Possibly the Worst Aviation "History" Video I've Encountered

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Better and faster. Bf109 with gun underwing pods. Could pack a punch but better and faster..well.

The Sterling Short. Ok thats enough. I think i give this kindergarten presentation a minus but will level with a cookie and milk. Have to speak to his parrents though.
 
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You know how there are websites out there that present such lists as the "ten worst fighters of WWII" or the "WW2's worst aircraft ranked"?

Well, there should be a site that has the "worst WWII YouTube info videos list" that ranks them in the order of the absolute worst and then picks them apart accordingly.

That way the War Thunder rejects can't delete comments that try and address their stupidity.
 
GrauGeist said:
You know how there are websites out there that present such lists as the "ten worst fighters of WWII" or the "WW2's worst aircraft ranked"?

Well, there should be a site that has the "worst WWII YouTube info videos list" that ranks them in the order of the absolute worst and then picks them apart accordingly.

That way the War Thunder rejects can't delete comments that try and address their stupidity.
Click to expand...

Honestly lets. We could make a thread on it. This is my submission (wooo hopefully 1!!!). Eventually we could link it to other locations and spread the knowledge.
 
To hs credit he did not erase my comments:
"

drgondog

3 days ago
A presentation that misses the supreme point of the B-17 as well as showers the viewers with a load of crap. First, we (USAAF) went to war with what we had and fought that war as best we knew how, and succeeded (Strategic Bombing) on critical German industrial targets. Like him or not Speer commented that the 8th AF (and later 15th AF) were a crucial factor in the destruction - or forced dispersal causing severe production shortages - of the German aircraft industry. You chose to cast aspersions on Spaatz, LeMay and Arnold from the comfort of your office chair - not giving even the slightest nod to the leadership demonstrated throughout the pre-Pearl Harbor existance of a fledling Air Force that grew from 10's of thousands of Regular Army in 1938 to 1.2M in 1945. You failed to note that the 8th AF led the way, and for certain understood the mantra of learn, adapt and improvise to solve the problem that RAF told them couldn't be done. You seemed to ignore Spaatz arguing against 'accepted wisdom of the Transportation Plan pre D-Day, including Harris and specifically Portal and Leigh Mallory - to go after the Oil/Synthetic Fuel industry. Speer noted that the day, May 12, 1944, marked the 'end of Germany as an industrialized nation'. Second, the German high command realized the threat and made destruction of daylight bombing their first priority, to the extreme - ordering their Fighter Command to 'ignore' escort fighters. Note that nearly 2x Bomber Comand casualties to German Night Fighters when the NJG were FAR fewer in number to German Day Fighter force and the (few) NJG units suffered far fewer losses to the Lancaster and Mosquitos. The NJG continued to inflict outrageous losses vs the Lancaster throughout the end of the war - not so for the B-17s and B-24s ofthe 8th and 15th AF. While not specifically significant factually, B-17s were slow compared to German fighters, the operational airspeed for formation flying at 25000 feet was 150mph IAS - about 215mph True Airspeed inbound to target. Slower than the Lanc at 15000 feet but far less vulnerable to flak. Additionally, at 25-28K the performance of the FW 190 and Bf109 fell off rapidly above 22000 feet, about full throttle height for bot fighter and FAR above optimal altitude for Me 110, Me 410, Ju 88 twin engine fighters - right in the strike zone of P-51s, P-38s and P-47s - particularly the P-51B with 1650-3 engine with FTH of second speed blower at 29,000 feet. Turn and climb are particulary sensitive to Excess Horsepower Available. Back to LeMay - he succeeded in strategic bombing campaign, at night. far better than Bomber Harris or RAF, because a.) he understood that much of Japan's indutrial foo chain were mbedded in shops and factories at the heart of the cities, b.) That Japan's night defense capability bot in fighters and AAA were pitiful in comparison to Germany and, c.) that the B-29 could successfully attack at low level, with less strain on engines, heavier bomb loads, and far fewer losses. One might argue that that campaign EXACTLY achieved what Bomber Harris attempted and failed to accomplish. Back to Arnold. He recognizd that during the Spanish Civil War, that pursuit would achieve lethality to the B-17 (and B-24) ind initiated the B-29 program in 1941 to replace both US 'Heavy Bombers' in case we needed to go to war. His was the hand that over rode AAF Materiel Command obstinance in refusing to 'buy' North American's P-51 in form of A-36, then again in supporting NAA's venture into Merlin powered Mustang XP-51B program. I was not particularly surprised at the attack on the conceptual 'Flying Fortress' given that it never lived up to capability of self defense, but candidly I was shocked that you stooped to ad hominem attacks on the AAF leadership. Summary, AAF went to war with what they had. They replaced 'what they had' when a better option presented itself (B-17 vs B-29, P-51B vs P-47D/P-38 ) and they successfuly executed their strategy globally. You wish to contrast that with RAF, LW, VVS, Japan?



Ygod6N0XRFK62B92nCwY4Mws=s48-c-k-c0x00ffffff-no-rj.jpg

[h3][/h3]HardThrasher
3 days ago
You make some very valid points about strategic bombing, but that was explicitly not what I was trying to address - do not confuse my anger at a shitty areoplane with a failure to recognise both the importance of US efforts vs Germany strategically or failures within the RAF to for example, drag Leigh Mallory out into the street by the hair and shoot him, which by 1944 was really a quite reasonable next step.


dBWPRwQJbJoiLYhWOAS8wu8w=s48-c-k-c0x00ffffff-no-rj.jpg

drgondog

3 days ago
@HardThrasher - why should you be angry at the B-17 and confuse it with a 'shitty airplane'? Name another bomber delivered in 1935 that delivers the same, or similar strategic accomplishments? You are correct if you wish to point out that the B-17 needed escort to survive air battles over Germany after mid 1943. You may, strangely, point out that the defensive firepower of the B-17 was inadquate to stop Bf 109s and Fw 190s in daylght strategic bombing, ditto for the B-24.
At that point you should pause and hold one, and only one, WWII design avilable in 1942 that 'might' have been a better solution for daylght strategic role - the Mosquito. That said, the Mossie, granted the wildest of probabilities of actually having the numbers and bomb aiming equipment to attack point targets without advantage of surprise - would also have different results in daytime ops against Bf 109s and FW 190s when forced to fly long distances with external tanks for the range while maintaining its only true advantage - speed. To even approach the 'at target' approach results require significant force/numbers to concentrate bomb loads on a large Industrial complex or refinery.

Plus, IIRC the '4000 pound' bomb load were Cookies, Not AP capable. Granted the next load out of 1x2000 pound GP or AP is useful, that is only 25% of the B-17 at say, Berlin or Posnan. If you propose low level single ship strikes I would love to see your Plan. Certainly NOTHING else in RAF inventory stood a chance of Better survival odds than the B-17 vs Day Fighters of Luftwaffe during daylight.

The Lancaster specifically, was not very survivable against single nightfighter attacks. Can you imagine the carnage if pressed into daylight operations unescorted, against Schweinfurt, Berlin? Could it even travel to Posnan or Prague - and if so at what altitude? Absent Merlin 61 series with 2S/2speed SC, it is worse off than Davis wing equipped B-24 if applied to US combat ops doctrine. Does it fly with same tactics as Night ops - no formation, but catch as catch can? How does that work out when German spotters on the coast mark and track and feed into central communications? It may be harder to concentrate large forces of Day fighters - but why bother? One FW 190A-8 is a nightmare in trail and virtually unstoppable in head on single attacks.

The B-24 while arguably a better bomber, all things considered, both faster and longer range - was arguably less able to defend itself. Before you hasten to point out lower loss rate per sortie, remember that it was not truly operational in Division level Strength until 1944 - when target escort was introduced. The Few B-24 BGs in 8th AF were clobbered because their high altitude restrictions due to Davis Wing had them flying Purple Heart corner, low and in trail until dispatched to 12 AF where the REALLY got clobbered at low altitude (Think twice about Mossie daylight ops against Ploesti!). Summary? The B-17 was as good as it had to be, suffered incredible loses in the most hostile attack/defense environment in WWII - and there was no single alternative to replace it in 1943/1944 for Strategic Daylight Bombing.
 
drgondog said:
To hs credit he did not erase my comments:
"

drgondog

3 days ago
A presentation that misses the supreme point of the B-17 as well as showers the viewers with a load of crap. First, we (USAAF) went to war with what we had and fought that war as best we knew how, and succeeded (Strategic Bombing) on critical German industrial targets. Like him or not Speer commented that the 8th AF (and later 15th AF) were a crucial factor in the destruction - or forced dispersal causing severe production shortages - of the German aircraft industry. You chose to cast aspersions on Spaatz, LeMay and Arnold from the comfort of your office chair - not giving even the slightest nod to the leadership demonstrated throughout the pre-Pearl Harbor existance of a fledling Air Force that grew from 10's of thousands of Regular Army in 1938 to 1.2M in 1945. You failed to note that the 8th AF led the way, and for certain understood the mantra of learn, adapt and improvise to solve the problem that RAF told them couldn't be done. You seemed to ignore Spaatz arguing against 'accepted wisdom of the Transportation Plan pre D-Day, including Harris and specifically Portal and Leigh Mallory - to go after the Oil/Synthetic Fuel industry. Speer noted that the day, May 12, 1944, marked the 'end of Germany as an industrialized nation'. Second, the German high command realized the threat and made destruction of daylight bombing their first priority, to the extreme - ordering their Fighter Command to 'ignore' escort fighters. Note that nearly 2x Bomber Comand casualties to German Night Fighters when the NJG were FAR fewer in number to German Day Fighter force and the (few) NJG units suffered far fewer losses to the Lancaster and Mosquitos. The NJG continued to inflict outrageous losses vs the Lancaster throughout the end of the war - not so for the B-17s and B-24s ofthe 8th and 15th AF. While not specifically significant factually, B-17s were slow compared to German fighters, the operational airspeed for formation flying at 25000 feet was 150mph IAS - about 215mph True Airspeed inbound to target. Slower than the Lanc at 15000 feet but far less vulnerable to flak. Additionally, at 25-28K the performance of the FW 190 and Bf109 fell off rapidly above 22000 feet, about full throttle height for bot fighter and FAR above optimal altitude for Me 110, Me 410, Ju 88 twin engine fighters - right in the strike zone of P-51s, P-38s and P-47s - particularly the P-51B with 1650-3 engine with FTH of second speed blower at 29,000 feet. Turn and climb are particulary sensitive to Excess Horsepower Available. Back to LeMay - he succeeded in strategic bombing campaign, at night. far better than Bomber Harris or RAF, because a.) he understood that much of Japan's indutrial foo chain were mbedded in shops and factories at the heart of the cities, b.) That Japan's night defense capability bot in fighters and AAA were pitiful in comparison to Germany and, c.) that the B-29 could successfully attack at low level, with less strain on engines, heavier bomb loads, and far fewer losses. One might argue that that campaign EXACTLY achieved what Bomber Harris attempted and failed to accomplish. Back to Arnold. He recognizd that during the Spanish Civil War, that pursuit would achieve lethality to the B-17 (and B-24) ind initiated the B-29 program in 1941 to replace both US 'Heavy Bombers' in case we needed to go to war. His was the hand that over rode AAF Materiel Command obstinance in refusing to 'buy' North American's P-51 in form of A-36, then again in supporting NAA's venture into Merlin powered Mustang XP-51B program. I was not particularly surprised at the attack on the conceptual 'Flying Fortress' given that it never lived up to capability of self defense, but candidly I was shocked that you stooped to ad hominem attacks on the AAF leadership. Summary, AAF went to war with what they had. They replaced 'what they had' when a better option presented itself (B-17 vs B-29, P-51B vs P-47D/P-38 ) and they successfuly executed their strategy globally. You wish to contrast that with RAF, LW, VVS, Japan?



View attachment 723527
[h3][/h3]HardThrasher
3 days ago
You make some very valid points about strategic bombing, but that was explicitly not what I was trying to address - do not confuse my anger at a shitty areoplane with a failure to recognise both the importance of US efforts vs Germany strategically or failures within the RAF to for example, drag Leigh Mallory out into the street by the hair and shoot him, which by 1944 was really a quite reasonable next step.


View attachment 723528

drgondog

3 days ago
@HardThrasher - why should you be angry at the B-17 and confuse it with a 'shitty airplane'? Name another bomber delivered in 1935 that delivers the same, or similar strategic accomplishments? You are correct if you wish to point out that the B-17 needed escort to survive air battles over Germany after mid 1943. You may, strangely, point out that the defensive firepower of the B-17 was inadquate to stop Bf 109s and Fw 190s in daylght strategic bombing, ditto for the B-24.
At that point you should pause and hold one, and only one, WWII design avilable in 1942 that 'might' have been a better solution for daylght strategic role - the Mosquito. That said, the Mossie, granted the wildest of probabilities of actually having the numbers and bomb aiming equipment to attack point targets without advantage of surprise - would also have different results in daytime ops against Bf 109s and FW 190s when forced to fly long distances with external tanks for the range while maintaining its only true advantage - speed. To even approach the 'at target' approach results require significant force/numbers to concentrate bomb loads on a large Industrial complex or refinery.

Plus, IIRC the '4000 pound' bomb load were Cookies, Not AP capable. Granted the next load out of 1x2000 pound GP or AP is useful, that is only 25% of the B-17 at say, Berlin or Posnan. If you propose low level single ship strikes I would love to see your Plan. Certainly NOTHING else in RAF inventory stood a chance of Better survival odds than the B-17 vs Day Fighters of Luftwaffe during daylight.

The Lancaster specifically, was not very survivable against single nightfighter attacks. Can you imagine the carnage if pressed into daylight operations unescorted, against Schweinfurt, Berlin? Could it even travel to Posnan or Prague - and if so at what altitude? Absent Merlin 61 series with 2S/2speed SC, it is worse off than Davis wing equipped B-24 if applied to US combat ops doctrine. Does it fly with same tactics as Night ops - no formation, but catch as catch can? How does that work out when German spotters on the coast mark and track and feed into central communications? It may be harder to concentrate large forces of Day fighters - but why bother? One FW 190A-8 is a nightmare in trail and virtually unstoppable in head on single attacks.

The B-24 while arguably a better bomber, all things considered, both faster and longer range - was arguably less able to defend itself. Before you hasten to point out lower loss rate per sortie, remember that it was not truly operational in Division level Strength until 1944 - when target escort was introduced. The Few B-24 BGs in 8th AF were clobbered because their high altitude restrictions due to Davis Wing had them flying Purple Heart corner, low and in trail until dispatched to 12 AF where the REALLY got clobbered at low altitude (Think twice about Mossie daylight ops against Ploesti!). Summary? The B-17 was as good as it had to be, suffered incredible loses in the most hostile attack/defense environment in WWII - and there was no single alternative to replace it in 1943/1944 for Strategic Daylight Bombing.
Click to expand...
Dang it. I gotta' go watch this video now just to give you a "like".
 
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