmut Lent awarded "B" license (i.e. qualified to fly at night).

1 March 1938.
Helmut Lent promoted to Leutnant.
434 sorties to date.
112 hours and 48 minutes total flight time.

1 March 1938 to 30 May 1938.
50 hours additional training.
Aerial recon, bombing practice and radio navigation.

26 June 1938.
Automobile accident.
Broken lower jaw, concussion and internal bleeding.

19 July 1938.
Helmut Lent cleared to resume flying.
Single engine fighter aircraft training.

30 September 1938.
Jagdflug. Helmut Lent's first operational patrol.
…..During Czechoslovakia crisis.

January 1939.
Lehrgant III training.
Qualification to fly Me-109.
Multi engine aircraft.
Blind flying certificate.
Electronic navigation certificate. Achieved 12 May 1939.
…..Quite a variety of advanced training!

7 June 1939.
First flight in Me-110.

25 August 1939.
I./ZG76 (including Helmut Lent) transferred to Ohlau airfield for operations against Poland.

.....Total flight training almost three years (after subtracting time off for motorcycle and automobile accidents).

 

[stona]

The pre-war and early war Luftwaffe crews were very highly qualified, arguably the best trained corps of airmen in the world at that time.
Cheers
Steve

I refer the honourable gentleman to my earlier post, quoted above.
Steve

 

[Shortround6]

1 April 1936. Enlistment in Luftwaffe. Lehrgant I training.
Recruit training similar to Heer.

7 August 1936.
Lehrgant II training.
Basic and advanced flight training.

7 June 1939.
First flight in Me-110.

25 August 1939.
I./ZG76 (including Helmut Lent) transferred to Ohlau airfield for operations against Poland.

.....Total flight training almost three years (after subtracting time off for motorcycle and automobile accidents).

Fine, now show us the pilots that began flight training in 1941 that got 3 years worth of training before beginning operations in 1944?

 

[OldSkeptic]

Not sure where this is going, it would have slaughtered just as much in this scenario as it was in real life. A 410 with a bit more performance ... so what? Can't exist by day (Spits get it), cant exist by night (Mossies get it).
Can't be a bomber destroyer (Mustangs get it).

So what use is it....

The only real design they had with the performance capable of a being a 'heavy fighter that can also be a fighter/bomber' and be effective and survive doing either was the Ta-154, all the rest were jokes (that does include the Do-335, arguably the biggest joke of them all).

So what of they can slip through some 410s to drop a few bombs on Britain, as if it would matter. The British had already gone through the Blitz, where there was zero night defences and survived and prospered. London, Glasgow, Liverpool and all the rest. A few, not long to survive, souped up 410s with a few small bombs .... meaningless.

Plus the British had the option to increase their Mossies performance ...as they did against the (real life) 410s and 190s. They used No2 as well!!!! Added 50mph to their speed (many refs to this) and that was with Merlin 20's (single stage, two speed). Imagine a 2 stage Merlin with No2 ...

By the time the 410 came out, Germany had lost the quality air war, as well as the quantity air war, by such a margin it was not funny.

 

[stona]

The problem wasn't that the Luftwaffe's bombers could not survive by night. They demonstrably could, though with an unsustainable casualty rate over a continuous campaign. There was only a limited number of night fighters available to the RAF, about 120 Mosquitos covered all of the UK mainland. The Luftwaffe tried to overwhelm them with numbers.
The Luftwaffe's bombers also faced a fairly well organised and equipped AAA system.

The problem was that they also demonstrated an inability to find and bomb London. How on earth were they supposed to hit targets in harbours the size of Weymouth, assuming a substantial number could actually find places like that?

The Luftwaffe had not developed tactics, nor did it possess the aircraft capable of a successful night bombing campaign in 1944. Compare the resources available to Pelz with those wielded by Harris! Many Luftwaffe units were still flying aircraft similar to those they had flown in the 1940 London Blitz. The crews however were not of comparable ability.

The only bomber that the Luftwaffe possessed with an ability to carry a meaningful bomb load was the He 177. Less than 50 were available for "Steinbock" at a time when Bomber Command could launch 300-500 four engine bombers against Germany on a regular basis and many more than that for a "maximum effort". By creaming off some of the most able young men from around the Commonwealth, and training them in the peaceful skies of that same Commonwealth and the US, with almost limitless resources in training aircraft, instructors, fuel etc, Bomber Command's crews were qualitatively far better than their late war Luftwaffe counter parts. They didn't always find their targets either.

I agree that Germany had lost the quantity/quality war by a huge margin.

Cheers

Steve

 

[davebender]

Port of Liverpool.
181,562 tons. Cargo throughput. Week ending 16 April 1941.
German bomber attacks on seaport. 1 to 8 May 1941.
35,026 tons. Cargo throughput. Week ending 10 May 1941.

German air attacks caused an immediate and drastic reduction in Port of Liverpool cargo throughput. Port of London showed similar reductions after air attacks.

Britain closed her seaports out of fright. Or else enough Luftwaffe bombs were on target to get the job done. Which do you consider more likely?