Planes that just were not needed

[pbehn]

At the height of the BoB! Never going to happen. I assume you are not being serious

I agree with a lot of the post though.

Cheers

Steve

we could have decided to produce more earlier or not sent so many to France.

 

[tomo pauk]

Vultee A-31 Vengence. I think its a neat looking airplane, all the operational use was via Lend Lease, and you can say it gave yeomanry service. Would we have been better off having Vultee build SBDs under license?

The A-31 and A-35 were used a great deal by Allied countries...it's absense would have left a vacuum.

And by the way, Vultee was swamped with their PT production, so Stinson was building the A-31/35 under contract...

As suggested by pinehilljoe - have the Vultee build the SBDs.

BTW - SB2C Helldiver also fits the category of not needed IMO.

 

[stona]

we could have decided to produce more earlier or not sent so many to France.

Not sure how they could have decided to produce more earlier. Production drawings were started in March 1936, and around the same time Hawker 'cleared the decks' by transferring all Hawker Hector production to Westland. Hawker Fury II production was given to General Aircraft Ltd. All in all Hawker freed up 24,000 sq ft of floor space at Canbury Park Road and another 14,000 sq ft during 1937 at Brooklands. They couldn't have done much more. The company even recruited another 280 skilled machine operators and fitters, and started to order materials for the production of 1,000 aircraft BEFORE it got contract cover from the Air Ministry.
The Ministry was in the interim period between Scheme E, which could not be cancelled out of hand, it included Gladiator fighters and Hind, Wellesley and Whitley bombers, all of which were required by the RAF in 1937.
Production Scheme F, a draft was agreed on 1st June 1936, called for 1,000 fighters with all but 100 of the Hawker fighters to be in service by January 1939. The wheels were turning very quickly, certainly by government standards. On 3rd June a contract for 600 'monoplane fighters' was received by the Hawker Board. The name 'Hurricane' was approved on 27th June.
Hawker received the official Air Ministry Specification for the type on 20th July.
There was an inevitable gap between this time as development (particularly of the engine and its installation) continued, but the first production Hurricane came off the line at the end of May 1937. The biggest delay to the introduction of the Hurricane into the four Hurricane squadrons planned in 1937 was the failure of the Merlin I to gain acceptance as a fighter engine. No. 111 Squadron finally received its first four Hurricanes before Christmas 1937, ahead of the 1st January 1938 schedule.
On the outbreak of war 16 Hurricane squadrons were fully operational, 1 was working up and another was about to receive its new aircraft. these squadrons had 280 aircraft on charge. Another 133 aircraft were at training establishments, test flights or Maintenance Units. The only possible source of any more aircraft might have been among the remaining 169 of the 572 so far produced. Some of this number had been exported, but many had already been written off, were being repaired, or were awaiting collection from Brooklands.

Not sending so many to France would have been as much a political as military issue.

Cheers

Steve

 

[pbehn]

Not sure how they could have decided to produce more earlier. Production drawings were started in March 1936, and around the same time Hawker 'cleared the decks' by transferring all Hawker Hector production to Westland. Hawker Fury II production was given to General Aircraft Ltd. All in all Hawker freed up 24,000 sq ft of floor space at Canbury Park Road and another 14,000 sq ft during 1937 at Brooklands. They couldn't have done much more. The company even recruited another 280 skilled machine operators and fitters, and started to order materials for the production of 1,000 aircraft BEFORE it got contract cover from the Air Ministry.
The Ministry was in the interim period between Scheme E, which could not be cancelled out of hand, it included Gladiator fighters and Hind, Wellesley and Whitley bombers, all of which were required by the RAF in 1937.
Production Scheme F, a draft was agreed on 1st June 1936, called for 1,000 fighters with all but 100 of the Hawker fighters to be in service by January 1939. The wheels were turning very quickly, certainly by government standards. On 3rd June a contract for 600 'monoplane fighters' was received by the Hawker Board. The name 'Hurricane' was approved on 27th June.
Hawker received the official Air Ministry Specification for the type on 20th July.
There was an inevitable gap between this time as development (particularly of the engine and its installation) continued, but the first production Hurricane came off the line at the end of May 1937. The biggest delay to the introduction of the Hurricane into the four Hurricane squadrons planned in 1937 was the failure of the Merlin I to gain acceptance as a fighter engine. No. 111 Squadron finally received its first four Hurricanes before Christmas 1937, ahead of the 1st January 1938 schedule.
On the outbreak of war 16 Hurricane squadrons were fully operational, 1 was working up and another was about to receive its new aircraft. these squadrons had 280 aircraft on charge. Another 133 aircraft were at training establishments, test flights or Maintenance Units. The only possible source of any more aircraft might have been among the remaining 169 of the 572 so far produced. Some of this number had been exported, but many had already been written off, were being repaired, or were awaiting collection from Brooklands.

Not sending so many to France would have been as much a political as military issue.

Cheers

Steve

Good post (as usual) but how many aircraft are we talking about to put on all of the UKs carriers in summer 1940 by this time the shortage was in pilots, Park could have done his bit by using a tiger moth to fly around instead of a Hurricane.

 

[Timppa]

The majority of armoured vehicles examined on the battlefield had been abandoned or destroyed by their crews and that was as a direct result of the efforts of the TAFs against their supply lines.
Armed reconnaissance (to use the British term) denied the Germans the chance to move or concentrate during daylight hours. The British had no better aircraft than the Typhoon for this role, which is why it was so extensively used.
Cheers
Steve

As I hinted above, Spitfires/Mustangs were as good in ground attack role. (Ignoring the now known false tank kills).
83 Group 12 Spitfire squadrons and 3 Mustang squadrons claimed twice as many enemy vehicles than the 10 Typhoon squadrons during the three months in Normandy. Also 300+ enemy airplanes (so they they were true fighter-bombers, btw. Typhoon claims: 0)

 

[Shortround6]

The Lysander was a victim of trying to do too many things and fast evolving technology.
Yes there was a perceived need for it. However the needs it was trying to fill were too many. While the British monoplane fighters were certainly first rate the "Army co-operation aircraft" despite high tech lift devices, was an anachronism. Designed when the RAF was still buying Fury and Gauntlet Biplane fighters somebody should have put the brakes on the program in 1938/39. Hawker Henleys were switched over to target tugs instead of Army support leaving the Battle (a single engine strategic bomber) and the Lysander to provide bombing support for the Army (along with the Blenheim).
An army "co-operation" aircraft (artillery spotter, message pick up and photo plane) should not have the same bomb load as the Henley and Skua. Or the same guns and bomb load as the Ju-87A (260 built?) two 250lb bombs vs one 550lb bomb.
While such multi-tasking may have worked well against the tribesmen of the middle east, expecting it to work against an enemy that was better equipped showed more than touch of wishful thinking.
The US and Germans had separated the duties into two different classes (at least) and the French may have also. The French sometimes built the same basic air frame in 'recon/observer' versions and strike/attack versions.

 

[stona]

The problem would be prising the aircraft from the hands of Fighter Command. Throughout July 1940 and the first couple of weeks of August the supply of Hurricanes from both new production and, crucially, repair actually exceeded losses, but Fighter Command was seeking to maintain some sort of reserve. It's just as well, for the week ending 17th August the net loss of Hurricanes was 58 aircraft, and yet no squadron went wanting. Had the net gains of the previous weeks not been preserved this might not have been the case.
From 17th August to 14th September there was a net loss of 111 Hurricanes, at a time when new production was 5-7 per day (total for Hawker and Gloster combined).
We know that the August/September losses would not be repeated, in fact there were ever increasing net gains up to the beginning of November, but there is no way this could be known at the time.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Shortround6]

As to Hurricanes on carriers, the summer of 1940 was sort of a goal or recognition of when a "Sea Hurricane" would have been practical. Obviously needs of the BoB might well trump deliveries.
Landing a plane on a carrier is only part of the problem, getting a Hurricane off the deck with a fixed pitch prop was probably not going to happen with enough of a safety margin.
If, in 1938 or early 1939, Blackburn or Fairey had been told to build a Sea Hurricane instead of Rocs/Skuas or Fulmars perhaps a Sea Hurricane might have been available in 1940, perhaps not. But a Sea Hurricane needs a 2 pitch prop at least and preferably the constant speed prop. Exact version of Merlin is subject to question. Merlin III or Merlin VIII? Some sort of folding wing would have been a big bonus even if width was still greater than a folded Fulmar.
But no, you can't decide in June/July of 1940 to stop Fulmar production and swipe several dozen Hurricanes from the RAF and stick them on carriers.

 

[stona]

As I hinted above, Spitfires/Mustangs were as good in ground attack role. (Ignoring the now known false tank kills).
83 Group 12 Spitfire squadrons and 3 Mustang squadrons claimed twice as many enemy vehicles than the 10 Typhoon squadrons during the three months in Normandy. Also 300+ enemy airplanes (so they they were true fighter-bombers, btw. Typhoon claims: 0)

How many Spitfires sat in a CABRANK under the control of a ROVER?
During Operation Garden, 1 Typhoon squadron attacked along the line of Horrock's advance and no fewer than 10 Typhoon squadrons were used to maintain a CABRANK thereafter.
When the advance of the spearhead (2nd Irish Guards) and their accompanying infantry (2nd Devons) was stopped the RAF controller in the contact car with the Guards was able to call in the Typhoons, firing rockets. They engaged German targets within 100 yards of the Guards. The Irish Guards War Diary records that the effect was almost instantaneous, with Germans running from their positions to surrender "trembling with fear."
You don't see many Spitfires with rocket rails in 1944, and then only four. If a Spitfire carried a drop tank to increase range, then its bomb lift was seriously reduced.
The Typhoon was developed as a ground attack aircraft, someone else already mentioned the extra armour. It could carry significantly more than a Spitfire and loiter for longer. It was also equipped with four 20mm cannon, the most accurate and destructive of all air to ground weapons against anything but a hard target. It was a far better ground attack aircraft, and that's why it was used in such numbers. Of course it couldn't compete in an air to air role, it had been optimised for something else.
Cheers
Steve

 

[GrauGeist]

As suggested by pinehilljoe - have the Vultee build the SBDs.

BTW - SB2C Helldiver also fits the category of not needed IMO.

Tomo, the Vengeance served the RAF and RAAF well, it was a very stable dive-bombing platform and was a key player in the CBI. It was also very instrumental in several battles.

For some odd reason, it seems to have either been forgotten or picked up a bad reputation, either opinion are not really warranted.

There is an excellent book, where the author has brought out great details of it's combat record and provides some excellent photos, several have never been published before, too. I really recommend getting for your library.

Vengeance! The Vultee Vengeance Dive Bomber by Peter C. Smith (ISBN 978-0906393655)

 

[tomo pauk]

I'll also recomend the book, having taking a peek several years ago.
Other aircraft mentioned here also served. Point that I'm trying to make is that SBD is already developed as capable dive bomber, and having them in production instead of Vengenace could've mean there is more of them in shorter time for the Allied air forces to use. I'm not saying that Vengence was a bad aircraft by itself.

 

[pbehn]

How many Spitfires sat in a CABRANK under the control of a ROVER?
During Operation Garden, 1 Typhoon squadron attacked along the line of Horrock's advance and no fewer than 10 Typhoon squadrons were used to maintain a CABRANK thereafter.
When the advance of the spearhead (2nd Irish Guards) and their accompanying infantry (2nd Devons) was stopped the RAF controller in the contact car with the Guards was able to call in the Typhoons, firing rockets. They engaged German targets within 100 yards of the Guards. The Irish Guards War Diary records that the effect was almost instantaneous, with Germans running from their positions to surrender "trembling with fear."
You don't see many Spitfires with rocket rails in 1944, and then only four. If a Spitfire carried a drop tank to increase range, then its bomb lift was seriously reduced.
The Typhoon was developed as a ground attack aircraft, someone else already mentioned the extra armour. It could carry significantly more than a Spitfire and loiter for longer. It was also equipped with four 20mm cannon, the most accurate and destructive of all air to ground weapons against anything but a hard target. It was a far better ground attack aircraft, and that's why it was used in such numbers. Of course it couldn't compete in an air to air role, it had been optimised for something else.
Cheers
Steve

I remember a pilot commenting as to how stable the Typhoon was, steady as a rock at circa 400MPH, i presume he was comparing to a spitfire

 

[tomo pauk]

Just to stir the pot - press on with Spitfire III from 1940-1942/43, pay a little more attention to fit & finish, install pressure injection carb and individual exhausts and there is really plenty of Allied fighters that become redundant. Added bonus: no Fw 190 scourge.

 

[Shortround6]

Obviously NOT building 3000 (or smaller number depending on type) or so aircraft in any air force is going to leave something of a hole.
Few aircraft were so useless that some use could not be found for them. (although a few spring to mind, Curtiss Sew Mew and Curtiss C-76 come to mind).
Now is the question about useless aircraft or aircraft that could replaced on a one for one basis (or close to it) by a different aircraft either in production or with minor modifications?

And sometimes programs were over taken by events. Perhaps the USN could have used Dauntless's to the end and not bought SB2Cs but that is using hindsight. The SB2C was a more capable aircraft, faster, bigger bomb load and more range. The fact that the Japanese Navy lost much of it's punch before the SB2C really took over in large numbers tends to obscure the need for the "better" aircraft. Had Midway gone different and/or the Japanese had a different training program/ better Zero in 1944, trying to use Dauntless's in 1944/45 might be viewed much different.

 

[Shortround6]

The Typhoon was developed as a ground attack aircraft, someone else already mentioned the extra armour. It could carry significantly more than a Spitfire and loiter for longer. It was also equipped with four 20mm cannon, the most accurate and destructive of all air to ground weapons against anything but a hard target. It was a far better ground attack aircraft, and that's why it was used in such numbers. Of course it couldn't compete in an air to air role, it had been optimised for something else.
Cheers
Steve

And there were few, if any, dedicated (or optimized) ground attack Spitfires. There were large numbers used for ground attack but usually redundant versions. MK Vs and MK IXs that had been superseded by newer types with the least amount of modification done.
Stick a Merlin 32 in a slightly beefed up MK V/IX airframe, 4 blade prop, fit four 20mm guns in the wings and a bit of armor and see what you might get. It would suck as a fighter at altitudes much above 5-10,000ft but then so did the Typhoon.

Of course this option would need a new Spitfire production line and a new source of Merlins. You don't replace 3-4000 aircraft without changing production facilities.

The Typhoon could very well be a better plane for ground attack on a one for one basis but then we don't know the cost. How much more money, time and effort went into each Typhoon? Is one Typhoon equal to two Spitfires?

 

[stona]

It was a big ask for those in charge of aircraft procurement to make the correct specifications and procure exactly the right aircraft for even roles that were foreseen. There were always going to be aircraft produced that would be fund wanting in a particular role, or even whose role was unrecognisable once the shooting started.
I think it is remarkable that so many outstanding aircraft did in fact have their origins in pre war procurement programmes, not that there were some lemons as well.
The rationalisation of programmes once the war had started when operational requirements could be based on the evidence of operational research, rather than supposition and prediction, is a better measure of how well various nations ran their various programmes.

In terms of the original question, there was a perceived need (at least as far as the British were concerned) for all the aircraft produced during the period of re-armament. That some of them found themselves redundant or unemployable is hardly surprising.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

The British do get a bit of a bad rap because of two things.
1. they are one of the better documented programs. Finding as detailed documents on other AIr forces requirements, designs and procurement is harder.
2. The US, Japanese and Russian airforces were sometimes able to shuffle some of their mid/late 30s designs out of sight before they were faced with enemy gun fire and shown to be really bad ideas or lacking in a fundamental way. French didn't establish a long enough track record to show up some of their mistakes either.

 

[yulzari]

The problem would be prising the aircraft from the hands of Fighter Command. Throughout July 1940 and the first couple of weeks of August the supply of Hurricanes from both new production and, crucially, repair actually exceeded losses, but Fighter Command was seeking to maintain some sort of reserve. It's just as well, for the week ending 17th August the net loss of Hurricanes was 58 aircraft, and yet no squadron went wanting. Had the net gains of the previous weeks not been preserved this might not have been the case.
From 17th August to 14th September there was a net loss of 111 Hurricanes, at a time when new production was 5-7 per day (total for Hawker and Gloster combined).
We know that the August/September losses would not be repeated, in fact there were ever increasing net gains up to the beginning of November, but there is no way this could be known at the time.
Cheers
Steve

Usually overlooked in the planning during the BoB is that they were determined to have an effective reserve that could be thrown at an invasion, as well as generally defend UK air space. Thus they did not draw upon all the experienced pilots available for Fighter Command leaving some with the second line work whilst arranging to use the full range of second line aircraft (from Tiger Moths to Westland Wallaces) against invasion barges and landed German forces. A pale reflection of this can be seen in the use of Hectors, Albacores and Rocs over Dunkirk. The last time I estimated this unseen air force I came up with a total of 650+ all of which needed crewing and appear on no 'gaming' of the USM I have seen any more than the steady attrition by the Home Guard even in the autumn of 1940 never mind 1941.

 

[stona]

Usually overlooked in the planning during the BoB is that they were determined to have an effective reserve that could be thrown at an invasion, as well as generally defend UK air space... A pale reflection of this can be seen in the use of Hectors, Albacores and Rocs over Dunkirk. .

And the much maligned Lysander!
Cheers
Steve

 

[GrauGeist]

To press on just a little bit more about the Vengeance - it was actually designed for the French before the U.S. was even at war. The design of the Model 75 was unique for it's ability to have a remarkably accurate dive and while it was slightly underpowered and had overheating problems (which the British fixed), it performed well.

It was never intended for the U.S. Military, but rather foreign deliveries...the fact that the U.S. took posession of some is typical of most of the foreign contracts taken over by the U.S. government after Pearl Harbor. So some A-31s and A-35s did see USAAF service, but the bulk went to the British, Australian, French and Indian air forces. It also served with the USN as the TBV.

The SBD on the otherhand, was built to USN specifications (and the A-24 to USAAF specifications) and was in service well before the Vengeance.

Cancelling the Vengeance would not have really had any effect on the U.S. war effort, but would have impacted the Allied operators to a degree.

This would be like saying that the P-39 was a poor performer, so we'll cancel it in favor of another type...but in doing so, would have robbed the Soviets of a valuable asset, as they used the P-39 with great success in their operations against the Germans.

Perhaps we could look at the USN's Torpedo Bombers: how were their successes versus losses justified?
In otherwords, at the battle of Midway, it was divebombers that carried the day while the only notable contribution of the TBFs and TBDs were to draw the Japanese attention away from the incoming SBDs.

There were the ocasional successes, but usually those successes came with a substantial loss to the attacking torpedo bombers.

What if the U.S. Navy decided to eliminate the Torpedo Bombers entirely and focus instead on Dive Bombers and fighters as their main compliment?