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The assclown probably deleted it.I let it run while I searched for drgndog's post. I didn't see the post. Meh.
Just for shits-n-grins, I should make a YT vid about the P-39, the greatest fighter ever made.I didn't let it run for very. He sounds like me when I used to know everything, only with pictures and charts.
Yep, the war could have ended in 1944 if only (insert reasons) they hadn't crippled the P-39Just for shits-n-grins, I should make a YT vid about the P-39, the greatest fighter ever made.
Some historians have come to realize that, regardless of targets destroyed, daylight bombing was worth doing just to destroy the Luftwaffe.
Correct.Doolittle's Jan 44 decision to free the fighters from close bomber escort was predicated on precisely this idea. The bombers, while still maintaining their own missions, in essence became the bait.
During the Battle of the Bulge, when the skies cleared enough to send air support, the Allies naturally responded strongly. The Luftwaffe did as well, realizing their ground troops would have no chance if they did not intercept the Allied fighter bombers. Knowing this, the 8th Air Force would attack a German city not too far away. The Luftwaffe had to make the choice of either defending the city or intercepting the fighter bombers. The correct choice was to intercept the fighter bombers but the Luftwaffe was already being berated by the civilians, "A hundred bombers hit us yesterday! Where was the Luftwaffe?" Well, the Luftwaffe was there, outnumbered 10 to one and getting its arse shot off, but it not did not look that way to the populace. So they sent some fighters to intercept the fighter bombers and some to hit the bombers and got their arse shot off anyway, as the German troops were getting pounded.Doolittle's Jan 44 decision to free the fighters from close bomber escort was predicated on precisely this idea. The bombers, while still maintaining their own missions, in essence became the bait.
I saw a startling statistic. From 1 Jan 1944 to 1 Jan 1945 the Luftwaffe lost something like 20,000 aircraft while they were being delivered from the factories to the operational units. No doubt many of those losses were due to "targets of opportunity" of US fighter escorts.One wonders how many 8th AF fighter pilots would have survived ETO ops had the 'incentive' to strafe airfields not been offered.
What is often lost in the discussions about Deep Germany strafing was the impact to logistics between manufacturing centers, de-centralized beginning in 1943. Attacking road, rail and barge traffic also disrupted delivery times to operational units.I saw a startling statistic. From 1 Jan 1944 to 1 Jan 1945 the Luftwaffe lost something like 20,000 aircraft while they were being delivered from the factories to the operational units. No doubt many of those losses were due to "targets of opportunity" of US fighter escorts.
Where and what by whom and when published would be nice to know. 20000:12 =1666 complete airplanes lost during transport a month. Seems a tad high.I saw a startling statistic
On the otherhand, how many ground attack sorties were conducted on a daily basis by the USAAF and RAF?Where and what by whom and when published would be nice to know. 20000:12 =1666 complete airplanes lost during transport a month. Seems a tad high.
Yes i agree but 1600 plus? A month on the ground. And how was that varified? And the the ones that did come on line. Again seems a tad high considering what is known about production.Airfelds, particulalry adjacent to manufacturing plants were routinely and often hit by 8th and 15th AF. I suspect more destroyed and damaged by heavy bomber attacks than by airfield strikes by fighters.
There is story that a Luftwaffe official came to Willy Messerschmidt in 1941 and said that they liked the BF-109 just fine but they really wanted a fighter with more power and more range. Probably thinking of the BF-110, Willy replied angrily, "You can have a fighter plane or you can have a barn door!" Adding power and fuel capacity to a fighter would add weight and size and that would in turn destroy agility and climb rate.What is often lost in the discussions about Deep Germany strafing was the impact to logistics between manufacturing centers, de-centralized beginning in 1943. Attacking road, rail and barge traffic also disrupted delivery times to operational units.
According to David Baker's book, the Mossie was the reason the Luftwaffe agreed to let the Me-262 be built. It was a fast multi-mission aircraft.Data says that the only thing the Germans were MORE worried about than the B-17 was the Mosquito.
The Me262 was under development before the Mossie was introduced into service.According to David Baker's book, the Mossie was the reason the Luftwaffe agreed to let the Me-262 be built. It was a fast multi-mission aircraft.
My Editor Dan Sharp has released what is definitely the best Me262 book on development/politics. Its entirely based on source German files. Called,According to David Baker's book, the Mossie was the reason the Luftwaffe agreed to let the Me-262 be built. It was a fast multi-mission aircraft.