Problematic aircraft

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

Says it right there...

well yes and no

yes the Marauder could be landed savely by experienced pilots. In comparison with lets say the B25 however it needed pilots with extended skills. In early wartime these would have been spread thin.
This should be all right if the ship had definite benefits above the other contenders which it hadn't.
 


Snautzer - BOTH aircraft needed pilots with more than the normal multi engine aircraft training that was given at the beginning of the war. The B-26 was a bit more difficullt to fly but once a pilot was trained the issues normmaly spoken about went away. And when I say "multi-engine" I'm refering to twins. In the end the B-26 is no different from any other twin engine bomber of WW2, you just needed the basics to understand what happens when you loose and wngine on take off or landing.
 
Last edited:
Wasn't Brewster located in downtown Brooklyn NY - the assembly line went UP - not across? Can't you picture the flow
No wonder they had quality issues - and since the workforce would mostly be immigrant European and initially USA was neutral - I wouldn't doubt for a minute that there were sabotage "issues". Sounds like the issues the Germans had with stuff coming out of France and the slave labor shops. Brewster, had management issues - no doubt.

MM
 

I think they did have a plant close to LI.

I doubt they had sabotage issues becuase of immigrant issues. The place was run by crooks.
 

That seems to be true for the BRITISH version.
Other versions differed.
 
Yes, Shortround, but your original post seemed to suggest that the extra tankage was installed to provide self-sealing fuel capacity because the integral fuel tanks in the F2A-2's spar couldn't be modified, even on the construction line. If the RAF Buffalo could have self-sealing tanks then so could the USN's F2A-2 which brings us back to why the -3 was procured - to extend the range of an already long-legged aircraft.
 

When the USN got their first F2A they suspected someone at the factory was actively sabotaged the planes. No we know the various defects were the result of poor workmanship and even worse QC.(see Lundstrom, "The First Team" and the Annals of the Brewster Buffalo.) And the Brewster made Corsairs lost wings in dives.


I thought the problem with the Buffalo was that Brewster did a poor job of upgrading? I think by the F2A-3, they slapped on four .50 cals and extra armor with the same powerplant as the F2A-1, killing the speed and rate of climb?

There was little way of upgrading. The F2A-1 had no armour, unprotected fuel tanks and one cal.50 with 250 founds and one cal.30 with 600. The three extra 50´s and the ammo added ~500lb alone, the other ~500 came from armour and stop-gap efforts to protect the fuel tanks. Thus the F2A-3 was waaay overweight, even with a 1,200hp engine.

Basically Brewster would have had to reduce the armament to a pair of 50´s and 30´s to get a decent performance and redesign the wing to allow internal self sealing. Given Brewster´s record of shoddy work and late deliveries plus Wildcats in sufficient numbers the Navy did not give them another change.



Shortround6 is right,it was done for protection only. The two 80gal wing tanks could not be internally self-sealed, so three small one´s were added. One 40gal fuselage tank and two 20gal tanks in the wings, all internally self sealing. In combat only one of the 80gal tanks was filled.

The exported planes had no internally self sealing tanks. Their´s were externally sealed ones by wrapping leather and rubber around them. That was far less effective, one well aimed salvo of 7,7mm bullets could rupture the tanks and start a fire.
 
Again specifics? There is one thing to site "poor workmanship" (miswired wire bundles, badly bucked rivets, machined and sheet metal parts not made to print, etc.) but sabotage is a different story. As I mentioned, there is no secret about the Brewster Corsairs not being well built, by the time Brewster was involved with the Corsair the company had some bad labor problems and was being run into the ground. This didn't mean that every plane was built bad or substandard quality was inherent in every airframe built.

Unless someone has actually built airplanes or worked in a factory, the terms "craftsmanship and quality control" mean a lot of things and each aircraft and manufacturer had different levels within their products that couldn't be painted with a broad brush. I could show you aircraft assemblies that look great on the outside but are built wrong. At the sametime I could show you components that look like crap but meet the design and function intent and would be accepted by inspection or quality control. Most WW2 aircraft were jig built so their finish would be basically transparent unless there was a production tooling problem, you're going to see little difference in the finish - so when you quote an aviation author chances are most of them have never held a rivet gun, let alone could judge quality on any aircraft sub assembly.

In the case with Brewster we do know they built some aircraft correctly. We knew that there was possible sabotage and we knew that the Navy wasn't happy with the Corsairs built by them but at the same time when each aircraft was delivered it met a "minimum requirement" with regards to "form, fit and function" as there were government inspectors assigned at each contractor responsible for this.
 
Last edited:

The British solution wasn't really up to what the USN Navy wanted for self sealing. The new tanks being fitted with what were called leak proof rubber fuel cells on the inside of the tank vs a wrapping of rubber sheet and horsehide on the outside of the existing tanks. The US Navy did fit a CO2 system to their (unlike the British) unprotected main spar tanks.

In the Book "America's Hundred-Thousand" weights are given for the F2A-3 in five different configurations. With full fuel (1080lbs ) 2 of the configurations are called over loaded while the standard 4 gun fighter and bomber configurations have only 660lbs of fuel. Ferry configuration calls for 1080lbs of fuel but no guns let alone no ammo. I would also note that the F4F ONLY carried 160 gallons of fuel in unprotected tanks and when protection was introduced fuel capacities fell to 144-147 gal. FM-2s even with drop tanks don't carry much more fuel than a F3F so either the Navy learned it's lesson or the extra range wasn't that firm to begin with.
 


Well i cant find any aaf remark about the more difficult handling of a ig B-25. But i think you said it right.


More difficult yes, problematic no,

nice Marauder site --->>http://www.b26.com/
 
Last edited:
Well i cant find any aaf remark about the more difficult handling of a ig B-25. But i think you said it right.


More difficult yes, problematic no,

nice Marauder site --->>Martin B-26 Marauder Man information at B26.COM.

There's a modern GA twin called an Aerostar. Similar to the b-26, small wingspan and very fast. It also has high accident rates because of training. Again, when flying a twin engine aircraft, there are training challenges that must be addressed and with the B-26 these challenges weren't addressed thus the end result. In the end however, a properly trained multi engine (twin) pilot could fly any twin once he was aware of any unique characteristics (high wing loading, high landing speed, sink rates).
 
The British solution wasn't really up to what the USN Navy wanted for self sealing.

Did the USN really know what it wanted in terms of self-sealing when the F2A-3 was ordered in Jan 41? The USN didn't even start thinking about self-sealing for the F4F-3 until the back end of that year. If the need for self-sealing, and the optimal implementation means, had been identified as early as Jan 41, why not implement it for the Wildcat? Just asking....
 
Again specifics? There is one thing to site "poor workmanship" (miswired wire bundles, badly bucked rivets, machined and sheet metal parts not made to print, etc.) but sabotage is a different story.


Virtually anything I read online and offline is very critical of Brewster´s QC. And I did not say someone actually sabotaged the planes at the factory, I said the USN thought someone did as they could not imagine workmanship and QC could be as bad as they were.
 
Virtually anything I read online and offline is very critical of Brewster´s QC.
And the folks who have written those statement were never able to give specifics as they know little or nothing about assembling aircraft and cannot determine the difference between quality problems and engineering problems. I bet half of those who have written about this don't know how to use a rivet gun.
 
I´m quite sure author´s like Lundstrom, Shores and Cull know their trade and that means a/c as well as writing about a/c. I´m also not aware of any such complaints about any other company.
 
I´m quite sure author´s like Lundstrom, Shores and Cull know their trade and that means a/c as well as writing about a/c. I´m also not aware of any such complaints about any other company.

I know all 3 of them never physically worked on aircraft and are more than likely not even qualified to comment on aircraft maintenance or construction. I think Lundstrum was a pilot but that make him any more quialifed than the other two.

I deal with a company that restores WW2 aircraft (I've posted photos here). Right now they are restoring a P-38 that saw extensive combat. Within in the bowels of the structure are dozens of manufacturing defects that would be deemed unacceptable in today's world. I've seen other such defects on Corsairs and post war jet aircraft.

Do you know that during a parade a factory fresh CG-4 lost its wing and killed the company president and the mayor of St. Louis?

"The urgent need for gliders to use in training as well as for combat meant that production was farmed out to a variety of firms, many of which had little or no experience in aircraft construction. Ford Motor Company produced the largest share of CG–4A gliders—more than four thousand of them—but other suppliers reflected a disappointing cross-section of production know-how. Ford, along with Waco and Cessna, had prior experience, in contrast to Anheuser-Busch and the Gibson Refrigerator Company, two of the larger firms involved in final production. Over 115 other contractors participated, including companies like the Steinway Piano Company and the H. J. Heinz Pickle Company, which turned out wing spars and wing assemblies, respectively. Ongoing quality control problems came to a head in the summer of 1943.

During an air show in Saint Louis, Missouri, the mayor and several other city officials, including a pair of high-ranking Air Force officers, climbed into a newly delivered CG–4A for a demonstration flight. Just after takeoff, one wing snapped off, sending the stricken glider into a nose dive that killed the crew and all passengers. An inquiry cited faulty workmanship for a wing-root attachment, and this led to stringent new quality controls."


CG-4

Brewster just bore the brunt of this and IMO it was because of the Buffalo's performance at Midway and the way some of the company officals mis-represented their capability. Bottom line is quality control problems could be found at every facotry, allied and axis during WW2.


Brewster did have problems but because of "engineering problems" with their products, many have lumped QC issues into the same bucket. My point they are not the same and some who have written about this subject didn't get it all right as they did not have the background to accurately present what really happened.
 
Last edited:

May be they did, after all 106 F4F-3s had been built before Jan of 1941 and with another 324 F4Fs delivered before the the back end of that year that pretty well covers ALL the combat F4F-3s, a number of Martlets and few F4F-4s so the protected tanks were well in hand by the back end of the year.
At what point did they change from unprotected to protected tanks? just asking..... because only 250 F4F-3s and 3As were built initially (another 100F4F-3 built in 1943 as trainers)

F2A-3 may have been ordered in Jan but first delivery wasn't until July with delivery's continuing into Dec.

"The left wing unprotected fuel tank was to be used for operations only in the overload fighter condition, and the filler neck cover plate was sealed off with the legend stenciled on " Not to be filled except on special authority of Commanding Officer."

From page 463 of "America's Hundred-Thousand", the chapter on the Brewster Buffalo. This tank was of 80 gals US capacity.
 
Shortrounds

None of the F4Fs had self-sealing prior to late-1941. I still don't understand why the USN would accept a huge increase in fuel capacity just to get self-sealing tanks for the F2A when it wasn't ordering self-sealing for other types.

Also, a note from Jim Maas, "It is bellieved the Navy intended to use the F2A-3 to maintain standing patrols at considerable distances from the carrier, however the advent of shipborne radar made the need for long-range standing patrols unnecessary." This justification makes much more sense to me, and perhaps explains why self-sealing was specified. In the event of battle damage, the F2A would be a long way from friendly vessels hence self-sealing tanks would enhance the chances of rescuing the pilot. Such long-range patrols would also enable the wing tanks to be used first during the transit out to the patrol area.

Cheers,
Mark
 
Last edited:

Users who are viewing this thread