Proposal to purchase of Japanese aircraft for RAAF in 1939/40

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It is part of at least one major parties agenda to become a Republic and the leader of the Republican Movement (Malcolm Turnbull) at the last attempt later became Prime Minister Turnbull.

If they can convince the people with a good model it may happen. Last time the Republican Movements lies included that there were only five Monarchy's left. Fortunately the model they put up was never going to gain support but they may have learned from that.
 
MiTasol said:
If they can convince the people with a good model it may happen.
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That is if the Australians want Malcolm Turnbull as their president, which I cannot see happening. Nor can I see ScoMo being accepted in this role. Break it down to the common denominator; the population would only accept such a thing if they had a leader that inspired them. Neither ScoMo or Turnbull do/did, so that's ruled out.
 
Turnbull was not a "candidate". The model his bunch of clowns was promoting was we the politicians will choose the president and to hell with the public because the public is too stupid to choose a president. He may well have hoped to become Pres at a later time but at that time he just wanted a Republic for the politicians, by the politicians and of the politicians.
In the referendum the public massively rejected that model.
 
GTX said:
Proof?
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here is a record of the first time that Australia advised it would in future be directly dealing with the USA - via the British Ambassador. What is not spelled out is the level of diplomatic consultation but the fact that they were only proposing a legation, not a consulate or embassy, shows that it would be low level.


 
This one expands on how slow direct discussion between the US and Aus developed. I think it is likely that all the US concerns were under London,s control, not Canberra's. Certainly that is the case with the tariffs which were paid to London, NOT Canberra

If any of you want the whole 116 page file just PM me. In many cases it refers to files that are not part of this file. The file is from the US NARA, not Aus Archives.
 
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Good points. Too bad Britain didn't think a forward base needed defences between itself and the mainland, nor secure water and food to withstand a prolonged siege. Assuming that any attack on Singapore would have to come via the sea was pure wishful thinking. Even with FIC in French rather than Japanese hands an undefended SCS and Gulf of Thailand is inviting invasion and then attack from Johore.
 

They probably realized the need for forward defenses, but were busy with their hands full? That's my reading of it.

Singapore is marginalized if Suez doesn't hold, and in spring and summer of 41 the Brits weren't getting great innings in North Africa.
 
The British understood the potential weaknesses of Singapore (by the late-1930s more than one Commander or other higher up had warned of the possibility of attack overland through the jungle areas), but their internal political and financial environment of the times did not allow development of the base to the the degree needed. They had originally intended to develop the port beginning in the late-1920s with completion in the early-1930s but could not get financing. It was not until shortly before WWII started in Europe that financing would have been OKed, but by then it was too late. And with the adoption of the Europe First policy the reinforcement of the Pacific theater became of secondary importance.

It is kind of interesting as to how the view of Singapore changed in the eyes of the US. Prior to the Anglo-Japan Alliance the US had looked favorably at the idea of Singapore as a joint US/UK base, but there was no political or economic support forthcoming in the US. After the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1923, the US never really took the idea seriously until shortly before WWII. The British approached the US in 1939 and again in early-1941, with the intent of enlisting the US aid in developing the port and basing a significant USN presence there. The US rejected the idea, partly due to nearsightedness/blindness (unbeknown to the US, a combined US/UK forward base in Singapore was considered a major stumbling block by the Japanese in their inter-war war planning, and would quite possibly have prevented the war as it actually occurred), and partly because it did not fit in with the USN's own planned method of prosecuting the coming war with Japan (by early-1941 the US knew war was almost certain with Japan, but the Europe First policy had been adopted and there were not enough US naval forces available to allow the basing of a large enough fleet in both Singapore and Hawaii to ensure the protection of both - particularly if the war in Europe went drastically wrong.)
 
ThomasP said:
The British approached the US in 1939 and again in early-1941, with the intent of enlisting the US aid in developing the port and basing a significant USN presence there. The US rejected the idea….
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A multinational RN/RAN/USN base at Singapore from 1939 onwards would have thrown a wrench into Japan's thinking for sure. No reason the MN and RNLN can't be invited as well.

As for Singapore, I would have completed the full round siege defences before commencing work on the drydock, etc. Place former RN 12" and 13.5" guns or other less pricey fixed artillery facing the mainland. Protect the water supply. Then build the port and drydock. When it's done, conduct war games to test the defences. Ideally get all this done before 1938.
 
Admiral Beez said:
As for Singapore, I would have completed the full round siege defences before commencing work on the drydock, etc. Place former RN 12" and 13.5" guns or other less pricey fixed artillery facing the mainland.
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I think this is a myth. From The Churchill Project (and perhaps biased as a result):


Churchill and the Guns of Singapore, 1941-42: Facing the Wrong Way?

Many factors, misjudgments and changes of plan led to the disastrous loss of Singapore in 1942, but the island's guns were not among them.
winstonchurchill.hillsdale.edu


Protect the water supply.
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Right, this was the concern that drove the surrender to my knowledge.

Then build the port and drydock. When it's done, conduct war games to test the defences. Ideally get all this done before 1938.
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Ya gotta get the money and material. What would you trade? Shipyards in England? Airfields? Concrete doesn't grow on trees. It's coming from somewhere.
 
Thumpalumpacus said:
Ya gotta get the money and material. What would you trade?
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If the US accepts the invite maybe they'll invest.

Otherwise, in those days before the US set up synthetic domestic production, Malaysia is the world's supplier of rubber. Let's make those private British and Malay rubber firms help pay for their plantations' protection. Instead IIRC the plantations were if anything obstructionists, preventing defence works and roads and competing for labour that would have disturbed their profits.

GTX said:
Can we get back on topic please.

More
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But I'll say no more on Singapore defence as I've taken us off topic. Apologies all.
 
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Up until early 1940 I do not think there would be any serious problem. The US was still exporting strategic materials to Japan at that time.

After the first active US embargo in July 1940 (aviation grade gasolines and iron/steel scrap) it might have still been possible but problematic - Australia would have to pay for the aircraft with something, raw and finished strategic materials would have been what Japan wanted.

After the Japanese invaded French Indochina in September 1940, the US imposed an embargo of all strategic materials.

I would say that any economic interaction with Japan after July 1941 (when the US imposed a total embargo and seized all Japanese assets, and induced the UK and DEI to do the same) any significant economic interaction with Japan would be viewed as a no-no by the US and the UK.

Also, Australia had imposed limited embargoes against Japan all on their own, starting in 1938 with the embargo on iron and steel. Although the embargo is portrayed in popular history as a form of protest over the Nanking incident, it was at least as much over concerns of Japan becoming more powerful in the region. There had been Australian business men and government officials recommending embargoes of strategic material against Japan since ~1934, but the idea was rejected, largely due to fears of retaliation in one form or another.



I typed up the majority of the above document a few years ago when we (I and my wargamer friends) were studying the Far East theaters of operation.
 
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A good chart - thank you.
Australia started Aluminium production about 1938 as part of the Wirraway and Beaufort production programs but I have not been able to find any solid numbers or even producers names. I believe from inference that the Electrolytic Zinc company was one of, if not the first, producer as they were part of the CAC consortium and the plan was to be a totally Australian product. There is a lot of wartime CAC literature that says they were using locally manufactured metals but no producer names that I have found to date. Probably hiding in plain site somewhere tho.

CAC also had a number of CAC spec metals that were not exact equivalents of Brit or US specs.
 
Hey MiTasol,

The Broken Hill Proprietary Company (now known as BHP) dates from 1885 and began mining aluminum ore (bauxite) in 1938. I may be wrong, but I do not think that Australia refined any of the ore they mined prior to the 1950s. Until then I am pretty sure that all aluminum ore (bauxite) was shipped to Canada or the US, and refined metals (whether alumina or alloys) were imported in ingot form, which were then turned into wrought aluminum products at foundries. If I am correct then the foundries would be the place to start looking for more info. The Australian Aluminium Company (currently known as Alcan Australia Ltd) was established in 1936 specifically to support the Australian aircraft industry. They did aluminum foundry work. The Broken Hill Proprietary Company had foundries for steel, copper, and a few other products, but I do not know if they worked with aluminum. I would think there must have been a few smaller Australian foundries prior to the war.
 
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The first Australian aluminium smelter opened in 1955 at Bell's Bay north of Launceston. Its development was brought about by the shortage of home sources in ww2 and a cheap source of hydro electric power.
 
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