Planes that just were not needed

Greyman said:

How so?

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Standard not-a-Spitfire assessment of any British single-engined aircraft?

stona said:

It was only needed to make up numbers and fulfill budget promises, so, in the context of the thread, I agree with this one
Cheers
Steve

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At the time the specification was written, it most definitely WAS needed as a replacement for the Hart and as an insurance policy in case the feared arms limitations on heavy bombers came into effect. By the time it was thrown into conflict, it had become the right answer to the wrong question.

Shortround6 said:

Hawker Typhoon

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Greyman said:

How so?

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KiwiBiggles said:

Standard not-a-Spitfire assessment of any British single-engined aircraft?

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It certainly was not needed as intended - to replace the Spitfire.

But that view relies heavily on hindsight.

For me the question regarding the Typhoon is could the roles it performed be done by other aircraft. Mostly I would say yes, but there were periods in which having the Typhoon available was necessary. Such as for chasing low level Fw 190 raiders.

we are getting our wires crossed badly here. "not needed" is not the same as "not anticipated". in the case of my suggested, "needed' does not equate to "needed, but prevented from being provided".

Hawker typhoon was conceived as a much improved replacement for the hurricane. its development was badly delayed and engine development messed about with. Its need in its original role as a fighter was probably an aircraft not needed (though it did do some excellent work low down as a fighter, so even here the claim it was "not needed' is highly questionable. It was needed as a tactical fighter bomber, though that role had not been anticipated at the time of its inception.

Lysander was also an aircraft I question as "not needed". The claim being made is that it was not needed because it was called upon to do stuff it was not designed to do. In France, in 1940, it was called upon to undertake army co-operation in skies controlled by the enemy. It did as well as might be expected in that environment, bearing in mind it was an aircraft in the class of a HS 126. by the time the skies over Europe were under complete allied dominance, newer better aircraft were no longer in short supply and the allies didn't need the economies and cheap construction the Lysander seemed to offer. they had the resources to use much more capable, but also much more expensive aircraft instead. at the time of their conception they were about the same as every other army co-operation machine in Europe. all these machines were cheap and easy to build, but only able to operate if enemy fighters were not too strong.

wuzak said:

It certainly was not needed as intended - to replace the Spitfire.

But that view relies heavily on hindsight.

For me the question regarding the Typhoon is could the roles it performed be done by other aircraft. Mostly I would say yes, but there were periods in which having the Typhoon available was necessary. Such as for chasing low level Fw 190 raiders.

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Just to be clear, I think the Typhoon was absolutely necessary. I was referring to a tendency to regard the Spitfire as the only worthwhile British aircraft. Not a view with which I agree.

buffnut453 said:

At the time the specification was written, it most definitely WAS needed as a replacement for the Hart and as an insurance policy in case the feared arms limitations on heavy bombers came into effect. By the time it was thrown into conflict, it had become the right answer to the wrong question.

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P.27/32 was drawn up in parallel with B.9/32 (from which the Hampden and Wellington came) and was regarded as unrealistic by everyone, including C R Fairey at the time. The sort of performance demanded from a single engine aircraft with the engines available at the time was unattainable. It's why Fairey kept on submitting alternatives designs, in an effort to persuade the Ministry that the belief that a light bomber should have one engine and a medium bomber two was unrealistic. He was not alone. P.27/32 was issued for a "Single-engine Day Bombing Aircraft" in April 1933. When Ludlow-Hewitt replaced Burnett as DCAS he already had reservations about the specification. He wrote to Ellington (CAS) as early as July 1933.

"This specification will produce an aircraft which will certainly not fulfil the need for a light high performance day bomber. It is questionable whether it will meet any particular requirement."

This before a single rivet had been placed. Ludlow-Hewitt believed that a smaller light bomber, with a 500lb load and 600 mile range, much more like the Hart, was required. So why on earth was the specification left in place and tendered for? The official argument, almost unbelievably, was that without P.27/32 there was little prospect of making use of the Griffon engine. The specification, with some modifications, was retained to use an engine with which it was never fitted! The Specification, with an increase in range, now effectively became one for a single engine medium bomber, and it was seen as a back up, should the heavier twin engine designs to B.9/32 become unlawful. That's not why it was built though.
In the end the Ministry wanted numbers, the bottom line would look good, and it wanted them as cheaply as possible. Following trials at Martlesham Heath the RAF had little interest in the aircraft. Ian Huntley has noted out that.

"...political pressure was such that there was a great demand to equip newly formed squadrons and a large number of Fairey light bombers were identified for this task in Expansion Scheme C of 1935 and F of 1936. The first order was placed for 155 air frames in mid 1935. Specification P.23/35 was drawn up to cover the revised design..."

The RAF got the Battle not for any operational exigency, but due to the political pressure applied during the desperate stages of pre war expansion to make the RAF's numbers look better.
The RAF was well aware of the Battle's limitations. It had received large numbers of an aircraft which it had known for years was not capable of the task for which it was intended. On 14th January 1939 Ludlow-Hewitt, now AOC-in-C Bomber Command, wrote to the Air Ministry asking to restrict the Battle's penetration into hostile air space, because of its slow speed and weak armament. The large numbers had been built in the cause of parity with the expanding Luftwaffe, and, with hindsight, it should never have been done.
The only positive to be drawn from the whole saga is that in building large numbers of more or less useless aircraft, work and training were provided in the expanding British aircraft industry, while more advanced designs were developed. That's not much and would be cold comfort to the families of the men who would soon die in these aircraft.

Cheers

Steve

stona said:

So why on earth was the specification left in place and tendered for? The official argument, almost unbelievably, was that without P.27/32 there was little prospect of making use of the Griffon engine. The specification, with some modifications, was retained to use an engine with which it was never fitted!

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That would be the Griffon I, basically a detuned Rolls-Royce R, and engine that didn't proceed to production stage and barely resembled the Griffon II, whose design started in the late 1930s?

I think the Ministry (it was in fact none other than a certain Dowding) must have been referring to the de-rated R Type engine in 1934, though I didn't know that it was called a Griffon, until I read about the decision this morning!

Rolls Royce seem to have promoted the Griffon on the grounds that much of the tooling etc. for the R-Type engine was compatible.
The company would experience serious difficulties and delays in the changeover from the standardised Kestrel to the new Merlin in 1936/7. Rolls Royce aero engine output in 1937 to the month of May was just half that for the same period the previous year. 1937 was also the first year since 1932 that the size of the work force did not increase. These things make Ministry men very nervous, and the company would have been very keen to allay any fears about any 'new' engines.

As far as I know the Griffon project (meaning the Griffon II in this context) didn't receive any impetus from Rolls Royce until early 1939, much too late for the Battle. Harry Cantrill was appointed to lead the Griffon programme in January 1939. It was not until February 1939 that Hives wrote to Freeman advocating the programme.

"The fact that this engine follows closely on the Rolls Royce standard design, and the fact that we have an engine of such dimensions on which we shall shortly be running an endurance test, and also that it is similar to the 'R' engine, means that we are taking the minimum of risk; far less than when jigs and tools are ordered for new aircraft."

Cheers

Steve

KiwiBiggles said:

Standard not-a-Spitfire assessment of any British single-engined aircraft?

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It is very hard to make a good assessment of the Typhoon. In large part because of the Sabre engine. Nobody really knows (outside of the government and companies involved at the time and they never talked). The Sabre was a technically wonderful engine. it was also VERY expensive, with some estimates saying it was over twice as expensive per horsepower as poppet valve engines. Others just twice as expensive or very expensive. Without actual costs it is hard to say if the program was worth the money poured into it. Or the time/labor and effort which were far reaching. The six Sundstrand centerless grinders rushed over from the US to help Napier out delayed completion the P & W Kansas city plant (building R-2800s) by six weeks for instance.
Yes the Typhoon did a lot of good work in the tactical role but was it worth the cost?
ANd by the way. First Deliveries of the Typhoon were in Sept, 1941. First use as a bomber (500lb bombs?) was in Sept/Oct of 1942, first use of rockets was in Sept 1943 and widespread use of 1000lb bombs wasn't until 1944 with 4 bladed props and bigger tail planes.
For a while there was a difference between fighter Typhoons and "bomber" Typhoons with differences in tail wheels and brakes. By mid 1943 all Typhoons were leaving the factory fitted as bombers but that is almost 2 years after deliveries started. The up to 780lbs of armor fitted certainly helped survivability from ground fire but sure didn't add anything to planes ability to operate as a fighter once bombs were gone. Lets not even go into the rocket rails.

If they had pulled the plug on the Sabre and Typhoon in late 1941 could they have redirected the production resources into more Melrins/Griffons/Hercules engines and different airframes to do the same role as the Typhoon wound up doing in late 1943/44 for less cost?

parsifal said:

Lysander was also an aircraft I question as "not needed". The claim being made is that it was not needed because it was called upon to do stuff it was not designed to do. In France, in 1940, it was called upon to undertake army co-operation in skies controlled by the enemy. It did as well as might be expected in that environment, bearing in mind it was an aircraft in the class of a HS 126. by the time the skies over Europe were under complete allied dominance, newer better aircraft were no longer in short supply and the allies didn't need the economies and cheap construction the Lysander seemed to offer. they had the resources to use much more capable, but also much more expensive aircraft instead. at the time of their conception they were about the same as every other army co-operation machine in Europe. all these machines were cheap and easy to build, but only able to operate if enemy fighters were not too strong.

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The Lysander almost falls into a class of it's own. And once again the truth seems hard to ferret out. I have seen arguments that the two forward firing MGs were for defensive use, a bit hard to swallow as it had the same forward armament as a Ju 87 or Hs 123. It's bomb load was over four times that of a Hs 126. and pretty much equal to a Hs 123 or FW 189. See also American O-47 and O-52 aircraft, one forward gun and no bombs. I don't think it was that cheap to build although it may have been touted as cheap because one plane could, in theory, undertake many different roles so you didn't have to buy as many planes and could keep costs down that way. Somebody was beginning to have doubts as much smaller/cheaper aircraft were being troop trialed in the spring of 1940, with 3 Austers and one Stinson being sent to France. HIgh command waffled and light aircraft didn't see use for several more years.

The capitalisation of the British aircraft industry in the pre-war years is a minefield, as is the way the various companies were paid. The terms under which the companies worked with the government were controlled between 1935 and 1941 by the various revisions of the so called 'McLintock Agreement'. McLintock was the accountant who negotiated on behalf of the Society of British Aircraft Constructors (SBAC).
On 31st October 1940 the Ministry of Aircraft Production owed the Bristol Aeroplane Company £4,285,706, which was an awful lot of money at the time.

I can't find a figure for the amount of government money poured into Napier, but what ever the amount, it must be put into the context of the huge sums invested in the other principle aero engine companies, Rolls Royce and Bristol. For example £7 million was poured into the Rolls Royce factories at Crewe (£2 million) and Glasgow (£5 million).

A sense of proportion regarding Napier is needed. The firm only produced one engine, the Sabre. Both Rolls Royce and Bristol produced one main engine (Merlin and Hercules in all their various Marks ), but developed, and early in the war produced, others. By 1942 both were producing more than 1,000 per month. Sabre production never exceeded 150 per month.

Cheers

Steve

KiwiBiggles said:

Just to be clear, I think the Typhoon was absolutely necessary.

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Typhoon was intended, at some point, to be replaced By P-47's. Not a bad choice to me, as early Typhoons had a habit of engine fires/failures, poisoning their pilots with carbon monoxide, and losing their tails inflight.
As we know now, the tank kill claims in Normandy by the Typhoons are vastly inflated. Even the the Spitfires were equal in air-to-ground missions.

Lysander release film:
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CRYCx_G25ro

Timppa said:

As we know now, the tank kill claims in Normandy by the Typhoons are vastly inflated. Even the the Spitfires were equal in air-to-ground missions.

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They were exaggerated by the pilots of all the TAF's including the Americans flying P-47s. Tank killing was just one aspect of the operations of the TAFs. The aircraft of all of them performed a tremendous amount of useful work apart from Close Air Support. Most obviously the bombs, rockets and cannon of the Typhoons, and the bombs, napalm and machine guns of the P-47s made light work of the soft tail of any armoured column.
The majority of armoured vehicles examined on the battlefield had been abandoned or destroyed by their crews and that was as a direct result of the efforts of the TAFs against their supply lines.
Armed reconnaissance (to use the British term) denied the Germans the chance to move or concentrate during daylight hours. The British had no better aircraft than the Typhoon for this role, which is why it was so extensively used.
Cheers
Steve

parsifal said:

Possibly the Albacore. after the Swordfish, RN should have concentrated on high performance monoplane strike aircraft. The obvious choices being the Barracuda and the Firefly.

The main advantages of the albacore over the swordfish was firstly its enclosed cockpit, which made it slightly more livablein poor weather, and its better range. I think in both instances there were easier alternatives. Give the pilot a woolly coat and put long range tanks on the swordfish. then get a move on with the replacements.

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You have to walk before you can run. And in the case of of the RN in mid 30s you had two different "classes" of aircraft carriers. Slow and short comprised of the Argus, the Eagle and the Hermes. Fast and long were the Courageous, Furious, Glorious, and Ark Royal. The Illustrious class wasn't ordered until 1937 and didn't go into service until 1940 and later. Granted the First 3 only held about 60-70 planes between them but ordering aircraft that might not be able to operate from 3 out your 6-7 carriers in the late 30s might not have gone over well.
With no experience with monoplanes on carriers going for high performance monoplanes would be a big gamble. But something like a British version of the Douglas Devastator might have been possible. It was the first monoplane to go into service on American Carriers and that wasn't until late summer of 1937. Some American carriers still had bi-plane fighters and dive bombers in 1940 if not a few lingering into 1941. The British had a real problem with dragged out design/development cycles.

id also say it was the aircraft that were not developed for the RN that cry amazing. Why didn't the RN develop a true high performance single seater built around F5/34 is beyond me. Instead they waited, until it was almost too late and then went nuts to try and convert a bomber into a two seat fighter recon type (the Fulmar). the Fulmar worked, but was never really outstanding. a properly developed single seat fighter would have been sooooo much better.

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I have some serious doubts about the F5/34, mostly along the lines of if it seems too good to be true it probably is. Given the lousy aerodynamics of the F5/34 and the use of an 840hp engine the performance listed seems to good to be true. Within 1-3mph of a Hurricane with almost 200hp less and little or no exhaust thrust. And adopting land planes to carrier use seldom works out well, it the took the Seafire quite a while to adapt. Some other types never would. The F5/34 also ran very late and first flew only about 6-7 months before the first order for 127 Fulmars was placed so it rather overlapped the Fulmar development cycle. The Prototype bomber the Fulmar was based on flying almost a year before the F5/34. Fulmar may have started as a bomber (but a much smaller bomber than the Battle) but then we run into the problem of the RN wanting that electronic homing beacon receiver.
Just Stick the Hurricanes on the carrier decks in the Summer of 1940 and have done with it

Vultee A-31 Vengence. I think its a neat looking airplane, all the operational use was via Lend Lease, and you can say it gave yeomanry service. Would we have been better off having Vultee build SBDs under license?

Timppa said:

Typhoon was intended, at some point, to be replaced By P-47's. Not a bad choice to me, as early Typhoons had a habit of engine fires/failures, poisoning their pilots with carbon monoxide, and losing their tails inflight.
As we know now, the tank kill claims in Normandy by the Typhoons are vastly inflated. Even the the Spitfires were equal in air-to-ground missions.

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Going thru the loss list for the Typhoon, there is very few that could be attributed to lost tails.

pinehilljoe said:

Vultee A-31 Vengence. I think its a neat looking airplane, all the operational use was via Lend Lease, and you can say it gave yeomanry service. Would we have been better off having Vultee build SBDs under license?

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The A-31 and A-35 were used a great deal by Allied countries...it's absense would have left a vacuum.

And by the way, Vultee was swamped with their PT production, so Stinson was building the A-31/35 under contract...

Shortround6 said:

Just Stick the Hurricanes on the carrier decks in the Summer of 1940 and have done with it

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At the height of the BoB! Never going to happen. I assume you are not being serious

I agree with a lot of the post though.

Cheers

Steve

parsifal said:

Lysander was also an aircraft I question as "not needed". The claim being made is that it was not needed because it was called upon to do stuff it was not designed to do. In France, in 1940, it was called upon to undertake army co-operation in skies controlled by the enemy. It did as well as might be expected in that environment, bearing in mind it was an aircraft in the class of a HS 126..

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Exactly. An army co-operation aircraft was certainly needed, and a lot of thought and research went into what that should be. The Lysander was the result. One of the early impediments to Whirlwind production was the perceived need for more Lysanders, so the argument that it was not needed is spurious. Unfortunately, as the war in the air developed in unanticipated ways, the Lysander did indeed prove incapable of carrying out the role now thrust upon it, which was entirely different to that envisaged in 1934/35.
The Lysander was not the first, nor will it be the last, weapon system to be shown to be incapable of fulfilling expectation when the exercises stop and the real shooting begins.
Cheers
Steve