Planes that just were not needed

[Pursuivant]

Fairey Battle

I agree, since every Merlin engine which went into a Fairey Battle could have powered a Spitfire or Hurricane.

In fairness to the Air Ministry ca. 1935, the 1930s were a time of unprecedented advancement in aeronautics, and air combat doctrine wasn't settled at the time. The idea that "the bomber would always get through" seems to have been terribly seductive. That led to a number of light bomber designs which worked well enough in peacetime, but failed miserably once war broke out.

 

[Pursuivant]

Vultee A-31 Vengence. I think its a neat looking airplane, all the operational use was via Lend Lease, and you can say it gave yeomanry service. Would we have been better off having Vultee build SBDs under license?

I have to agree. Arguably, ALL dive bombers were faulty designs, since they required the loss of massive amounts of altitude to make their attacks, which left them vulnerable to fighters and AAA once they were on the deck. The successful dive bomber designs of WW 2 (SBD, D3A, Ju 87, arguably A-31/A-35) could only survive if there was local air superiority and relatively low AAA threat.

As for the A-31/A-35 series, there were some serious problems. Notably, the designers messed up its COG, so it always flew level while the nose was slightly elevated, and so that the wings had to be "cranked" forward" giving it its distinctive profile. It was useful in that it could actually dive bomb at a 90 degree angle, which minimized bomb drift, but other than that it was a slow, bulky aircraft whose job could have been done just as well by fighter bombers.

 

[Shortround6]

"World's Worst Airplanes" implies that GM/Fisher only proposed the P-75 to keep its production lines running, although I haven't read of any graft or corruption surrounding the P-75 from other sources.

A lot of people love conspiracy theories. However.
Fisher Body Aircraft in World War Two / WWII

Fisher Body Division World War Two / WWII Database

Seems like Fisher wasn't faced with empty production lines

 

[Pursuivant]

Once the technology allowed, there was a change in the ratio of bombers to fighters on US carriers, with VBF squadrons flying Hellcats and Corsairs. This also helped combat the Kamikaze. At the start of the war there wasn't a carrier based fighter bomber.

Arguably, all torpedo bombers were failures, because of the need for a "low and slow" attack run and the long stand-off distance required to allow the torpedo to arm itself which reduced accuracy and allowed the target a decent chance to evade. Additionally, torpedoes are very expensive as compared to "dumb" iron bombs. Almost all torpedo bombers that served in WW2 were products of pre-war design requirements.

Once various air forces figured out the mechanics of skip bombing/glide bombing, and once large caliber rockets became widely available, there was little need for torpedo bombers.

 

[Pursuivant]

I'm surprised that nobody's mentioned the Breda Ba.88.

The RA canceled the contract once they realized that the military version of the Ba.88 was a dog, but production was resumed for political reasons. About a 100 aircraft were built, but it's clear that the RA had no use for the plane since most were scrapped as soon as they reached the combat zone.

Unlike other planes discussed so far, the Ba.88 wasn't a product of mistaken design requirements, faulty pre-war operational doctrine, or extended "teething problems". At the time, everyone knew the plane was bad, but still the Italian government insisted on building 100 of them, diverting badly needed engines and aluminum which could have been used for the far more useful SM.79.

 

[GrauGeist]

"World's Worst Airplanes" implies that GM/Fisher only proposed the P-75 to keep its production lines running, although I haven't read of any graft or corruption surrounding the P-75 from other sources.

Arguably, a huge number of "X" projects weren't needed, and ended up being a waste of money, but given the state of aeronautical research at the time, they were useful dead ends in that they provided examples of what didn't work.

The P-75 was conceived of at a time when the war was not going well for the Allies.

It's concept was to produce a powerful, long-range fighter/escort from ready-made materials, thus reducing it's assembly time. It was fast, had excellent range and had impressive firepower.

However, it came along too late, as there were other types that were already doing it's intended task by the time it's development matured..

In this case (and the case of many "X" projects), timing is everything.

 

[Ascent]

I have to agree. Arguably, ALL dive bombers were faulty designs, since they required the loss of massive amounts of altitude to make their attacks, which left them vulnerable to fighters and AAA once they were on the deck. The successful dive bomber designs of WW 2 (SBD, D3A, Ju 87, arguably A-31/A-35) could only survive if there was local air superiority and relatively low AAA threat.

As for the A-31/A-35 series, there were some serious problems. Notably, the designers messed up its COG, so it always flew level while the nose was slightly elevated, and so that the wings had to be "cranked" forward" giving it its distinctive profile. It was useful in that it could actually dive bomb at a 90 degree angle, which minimized bomb drift, but other than that it was a slow, bulky aircraft whose job could have been done just as well by fighter bombers.

The COG was messed up on the Vengeance which explains the wing shape but the attitude was actually a design feature. To allow it to dive at 90deg the position of the wing made it fly nose high, or as the Vengeance pilot described it, dragging it's arse.

It was very vulnerable to enemy fighters, which fortunately they saw very little of, but the vertical dive made it a difficult target for Japanese AA. How it would have fares in Europe I don't know.

 

[stona]

...every Merlin engine which went into a Fairey Battle could have powered a Spitfire or Hurricane.

What Spitfires and Hurricanes?
The only delays caused to Hurricane production by engine issues were due to the unreliability of the Merlin F/Merlin I, which failed to be approved for fighter use, and the consequent adoption of the Merlin G/Merlin II. This caused Hurricane production to be halted in November 1937, while the relevant changes were made, but all 170-180 (depending who you believe) production examples of the Merlin I were set aside for use in the Fairey Battle where the "full throttle restriction was less critical."
There was never a lack of engines for the Hurricane (and later Spitfire) caused by the production of the Battle.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Milosh]

What Merlin engine was used in the Battle II and V?

 

[stona]

I have to agree. Arguably, ALL dive bombers were faulty designs, since they required the loss of massive amounts of altitude to make their attacks, which left them vulnerable to fighters and AAA once they were on the deck. The successful dive bomber designs of WW 2 (SBD, D3A, Ju 87, arguably A-31/A-35) could only survive if there was local air superiority and relatively low AAA threat.
.

You are correct, but with hindsight. The reason that dive bombing was adopted as a technique by most air arms in the inter war years was accuracy. With the technologies available level bombing was just not accurate enough to hit smaller targets, even things the size of capital ships, with any statistical chance of success.
The RAF was probably the least enamoured of dive bombing, probably because it saw this as a technique which would lend itself to tactical support of the Army and ultimately threaten its recently won independence. It did flirt with the idea in the mid 1930s. A proposed replacement for the Hart, which never got built, was to have a dive bombing capability and be fast enough to evade hostile fighters as well as carrying a 500lb load 600 miles. Given these requirements (as in P.4/34) it is not surprising nobody could meet them at the time.
Cheers
Steve

 

[stona]

What Merlin engine was used in the Battle II and V?

Battle II, III and V are not different Marks of the aircraft, which was only ever built as the Battle Mk. I (bomber) Battle Tug and Battle Trainer. The suffix refers to the engine fitted.
Only 170-180 Merlin Is were built, and 136 went into the first Battles from the Fairey factory. 2,201 Battles were built in total. The Merlin III became in effect the standard engine for the Battle, and as far as I can tell only the first 59 Austin built aircraft used the Merlin II and few were ever fitted with a Merlin V. I can't remember the differences between a Merlin II and V, but I don't think they were substantial.
There was not a time when Spitfire or Hurricane production was lost due to Battle production.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Shortround6]

Arguably, all torpedo bombers were failures, because of the need for a "low and slow" attack run and the long stand-off distance required to allow the torpedo to arm itself which reduced accuracy and allowed the target a decent chance to evade. Additionally, torpedoes are very expensive as compared to "dumb" iron bombs. Almost all torpedo bombers that served in WW2 were products of pre-war design requirements.

Once various air forces figured out the mechanics of skip bombing/glide bombing, and once large caliber rockets became widely available, there was little need for torpedo bombers.

Problem here is that bombs couldn't sink big battleships, at least not the bombs carried by most carrier aircraft. Damage them yes, send them back to port yes. But sink them with fewer than a dozen hits? unless very, very lucky?
And by 1944 the drop parameters had changed considerably. The American MK 13 torpedo " By late 1944, the design had been modified to allow reliable drops from as high as 2,400 ft (730 m), at speeds up to 410 knots (760 km/h)..
And I would love to see the rocket that could replace the the 600lb warhead on a late model MK 13 torpedo.
Other Nations had also made considerable improvements to the drop envelope of their torpedoes.

 

[stona]

To sink a battleship, as someone better qualified than me once said, you need to let water in. Torpedoes were much better than bombs at doing this....when they worked.
Cheers
Steve

 

[pinehilljoe]

You are correct, but with hindsight. The reason that dive bombing was adopted as a technique by most air arms in the inter war years was accuracy. With the technologies available level bombing was just not accurate enough to hit smaller targets, even things the size of capital ships, with any statistical chance of success.
The RAF was probably the least enamoured of dive bombing, probably because it saw this as a technique which would lend itself to tactical support of the Army and ultimately threaten its recently won independence. It did flirt with the idea in the mid 1930s. A proposed replacement for the Hart, which never got built, was to have a dive bombing capability and be fast enough to evade hostile fighters as well as carrying a 500lb load 600 miles. Given these requirements (as in P.4/34) it is not surprising nobody could meet them at the time.
Cheers
Steve

In the late 30's, given the engine technology available, the only way to accurately deliver 2000 lbs of bombs, with a single engine plane was a aircraft designed as a dive bomber.

 

[wuzak]

The P-75 was conceived of at a time when the war was not going well for the Allies.

It's concept was to produce a powerful, long-range fighter/escort from ready-made materials, thus reducing it's assembly time. It was fast, had excellent range and had impressive firepower.

However, it came along too late, as there were other types that were already doing it's intended task by the time it's development matured..

In this case (and the case of many "X" projects), timing is everything.

The P-75 was conceived at a time when the USAAF top brass suddenly realised that their heavy bombers did need long range escorts in order that losses on raids were not prohibitive.

So the P-75 was absolutely needed.

Fortunately for the USAAF and countless bomber crew, the P-51B was found to be able to do the long range escort well. Fortunate because it would be available in the ETO far sooner than the P-75 could ever have been.

With hindsight we can say the P-75 was not needed because the P-51 fulfilled its role. But at the time the P-75 was ordered/requested it was not certain.

 

[Shortround6]

I agree, since every Merlin engine which went into a Fairey Battle could have powered a Spitfire or Hurricane.

This argument gets brought up repeatedly but requires the hypothetical RAF to change quite a number of things and takes no account of the collateral damage of such a policy.
The RAF had a succession of expansion plans. Adding both new bomber squadrons and new fighter squadrons at a high rate per year plus a few other supporting squadron types. The RAF needed the Battle in 1938-39 or other wise the bombing force would have been in serious trouble had war broken out earlier. For instance as of Jan 1st 1938 the RAF had 6 Squadrons of Battles (or squadrons converting over to Battles) compared to 7 squadrons with Bristol Blenheims but the kicker is the 20 squadrons flying Hawker Hinds.

and the 7 squadrons flying Handley Page Heyfords.

and other squadrons flying equally obsolete/unsuitable aircraft. There were a few squadrons flying A W Whitleys but the early versions used the A W Tiger engine that would soon lead the Whitleys using such engines being banned from over water flights.
In Sept of 1939 the Battle was in use by 15 bombing squadrons. Without the Battle you either have 15 fewer bombing squadrons or 15 squadrons flying planes much worse than the Battle.
The only shortage of Merlins to Hurricanes was in the start-up of Hurricane production was sorted out by the early summer of 1938. Hurricanes being built at that time having fabric covered wings, fixed pitch props, no armor, no self sealing tanks and so would require considerable re-work.
Battles went on to do much work in Canada and Australia as crew trainers. This is what is missed by many of the "more Hurricanes/Spitfire school". If you don't have the Battles to equip the training squadrons with you need something in large numbers or you run into the same problem as the Germans, Japanese and Russians with poorly trained aircrews or aircrews trying to learn their crafts flying twin or 4 engine operational aircraft. Does anybody think sending hundreds of Wellingtons to Australia and Canada to act as trainers would have been a good idea in 1940-41?
Once you have operational squadrons in place it is relatively easy to switch the squadron over to new aircraft. An operational squadron being much more than the pilots/crews. It is the Ground crews and support personnel and administration, The squadron commander doing much more than just lead the squadron into combat or plan flight paths. He could overseeing well over 100 men including the ground staff. It takes time to get such organizations running smoothly.

 

[stona]

An even more fundamental problem with the 'more Hurricanes and Spitfires' school, would be actually getting them built. Hawker was producing as many Hurricanes as it could in 1938/9, I already mentioned the ways in which the company cleared space for production and farmed out the production of other types. Supermarine was just getting up and running, but we are still a long way from any meaningful production from Castle Bromwich.
There was never a shortage of Merlins for either type, because though in the early rearmament years air frames presented much greater design and development problems than aero engines, the central position of the aero engine in a balanced aircraft production programme had been recognised by mid 1937. Managing aero engine production to match air frame production was made somewhat simpler for the British because between April 1936 and May 1939 83% of British aero engine production (by horsepower) was by just two companies, Rolls Royce and Bristol. British aero engine programmes from the mid 1930s were really down to the management of just these two companies.

A specific objective of Scheme F was to replace the Kestrel engined Hawker biplanes, which were a mainstay of the front line RAF in the 1930s. The Merlin was required for the Hurricane, Spitfire and Battle, all crucially single engine designs, and the Air Ministry believed that peace time requirements could be fulfilled without any special measures to expand capacity. Large scale expansion would have been difficult in any case, given that the Merlin had not been standardised for manufacture in 1936.

The case for Bristol was quite different. It's more standardised Mercury and Pegasus engines were needed urgently and in numbers. A large demand was to fulfill requirements for the Blenheim, ordered from Bristol and Rootes in 1935 and 1936 respectively and from A V Roe in 1937. These engines also powered the Wellesely, Wellington I, Harrow and Hampden bombers as well as Gloster's Gauntlet and Gladiator fighters, Fairey's Swordfish torpedo bomber and the Short, Supermarine and Saunders flying boats. It was these requirements that led to the triggering of the Committee of Imperial Defence's plans for using resources beyond the professional aircraft industry, and thence to the first aero engine shadow scheme.

Capacity at Rolls Royce was considered sufficient even after the 'Anschluss'. As late as 29th March 1938 the Air Member for Supply and Organisation (AMSO) could write.

"so far as could be seen, the existing Rolls Royce factory should be just about sufficient for all engines of Rolls Royce types which would be required under the existing and any future programme at present contemplated."

It was only the introduction of Scheme L, with an increased requirement for Merlin engined fighters, that led to the authorisation of a new factory at Crewe. It was not until 1939 and 'war potential' planning, including for the four engine bombers like the Halifax, that the government would sanction two additional plants.

It should be noted that though Rolls Royce was left to manage its engine production alone, its capacity in 1938 was far greater than it had been in 1935. The company had undertaken a programme of internal reorganisation, introduced new management practices and made substantial capital investment. This is why the Air Ministry was so confident that the supply of Rolls Royce engines would meet demand, and it is why there were never Spitfires, Hurricanes, or even Battles, waiting for engines.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

FWIW - I'd just love to see Battles navalized. Yes, no Albacore, no Barracudas.

 

[parsifal]

Fulmars were based on a light bomber specification 4/34 which was very similar to the Battle. A navalised Battle as a bomber recon would have been a step backwards compared to the Swordfish they would replace, despite the apparent obsolescence of the swordfish. the swordfish all weather capabilities and superior lift and inherent stability made it much better propositiion

 

[stona]

FWIW - I'd just love to see Battles navalized. Yes, no Albacore, no Barracudas.

Well in a rather indirect way, via P.4/34, it was in the shape of the Fulmar.

The Battle was a fairly large aircraft, wingspan about 7 ft longer than the Fulmar, and may have had to be developed along the lines of the P.4/34 to 0.8/38 for carrier use in any case.

Cheers

Steve