Regarding the true combat performance of the P-38 (and other advanced US fighters) in the PTO from 1942-44 (1 Viewer)

[JoblinTheGoblin]

Does anyone here own copies of Volumes 9 and 10 of the Pacific Profiles book series by Michael John Claringbould, or any other sources of information on the performance of the P-38, and of other advanced US fighters (other than the Osprey books on the topic, which I am familiar with), in air-to-air combat against Japanese fighters from late 1942 through early 1944, during the gradual loss of experienced pilots and decline in overall skill and experience on the Japanese side?

From the reviews of both books on Modelling Madness, the actual "kill ratio" of P-38s (and of the P-47), was just 1:1 against Japanese fighters, but I'm unsure of the reliability of their reliability, as Claringbould's Osprey-published book on the P-47's record against the Ki-43 over New Guinea provides a 2:1 ratio in favour of the P-47, and, though it's not the focus of the book, the Ki-61, and other Japanese fighter types for that matter, didn't appear to fare too well either, against both the P-47 and P-38.

I know that a user in this forum, Schweik, mentioned some of Claringbould's book series, including Pacific Profiles, in his thread on combat records, but it looks to have stalled early on, having never even covered the PTO, not to mention that said user is also banned.

 

[Mesan]

I believe Rick Dunn also, in his two articles about P-38 in the Pacific, whch can be found in his internet site, clearly mentioned the overclaiming made by P-38s. He relates claims and actual kills, it is a good read. Besides you can also search for his other article named "Shootout at Rabaul" in whch he tells the story of P-38 operations and their results over Rabaul in 1943-44., also an excellent read

 

[GregP]

Hi Joblin. While not directly related to the P-38, the stuff below seems relevant, at least to me, when talking about losses and kill ratios.

You have to define your terms quite carefully.

By way of example, take the F6F Hellcat in WWII:

1) The US Navy suffered 270 F6F losses to enemy aircraft in combat. The F6F shot down 1,445 bombers and 3,718 fighters for a total of 5,163 victories. That's a kill ratio of 19.12 : 1, usually quoted as 19-to-1 in "air-to-air combat."
2) We also lost 553 F6Fs to enemy AAA, though these were action sorties by definition, they were not air-to-air combat losses. An AAA guns sit on the ground; they don't fly. Fighter pilots can't dodge AAA rounds because, a) they can't see them coming, and b) if they could, the rounds come much faster than enemy airplanes do. Notice we lost about twice as many to AAA as to enemy airplanes.
3) We also lost 340 F6Fs on Operational flights when we saw no enemy but we engaged in partol or general fleet defense routine flying. Again, not air-to-air combat losses, non-action sorties.
4) We also lost 885 F6Fs on other flights, such as repositioning, deployment, moving between bases, etc. Again, not air-to-air combat flights and no enemy was encountered ... non-action sorties.
5) We lost 413 F6Fs on ship or gound when not in operation. That is, the F6Fs were on a ship that sank or when the F6F got consumed by fire or explosions aboard ship that was attacked or suffered an accident or was destroyed sitting still on the ground by enemy aircraft or some other way. These are not sorties, action or otherwise. They are aircraft lost when not actually flying. How do we account for these losses?
6) The total of all losses above is 2,461 as opposed to 270 lost in air-to-air combat against enemy airplanes. 2,461 losses against 5,163 victories is a kill-to-loss ratio of 2.1 : 1.

You COULD break out losses that happen only while flying and you get a number between 2.1 :1 amd 19.1 : 1 but, if you do, then you are mixing losses on action sorties with losses on non-action sorties. Should it count against that airplane's reputation if the pilot was stupid enough to run out of fuel and ditch in the ocean? What about if he forgot to use carb heat and wound up ditching due to carb ice or propeller failure of some sort, or an engine that packed it in during a maintenance flight?

Most people look at WWII losses against enemy airplanes versus combat victories, so the F6F has a ratio of 19.1 : 1.

But, depending on how you lump losses together, it could be as bad as 2.1 : 1.

As they say, you can make statistics say almost anything you want if you lie creatively enough ... caveat emptor. You need to look very carefully at how things are calculated to be sure what the numbers you see in print actually mean.

If a pilot has 3 aerial victories but has destroyed 5 of his own aircraft due to accidents or running out of fuel, is he a combat asset, an enemy ace, or what?

Personally, I look at aerial victories against losses in air-to-air combat with enemy airplanes. Operational losse are more related to the quality of the planning, maintenance, and general operation of the airplane than its combat reputation. AAA losses are more severe than most people think they are. Overall, in the US Navy during WWII, we lost 907 airplane to enemy aircraft while we lost 1,982 to AAA. That's 2 : 1 for losses due to AAA over losses due to enemy aircraft. Basically, 1/3 of all our action sortie losses were due to enemy airplanes and the other 2/3 was to AAA. So, we'd have had 2/3 of our actual losses even if we didn't lose a single aircraft to enemy fighters / bombers.

It's worth thinking about in some detail.

The numbers above came from Table 1, Naval Avation Combat Statistics World War II, OPNAV-P-23B, dated 17 Jun 1946, available online as a pdf file.

The definition of a "loss" is also fraught with difficulty, and is worthy of a dedicated thread. Just to scratch the surface, if a plane gets damaged in combat and is later flying home to the carrier when the engine catches fire due to an oil leak, and the pilot bails out, should that be classified an operational loss or a combat loss? What about if the airplane is damaged in combat and flies home and lands without incident, but is then later scrapped because the damage was too severe to repair. Is that a combat loss? Or did we scrap it beause we didn't have time and manpoower to fix it so we just pushed it over the side of the ship?

Again, things can happen that make classifying the event a tough decision.

Cheers!

 

[Pale Runner]

And then we have to remember that the most effective way to shoot down an enemy aircraft is not be seen. So, how many of those 'shot down by AAA' and 'operational losses' are actually shot down by enemy ace that executed a normal 'hit and run' attack?

This is the way most successful aces managed to get their scores.

 

[SaparotRob]

Hi Joblin. While not directly related to the P-38, the stuff below seems relevant, at least to me, when talking about losses and kill ratios.

You have to define your terms quite carefully.

By way of example, take the F6F Hellcat in WWII:

1) The US Navy suffered 270 F6F losses to enemy aircraft in combat. The F6F shot down 1,445 bombers and 3,718 fighters for a total of 5,163 victories. That's a kill ratio of 19.12 : 1, usually quoted as 19-to-1 in "air-to-air combat."
2) We also lost 553 F6Fs to enemy AAA, though these were action sorties by definition, they were not air-to-air combat losses. An AAA guns sit on the ground; they don't fly. Fighter pilots can't dodge AAA rounds because, a) they can't see them coming, and b) if they could, the rounds come much faster than enemy airplanes do. Notice we lost about twice as many to AAA as to enemy airplanes.
3) We also lost 340 F6Fs on Operational flights when we saw no enemy but we engaged in partol or general fleet defense routine flying. Again, not air-to-air combat losses, non-action sorties.
4) We also lost 885 F6Fs on other flights, such as repositioning, deployment, moving between bases, etc. Again, not air-to-air combat flights and no enemy was encountered ... non-action sorties.
5) We lost 413 F6Fs on ship or gound when not in operation. That is, the F6Fs were on a ship that sank or when the F6F got consumed by fire or explosions aboard ship that was attacked or suffered an accident or was destroyed sitting still on the ground by enemy aircraft or some other way. These are not sorties, action or otherwise. They are aircraft lost when not actually flying. How do we account for these losses?
6) The total of all losses above is 2,461 as opposed to 270 lost in air-to-air combat against enemy airplanes. 2,461 losses against 5,163 victories is a kill-to-loss ratio of 2.1 : 1.

You COULD break out losses that happen only while flying and you get a number between 2.1 :1 amd 19.1 : 1 but, if you do, then you are mixing losses on action sorties with losses on non-action sorties. Should it count against that airplane's reputation if the pilot was stupid enough to run out of fuel and ditch in the ocean? What about if he forgot to use carb heat and wound up ditching due to carb ice or propeller failure of some sort, or an engine that packed it in during a maintenance flight?

Most people look at WWII losses against enemy airplanes versus combat victories, so the F6F has a ratio of 19.1 : 1.

But, depending on how you lump losses together, it could be as bad as 2.1 : 1.

As they say, you can make statistics say almost anything you want if you lie creatively enough ... caveat emptor. You need to look very carefully at how things are calculated to be sure what the numbers you see in print actually mean.

If a pilot has 3 aerial victories but has destroyed 5 of his own aircraft due to accidents or running out of fuel, is he a combat asset, an enemy ace, or what?

Personally, I look at aerial victories against losses in air-to-air combat with enemy airplanes. Operational losse are more related to the quality of the planning, maintenance, and general operation of the airplane than its combat reputation. AAA losses are more severe than most people think they are. Overall, in the US Navy during WWII, we lost 907 airplane to enemy aircraft while we lost 1,982 to AAA. That's 2 : 1 for losses due to AAA over losses due to enemy aircraft. Basically, 1/3 of all our action sortie losses were due to enemy airplanes and the other 2/3 was to AAA. So, we'd have had 2/3 of our actual losses even if we didn't lose a single aircraft to enemy fighters / bombers.

It's worth thinking about in some detail.

The numbers above came from Table 1, Naval Avation Combat Statistics World War II, OPNAV-P-23B, dated 17 Jun 1946, available online as a pdf file.

The definition of a "loss" is also fraught with difficulty, and is worthy of a dedicated thread. Just to scratch the surface, if a plane gets damaged in combat and is later flying home to the carrier when the engine catches fire due to an oil leak, and the pilot bails out, should that be classified an oprrational loss or a combat loss? What about if the airplane is damaged in combat and flies home and lands without incident, but is then later scrapped because the damage was too severe to repair. Is that a combat loss? Or did we scrap it beause we didn't have time and manpoower to fix it so we just pushed it over the side of the ship?

Again, things can happen that make classifying the event a tough decision.

Cheers!

Tiny thread jack, as long as you were here. Do you have any current shots of the "Saipan Zero"?

 

[JoblinTheGoblin]

After having read through Claringbould's Osprey-published works, and Rick Dunn's articles on the P-38 (and F6F) as suggested in this thread, I am unsure if I can continue engaging with WWII aviation, or even military aviation as a whole, in any form whatsoever, never mind other similar subject matter. The evidently miserable performance of those two aircraft, and of the F4U, in combat against that cartoonish, sluggish plane that was the A6M, has left me despondent. Though a few thoughts remain on my mind, like the potential performance of the A6M2/3/5 and the Ki-43-II in hypothetical duels with the relatively nimble aircraft of the Soviet and Union and of Italy, and that both Japanese fighters, especially the former, didn't appear to have been that far behind the more advanced US fighters in speed at lower altitudes to begin with, I don't see much point left in continuing any further with this topic.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

A rather drastic response to finding information that doesn't necessarily comport with your opinions, don't you think? You've learned that there are differing views. How is that a negative?

 

[JoblinTheGoblin]

The implications could be more severe than you think if this information is true without a doubt, but that's a topic for another forum.

 

[Shortround6]

A further complication to the " kill:loss ratio" is that many many planes (on both sides) changed (improved) over the 2-3 years in question.
For the P-38 in May of 1942 the first deployment of 25 P-38Es are sent to Alaska with drop tanks and winterization. P-38Es have 1150hp engines.
June 1944 sees the first P-38Ls being delivered (not in combat yet) with dive flaps, powered ailerons and 1600hp engines.

But the Japanese are not using 1942 Zeros or just 1942 Ki-43s either in 1944.
AA also improved a lot during the 2-3 years, at least in quantity.

Going back to what what GregP said about breaking down causes of losses. Look at it the other way.
If you are going to loose hundreds of planes on operational flights and hundreds more on repositioning, deployment, moving between bases flights that are going to happen for just about any type of fighter or bomber (unless the aircraft/engine is really crappy) then a plane that that can kill 1 enemy aircraft for each total loss beats the heck out of a plane that only kills 0.5 enemy planes for each total loss.
It is twice as effective for the total cost of manufacture, transporting/deployment, training and operations assuming they are equal (they are not but that is a different thread).

Modern war (post Crimea (1854) and the American Civil war was always about logistics/manufacturing. It took a lot of effort to get the pointy parts of the spear to the right areas in battles far, far away from the home territories.

As a further complication, types of missions changed over the years. In certain theaters some fighters changed roles, as the Japanese got weaker in some areas air to air combat declined (but did not stop) and a number of allied squadrons were reassigned to ground support or at least strafing/bombing ground targets which runs up the losses to ground fire.
Now if your turbo P-38 gets bounced by Japanese Ki-XX at low level while carrying a pair of 1000lb bombs what happens? Even if the P-38 can jettison the bombs?

 

[Flylo]

Does anyone here own copies of Volumes 9 and 10 of the Pacific Profiles book series by Michael John Claringbould, or any other sources of information on the performance of the P-38, and of other advanced US fighters (other than the Osprey books on the topic, which I am familiar with), in air-to-air combat against Japanese fighters from late 1942 through early 1944, during the gradual loss of experienced pilots and decline in overall skill and experience on the Japanese side?

From the reviews of both books on Modelling Madness, the actual "kill ratio" of P-38s (and of the P-47), was just 1:1 against Japanese fighters, but I'm unsure of the reliability of their reliability, as Claringbould's Osprey-published book on the P-47's record against the Ki-43 over New Guinea provides a 2:1 ratio in favour of the P-47, and, though it's not the focus of the book, the Ki-61, and other Japanese fighter types for that matter, didn't appear to fare too well either, against both the P-47 and P-38.

I know that a user in this forum, Schweik, mentioned some of Claringbould's book series, including Pacific Profiles, in his thread on combat records, but it looks to have stalled early on, having never even covered the PTO, not to mention that said user is also banned.

Does anyone here own copies of Volumes 9 and 10 of the Pacific Profiles book series by Michael John Claringbould, or any other sources of information on the performance of the P-38, and of other advanced US fighters (other than the Osprey books on the topic, which I am familiar with), in air-to-air combat against Japanese fighters from late 1942 through early 1944, during the gradual loss of experienced pilots and decline in overall skill and experience on the Japanese side?

From the reviews of both books on Modelling Madness, the actual "kill ratio" of P-38s (and of the P-47), was just 1:1 against Japanese fighters, but I'm unsure of the reliability of their reliability, as Claringbould's Osprey-published book on the P-47's record against the Ki-43 over New Guinea provides a 2:1 ratio in favour of the P-47, and, though it's not the focus of the book, the Ki-61, and other Japanese fighter types for that matter, didn't appear to fare too well either, against both the P-47 and P-38.

I know that a user in this forum, Schweik, mentioned some of Claringbould's book series, including Pacific Profiles, in his thread on combat records, but it looks to have stalled early on, having never even covered the PTO, not to mention that said user is also banned.

 

[JoblinTheGoblin]

A further complication to the " kill:loss ratio" is that many many planes (on both sides) changed (improved) over the 2-3 years in question. [...]
June 1944 sees the first P-38Ls being delivered (not in combat yet) with dive flaps, powered ailerons and 1600hp engines.

Too late to be relevant to the topic at hand. Japanese pilot training and experience overall, by that point in time, had become infamously deficient, which, of course, complicates comparisons between Japanese and American fighter aircraft.

But the Japanese are not using 1942 Zeros or just 1942 Ki-43s either in 1944.

From what I've read, an eclectic mix of A6M2/3/5s was operating around Rabaul and the Solomons into early 1944. The A6M3 entered production in mid-1942, and the A6M2 was in service in the latter half of 1940, over a year before Pearl Harbour. The newer Ki-43-III didn't enter production until mid-1944, which is outside the scope of this discussion. It was instead the 'vintage' 1942 Ki-43-II that was in service with the IJAAF around that time.

As for all discussion on semantics and statistics, what I will say is that I have assumed good faith on the part of Claringbould and Dunn, and I have especially assumed good faith on the part of Japanese wartime reports. Given how Japan conducted the war, how the Japanese overclaimed at higher rates than their Allied opponents, that many documents were destroyed in the immediate aftermath of the war, and how Japanese society and especially its government was at the time, it's possible that the Japanese were, less scrupulous, shall we say, in reporting losses of their own aircraft than the Allies were. As it stands, it's merely speculation without any real evidence, in records, histories, reports or elsewhere, or any suspicions expressed by any surviving pilots after the war, never mind any other potential holes in this line of thought. Even if it were the case, the additional losses could be mere rounding errors, with the Japanese fighter aircraft retaining relatively favourable kill ratios with the newer US fighters, given the likely higher material cost and complexity of the latter.

CClaringbould has stated numerous times in his works that he took the time to thoroughly go through and compare Allied and Japanese reports, taking into consideration movement, timeframes, targets and claims, and accounting for any potential misidentification, to reach his conclusions. He makes note of whenever aircraft had to ditch, crash land or managed to return to base, with varying amounts of damage or malfunction, separate from losses in both air-to-air and ground-to-air (AA fire) combat. I haven't seen him include operational losses in his loss ratios, certainly not for one side exclusively as GregP might have suggested. He has also stated, numerous times, that Japanese data, especially IJNAF data, on combat losses is reliable, though data on non-combat losses is a different matter. There is nothing to counter his claims. Dunn appears to approach his evaluations of the advanced Allied fighters of the PTO in a similar manner.

At the end of the day, evidence suggests that Allied fighter pilots overclaimed grossly, and that the kill ratios of their aircraft, especially in the period between late-1942 and 1944, when experienced pilots still made up a sizeable, though dwindling, contingent of the IJAAF and IJNAF, when examined against Japanese records, are much lower than at first glance, which is how the majority of past historians outside of Japan have approached these inflated ratios. These expensive, extravagant, cutting-edge aircraft barely managed to break even with gawdy, 'obsolete' opponents. This has major implications for technological progress as a whole. I am unsure if I can continue engaging any further with WWII aviation, or anything similar for that matter.

Snip

?

 

[MIflyer]

We did not win the war by shooting down Zeros. We won it by shooting down the airplanes the Zero was escorting and preventing the Zeros from shooting down our bombers. The mere fact that P-38's and other American aircraft could fly over so high and fast that the Zeros could not touch them was alone enough of a problem for the Japanese to be decisive.

 

[JoblinTheGoblin]

I don't know about all that. From what I've read, it was mainly numbers and the wearing down of experienced Japanese pilots that were the key factors, not any particular advantage in performance. The Japanese had their ways of bringing those shiny, high-flying birds down to earth, or in this case, open waters. Against raids aimed at and near Bougainville in February of 1943, A6Ms savaged escort and bomber alike without loss, a defeat significant enough to have resulted in a hiatus in bombing raids lasting almost half a year. In the case of the F4U, it didn't appear to get off to a great start trying to shoot down Japanese dive-bombers. It just doesn't seem like newer US fighters of the PTO performed well enough against capable A6M pilots to justify themselves, given how expensive and complex they must have been. It was only due to the golden parachute in the form of the overwhelming US industrial-military complex and greater manpower that they managed to eventually gain any semblance of a true advantage over their IJNAF opponents.

At the very least, they may have performed somewhat better against IJAAF fighters, though from what I've heard, Army pilot quality may have lagged behind their counterparts in the Navy to some degree, not to mention that some older, slower Ki-43-Is were still in their ranks around that time.

 

[Shortround6]

From what I've read, an eclectic mix of A6M2/3/5s was operating around Rabaul and the Solomons into early 1944. The A6M3 entered production in mid-1942, and the A6M2 was in service in the latter half of 1940, over a year before Pearl Harbour.

It may have been an eclectic mix, but that does nothing for the Japanese trying to fly in formation. Trying to operate A6M2s with later model Zeros is a headache from a supply point of view. Different engines (2 speed superchargers and possibly different propellers or same hubs but different blades) and different 20mm guns requiring different ammo just for starters. The A6M5 entered production in Aug 1943. Early A6M2 production was slow and subject to refits/changes. The famous 15 Zeros used against the Soviets in Manchuria were a rushed pre-production batch. Zeros had several problems with the wings in 1940 and 1941 some of the modifications were not done at the breaks between models. In Early 1941 the Zeros (A6M2s) were restricted to a red line of 250kts and a 5 G limit on pull outs from dives while investigations into wing failures was carried out. In May 1941 they started increasing the wing skin thickness on the outer panels, Installing longitudinal stringers to increase torsional strength, Adding external balance weights on the Ailerons. The problem seemed to have started with the incorporation servo balancing tabs on the ailerons starting with airframe No.127. These were tried to correct poor aileron response at high speed. The 4th thing they did "fix" the problem was to stop fitting the balance tabs which did not reappear until A6M3 model 22. The Zeros that went to Pearl Harbor where pretty much the ones built from May to Nov 1941 with all of the improvements/approved modifications.

The newer Ki-43-III didn't enter production until mid-1944, which is outside the scope of this discussion. It was instead the 'vintage' 1942 Ki-43-II that was in service with the IJAAF around that time.

The Ki-43-III is pretty much vapor ware. 10 (?)built? fewer than FW 152H models? Out of over 6000 Ki-43s built their impact on the war was microscopic. Yes it is the 'vintage' Ki-43-II that is part of this discussion. And 'Vintage' Ki-43-II only entered production in Nov 1942 after 5 prototypes and 3 (?) preproduction examples. Japanese were doing real good with early version or really missed the boat with needed a better plane than the Ki-43-II begin with?

Now one thing about the Guadalcanal and Solomon's fighting was the extreme distances that were being flown. Minor damage that might have been 'survivable' over the Channel, In NA or in Russia might have resulted in a crash/loss when trying to stay in the air for 2 1/2 to 3 hours.

 

[JoblinTheGoblin]

Japanese were doing real good with early version or really missed the boat with needed a better plane than the Ki-43-II begin with?

The former. The early, ≥1942 model A6Ms and Ki-43s managed to hold their own into 1944, especially with seasoned pilots at the controls.

Now one thing about the Guadalcanal and Solomon's fighting was the extreme distances that were being flown. Minor damage that might have been 'survivable' over the Channel, In NA or in Russia might have resulted in a crash/loss when trying to stay in the air for 2 1/2 to 3 hours.

Good point, but I'm not sure how much that changes the apparent reality that the Corsair, Lightning, Hellcat and other advanced US fighters didn't perform so well against the supposedly obsolete Reisen and Hayabusa, especially the former.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Call me crazy, but I'll take 2:1 over 1:2 any day of the week and twice on Sundays. Handwringing about exorbitant claims (made by all sides, btw), or having to take aboard new information about loss-ratios notwithstanding, I don't see anyone producing or flying Zeroes until 1952.

 

[JoblinTheGoblin]

Call me crazy, but I'll take 2:1 over 1:2 any day of the week...

How about 1:1? And in the case of the Corsair, its performance in combat could get as bad as the latter ratio earlier on against better Japanese pilots.

Handwringing about exorbitant claims (made by all sides, btw)...

American claims are often taken at face value, and have been repeatedly mentioned across the entirety of the English-speaking WWII community, if not elsewhere, for decades.

...I don't see anyone producing or flying Zeroes until 1952.

I could see some later version of the A6M, or better yet, its student the A7M, make it to that year, given that the F4U was still in operation by the Korean War, with a jet kill to its name at that. The Ki-43 was still in service up to that year, albeit as an advanced trainer, and one example did engage P-51s in air-to-air combat in 1947, though it had just one little problem preventing it from shooting down any aircraft. Of course, it would have been unambiguously obsolete by then, but that would have been the case for any other fighter aircraft contemporaneous with it, including the aforementioned Corsair.

 

[Juha3]

There were 10 Ki-43 III-Ko prototypes but how many were produced seem to be anyone's guess. Serial production was assigned to Tachikawa, Nakajima concentrating Ki-84 production. From April 1944 onwards Tachikawa manufactured 2,124 Ki-43-IIs and -III-Kos, but I have not seen info of the exact number of -III-Ko production, but because they served in several Sentais, e.g. 25th, 33rd, 48th, 54th, 64th and 204th Sentais alongside Ki-43-IIs, the number may well be at least a few hundreds. E.g. the Ki-43 Oscar flown by W.O. Sugimoto on 7 January 1945, McGuire's last fight, are claimed to be Ki-43-II and -III by usually reliable suorces.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

How about 1:1? And in the case of the Corsair, its performance in combat could get as bad as the latter ratio earlier on against better Japanese pilots.

Early versions of any plane often suffer teething issues that raise non-combat loss rates.

American claims are often taken at face value, and have been repeatedly mentioned across the entirety of the English-speaking WWII community, if not elsewhere, for decades.

No one with a lick of common sense takes aerial kill-claims at face value.

I could see some later version of the A6M, or better yet, its student the A7M, make it to that year, given that the F4U was still in operation by the Korean War, with a jet kill to its name at that. The Ki-43 was still in service up to that year, albeit as an advanced trainer, and one example did engage P-51s in air-to-air combat in 1947, though it had just one little problem preventing it from shooting down any aircraft. Of course, it would have been unambiguously obsolete by then, but that would have been the case for any other fighter aircraft contemporaneous with it, including the aforementioned Corsair.

You're gonna need a lot of improvements, improvements that will by necessity hamper their performance.

 

[Shortround6]

The former. The early, ≥1942 model A6Ms and Ki-43s managed to hold their own into 1944, especially with seasoned pilots at the controls.

I have a real problem with this statement.
The Japanese on built around 716 of the "1942 model" Ki-43s out of over 5700 versions. While the last Ki-43 I built rolled out of the factory in Feb 1943 they had been building Ki-43 IIs in November so there is some overlap. Ki-43 I's in frontline squadron service in 1944??? Training squadrons yes, 'home defense' squadrons yes. In 1944 just due to normal attrition "1942 model" Ki-43 was well under 10% of the of the strength.
Same pretty much goes for the A6M. While the Navy was a lot quicker to get the two speed supercharger into the A6M the "1942 models" actually cover at least 3 models of A6Ms. The A6M2 21 which is the classic Pearl Harbor, Midway, early Guadalcanal Zero with long wing and single stage supercharger. The A6M3 32 which got the new engine, shorter wing (tips removed). Production started in spring of 1942 and was first spotted by the Allies in Aug 1942, However the new engine meant that the fuselage tank was reduced in size and with the thirstier engine this reduced range. Field commanders requested additional fuel tankage to restore range and after testing the A6M3 22 (yes the numbers are reversed, earlier plane used the higher model number) entered in production in Dec 1942 with the old folding wings in addition to the new small tanks in each wing. So what was the "1942 model"? Also note that 1941-42 production of the A6Ms was about 17% of total production so again, numbers of 1942 production fighters in front line squadrons in 1944 would have been very small.
I would also note that many Allied and Axis pilots weren't much better at aircraft identification than they were at accurate score keeping. Japanese had an easier time of it as the 6 main US fighters were all rather different. Many allied pilots could not tell a Ki-43 from an A6M. They often could tell the A6M3 32 from the others due to the clipped, squared off wing tips.
The rate of attrition on both sides was huge. Many aircraft were written off as soon as they landed due to combat damage, as noted earlier, many were written off due to landing/taxing damage. In the Solomon's and New Guinea both sides lost numbers of planes due to bombing raids (or shell fire). "1942 model" planes, on both sides, were in 2nd line or 3rd line squadrons/areas of operation/duties in 1944.

The Ki-43 was still in service up to that year, albeit as an advanced trainer,

I don't hold much stock in after WW II use. Too much depends on the actual air force and planes involved. As an example France was still using Hawk 75s (very few) as trainers into the early 50s. Any that had been built with Wright R-1820 engines had been repowered with P&WR-1830 engines. France had enough trouble paying for new combat jets, no money for training aircraft.
F4U was sort of a special case. P&W and Vaught had managed to shoe horn in new version of the R-2800 engine that gave much better performance at altitude than many of the early jets. This was at a time when they were still figuring out how to operate jets of carriers (Corsair was no picnic but the jets were really bad) and the new Corsairs were also easy to convert to night fighters (they already knew how to mount the radar). As a air frame already in production and a work force in place it was also easy to stick in an old model engine for a ground attack variant and there was also a French order (cheap aircraft?)
Vaught may also have been getting a pity contract or two. Their jets pretty much sucked. Not all due to Vaught, Navy insisted that Vaught use Westinghouse engines. Axial flow was just so much better than centrifugal (sarcasm) in 1944-47.

Took about 5 years to get this into service. Navy had to keep Vaught in business building something
The Navy did get a lot more use out of F4U-5 fighters than many of the early jets which were, effectively, little more than trainers for pilots, maintenance men and operations.