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Interestingly, on the subject of firing passes, the Admiralty didn't like the point harmonisation recommended by the RAF and stuck with their own, more spread out pattern. They found that point harmonisation was of no added benefit in destroying enemy aircraft, and that casualties to their own fighters were much higher (five times higher by their figures).
Their reasoning was exactly what you just described - longer exposure to enemy defensive fire as the Fulmar tried to get within 250 yards.
Surely the best thing would be to increase production of Spitfires and Hurricanes, but in any case the shortage wasn't planes it was pilots.
...It's been mentioned previously that 9 Fulmars met a superior number of 109s and 110s over Kirkenes, with the result that 2 Fulmars and 1 110 were shot down - according to you this outcome should not have been possible, yet it is predicted by Shaw, above. It also explains why the Wildcat/Martlet could tackle the Zero.
Forget the Defiant, the Blenheim had better level speed and climb performance than the Fulmar.
one thing is to scrounge around and find aircraft that, whilst unable to challenge for air superiority, can cause a bit of mischief amongst the enemy's bombers, by working to the strengths that opposing aircraft, or aircraft fleets might not possess.
According to the report of the captain of HMS Victorious the crews of the Fulmars saw at least three M.E. 109s and six ME110s approaching. Because the 1.(Z)/JG 77 and 14./JG 77 were the only LW Zerstörer and fighter units participating and most of them clearly concentrated on torpedo-bombers, I doubt that Fulmars fought against significantly superior numbers. And as I have written before the Bf 110 pilot, Karl-Fritz Schlossstein, and his gunner, both survived, maintained that they were shot down by an Albacore gunner whose plane they were hitting hard not by a Fulmar.
Juha
... It has been estimated that throughout the history of air combat 80 to 90 percent of downed fighter pilots were unaware of their danger until the moment of the attack. Surprise, then, and conversely, the avoidance of surprise, must be considered the most vital element in air combat.
Shaw, Fighter Combat: tactics and Maneuvering, p.195.
Doesn't paint a rosy picture for the Fulmar in an environment heavy with first class single-seaters!
Parsifal, I generally respect your point of view and on the whole agree with your synopsies of situations because you generally make sense. But I think in this case I have to disagree with you, for the simple fact that what the RAF needed was first rate fighters - forget for the moment pilot shortage etc - aircraft that were up to the quality of the Spitfire and Hurricane - nothing less. Dowding had to accept the Defiant, Gladiator and Blenheim and all their inadequacies; he had little choice. Although I'm guessing here, I suspect that if he had a choice, Dowding would have gone for a single-seater with good performance, not another two-seater and certainly not something with performance worse than that of the second fiddle fighters he already had. Adding another poor performer like the Fulmar would not serve any real benefit at all and, like we've stated all along, in an environment where high performance single-seaters were operating in large numbers, the last thing you want is to throw away the lives of your pilots and waste equipment. The removal of the Defiant from day fighter duties at the end of August 1940 was for that very reason.
In the event of production of either Spitfire or Hurricane not living up to expectations, the Air Ministry made plans for stop-gap fighters to be built that it was hoped could have some effect against the Germans, but they were stop-gaps only. Even then, with performance better by a country mile than the Fulmar, they were only expected to do their jobs until there were sufficient high performance single-seaters available. Adding another second string fighter is a waste. Whilst I agree that a Hawk 75 would be a possible option, I have to disagree with the Fulmar because of its inadequate performance alone - not that they were in any numbers to have been available by the summer of 1940 at any rate.
There is continuing reference to the naval fulmar, rather than to the NN Fulmar, which is what the RAF would have been using, if developed as an alternate, heavy LR patrol/escort fighter.
They wouldn't be the first aircrew to be wrong about how they were shot down...clearly they didn't see the attacking Fulmar, as their attention was elsewhere:
Fulmar's claimed 2 x 110s while Albacores claimed none, AFAIK.
In any event, even if the numbers were roughly equal; 3 (or more) 109s and 6 110s, why weren't the Fulmars wiped out? Even the 110 has a huge advantage, on paper, over the Fulmar.
I have to say that it is almost pointless to discuss historical alternatives on this board, because there is such a huge resistance to actually discussing the topic at hand - alternative fighters in this case .
My own personnel favorite was the Whirlwind, especially with 20/20 hindsight but the decision to ditch working on a 21 liter engine in favor of working on a 36 liter engine was the right one for R-R. Dowding's quote about not wanting a plane with two engines when you could have a plane with the same armament with one engine actually doesn't stand up quite so well when it is two 12 cylinder engines vs one 24 cylinder engine.
As an "alternative" it is one of the few that had decent performance, an engine that needed little, if any, modification to be "useful" in the Bob and both aircraft and engine had actual production facilities (small though they may be) in existence in time for the BoB.
A little more 'belief" at the time and a firm order NOT to concentrate of Lysander production might have seen more use of the Whirlwind.
Squadrons in other Groups were relieved of their experienced pilots and men which they had trained, who were transferred to squadrons in 11 Group. 11 Group squadrons were also maintained with a higher number of pilots, on average about 19 as opposed to as few as 10 in other Groups. By mid September 1940 even 11 Group's squadrons had on average only 16 pilots. The official establishment for a squadron in Fighter Command was 26.
This was Dowding's so called 'stabilisation system' introduced on 8/9/40 a day after the conference I cited above. Entire squadrons would no longer be rotated in and out of 11 Group, trained men would be. This system was very unpopular, particularly with the squadrons who lost their most experienced men along with newly operational pilots whom they had just trained. Introduced as an 'expedient', read desperate measure, it continued until the end of November 1940.
Dowding himself wrote. 'The stabilisation of squadrons in the line and the creation of Class 'C' squadrons was a desperate expedient forced on me by the heavy losses.'
Many squadrons in other Groups were either not fully operational or, as Dowding himself said, capable only of taking on unescorted bomber formations. On 23rd October 1940 440 of Fighter Command's pilots, roughly one third, were non-operational. This is why the raw figures for pilot numbers are somewhat misleading.
There was no large reserve of experienced pilots upon which Fighter Command could draw.
12 and 13 Groups both had jobs to do even with their limited resources, protecting the industrial infrastructure of the Midlands and the North. 13 Group did this very well as Luftflotte 5 discovered on 15th August.
We know, but Dowding could not, that such an attack would not be repeated.
Cheers
Steve
Thanks Steve, I did read in one book that Leigh Mallory was suspected of keeping his best pilots to further his big wing theory.
The fact that the Whirlwind was designed for Peregrine engines (originally the Kestrel K.26 for the pedants) was one of the factors that led to its and that engine's demise. It could have been developed into a decent fighter with those engines but it, like many war time designs, was never given a chance. As it was it was by no means a bad aeroplane. It was a very advanced aeroplane for its time and a 350+mph fighter which certainly puts it in a different class to something like a Fulmar.
Cheers
Steve
If your "historical alternatives" include not only alternative fighters but engines that never were (and never could be) and alternative physics then yes, you are going to wind up with huge resistance.
The Bristol Mercury was a very nice 25 liter 9 cylinder radial but it had 92.6% of the displacement of the Merlin, it ran at 91.66% the RPM of the Merlin and even with 100 octane fuel and even boosting to 9lbs it operated at 88.8% of the manifold pressure of the Merlin. Put it all together and it was going to give you 75-80% of the power of the Merlin, granted it was lighter but it had more drag. Powering ANY alternative fighter with the Mercury is going to result in distinctly second rate fighter.
The ONLY other British radial in production in numbers during the BoB is the Bristol Pegasus, which is not only in demand for the Hampden and Wellington bombers but a number of other aircraft as well. It also has higher drag than the Mercury to somewhat off set it's higher power but even at it's best it only gave 965hp at 13,000ft with a 2 speed supercharger and 100/130 octane fuel.
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When looking the prototypes that were passed over in 1935-39 try asking why instead of assuming politics or stupidity on the part of the air staff. There may have been but it requires proof, they may have had good reasons for passing over many of those planes.
My own personnel favorite was the Whirlwind, especially with 20/20 hindsight but the decision to ditch working on a 21 liter engine in favor of working on a 36 liter engine was the right one for R-R. Dowding's quote about not wanting a plane with two engines when you could have a plane with the same armament with one engine actually doesn't stand up quite so well when it is two 12 cylinder engines vs one 24 cylinder engine.
As an "alternative" it is one of the few that had decent performance, an engine that needed little, if any, modification to be "useful" in the Bob and both aircraft and engine had actual production facilities (small though they may be) in existence in time for the BoB.
A little more 'belief" at the time and a firm order NOT to concentrate of Lysander production might have seen more use of the Whirlwind.
Part of the reason for the Whirlwind's demise was that the Hurricane and Spitfire were so successful, meaning that development and production of the Merlin had to take priority over developing the Peregrine.
With my original list - I avoided aircraft such as the Bristol 153 153A, Supermarine 313, or Martin-Baker MB2:
The Boulton-Paul P.88 - one of the 'winners' of the competition, but the Treasury wouldn't finance so many prototypes - only Westland built, in addition, while in OTL the Vulture got terminated, the Hercules had 'problems' while not imagining the Hercules 100 could appear years earlier, still possible one in the 1500hp region could've been done in-time.
The Marlet - the British Purchasing Commission could've been interested enough in it to order it before the French, so interesting to see the comments. But they were more interested in the Harvard, Hudson, Catalina later the Mustang, so no early Martlet and no P-36.
.Few can dislike the Whirlwind, obviously again problems with the engine, have read as well about maintenance issues - unrelated to the engine
The problem with the Hercules is what numbers of production and what power at what altitude. Bristol had little trouble making a few sleeve engines a month or even a few dozen per month, the trouble was trying to make thousands of sleeves per month in order to make hundreds of engines per month, they did solve it 1940, just not in time for the BoB. The adoption of 100 octane fuel did very little for the early Hercules engines. In some cases allowable boost went from 5lb to 6 3/4lbs (for a 1941 MK VI engine), There were changes in cylinder finning and cylinder head design as the Hercules went on.
So, this begs the Question - what was the 'problem', why couldn't Bristol do it earlier? And how did they solve it? Therefore could that solution have arrived earlier!? I seem to remember that unlike Rolls-Royce Bristol didn't take on apprentices when re-armament started. And altitude - I think Fedden was fixated on the snail-volute rather than the turbine-volute for the supercharger.
The Gloster single-engine - granted the Mercury engine was quite mature by then - not a lot more that could be squeezed out of it, yet the original spec was for a radial fighter for hot climates - so maybe the Air Staff still take that into account! Also I have seen mention of re-engining with the Taurus - though much of an advantage that gives is debatable! But it does need an earlier first flight to stand a chance, especially if that was when there were 'problems' with the Merlin.
Perhaps more could have been squeezed out, but not without taking engineering time from the sleeve-valve engines, given the Taurus's saga perhaps they should have
Debate on the Taurus is you get a smaller diameter but heavier engine that gives no more power at altitude (in production versions) but adds cooling problems. Lets look at it objectively shall we. Replace 24.9 liter 9 cylinder radial with 25.4 14 cylinder radial engine. You have to believe the sleeve valve is some sort of magic to think you are going to get a major increase in power. Minor increase due to higher rpm, minor increase due to smaller cylinders, minor increase due to the sleeve valves, but a MAJOR increase? US 1200 hp radials were around 29.9 liters.
The Gloster single-seater had a lot in common with the Macchi MC200, whereas later many would be glad to have the MC202, I suspect at the time most preferred it to the CR-42.
And here you run into an engine problem too, which model P&W R-1830 or wright R-1820s will be ordered in 1939 compared to what was becoming available in the fall of 1940 let alone what was used in 1941? A lot of the P W engines deleverid to the French and early British were single speed engines with around 1050 hp for take-off, later delivers shifted to 1200hp engines, Wright engines usually had two speed super chargers but had some problems as fighter engines.
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