PM Stanley Baldwin expedites rearmament

[Admiral Beez]

Neville Chamberlain (PM May 1937 to Oct 1940) is unfairly blamed IMO for Britain not being sufficient armed for WW2. Where I think Britain could have done better is under PM Stanley Baldwin, who was PM from June 1935 to May 1937. Baldwin was certainly busy during the last months of his government, having ordered all three Illustrious class carriers and the final two KGV class battleships between Jan and April 1937, but could he have done more? The Great Depression was rapidly losing its hold on Britain and Hitler has been in power since 1933.

 

[SaparotRob]

When was Chain Home approved?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The need to rearm should have been obvious by 1935-36, but early rearmament also carries risk, as the Italians learnt with their Air Force.

 

[Shortround6]

The need to rearm should have been obvious by 1935-36, but early rearmament also carries risk, as the Italians learnt with their Air Force.

The British learned about it too, but they were able to recover. Barely.
The British were adding a number of squadrons per year to the RAF, (and ships and some army equipment) but that means they needed something for the new squadrons to fly as they were adding squadrons faster than the "new" aircraft could be built and the older aircraft passed down to the new squadrons.
So they ordered new production of old designs with the idea that they could build the old designs faster (at least they knew the old designs worked).

From Wiki.
"
A sole prototype, designated Handley Page HP.38, was produced, performing its maiden flight on 12 June 1930 and commencing service trials shortly thereafter.

During November 1933, the first Heyfords entered service, being initially flown by No. 99 Squadron at RAF Upper Heyford; before the end of 1936, Bomber Command had a total of nine operational squadrons equipped with the Heyford. Despite forming a considerable portion of the RAF's bomber fleet during the mid-1930s, the Heyford had a relatively short service life as it was rapidly eclipsed by a new generation of monoplane bombers, such as the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley and the Vickers Wellington. The replacement of the type had commenced during 1937 as more capable bombers were introduced during a major rearmament push for the RAF; the Heyford was formally declared obsolete in July 1939, barely two months prior to the outbreak of the Second World War."

This was being replaced just as Hawker was tooling up to make the Hurricane.

Unfortunately, while the old designs did teach the crews to fly and the mechanics how to maintain aircraft their low performance did little to advance tactics or theory.
With a top speed only a couple dozen mph higher than bombers flying in 1918 too much of British planning was based on theory and not enough on even realistic war games/exercises.

How do you shoot down a 250mph bomber with a 300 mph fighter?????????
I know, I know, I Know,....................................you use fighters carrying their armament in turrets

 

[Admiral Beez]

The need to rearm should have been obvious by 1935-36, but early rearmament also carries risk, as the Italians learnt with their Air Force.

On aircraft this is particularly true as you don't want to go too far down the wrong path.

To be fair I don't think there's more the Baldwin government could have done for the Spitfire. After less than three months after its first flight, Baldwin's government ordered the first three hundred Spitfires in June 1936... but due to production issues at Vickers-Supermarine these were not delivered until well into 1938.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

On aircraft this is particularly true as you don't want to go too far down the wrong path.

To be fair I don't think there's more the Baldwin government could have done for the Spitfire. After less than three months after its first flight, Baldwin's government ordered the first three hundred Spitfires in June 1936... but due to production issues at Vickers-Supermarine these were not delivered until well into 1938.

It helped that the UK aviation industry was more advanced than the counter-example I presented with the Italians. They entered WWII with a mostly-obsolescent air force, and that's not due to design incompetence but rather funding, I believe. But the funding issue might also crop up if you're pushing big MoD budgets in 1935-6 only to find that you're starting the war with not enough modern stuff and too many planes long in the tooth.

It's a narrow bridge to cross and I have to admit that this objection of mine relies on too much hindsight to be very useful ... it's more just a cautionary proceeding.

 

[EwenS]

You will probably find this interesting.

HyperWar: British War Production [Chapter II]

As for the RN, the date of ordering the ships is misleading as to which Government was responsible for what vessels. The 1937 warship building programme was drawn up in late 1936 and agreed in spring 1937 (and debated in Parliament in March). So although Indomitable for example was ordered after the change of Govt, it had been approved for construction prior to that change.

And don't forget the effects of the various Naval Limitation Treaties. So no Battleships can be laid down until 1 Jan 1937 (WNT). Cruiser total tonnage is limited (1930 Treaty. Belfast & Edinburgh in the 1936 Programme used up the last available) and ships couldn't be replaced until they reached a certain age (1930 Treaty. 16-20 years). So while some of the C/D/E/Elizabethan class could have been replaced earlier the problem then becomes one of the numbers the RN needed - new larger cruisers = fewer vessels for patrolling the Empire shipping routes. The overall tonnage limits only expire on 31 Dec 1936 but cruisers are then limited to 8,000 tons and 6" guns.

While Britain could have replaced Argus, Eagle, Hermes and Furious at any time in the early 1930s under WNT with the tonnage limits it would have forced a reduction in the numbers of ships.

So there are external restrictions to be taken into account.

 

[Admiral Beez]

While Britain could have replaced Argus, Eagle, Hermes and Furious at any time in the early 1930s under WNT with the tonnage limits it would have forced a reduction in the numbers of ships.

Good points. If treaties allow I'll take the combined Argus, Eagle and Hermes displacement and make another Ark Royal.

 

[ThomasP]

From what I have read (and this is not meant to contradict anything up-thread) from the time of Ark Royal design stage (maybe earlier) the UK was more limited by shipbuilding capacity that it was funding. For the ship construction capacity to be built to the point where it was effective before the war, the expansion of the ship yards would have to start around 1930 (I think).

Otherwise and/or in addition, the only thing I can see that would be seriously effective that the earlier UK government(s) could do in terms of naval power, would be to not build the KG V class. Use the money/material/shipbuilding capacity earmarked for the KG Vs in real life to rebuild the Hood, plus QE and Repulse class ships. Use what is leftover for more carriers, ie improved Ark Royals and/or a larger initial order for the Illustrious class.

Maybe?

Obviously, as already noted up-thread, the Naval treaties limited what could be done to a significant extent.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Otherwise and/or in addition, the only thing I can see that would be seriously effective that the earlier UK government(s) could do in terms of naval power, would be to not build the KG V class. Use the money/material/shipbuilding capacity earmarked for the KG Vs in real life to rebuild the Hood, plus QE and Repulse class ships. Use what is leftover for more carriers, ie improved Ark Royals and/or a larger initial order for the Illustrious class.

Maybe?

With the battlecruiser race going on between France and Germany, and the Italian Littorios in the pipeline, as well as the Bismarcks in Germany, I'd be surprised if many MPs would support skipping the KGVs for aircraft carriers. Remember, no one at the time had much of an idea that planes would be so deadly to ships, so I bet the uproar would be pretty loud.

 

[ThomasP]

True. But my point is that, even if they had realized the ascendancy of the carrier over the battleship, they were limited in their options anyway.

 

[EwenS]

When was Chain Home approved?

The timeline on CH runs like this:-

1934 Watson Watt was asked about the possibilities of detecting aircraft with radio waves.
1935
Jan - Initial funding for the project. Further funding dependent on the success of a practical demonstration.
26 Feb - Successful Daventry experiment with Post Office transmitter and a borrowed Handley Page Heyford.
May - Additional funding allows recruitment of staff for experimental work on radar at Orfordness with Watson Watt.
Aug - Air Staff accept a proposal to develop a chain of stations from the Tyne to Southampton and Treasury funding is agreed by end of the year. Proposal is for 7 stations by Aug 1936 (target missed).
1936
Bawdsey Manor purchased to allow Watson Watt to develop the system further with all experiments transferred from Orfordness.
July - Fighter Command formed
1937
Jan - RDF training school set up at Bawdsey
April - First RDF towers erected at Bawdsey. Trials in exercises produced poor results revealing the need for Filter Rooms.
July / Aug - First Filter Room established at Bawdsey to co-ordinate information from Bawdsey & 2 other stations.
Aug - First trials of the system in exercises.
24 Sept 1937 Bawdsey becomes the first operational radar station in the world.
Nov - production order given to industry for 20 sets.
1938
Aug - more exercises involving Bawdsey & 4 other CH stations then available.

By the outbreak of WW2 there were 18 CH stations reporting to the Stanmore Filter Room plus 2 another independent stations. Plus 24 CHL stations on order, the first of which opened in Nov 1939.

 

[SaparotRob]

So Chain home went into action under Sir Neville Chamberlain?

 

[Admiral Beez]

So Chain home went into action under Sir Neville Chamberlain?

Yes, but it was developed and mostly funded under previous governments.

But we're not letting Baldwin off the hook. For starters, Baldwin's government could have followed Australia's example and taken a smarter approach with Japan. Australian Prime Minister Joseph Lyons and External Affairs Minister John Latham's below Jan 1935 proposal to the Empire was rejected by Baldwin's predecessor, the sickly Ramsay MacDonald, but Baldwin should have seen sense, especially as his government was now responsible for moving ahead with the Singapore naval base construction, until then on the backburner since 1923.

The Manchurian crisis and the genesis of Australian foreign policy | The Strategist

September 2021 marked 90 years since the Manchurian crisis, when the Imperial Japanese Army attacked and proceeded to occupy the Chinese province of Manchuria. This action precipitated the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

"Latham's position no doubt informed Lyons's efforts at the 1935 British Empire leaders' meeting. In a plea to stabilise relations with Japan, Lyons proposed a Pacific security pact. This proposal included recognition of Manchukuo. Lyons stressed his fear that Japan might turn its attention south—and towards Australia—if it wasn't allowed to expand in its immediate region. Much to Lyons's dismay, Manchuria was deemed a matter for the League of Nations and the pact was quickly set aside. Lyons would again raise the possibility of a Pacific security pact at the 1937 Imperial Conference, where it was again set aside."

I think Japan would have leapt at the opportunity to renew a security pact that included the Baldwin government's recognition of Manchukuo. Japan would have a face-saving exit from the financially ruinous war with China, and the British Empire can breath easier in the Pacific while they sort out a plan to deal with Italian aggression in the MTO and a fascist, rearming Germany.

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
The book 'Britain's Shield, Radar and the Defeat of the Luftwaffe' by David Zimmerman, has some useful information on the beginnings of radar, including on pages 26-27, the "temporary" suspension of construction of the improved Acoustical Mirror System (it had operated fairly well in the 1934 air exercises) on the 14th August 1935. The Air Ministry had suddenly suspended it without much explanation, they told the War Office that this was due to "pending further results of the experiments with radio detection". It appears that Air Ministry were already banking on Radar for future detection of air attacks.
During 1936 there were tests of the radar equipment then in place, images from the book below:

The 1938 air exercises with several radar stations and other parts of the system, were more realistic, details below:

So a lot of work was being done at quite a pace, although the equipment was not the 'best' that could be produced but it would be available earlier and therefore in place if hostilities did suddenly start (which in hindsight was the correct decision as by mid 1940 it was an extensive system). We should remember that no-one knew at the time that the war would start in September 1939 and that no re-armament programs were targeted at that date.

Mike

 

[Admiral Beez]

It appears that Air Ministry were already banking on Radar for future detection of air attacks. .... So a lot of work was being done at quite a pace,

In this case I don't think the 1935-37 Baldwin government could have done more to get radar up and running.

 

[Admiral Beez]

And don't forget the effects of the various Naval Limitation Treaties.

What of the little ships that would be so crucial in the coming war? Could Baldwin's government have ordered more destroyers or escorts and not violated any naval treaties?

Previous governments began construction on quite a few destoyers...

• MacDonald government, six years (June 1929 - June 1935) - 18 x G/H class laid down in 1934-35, 18 x E/F class 1933-34, 14 x C/D class in 1931-32 and eleven (of twenty) A/B class in 1929-30. Total of 61 destroyers laid down during this government.
• Baldwin, three years (June 1935 – May 1937) - 8 x I-class in 1936 and 15 x Tribal class in 1936-37. Total of 23 destroyers laid down during this government. There were no destroyers begun under Baldwin's government in 1935. There seems to be a lag until the first two I-class are laid down in January 1936. Perhaps the yards were jammed with existing construction.

Perhaps priorities and funding were elsewhere, but if the naval treaties prevent the construction of battleships, aircraft carriers and cruisers, why not focus on building a ton of the little ships?

 

[Shortround6]

Destroyers are expensive per ton of ship.
The Tribals were expensive for a British destroyer but they felt they were necessary to counter other navy's big destroyers.
Actual 32-36kt destroyers are are very expensive for anti-submarine ships.

Destroyers were almost always (or always?) built in smaller yards that specialized in Destroyer production.

Destroyers and smaller ships had shorter build times which generally meant that they could ramp up production as international tensions rose.

The first 6 Dido class cruisers took around 3 years to complete after being laid down in 2nd half of 1937.
The Tribals took about 2 to 2 1/2 years to build
The J's took just about 2 years to build.
The early Hunts were usually just over a year to build. Granted they were a bit later in timing and the war started just a few months after laying down.

 

[EwenS]

What of the little ships that would be so crucial in the coming war? Could Baldwin's government have ordered more destroyers or escorts and not violated any naval treaties?

The was no limitation on ships under 600 tons. Britain was building turbine engined Kingfisher class scoops from 1933 (9 completed between June 1935 and Nov 1939). But these proved to be too small and expensive with their turbine machinery to be mass produced in time of war. Hence the hurried development of the Flower class corvette in 1939 (925 tons standard displacement with reciprocating machinery able to be built quickly in civilian yards used to building trawlers etc and manned by personnel from fishing fleet and merchant navy).

Kingfisher-class sloop - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

No limitation on ships between 600 and 2000 tons provided no guns over 6.1", no more than 4 guns over 3", no torpedoes and speed <20knots. Britain built a considerable number of sloops under this provision between the wars. 32 in total between the 1928 Bridgewater class and the 1938 Black Swan class which were just beginning to enter service as WW2 began. In particular 8 Grimsby class and 3 Bittern class were laid down between Jan 1933 and Aug 1936.

Grimsby-class sloop - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

When it came to WW2 these ships were amongst the best escort ships available to the RN. More modified Black Swan were built in WW2. But the class was too complex for mass production with turbine machinery and complex gunnery direction systems.

There was a limit on destroyer tonnage of 150,000 tons and no more than 16% of that can be in ships over 1,500 tons. (there are other rules but those are the main points). Ships laid down before 1 Jan 1921 could not be replaced for 12 years. Ships laid down after that for 16 years.

The problem for Britain was the large number of R,S,V, W & mod W class destroyers built at the end of WW1. While large numbers were scrapped in the early 1930s, so freeing up tonnage, they couldn't be replaced one for one so there was still a single R plus S,V,W and mod W available to serve in WW2 (total 80 ships).

Britain started new destroyer construction under the 1927 Naval Estimates ordering a class of 8 plus a flotilla leader each year (except for 1929 when it was a half flotilla) through to 1935 (The A to I classes). Then in 1935 there is a step change with the design of the big (over 1,500 ton) Tribal class, the first 7 of which were ordered in March 1936 with another 9 following. All were laid down by the end of Jan 1937. There classes formed the core ofvthe RN destroyer flotilla on the outbreak of war and suffered accordingly with about two thirds being sunk.

It is all very well to ask how to build more ships. But how do you crew them? And it was only in Sept 1931 that the Atlantic Fleet had mutinied at Govt attempts to cut sailors wages. That doesn't do a lot for recruitment.

In the 1930s a lot of destroyers were in Reserve as old V & W were replaced in the active fleet by new A to I classes. And ships in Reserve still cost money to maintain. And how do you argue for ever more shiny new toys when the old ones have only just been taken out if service.

And not enough money was being spent on RN Dockyards in Britain in the 1930s. Things like new and bigger dry docks. This was something that caused problems from 1943 with new carrier designs and is still being felt today. The US on the other hand invested heavily in infrastructure from about 1938/39.

 

[Shortround6]

Destroyers actually make pretty lousy anti-submarine ships as too much is invested in their machinery (boilers/turbines) and in the surface armament (guns/torpedoes) until the Tribals the AA armament was total crap. The Tribals were only sort of crap.

Then when you got done with all that they tried to jam a single K gun (depth charge launcher) on each side and one or two short depth charge rails over the stern, depending on how the ship trimmed by the stern
The Destroyers that were used as escorts in the North Atlantic often had one set of torpedoes tubes taken out and one of the 4.7in guns (and sometimes two) to increase the amount of depth charges & launchers and allow for a few pitiful AA guns.

The British actually had a good idea of what they wanted. The problem was that the best was the enemy of good. Like the 20kt turbine sloops instead of the reciprocating engine Frigates. The Corvettes were a little too cheap to be ideal but they certainly allowed numbers to be built.