Ready for El Alamein: ideal British tanks

Yeah, I think Italian is the best bet since they were there for so long.

typical italian mount with the guns groupled so close together. Surprised though that the calibre is only 4.7['. The breeches seem a lot bigger. I notioce also that the guns' breech blocks have been removed....they wont fire without them

remove breech blocks was normal in withdrawn if guns can not moved

Ratio of AP (all types) production to HE production by year for 6 lbr shot

1942: 20.2 to 1
1943: 5.7 to 1
1944: 12 to 1
1945: 09. to 1

There were about 22.3 million rounds of AP ammunition produced. There were only 2.8 million HE rounds produced. Maybe the marginal effectiveness of the 6 lbr HE shot and British doctrinal issues had something to do with this?

The 6 pounder anti tank gun would only occasionally have need to use HE as it was used and placed for fire against armour. The HE alternative for tanks was the 6 pounder bored out to 75mm and that used HE by preference so the proportions make sense if you combine them with the 75mm figures. You would not choose 6 pounder HE if you had 75mm available. But, if you did not, then 6 pounder HE was useful so you would want to have a few available (not least to swap with US 57mm A/T crews for kit and rations.)

I thought the perceived wisdom was that tanks were primarily for taking on anti tank guns and infantry targets - so needed more HE than arour piercing rounds?
So when they broke through / out of a position, they could wreak havok amongst the rear of the enemy?
In such cases, firing an armour piercing / sold shot against an anti tank gun was useless.

"perceived wisdom" changed with time and place.

In the 1930s some "experts" thought that "fleets of tanks" would roam the battlefield exchanging broadsides like ships at sea.

Getting the enemy to waste his tanks on your dug in AT guns while your tanks chew up his back areas unhindered is the ideal but seldom achieved.

In the 1930s the majority of tank guns and sighting equipment did not out range the capabilities of the machine gun so the lack of HE shells for 37-40mm guns with their 25-50gram explosive charges (US/British 75mm explosive charge was about 660-670 Grams) wasn't seen as that critical.

If one was in charge of Panzertruppen in 1940/41, the good, or excellent AT capability was maybe a number one requirement? Mid-war, the British brass arrived at the same conclusion?

In the 1930s some "experts" thought that "fleets of tanks" would roam the battlefield exchanging broadsides like ships at sea.

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Ive read accounts of some of the critical battles in NA that describe the tank battle component in exactly those terms, or more correctly, likened the movement and manouverings of the respective tank formations to that of battleships at sea. I dont think there were references or inferences to line of battle or broadsides, but in the open desert terrain liklening armoured vehicles to a battleship in some respects is not innaccurate

Getting the enemy to waste his tanks on your dug in AT guns while your tanks chew up his back areas unhindered is the ideal but seldom achieved.

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I agree with the first part, but in relation to whether tanks broke through to chew up the rear areas of an oppnent, it happned at a tactical level at least all the time. It was not a rare event, though tactics were eventually learnt to counter it. At the beginning of the war, most nations, with the notable exception of the Germans, believed in the idea of the "conituous front". This spilled over into the desert, even after the experiences in France. It certainly happened against the italians, and was a critical reason for the success of Rommel in his first offensive. Eventually tactics were worked out to counter the armoured exploitation concept. They have various names...in France it was called "quadrillage defence, the british tended to refer to it as hedgehog defence, the Russians called it pakfronts. Not sure what term the Americans used. However, even though Infantry worked out methods to counter armoured brekthrough tactics, they werent always successful, as some of the experiences at Gazala and Tobruk demonstrate

In the 1930s the majority of tank guns and sighting equipment did not out range the capabilities of the machine gun so the lack of HE shells for 37-40mm guns with their 25-50gram explosive charges (US/British 75mm explosive charge was about 660-670 Grams) wasn't seen as that critical

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.

The British Armoured warfare manual of 1938 expected tanks to engage enemy targets from around 1000m. not sure what they intended to engage enemy soft targets with at that range, but assuming they could, I doubt there were many MGs able to effectively engage enemy soft targets at that range.

parsifal said:

I agree with the first part, but in relation to whether tanks broke through to chew up the rear areas of an oppnent, it happned at a tactical level at least all the time. It was not a rare event, though tactics were eventually learnt to counter it. At the beginning of the war, most nations, with the notable exception of the Germans, believed in the idea of the "conituous front". This spilled over into the desert, even after the experiences in France. It certainly happened against the italians, and was a critical reason for the success of Rommel in his first offensive. Eventually tactics were worked out to counter the armoured exploitation concept. They have various names...in France it was called "quadrillage defence, the british tended to refer to it as hedgehog defence, the Russians called it pakfronts. Not sure what term the Americans used. However, even though Infantry worked out methods to counter armoured brekthrough tactics, they werent always successful, as some of the experiences at Gazala and Tobruk demonstrate

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Well, I did say "unhindered".

Breakthroughs occurred a fair amount of the time. Unhindered Breakthroughs were the tanks ran into little or no opposition ( no reserves, no mobile "fire brigades", no worries about being cut off behind enemy lines) and had freedom to roam where and when they wished were somewhat rarer.

1930s theory didn't really play out too well in 1940s reality even if the tanks were quite effective.

parsifal said:

The British Armoured warfare manual of 1938 expected tanks to engage enemy targets from around 1000m. not sure what they intended to engage enemy soft targets with at that range, but assuming they could, I doubt there were many MGs able to effectively engage enemy soft targets at that range.

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Any decent co-axial mg could engage at 800-1000 meters ( or yards for a British 1938 manual?) just as well as a a ground mounted medium or heavy MG could engage at those ranges. In fact the ground mounted guns (Vickers, tripod mounted MG 34, 1917-1919 Brownings) were usually rated at being effective at even longer ranges.

Crusader and Valentine tanks negotiate boggy ground on a training course at Linney Head in Wales, 17 December 1942.

Even today, the tactics of Infantry remain basically the same as they were by 1943. Infantry engaging tanks directly do not move. If caught in the open you seek or make cover, even if that cover is a shallow slit trench. You form as best you can an integrated all round defence, if the weapons you have at hand are not suitable, you try to isolate the enemy armour from its support, if your weapons can engage the enemy tank, you do so. Tank fire versus dug in Infantry is remarkably inneffective, even when those tanks are equipped with 105mm guns firing HE or larger. As direct fire weapons the tanks are literally quail shooting with their heavy guns. And quite inneffective against the entrenhed Infantry, because direct fire weapons just cant hit them really (mortars and indirect fire weapons are needed for that) .In those situation the centre of you squads firepower shifts from the MGs and mortars to the AT weapons that you have available. In the 1930's the squad or more often the platoon weapon was the ATR. Against the light tanks of the 1930s these weapons were light, but had some chance of engagement at around 250m. MG fire at 1000 yards/metres, is going to do nothing against dug in Infantry, or Infantry in cover. By 1941, ATRs were pretty much obsolete, and really had been replaced by light ATGs of 50mm or below. 88mm weapons were not an Infantry squad based weapon. They were even a battalion based asset. At Halfaya pass, the German defences centred around just 12 dug in 88s fromm memory, making them a divisional asset.

Against tanks, ATGs of the 50mm variety could theoretically engage out to about 500 yards, but in reality the tanks needed to close to 250m or less for the ATGs to have much chance. that was certainly the 9th divs experices in Tobruk. Things would change if the tanks preented their flaks or rear to the ATGs as the Germans found in their March to May '41 assaults of the position. British tanks assaulting Axis Infantry positions found pretty much the same....50mm German ATG weapons were good pinning weapons out to about 400m, but really had to allow British tanks to close to under 250mm to be effective at killing them. The gane changers were the 88mm but more often the ex-Soviet 76.2 adapted to fire AT. An 88mm could engage British tanks with a fair chance of a kill, from more than 1800m. Against that, standard British techniques faltered. The Infantry positions could no longer be engaged with buttoned up MG fire or CS support. British tanks were forced to make near suicidal charges of these positions. It was that the Brits were unaware of the suicidal nature of these tactics, it was that that their solid shot main armaments couldnt help them. But even with the arrival of 75mm HE equipped tanks like the Grant, Allied armour had a very hard time against the German 88mm and the Italian 90mm batteries

Stug3 - thanks for posting the pics. I still think the Crusader was a pretty tank.
If it had been more reliable it may have been regarded more highly?
A 6pdr with HE capability (or ammo availability) when it first appeared would have been helpful!

vinnye said:

Stug3 - thanks for posting the pics. I still think the Crusader was a pretty tank.
If it had been more reliable it may have been regarded more highly?
A 6pdr with HE capability (or ammo availability) when it first appeared would have been helpful!

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The Nuffield organisation sent teams of engineers and upgrade kits to NA to sort out the problems with the Crusader and it ended up a lot more reliable by late 42 but by then it was too late its reputation was mud and the Commonwealth armies didnt want it.

Apparently one of the major problems was that the cooling system was drained before it was loaded onto the ship then when the tank was unloaded they were driven to the railhead with a dry engine, no one thought to ask the tankmen or engineers to check the tanks had coolant. Another problem was the cooling fan drive which was a long chain that worked okay in the UK but of course in the desert the chains wore out at a frightenening rate.

That lack of communication about coolant being drained is a typical administration **** up!
No wonder the Crusaders did not have a good rep!
If I remember correctly there was a problem with air filters?
But I suppose you have to expect problems with any new vehicle - especially when it is rushed into production with mimimal testing, and going into a hostile environment
Still looks pretty though!

When it is pitch black, you are infantry and you hear the squeak squeak of tracks nearby, no tank is pretty.

IIRC with a combined infantry/armour assault the task of the tanks is to deny the enemy the opportunity to fire upon your infantry so that they can reach into the enemy position. Then it is pointy stick time.

The infantry's task is to protect the tanks from infantry A/T weapons.

Of course it is far far more confused in real engagements.

parsifal said:

MG fire at 1000 yards/metres, is going to do nothing against dug in Infantry, or Infantry in cover.

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Dug in infantry is no longer a "soft target". As for "Infantry in cover" I guess that depends on the definition of "Cover", is it actual "cover" ( some degree of protection, even a depression in the ground or tree?) or is it "concealment" (bushes, tall grass, corn field?)

parsifal said:

Against tanks, ATGs of the 50mm variety could theoretically engage out to about 500 yards, but in reality the tanks needed to close to 250m or less for the ATGs to have much chance. that was certainly the 9th divs experices in Tobruk. Things would change if the tanks preented their flaks or rear to the ATGs as the Germans found in their March to May '41 assaults of the position. British tanks assaulting Axis Infantry positions found pretty much the same....50mm German ATG weapons were good pinning weapons out to about 400m, but really had to allow British tanks to close to under 250mm to be effective at killing them. The gane changers were the 88mm but more often the ex-Soviet 76.2 adapted to fire AT. An 88mm could engage British tanks with a fair chance of a kill, from more than 1800m. Against that, standard British techniques faltered. The Infantry positions could no longer be engaged with buttoned up MG fire or CS support. British tanks were forced to make near suicidal charges of these positions. It was that the Brits were unaware of the suicidal nature of these tactics, it was that that their solid shot main armaments couldnt help them. But even with the arrival of 75mm HE equipped tanks like the Grant, Allied armour had a very hard time against the German 88mm and the Italian 90mm batteries

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All true, I would point out that the British weren't entirely blind to the problem. At Halfaya pass the 25pdr unit that was supposed to fire in support of the tank attack had gotten bogged down in a wadi and did not reach their firing position in time. Now the British may have been in error in not using more guns (units) in support of the attack (subject to availability?) or deciding to go in alone without artillery support (poor communications?) or tank commander did what he could because even more units than the tanks and the artillery unit were on a time table and failure to attack would screw up the whole operation. (so did losing the vast majority of attacking tanks.)

Combined arms is a difficult thing to use properly even if things go mostly right.

Small caliber HE, while better than nothing, is not a game changer against well dug in AT guns. Troops on the sharp end may well have complained about the lack of HE ammo but since by not having it, they really had no idea of how effective ( or ineffective) it might be. If 600 grams or so of HE in a 75mm shell are not quite good enough then the 30-50 grams in a 37mm-40mm shell is going to make a pretty poor impression. (US 37MM HE ammo in M3 Light tank had about 38 grams). German 50mm/L60 HE had about 165 grams HE. Germans still provided a fair number of short 75mm armed tanks to support the 50mm armed tanks.
The 37-40mm HE shells may have been more important for morale ( both to raise friendly and lower enemy) than for actual destructive ability.

Dug in infantry is no longer a "soft target". As for "Infantry in cover" I guess that depends on the definition of "Cover", is it actual "cover" ( some degree of protection, even a depression in the ground or tree?) or is it "concealment" (bushes, tall grass, corn field?)

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Yes I would agree with that, but Infantry takes very little time to be dug in, particualalry in the Desert, where there are numerous wadis , river beds,
Ive attached a typical example.

Even hastily prepred position, say slit treches or a few sandbags weree effective cover against direct Light AT fire. And Allied Infantry was motorized, so could usually stay away fromthe enemy armour if caught in the open. Quite possible for them to see the armour sefveral hours ahead of arrival (from the dust) and prepare, or pull back to more easily defended position.

A Sherman tank with a Christmas greeting painted on its hull, Benghazi, 26 December 1942.


A Stuart tank comes to the rescue of a truck which has become stuck in soft sand near Nufilia, 26 December 1942.


The grave of a Scots Greys officer lies beside his Stuart reconnaissance tank, 26 December 1942.


A Crusader Mk II, often used out in front for reconnaissance and probing the enemy.

parsifal said:

Infantry takes very little time to be dug in, particualalry in the Desert

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In Oman digging in used to involve explosives. I don't know how a sangar would cope with solid AP shot Even if it is SA proof.