PM Stanley Baldwin expedites rearmament

[Admiral Beez]

The was no limitation on ships under 600 tons.

If that's the case, my vote is for lots more MTB and MTGBs from their introduction in 1937. Include Building them in India and Australia for work around Malaya, Burma, PNG and ANZ.

It is all very well to ask how to build more ships. But how do you crew them?

For those made in India and ANZ, the RAN, RIN and RNZN will crew them.

 

[Shortround6]

If that's the case, my vote is for lots more MTB and MTGBs from their introduction in 1937. Include Building them in India and Australia for work around Malaya, Burma, PNG and ANZ.

For those made in India and ANZ, the RAN, RIN and RNZN will crew them.

Ok, now you need engines. In 1937/38 you have two choices.
Napier lions.
Hall-Scott engines from the US.
1937 Hall-Scott was putting a pair of 6 cylinder Invader engines on a common crankcase (V-12) to make the Defender engine. They were good for around 550-600hp each.

Now you have the problem of these boats having a practical endurance of a couple of days IF you don't use high speed. At high speed endurance is measured in hours.

 

[EwenS]

If that's the case, my vote is for lots more MTB and MTGBs from their introduction in 1937. Include Building them in India and Australia for work around Malaya, Burma, PNG and ANZ.

For those made in India and ANZ, the RAN, RIN and RNZN will crew them.

Now I'm confused. Just what role are you looking to fill? MTB/MGB were not referred to as Coastal Craft for nothing. Generally unable to to travel far from the coast (some of the larger types did however make ocean transit voyages later in the war). Crews of the smaller types generally lived ashore. Only able to carry generally light weapons. But they could be built quickly so you don't need to start in 1935 producing vast numbers. They would have been no good as ocean convoy escorts for example.

Development of these craft actually did begin in 1935. The first order for British Power Boat saw a initial order for 18 completed 1936-39. Other companies and designs appeared as war approached.

Engines were a major problem as pointed out. Britain didn't have access to the type of lightweight Diesel engines that Germany had for its S boats (E boats) until post WW2. The earliest Vosper and Thornycroft craft had petrol engines from Isotta-Fraschini, an Italian company, until that source dried up in June 1940 when Italy entered the war.

Harbour Defence Motor Launches (HDML. 54 tons 11.5 knots) and Fairmile Type B Motor Launches (ML, 73 tons 20 knots) were built by small boatbuilders both in the U.K. and around the world in places from Canada to Egypt, down the East African Coast to South Africa, across the Indian Ocean to India, Ceylon, Burma, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and Hong Kong. Most of these were manned by personnel from the countries they were built in. Many hundreds of these craft were built and used in a variety of roles but largely in coastal waters.

 

[pbehn]

The British learned about it too, but they were able to recover. Barely.
The British were adding a number of squadrons per year to the RAF, (and ships and some army equipment) but that means they needed something for the new squadrons to fly as they were adding squadrons faster than the "new" aircraft could be built and the older aircraft passed down to the new squadrons.
So they ordered new production of old designs with the idea that they could build the old designs faster (at least they knew the old designs worked).

Situations change, Hawkers were given permission to export the Hurricane because at one stage they were making them faster than the RAF could accept them. To me that is mismanagement by the RAF not the government.

 

[SaparotRob]

Situations change, Hawkers were given permission to export the Hurricane because at one stage they were making them faster than the RAF could accept them. To me that is mismanagement by the RAF not the government.

Hit reply by accident.

 

[Shortround6]

I have some sketchy information about British motor launches but nothing about MTBs/MGBs.

The WW I 80 ft motor launch

was good for about 19 kts on trial from their pair of 220hp engines (460rpm)
They held about 6.6 tons of fuel.
Endurance was about 1000 miles at 15kts.
They were sold out of service at the end of WW I and were judged not very useful being very wet in a seaway.

The HDML was drawn up in 1939

Speed 11-12 kts depending on engines (130-160hp diesels) with 1250 gallons in the main tanks and another 300 gal addition in the engine room. Assuming IMP Gal
endurance about 2000 miles at 10 kts. There were very successful under took some very long distance voyages. However they had very limited offensive capability.

The Fairmile A was started before the war but not finished until 1940.

3 Hall-Scott Defender engines of 600hp each drove them at 25kts or 22kts max continuous.
Fuel was only 1200 gallons.
The Fairmile B had a change in hull form to a round bilge.

A shortage of the Hall-Scott defender engines led to only two engines being fitted.
Max speed was 20kts with max continuous being 17.5kts.
Fuel below deck was 2305 gallons,
Endurance at max speed was 600 miles, at 12kts they were good for 1500 miles.
They were very seaworthy and many long trips. Often with fuel tanks on the deck to peak at 5000 gallons.

They did use the Fairmile A to build the Fairmile MGBs while they sorted out the smaller high speed MGBs

Three 900hp Hall Scott supercharged engines gave them a speed of 26 1/2 Kts. 1800 gallons gave them an endurance of 500 miles at 10kts.
They had increased weight from about 50 tons to 75 tons.

the older MTBs were the 55ft boats (or around there)

design dates to WW I but nearly identical boats were built during the 1930s for forego governments.
In fact four were taken over by the RN at the start of WW II.
They were around 12-17 tons and engines ranged from a pair of 375s to over 450hp ones.
No information on range but it must have been short.

British power boat co 60ft

These started about 1935-36 and were the boats powered by 3 Napier Lions of 600hp each. They ran trials at 18 tons but in service they were between 22-24 tons.
Top speed in service was about 33kts. Fuel capacity of 500 gallons or 740 gallons including a deck tank. Torpedoes were launched over the stern on the folding racks.
These boats did make it to Malta on their own bottoms. but they stopped at Brest, Corunna and Lisbon on the way to Gibraltar.

 

[SaparotRob]

Great stuff!

 

[ThomasP]

I recall reading that some company in the UK was talking to Isotta-Fraschini about license production of their engine pre-war. Maybe if they had arranged license for the ASM-180/-181 (900 HP) earlier (say in the mid-1930s) they could have had a very good engine available by the start of WWII in an equivalent to the ASM-183 (1150 HP) of 1937.

Thorneycroft(?) used the ASM-183 (or similar variant) in some of their 1938 boats.

 

[EwenS]

The biggest thing that needs to be remembered about all the British planning pre-war is that no one envisaged envisaged the surrender of France as happened in June1940 nor the occupation of Netherlands, Denmark and Norway in April/May 1940 that had remained neutral in WW1. That was a complete game changer. At that point all pre-war planning went out the window. Italy joining the war in June 1940 added to the problems. And planning was on the basis that it would be war in Europe or the Far East but not both simultaneously.

Virtually overnight, in April / May 1940 that has several effects:-

1. No French Fleet available to balance out the Italian Fleet in the Med.
2. U-boats that in WW1 and WW2 until June 1940, had to travel from Germany, round northern Scotland expending fuel to position to attack convoys relatively close to Britain, were now based in Norway and on the Biscay coast and able to travel much further out into the Atlantic than had been planned for. The maps of monthly merchant ship sinking show a dramatic change from July 1940 as U-boats range further afield.

Ship losses by month - uboat.net

The U-boat War in World War Two (Kriegsmarine, 1939-1945) and World War One (Kaiserliche Marine, 1914-1918) and the Allied efforts to counter the threat. This section includes over 21.000 Allied Warships and over 11.000 Allied Commanders of WWII, from the US Navy, Royal Navy, Royal Canadian...

uboat.net

3. Instead of there being a threat in the coastal waters of the southern North Sea, that was extended all the way down the English Channel.
4. The threat from the air was now coming at Britain from air bases from Norway to the Brittany peninsula, instead of a more confined area from across the North Sea.

All of that multiplied the defence problems for Britain. So there are the following effects (probably amongst many others)
1. The CH radar network had to be extended to cover all of Britain's coastline not just the Tyne to Southampton. And with it the amount of airspace that Fighter Command needs to protect. Into 1941 the Air Defence of Scapa Flow, a main Home Fleet Anchorage, was determined to be an RN responsibility as the RAF couldn't spare fighter squadrons for the purpose.
2. The RN became spread much more thinly across Home and Med waters in 1940/41 than was ever intended, let alone after war with Japan broke out.
3. While the Flower class corvette was designed in 1939 (laid down from around the outbreak of war) for operations in waters close to Britain's shores (ie a WW1 type AS war) by the time they were entering service from April 1940 the U-boat war was changing. The result of that was the design in the latter part of 1940 of the ocean going twin screw corvette (aka the River class frigate) to augment the pre-war sloops and old WW1 destroyers in the AS war. The First U-boat Happy Time was July-Oct 1940 after the Fall of France.
4. Most of the pre-war MTB were sent to the Med (2 flotillas) and Hong Kong (1 flotilla). With the need to attack enemy shipping along the full length of the English Channel after June 1940, Coastal Forces become much more important.

So the Fleet that Baldwin's Govt would in 1935 have envisaged needing in time of war was not the Fleet that turned out to be necessary to fight WW2.

 

[EwenS]

Details of the various types of Coastal Craft can be found on U-boat.net

Motor Torpedo Boats - Allied Warships of WWII - uboat.net

The U-boat War in World War Two (Kriegsmarine, 1939-1945) and World War One (Kaiserliche Marine, 1914-1918) and the Allied efforts to counter the threat. This section includes over 21.000 Allied Warships and over 11.000 Allied Commanders of WWII, from the US Navy, Royal Navy, Royal Canadian...

uboat.net

Motor Launchs - Allied Warships of WWII - uboat.net

The U-boat War in World War Two (Kriegsmarine, 1939-1945) and World War One (Kaiserliche Marine, 1914-1918) and the Allied efforts to counter the threat. This section includes over 21.000 Allied Warships and over 11.000 Allied Commanders of WWII, from the US Navy, Royal Navy, Royal Canadian...

uboat.net

Submarine chasers - Allied Warships of WWII - uboat.net

The U-boat War in World War Two (Kriegsmarine, 1939-1945) and World War One (Kaiserliche Marine, 1914-1918) and the Allied efforts to counter the threat. This section includes over 21.000 Allied Warships and over 11.000 Allied Commanders of WWII, from the US Navy, Royal Navy, Royal Canadian...

uboat.net

Motor Gun Boats - Allied Warships of WWII - uboat.net

The U-boat War in World War Two (Kriegsmarine, 1939-1945) and World War One (Kaiserliche Marine, 1914-1918) and the Allied efforts to counter the threat. This section includes over 21.000 Allied Warships and over 11.000 Allied Commanders of WWII, from the US Navy, Royal Navy, Royal Canadian...

uboat.net

Motor Anti-Submarine Boats - Allied Warships of WWII - uboat.net

The U-boat War in World War Two (Kriegsmarine, 1939-1945) and World War One (Kaiserliche Marine, 1914-1918) and the Allied efforts to counter the threat. This section includes over 21.000 Allied Warships and over 11.000 Allied Commanders of WWII, from the US Navy, Royal Navy, Royal Canadian...

uboat.net

Some of the best coastal forces craft were the Fairmile D type. Larger, and able to carry a heavier armament so combining the MTB and MGB roles in a single vessel.

 

[pinehilljoe]

In his book With Wings Like Eagles: The Untold Story of the Battle of Britain, Michael Korda is kind to Baldwin and Chamberlain. As he puts it, the appeasers funded the Hurricane, the Spitfire, Radar and the Integrated Command, Control and Communications System. When the Battle of Britain started, Britain had the weapon system to fight.

 

[EwenS]

In his book With Wings Like Eagles: The Untold Story of the Battle of Britain, Michael Korda is kind to Baldwin and Chamberlain. As he puts it, the appeasers funded the Hurricane, the Spitfire, Radar and the Integrated Command, Control and Communications System. When the Battle of Britain started, Britain had the weapon system to fight.

The first squadron received Spitfires in Aug 1938. By the outbreak of war that had increased to 11.

As I noted above the CH network in Aug 1938 consisted of 5 stations. By the outbreak of war that had increased to 20.

 

[GreenKnight121]

I have long understood that much of Chamberlain's so-called "appeasement" was actually a moderately well-informed plan of "slow Hitler as much as we can diplomatically while we get our military ready to fight", mixed with a good dose of "make Hitler think we aren't planning to fight him, so he doesn't pay as much attention to our preparations as he might if he thinks we are a threat".

To pull off the second he had to publicly play the "over-optimistic peace-seeker" to convince the Germans to not look closer.

 

[MikeMeech]

I recall reading that some company in the UK was talking to Isotta-Fraschini about license production of their engine pre-war. Maybe if they had arranged license for the ASM-180/-181 (900 HP) earlier (say in the mid-1930s) they could have had a very good engine available by the start of WWII in an equivalent to the ASM-183 (1150 HP) of 1937.

Thorneycroft(?) used the ASM-183 (or similar variant) in some of their 1938 boats.

Hi
Reference the Isotta Fraschini, the book 'Nelson to Vanguard' by D K Brown, page 139 footnote 13, mentions: "A suggestion that Vosper should build these under licence was not pursued. The Italian price was £5250 each and thought excessive."

Mike

 

[MikeMeech]

Yes, but it was developed and mostly funded under previous governments.

But we're not letting Baldwin off the hook. For starters, Baldwin's government could have followed Australia's example and taken a smarter approach with Japan. Australian Prime Minister Joseph Lyons and External Affairs Minister John Latham's below Jan 1935 proposal to the Empire was rejected by Baldwin's predecessor, the sickly Ramsay MacDonald, but Baldwin should have seen sense, especially as his government was now responsible for moving ahead with the Singapore naval base construction, until then on the backburner since 1923.

The Manchurian crisis and the genesis of Australian foreign policy | The Strategist

September 2021 marked 90 years since the Manchurian crisis, when the Imperial Japanese Army attacked and proceeded to occupy the Chinese province of Manchuria. This action precipitated the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

"Latham's position no doubt informed Lyons's efforts at the 1935 British Empire leaders' meeting. In a plea to stabilise relations with Japan, Lyons proposed a Pacific security pact. This proposal included recognition of Manchukuo. Lyons stressed his fear that Japan might turn its attention south—and towards Australia—if it wasn't allowed to expand in its immediate region. Much to Lyons's dismay, Manchuria was deemed a matter for the League of Nations and the pact was quickly set aside. Lyons would again raise the possibility of a Pacific security pact at the 1937 Imperial Conference, where it was again set aside."

I think Japan would have leapt at the opportunity to renew a security pact that included the Baldwin government's recognition of Manchukuo. Japan would have a face-saving exit from the financially ruinous war with China, and the British Empire can breath easier in the Pacific while they sort out a plan to deal with Italian aggression in the MTO and a fascist, rearming Germany.

Hi
Interesting that Australia wanted to do 'deals' with Japan, Australian governments had been fairly 'lukewarm' to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty' during much of its existence. The Treaty ended mainly to keep on the side of the USA, indeed part of the push to end it came from Canada to keep up a good relationship with the US.
There is an interesting comment in Boyd's 'The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters', page 168:

It appears that Australia was not keen (like many countries) to spend money on defence despite their fears of Japan. It could be argued that if they had spent the same proportion of national income that Britain was they would have been in a better position at the start of the war, but there are always better things to spend money on than defence in peacetime.

Mike

 

[MikeMeech]

Neville Chamberlain (PM May 1937 to Oct 1940) is unfairly blamed IMO for Britain not being sufficient armed for WW2. Where I think Britain could have done better is under PM Stanley Baldwin, who was PM from June 1935 to May 1937. Baldwin was certainly busy during the last months of his government, having ordered all three Illustrious class carriers and the final two KGV class battleships between Jan and April 1937, but could he have done more? The Great Depression was rapidly losing its hold on Britain and Hitler has been in power since 1933.

Hi
Aviation rearmament fairly early, 1934, on with a rapid change in the types of expansion schemes up to the war. From 'Grand Strategy Volume 1' by N H Gibbs, page 563:

And from 'Industry and Air Power, The Expansion of British Aircraft Production, 1935-1941' by Seb Ritchie, page 42:

The 'F' Scheme (1936) included the introduction of 'Shadow Factories' to give more production capacity aircraft, aero engines etc. It all had to be done without bankrupting the country and keeping up trading with other nations to bring in earnings, which included exporting aircraft (including licence agreements for the Hurricane production in other countries) as well as ships, tanks etc. This was not unusual, indeed US companies were selling licence agreements for Douglas, Lockheed and North American types (plus Hamilton Standard CS propellers) to Japan in the late 1930s despite the US government disapproving of its actions in China at the time.

Mike

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

RAF expansion, much is a repeat of the above table 16.
8 March 1934, Air estimates, 4 more RAF squadrons, 2 home, 2 overseas.
19 July 1934, to expand the RAF by 41 squadrons over 4 years (Including the 4 from March), 33 for home defence, meaning the Metropolitan Air Force would grow from 42 to 75 squadrons, while the other 9 squadrons were for the FAA or overseas. This was scheme A. In addition to the 75 home squadrons there were four flying boat and five army co-operation squadrons in Britain.

May 1935 Scheme C, 125 squadrons in Britain, with 1,512 aircraft, to be completed by March 1937, or two years earlier than scheme A. The 1935 estimates upped the air force expenditure by 3 million pounds, scheme C pushed this to 5.33 million pounds.

25 February 1936, Scheme F, most light bomber production with medium ones, reserves provided for, shadow factories. "providing for a Metropolitan Air Force of 124 squadrons with 1736 first-line aircraft, an overseas strength of 37 squadrons with 468 aircraft, and a Fleet Air Arm with the equivalent of 26 squadrons and 312 aircraft, was the longest-lived of all the expansion schemes. It actually ran its full course. Sir Kingsley Wood, Secretary of State for Air, was able to state in the House of Commons on 9 March, 1939, that it would be completed by the appointed date, then only three weeks ahead. [H.C. Debates, vol. 344, Col. 2387.] It was in fact the only pre-war expansion programme that was completed."

Scheme H and J from 1937 not put into action, (J reported to cost 650 million pounds)

Scheme K was a cut down J, dropped after the The Anschluss.

Scheme L, April 1938, " Metropolitan Air Force of 141 squadrons and approximately 2370 first-line aircraft, to be completed by 31 March, 1940, and for such increases in the overseas and Fleet Air Arm establishments as would bring their first-line strength to approximately 490 and 500 respectively"

Scheme M The date for its completion was 31 March, 1942, the Cabinet's approval was given rather for an over-all program of construction than for the precise establishment of squadrons and machines. When it came before the Cabinet in November, 1938, it was expected the number of new aircraft authorised in Scheme L - 12,000 aircraft within two years - would probably be completed by the due date of 31 March, 1940, "The total number of Metropolitan squadrons provided for under Scheme M was 163, with 2549 first-line aircraft; the air striking force was to be 85 heavy bomber squadrons, with 1360 aircraft. The provision for overseas was also greater than that in Scheme L - 49 squadrons with 636 aircraft as compared with the former programme of 39 squadrons with 490 aircraft."

The Air Force numbered 31,000 officers and men in 1934. The strength of the Air Force on 1 September 1939 was approximately 118,000 plus reserves totalling about 45,000. The Auxiliary Air Force was created in 1934, along with the Special Reserve, under the Auxiliary Air Force and Air Force Reserve Act of that year. The Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve was announced by the Air Ministry at the end of August, 1936. A start was made with the training in April 1937

Production for the RAF in 1934 was 652 aircraft according to Air 19/524, it grew to 917 in 1935 while military aircraft production was 2,280 in 1937 including 105 for export and 48 for dominions. (Top of non RAF orders were 84 Gladiator for export, 26 Anson for Dominions). To fill in the gaps, 1936 production for the RAF and dominions was 1,820, 1938 military aircraft production was 2,827 including exports, 1939 was 7,998. As time went on more export orders were treated as offsets from RAF contracts.

It would be worthwhile to locate the census of production as it seems to count military and civil aircraft production to end up with 1,108 in 1934 and 1,807 in 1935, unless Britain was exporting 1 military aircraft for every 1 built for the RAF or the years being reported are actually 1935 and 1936.