Planes that just were not needed

[Shortround6]

The table does point to another interesting situation. Like what the Spitfires were actually doing?
Not much bombing and with a lot of enemy planes shot down/damaged (or at least claimed)perhaps they were actually flying top cover for the Typhoons and NOT flying identical missions? Maybe not but lets make sure we are really comparing apples to apples.

 

[Hickam Field]

In hindsight 20/20, the first airframe that comes to mind is the Me-410. Those Daimler Benz 603's could've possibly been applied to a more useful design like the Fw-190V-18. (Fw-190C)

 

[Shortround6]

The usual Spitfire (engines Merin 45 or 50) was not allowed for +18 psig boost, like it was the case for the low level variants with cropped S/C (engines with 'M' suffix). But even with +16 psig, Spitfire V will still do 370 mph, give or take; that is with 'kidney' exhausts, ice guard, and historical fit & finish. Pressure carb might add some speed, though.

My suggestion was for a dedicated ground attack version to be built as a substitute for the Typhoon in a "what if" scenario to show that the Typhoon was not really irreplaceable. The Typhoon not getting bomb racks until Sept/Oct of 1942. It didn't get rockets until a year later so comparing late 1943 Typhoons to 1941 and early 1942 Spitfires would show them at a disadvantage.
By some time in 1943 there were several single stage, single speed Merlins rated at 18lbs of boost. Some of the cropped impeller engines, the Merlin 32 in the Barracuda. Moving to the single stage, two speed engines you had the Merlin 24,26 and 27 (last two were not mass produced) with the MK 27 being trialed in the Hurricane IVD or MK V.

some sources claim a few of the last Hurricanes got The Merlin 32. These two speed engines were rated at 18bs for takeoff in addition to 18lbs for war emergency.
Please note the Typhoon was introduced using the Sabre II, the Sabre IIa being introduced in late 1943 and the Sabre IIb engine coming into use in 1944 and many earlier aircraft were refitted with the IIB engine.

Low level Spit V, decent as it was, was still slower than Typhoon at low level by 20+ mph. Fw 190A falls between the two there. Low level Spit is just another P-40 or P-39 prior mid-1943, performance-wise. If even that much.

That may be true but there were only about 500 Typhoons built by Sept of 1942. Average production being around 42 a month obviously lower in 1941. There just weren't that many in the first year. By August of 1942 for example I believe there were 4 Squadrons of MK IX Spits and 4 Squadrons of Mustangs operating.

Carrying 3x250 lbs bombs means something must be removed from Spitfire, and we still did haven't added additional armor or installed full 4 cannons. That have had less rpg than Typhoons historically. Rate of roll, already not that good, also takes a dip with weight added away from centreline. Typhoon, P-39/40 and Fw 190 at least can roll fast as speed goes up.

Many later Spitfires could carry a single 500lb under the fuselage or a 250lb under each wing (not sure if there was a bomb rack that would carry a pair of 250lbs side by side under the fuselage) Some could carry a 500lb under the fuselage and a 250lb under each wing .

A MK IX Spit. Three 250lbs should not have a big deal.
Difference in ammo is 20 rounds per gun. Not that big a deal, 12 seconds of strafing time vs 14 seconds? Roll rate might be worse but then you are taking the .303 guns and ammo out of the outer wings so their may be some cancellation of effect even if not total.

Four 250 lbs bombs, or twice the max bomb load - chances are slim to none, and Slim has already left the town. Spitfire V's max bomb load was 500 lbs even in 1944.

A Modified plane, using the MK V as a base (early MK IXs were MK V airframes and early MK XIIs with Griffons were MK V airframes)
might be able to carry four bombs with a suitable center rack.

Fuel: 84 gals/1510 HP = 0.0556; 154/2050=0.0751. Typhoon has 35% more fuel per installed HP (emergency power) than Spitfire V.

Use the larger top fuselage tank and stick in the wing leading edge tanks. 123 Imp gallons capacity like a MK VIII
The single stage engine using 18bs boost for take-off was good for 1610-1625hp. You aren't carting around the 2nd stage and the intercooler so saving over 150lbs in dry engine weight. (add to armor/fuel?)

It is not as good as a Typhoon but it is a lot cheaper and not really all that far behind on many missions. Rocket installation may be questionable(would aluminium rails instead of steel allow more to be carried?)

 

[stona]

The table does point to another interesting situation. Like what the Spitfires were actually doing?

The Typhoons were specialised for ground attack. The RP armed Typhoon was seen by the 2nd TAF as its premier ground attack weapon. All Typhoons coming of production lines were equpped with RP connections by February 1944 and an urgent scheme to modify those in service (by rotation through Hawker Aircraft, Cunliffe Owen or 13 MU) meant that all Typhoons were suitably equipped by D-Day.
Loading rockets or bombs, as missions required, was found to be cumbersome and impractical, so squadrons specialised in one or the other. 83 Group fielded two RP Wings (121 and 124) and a single bomber Wing (143). 84 Group fielded one RP Wing and one mixed RP/bomber Wing (146 with differing proportions of bomber to RP squadrons).

2nd TAF Typhoons fired 210,028 rockets. The fighter bombers could carry 2,000lb, twice the maximum load of the Spitfires, that's not to say that they always did, but then you'll struggle to find many Spitfires with a 1,000lb load too.
(Someone is bound to point out that the Spitfire XIV had a maximum load of 1,500lb, but only one squadron operated it in the bomber role.)

There was no comparable specialisation of Spitfire units.

Cheers

Steve

 

[pinehilljoe]

To press ..

What if the U.S. Navy decided to eliminate the Torpedo Bombers entirely and focus instead on Dive Bombers and fighters as their main compliment?

Once the technology allowed, there was a change in the ratio of bombers to fighters on US carriers, with VBF squadrons flying Hellcats and Corsairs. This also helped combat the Kamikaze. At the start of the war there wasn't a carrier based fighter bomber.

 

[Shortround6]

There was no comparable specialisation of Spitfire units.

That is part of the argument.
If the Spitfires were flying top cover (escorting) the Typhoons then there is no way they could have run up the bombs dropped column.
Going by the aircraft killed/damage columns ( and yes allowing for over claiming) it appears the Spitfires and Mustangs were keeping the Luftwaffe fighters off the Typhoons backs. Wither by intercepting them close to the Typhoons area of operations or by attacking the German fighter bases and/or interdicting them I don't know.
One can also read way to much into charts without really trying
Like the loss ratio of planes lost to sorties flown was much lower for the Spitfires and the utilization rate (sorties flown per available squadron/s) was much higher for the Spitfires.

It leads me to believe the two types were not flying similar missions even if assigned to the same Group.

The Typhoon was nice to have, very nice. There is no way the Spitfire, no matter what you did to to it, could substitute on a one for one basis for the Typhoon. That does not mean the Typhoon was irreplaceable or a wise use of resources.
Perhaps you would have need 4500 ground pounder Spitfires instead of 3000 Typhoons. But then you would have had 7500-8000lb airplanes vs 11,000 lb airplanes and 12 cylinder engines instead of 24 cylinder engines.

 

[Shortround6]

Once the technology allowed, there was a change in the ratio of bombers to fighters on US carriers, with VBF squadrons flying Hellcats and Corsairs. This also helped combat the Kamikaze. At the start of the war there wasn't a carrier based fighter bomber.

Actually there was. The F4F could carry a 100lb bomb under each wing. The Grumman F3F Biplane could carry a 116lb bomb under each wing. Granted 100lb bombs are not ship killers but then there is only so much you can do with 900-1000hp engines.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Actually there was. The F4F could carry a 100lb bomb under each wing. The Grumman F3F Biplane could carry a 116lb bomb under each wing. Granted 100lb bombs are not ship killers but then there is only so much you can do with 900-1000hp engines.

Hey! Wait a second! VMF 211 flew 1200 HP F4F-3s at Wake Island and sank destroyer Kisaragi and damaged several other ships on 11 Dec 1941 dropping 100 lb. bombs. The light frag bombs used by the Navy at Lea and Salamaua, 10 Mar 1942, were considered a waste of effort.

 

[Shortround6]

Knew somebody would bring that one up

What works on small destroyers (with a bit of luck) may not work so well larger ships like even WW I Cruisers.

 

[GrauGeist]

Once the technology allowed, there was a change in the ratio of bombers to fighters on US carriers, with VBF squadrons flying Hellcats and Corsairs. This also helped combat the Kamikaze. At the start of the war there wasn't a carrier based fighter bomber.

It wasn't so much as a "change in technology", it was a shift in mission profile.
The dive bombers still provided a much needed service in pinpoint strikes against Japanese positions, but as the Japanese surface fleet dwindled, the need for dive bombers and torpedo bombers became less of a priority.

As far as "technology" goes, even the Curtiss SOC (introduced 1935) could carry up to 650 pounds of bombs.

 

[stona]

The problem demonstrated by the Lysander, Battle and other aircraft sent to France at the beginning of the war was far more fundamental than what role those aircraft should play. Almost none of the soul searching done in the wake of the defeat in France asked the right question about these aircraft and what they should have been doing. That question should have been "who should control aircraft on the battlefield?" Had this been posed several years earlier then those aircraft themselves might have been somewhat different.
Eventually the RAF was forced, by the War Office, to create the Army Co-operation Command, this was NOT the idea of the Air Ministry. It was deliberately created as a toothless tiger, the Air Ministry were very concerned that it could easily become an Army air arm, and it operational capabilities were consequently restricted. Though the Command's operational capacity was limited it did serve as an experimental platform for the early development of tactical air power. The benefits would not be reaped for several years, and the aircraft were not Lysander's and Battles, but Typhoons and Spitfires.
The baleful effects of inter service rivalries impacted upon all aspects of British air power, even down to the sorts of aircraft developed and delivered to the various services.
Generally aircraft were ordered because they were needed, the problem was that what the various services thought they needed was not what was really required. At a higher, even doctrinal level many questions (who would protect the Navy's ships? How could an independent air arm support the Army?, even more fundamentally, what was an independent air arm for? Simply waging a srtategic campaign?) were not properly resolved.
Cheers
Steve

 

[pinehilljoe]

It wasn't so much as a "change in technology", it was a shift in mission profile.
The dive bombers still provided a much needed service in pinpoint strikes against Japanese positions, but as the Japanese surface fleet dwindled, the need for dive bombers and torpedo bombers became less of a priority.

As far as "technology" goes, even the Curtiss SOC (introduced 1935) could carry up to 650 pounds of bombs.

I think it was both, change in operational need and technical advancement of the new generation fighters, with the introduction of the Hellcat and Corsair.

The F4F used as a bomber would not have sunk 4 carriers at Midway.

I think the only Pre-War fighter that could meet end of War multi role combat requirements for range, load carrying, was the P-38.

 

[Shortround6]

Generally aircraft were ordered because they were needed, the problem was that what the various services thought they needed was not what was really required. At a higher, even doctrinal level many questions (who would protect the Navy's ships? How could an independent air arm support the Army?, even more fundamentally, what was an independent air arm for? Simply waging a srtategic campaign?) were not properly resolved.
Cheers
Steve

Well, very few air forces bought planes they thought they didn't need. There was almost always some reason behind the purchase.
Wither the reasons were sound is another question. And sound only in hindsight or were there competing theories/reasons that argued against the purchase or for a different purchase?
Another complication was the passage of time. And politics. From the formulation of theory to formal requirement being issued (invitation for companies to submit designs) could take months (if not over a year). Time for designs to be submitted, evaluated and winning prototypes ordered and built. Time for final selection to be made and material ordered, factory tooled up and production to commence. Time for production planes to enter service in numbers.
Politics start to come into it in the numbers desired. Large expansions in numbers of squadrons call for some sort of aircraft in the immediate future even if not what was really wanted. Theories/doctrine may have changed but putting off purchases delays the expansion (or leaves you with really obsolete planes should war start early). Changing doctrine too fast and canceling large programs in mid-stream can wind up with the politicians trying to micro-manage the purchasing programs because obviously the services involved couldn't be trusted with the tax payers money or they wouldn't be wasting it by shifting back and forth on doctrine. Nobody wanted to admit that program XXX was turkey or that program YYY wasn't what was wanted anymore. They just wanted to order program ZZZ while quietly letting Program XXX or YYY run out to the end (or at least the initial contracts).

What is puzzling is that so much experience from WW I seems to have been forgotten. Or deliberately ignored. Tactical bombing raids in WW I often had escorting fighters yet in France such escorts were almost totally lacking. In some cases they were assigned but failed to meetup for one reason or another (lack of training/co-ordination), In too many cases they may never have been assigned in the first place. Night fighting needed some re-learning even without radar. Night bombing had progressed almost zero in 20 years, air borne anti-sub warfare had gone backwards.

In some cases the British were buying intermediate or interim aircraft to build up numbers and got caught before the desired replacements came into service.

I have very mixed feelings or thoughts about the Fairey Battle. Designed as a strategic bomber to get around a possible treaty clause it went into service in large numbers, in part because it was cheap, to build up the numbers of bombing squadrons. These new squadrons would, in time, be equipped with real bombers. Unfortunately the Battle had to go into combat in role it was not designed for and without fighter escort. The Battle did fulfill a secondary roll as trainer for aircrew, ground crew and even a trainer for factory workers/factory planning. Many Arm Chair Air Marshals want to plan to cancel the Battle and get XXX number of better combat planes instead. While the exact number is subject to discussion very few of these ACAMs ( Arm Chair Air Marshals) want to talk about what would be needed to replace the Battle in the training role or the effect of poorer trained crews going into combat.

The Battle also seems to illustrate the divide between the real role of the RAF and what was actually needed. Army support would be provided by whatever semi-obsolete aircraft the RAF could scrounge up to supplement the state of the art Lysander, while the RAF went on with it's true mission of bombing the enemy homeland into submission.

 

[Shortround6]

I think it was both, change in operational need and technical advancement of the new generation fighters, with the introduction of the Hellcat and Corsair.

The F4F used as a bomber would not have sunk 4 carriers at Midway.

I think the only Pre-War fighter that could meet end of War multi role combat requirements for range, load carrying, was the P-38.

In part it was 'technology' but the technology was the simple progression of more powerful engines allowing the airplanes to do more.

The Progress of weapons/Aircraft in the Pacific gets a bit confusing as the US torpedo took so long to fix. It didn't become a really usable weapon until 1944. By which time the Navy had been making all kinds of changes in it's attack methods to get around the lack of the Torpedo. You also have to look at Midway and it's effects long term. The SBC2 and the TBF could carry substantial bomb loads over ranges much further than the F4U and F6F could. As the Japanese ability to mount return strikes fell and as the US fleet air defense rose (better radar and intercept, proximity fuses and AA fire control) the Carriers could operate closer to targets and long range of bomb equipped aircraft became less important. However please remember that the US lost 80 aircraft during the Battle of the Philippine sea due to running out of fuel.

 

[stona]

The Battle also seems to illustrate the divide between the real role of the RAF and what was actually needed. Army support would be provided by whatever semi-obsolete aircraft the RAF could scrounge up to supplement the state of the art Lysander, while the RAF went on with it's true mission of bombing the enemy homeland into submission.

As far as the RAF was concerned it existed as an offensive, strategic force to bomb the enemy, though I would say to bomb it's means of waging war, rather than bomb the homeland into submission

This is why the specifications for the Battle led to it becoming, effectively, a single engine medium bomber, except to meet the specification it was under armed and under powered. In fact Ludlow Hewitt suggested that the P.27/32 Battle should have its range requirement increased from 600 to 720 miles (he seems to have forgotten that the 720 mile range of B.9/32 was itself only an increase on the original 600 mile operational range due to a change in the definition of range) and that it should be tested against the Sidestrand replacement developed to B.9/32. The ferry range required in B.9/32 was even added to P.27/32.
Maybe Arthur Harris' (Deputy Director of Operations and Intelligence (Plans) in 1934) comment on what he deemed "arbitrary limitations unconnected with operational efficiency" had on the products of such specifications, that they tended to be "freaks like London taxi cabs and HMS Nelson" was more perceptive than it appeared at the time.
Cheers
Steve

 

[davparlr]

The B-29 program was pushing the limits of technology of the day in a wide range of areas, including the engines. They even had the XB-39 in the works (re-engined B-29) in the event that the R-3350 engines were a failure. So the B-32 was a fallback. While it did not see significant action in the war, it would have been one of the few aircraft capable of carrying nuclear bombs at the time. The B-17 and B-24 also lacked the range of the B-29 with comparable loads.

This is true, there was certainly concern with the R-3350 but what is baffling is that the B-32 had the same engine, so was the risk reduced?

 

[GrauGeist]

To be honest, I am not sure why they made that decision.

As it turns out, the B-32 had more than it's share of problems that nearly caused it to miss the war entirely.

 

[Shortround6]

Problems with the R-3350 also caused delays with the C-69.

 

[GrauGeist]

Also makes me wonder, if the R-3350 had been bug-free earlier, if this may have accelerated the B-19 program to the point where it would have been put into production.

As it happens, it would have been very capable of delivering the atom bomb if the B-29 and B-32 never made it to production (or delayed beyond the war)

 

[Pursuivant]

The P-75: Can you picture the Sales team at GM talking to the USAAF: we're going graft the empennage of a dive bomber (SBD), wings of a fighter ( P-40) , undercarriage of a carrier fighter (F4U) and arrange the V-3420 engine (still has some kinks to be worked out) like the P-39 and build a high performance long range fighter. But there was a war on, and we needed thousands of planes, hindsight is 20-20.

"World's Worst Airplanes" implies that GM/Fisher only proposed the P-75 to keep its production lines running, although I haven't read of any graft or corruption surrounding the P-75 from other sources.

Arguably, a huge number of "X" projects weren't needed, and ended up being a waste of money, but given the state of aeronautical research at the time, they were useful dead ends in that they provided examples of what didn't work.