Possibly the Worst Aviation "History" Video I've Encountered

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Just remember one very important thing: The B-17 was designed as a High Altitude Bomber. It service ceiling of 35,000 ft is higher than that of a C-130 and better than that of a B-24. This reduced the vulnerability of the B-17 to both AAA and fighter interception. The FW-190 ran out of steam real fast after it hit 20,000 ft, which was the reason for the D model.

Daylight bombing of Germany was very difficult but would have been impossible without turbosupercharged heavy bombers. And ironically, it could be argued that daylight bombing offered the Luftwaffe targets for interception and as a result forced the Germans to come up in large numbers where they could be destroyed as well as virtually eliminating the Germans' offensive bombing capabilities by forcing them to concentrate on fighter interceptors. Hitler wanted the Me-262 to be used as a bomber because the Luftwaffe had nothing else that had a chance of getting through the Allies' defenses. Some historians have come to realize that, regardless of targets destroyed, daylight bombing was worth doing just to destroy the Luftwaffe.
 
Doolittle's Jan 44 decision to free the fighters from close bomber escort was predicated on precisely this idea. The bombers, while still maintaining their own missions, in essence became the bait.
Correct.

To amplify, In early January, General Lawrence Kuter briefed AAF-HQ, Twining, Eaker, Spaatz and Doolittle, from both US and Brit Intelligence dispatches, that German Day Fighter strength was growing alarmingly fast.

The estimates and potential threat to Overlord created the pressure to destroy the LW by any means necessary. IMO - this pressure at SHAEF level command was also instrumental in Spaatz' success in rebuffing Leigh-Malloy's argument that he retain control of 9th AF fighter assignments - on the basis that LW woud be defeated over the Beachhead.

I'm still not sure (have not found any source documents) that could be construed as a suggestion from Spaatz or Arnold regarding the decision to award US fighter pilots victory credits equally for the destruction of aircraft on the ground.
That decision I believe arose solely from Doolittle and provided another incentive to chase LW all the way to the deck and shoot up 'stuff' on the way home.

Both Galland and Schmidt point to that change in tactics as the 'beginning of the end' for the LW.

As a side note - the top strafing FG and #3 total scorer - air and gound - was the 355th FG. It lost zero aces to LW air to air, but lost one KIA and four POW to flak. It lost 41 total air to air vs 351 VCs, but lost 90 to strafing for 501 destroyed.

Sadly, but understandable, 30 355th pilots recognized as Aces with combined air/ground totals of 5 or more, butless than 5 in air - were later removed from American Fighter Aces Association rolls when USAF later recognized only air victories. One wonders how many 8th AF fighter pilots would have survived ETO ops had the 'incentive' to strafe airfields not been offered.
 
Doolittle's Jan 44 decision to free the fighters from close bomber escort was predicated on precisely this idea. The bombers, while still maintaining their own missions, in essence became the bait.
During the Battle of the Bulge, when the skies cleared enough to send air support, the Allies naturally responded strongly. The Luftwaffe did as well, realizing their ground troops would have no chance if they did not intercept the Allied fighter bombers. Knowing this, the 8th Air Force would attack a German city not too far away. The Luftwaffe had to make the choice of either defending the city or intercepting the fighter bombers. The correct choice was to intercept the fighter bombers but the Luftwaffe was already being berated by the civilians, "A hundred bombers hit us yesterday! Where was the Luftwaffe?" Well, the Luftwaffe was there, outnumbered 10 to one and getting its arse shot off, but it not did not look that way to the populace. So they sent some fighters to intercept the fighter bombers and some to hit the bombers and got their arse shot off anyway, as the German troops were getting pounded.
 
One wonders how many 8th AF fighter pilots would have survived ETO ops had the 'incentive' to strafe airfields not been offered.
I saw a startling statistic. From 1 Jan 1944 to 1 Jan 1945 the Luftwaffe lost something like 20,000 aircraft while they were being delivered from the factories to the operational units. No doubt many of those losses were due to "targets of opportunity" of US fighter escorts.
 
I was mooting about starting my own youtube "carreer" a few years ago, but nixed that idea for fear of making videos that are not very good, so people will make fun of me.
Rest assured, after watching videos like this, and that 'Dark xyz' crap, my fears are no longer present.

Down-voted the video.
 
What is often lost in the discussions about Deep Germany strafing was the impact to logistics between manufacturing centers, de-centralized beginning in 1943. Attacking road, rail and barge traffic also disrupted delivery times to operational units.
 
Where and what by whom and when published would be nice to know. 20000:12 =1666 complete airplanes lost during transport a month. Seems a tad high.
On the otherhand, how many ground attack sorties were conducted on a daily basis by the USAAF and RAF?

Now take that number and times it by 365 to get an idea of how it's possible to destroy 1,666 new aircraft per month over the period of twelve months.
 
Airfelds, particulalry adjacent to manufacturing plants were routinely and often hit by 8th and 15th AF. I suspect more destroyed and damaged by heavy bomber attacks than by airfield strikes by fighters.
 
Airfelds, particulalry adjacent to manufacturing plants were routinely and often hit by 8th and 15th AF. I suspect more destroyed and damaged by heavy bomber attacks than by airfield strikes by fighters.
Yes i agree but 1600 plus? A month on the ground. And how was that varified? And the the ones that did come on line. Again seems a tad high considering what is known about production.
 
What is often lost in the discussions about Deep Germany strafing was the impact to logistics between manufacturing centers, de-centralized beginning in 1943. Attacking road, rail and barge traffic also disrupted delivery times to operational units.
There is story that a Luftwaffe official came to Willy Messerschmidt in 1941 and said that they liked the BF-109 just fine but they really wanted a fighter with more power and more range. Probably thinking of the BF-110, Willy replied angrily, "You can have a fighter plane or you can have a barn door!" Adding power and fuel capacity to a fighter would add weight and size and that would in turn destroy agility and climb rate.

A few years later Willy and that same Luftwaffe official were on a train in Germany. It stopped suddenly and they had to evacuate it and jump in a ditch as P-47's came in strafing. Looking up at the big powerful American fighters attacking deep in Germany the Luftwaffe official said to Willy, "Well, there are your barn doors!"
 
According to David Baker's book, the Mossie was the reason the Luftwaffe agreed to let the Me-262 be built. It was a fast multi-mission aircraft.
The Me262 was under development before the Mossie was introduced into service.

I beleive it was the Ta154 that was pushed through as a potential counter to the Mosquito, in spite of all the politics between the He219 camp and the Ta154 camp.
 
According to David Baker's book, the Mossie was the reason the Luftwaffe agreed to let the Me-262 be built. It was a fast multi-mission aircraft.
My Editor Dan Sharp has released what is definitely the best Me262 book on development/politics. Its entirely based on source German files. Called,
unsurprisingly "Messerschmitt Me 262: Development and Politics"
 

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