RN going with 15' or 16' for KGV BB - pros cons?

[tomo pauk]

<snip>

The 15"/42 was probably the best all round heavy gun and mount combination ever to go to sea but by 1939 it was past its best. With hindsight we can see that a KGV built with the 15/42 would have been better in 1941 but expecting the RN to fit Grannies teeth to a new battlewagon isnt going to happen it would be like fitting Vickers .303s to a Spitfire.

Hi, fast,

Would we consider the KGV's 14in to be superior to the 15''/42 in firepower (ie. without taking reliability into equation)?

For general audience: was the 4x2 15in battleship feasible, to sport same size/weight, levels of speed and protection as the historical KGV?

 

[fastmongrel]

Hi, fast,

Would we consider the KGV's 14in to be superior to the 15''/42 in firepower (ie. without taking reliability into equation)?

In real terms there probably wasnt a great deal between the 2 shells terminal performance. Both were good penetrators and both had a good HE content. The 14" was more accurate and lighter simply because the tube was a more modern design. To the people who were receiving the shells it was probably a 49/51 thing ie too close to call in real terms. However if I was the one at the pointy end of heavy fire I would definitley want to be in the 14" equipped vessel. The 15" as good as it was was 2 generations behind the 14" and no modernisation is going to close the gap, the 14" was possibly the safest mount of WWII in fact possibly too safe as it was often the interlocks that caused the problems. The RN knew the 15" wasnt up to scratch witness the changes made in HMS Vanguard to try and rectify the situation. The changes to the mounts ended up causing more problems than they solved and Vanguard never reached the reliability of the modernised 15" mounts in the Queen Elizabeth class. In fact post war the KGVs were more reliable than Vanguard so the alt history favourite of putting 15s onto the KGVs might not have worked. From wiki The 15-inch turrets had been designed when the customary practice was to place the magazine above the shell room and it was not cost-effective to modify the ammunition hoists to accommodate the opposite arrangement adopted after the Battle of Jutland demonstrated the dangers of exposing the magazines to long-range gunfire. The ship was provided with a powder-handling room above the shell room to mimic the arrangement that turret's hoists were designed to handle, and another set of hoists moved the propellant charges from the magazines to the powder-handling room.

For general audience: was the 4x2 15in battleship feasible, to sport same size/weight, levels of speed and protection as the historical KGV?

No the 4 mount design would have come out longer and heavier with less protection than the 3 mount design. Speed wouldnt have changed I believe as the longer finer waterline would counter the greater weight. The extra 60 feet of length iirc would have cost 2 inches of deck armour (to counteract the high up weight of C mount and the aft director which would need to be 2 decks higher than in the 14" ship) and a shallower torpedo defence, also the 5.25 battery would have had to be mounted closer together and a deck lower to counter blast from C mount. The only way to get the same protection in the 4 mount was to break the Washington treaty big time and that wasnt politically or economically possible when the design was sealed in 1936.

 

[Kryten]

By 1945 USN torpedoes were reliable too. That doesn't help during 1941 when weapon reliability was a matter of life or death for British and American military personnel.

they were reliable long before 1945, Duke of York disabled the Scharnhorst in 43!
Prince of Wales was a brand new ship with no workup as previously noted, that had as much to do with her reliability issues in the Denmark Straight as any teething trouble with the design, she even had civillian workmen aboard during the battle!

 

[Tante Ju]

they were reliable long before 1945, Duke of York disabled the Scharnhorst in 43!

Yes but seems still not quite optimal.

"Many, if not most, of these problems had been corrected by 1943. During the early part of her action against Scharnhorst at the Battle of the North Cape on 26 December 1943, HMS Duke of York scored 31 straddles out of 52 broadsides fired and during the latter part she scored 21 straddles out of 25 broadsides, a very creditable gunnery performance. In total, Duke of York fired 450 shells in 77 broadsides. However, HMS Duke of York still fired less than 70% of her possible output during this battle because of mechanical and "errors in drill" problems."

From: Britain 14"/45 (35.6 cm) Mark VII

 

[fastmongrel]

Yes but seems still not quite optimal.

"Many, if not most, of these problems had been corrected by 1943. During the early part of her action against Scharnhorst at the Battle of the North Cape on 26 December 1943, HMS Duke of York scored 31 straddles out of 52 broadsides fired and during the latter part she scored 21 straddles out of 25 broadsides, a very creditable gunnery performance. In total, Duke of York fired 450 shells in 77 broadsides. However, HMS Duke of York still fired less than 70% of her possible output during this battle because of mechanical and "errors in drill" problems."

From: Britain 14"/45 (35.6 cm) Mark VII

The battle of the North Cape was fought in appalling weather, weather so bad a large cruiser like HMS Belfast was only able to reach 24 knots and still suffered storm damage. Duke of York was sailing at top speed into a Sou Westerly gale pitching 40 plus feet rolling 20 plus degrees shipping water over the bows, had all pumps working to clear water getting into the gun mounts and was at action stations for 10 1/2 hours, at shooting stations for 3 and a 1/2 hours and only managed to fire 77 salvos of which 52 were straddles.

We dont have Scharnhorsts records so we cant know how many failed to fire she suffered but under the same conditions as DoY she didnt manage to fire much faster even though theoretically she had a firing rate twice as fast as DoY. I imagine Sch-t had similar problems with 700 pound AP shells jumping out of hoists and crews getting tired and resulting in errors.

That both DoY and Sch-t managed to fight in such bad weather is astonishing that DoY managed to shoot 70% of possible shots is astonishing.

If anyone can find an action fought under similar conditions by similar units where the ships managed to fire better than 70% then we can talk about reliability.

 

[vinnye]

I just found this on a website -
HMS Rodney, British battleship, WW2

RODNEY fired two types of salvo, the outer guns of A and X plus the inner gun of B in a five gun salvo followed by the inner guns of A and Y and the outer guns of B in a four gun salvo and this is how she initially engaged the German ship. The reason for this pattern of firing was an attempt to limit self inflicted damage form the blast of her own guns.
RODNEY's first two salvos were over, her third was a straddle.

At 0901 hours RODNEY fired her fourth salvo, two shells missed and two were hits. At least one of the shells hit in the vicinity of Bruno turret completely disabling it and partially disabling Anton; also the explosion tore upwards through the bridge killing many on the bridge.
At 0849 hours BISMARCK returned fire from her Anton and Bruno turrets, the only ones that could bear, on RODNEY. The first three salvos were short, straddle and over. One of BISMARCK's shells exploded in the water off the port bow and the force of the explosion jammed her port torpedo tube doors.
At 0854 hours the heavy cruiser NORFOLK opened fire on BISMARCK at a range of 18,000 yards.
At 0916 hours RODNEY fired the first of twelve torpedoes from her starboard tube at the BISMARCK, this was the first time a battleship had fired a torpedo at another battleship. All the torpedoes except possibly one missed.
At 0918 hours RODNEY closed to 8,000 yards.
At 0927 hours BISMARCK fired her last shells from her forward turrets.
At about 0930 hours a 16in shell from RODNEY penetrated BISMARCK's deck armour and exploded in the port engine room killing most of the crew and putting the engine room out of action.
At 0930 hours RODNEY closed to 6,000 yards to compensate for the failure of her fire control equipment.
At 0931 hours a 16in hit from RODNEY hit Dora turret, which was then abandoned by its crew due to smoke and gas. At the same time Caesar turret fired the last of her shells This hit and the exhausting of ammunition for Caesar turret, ended fire from BISMARCK's after turrets.


seems like Rodneys 16 inch guns were pretty effective!

 

[fastmongrel]

I just found this on a website -
HMS Rodney, British battleship, WW2

RODNEY fired two types of salvo, the outer guns of A and X plus the inner gun of B in a five gun salvo followed by the inner guns of A and Y and the outer guns of B in a four gun salvo and this is how she initially engaged the German ship. The reason for this pattern of firing was an attempt to limit self inflicted damage form the blast of her own guns.

According to Naval Weapons of WWII by John Campbell the 5 and 4 salvo sequence was used because the shell bogies which carried the shells from the magazine to the loading rammers were interconnected and all 3 barrels had to be loaded at the same time or cease firing whilst loading 1 or 2 barrels. Firing all 3 barrels in full broadsides caused dispersion of the shells and also caused blast damage as you said. The shell bogies were connected to interlocks so that no flashtight door or scuttle in the rotating mount or magazine could possibly be open whilst firing or loading cordite.

Some RN officers thought the USN took risks with propellant safety to increase rate of fire. Equally USN officers thought the RN was too careful citing the better shock and fire safety of modern propellants.

 

[vinnye]

The 14 inch guns of KGV were not as reliable during this action ;

At 0847 Rodney opened fire...at a gun range of 23500 yards, followed by King George V one minute later at 24,600 yards...[96] Initially she [KGV] did well achieving 1.7 salvoes per minute while employing radar control but she began to suffer severe problems from 0920 onward [Note: KGV had opened fire at 0848 and fired for about 25 minutes at 1.7 salvoes per minute until 0913, when the type 284 radar broke down, but with no recorded loss of 14 inch gun output until 0920.[97]]. KGV recorded 14 straddles out of 34 salvoes fired from 0853 to 0913, when using her type 284 radar for ranging and spotting.[98] 'A' turret was completely out of action for 30 minutes [From 0920[99]], after firing about 23 rounds per gun, due to a jam between the fixed and revolving structure in the shell room and Y turret was out of action for 7 minutes due to drill errors. . . Both guns in B turret, guns 2 and 4 in A turret and gun 2 in Y turret were put out of action by jams and remained so until after the action – 5 guns out of 10! There were a multitude of other problems with mechanical failures and drill errors that caused delays and missed salvos. There were also some misfires – one gun (3 of A turret) misfired twice and was out of action for 30 minutes before it was considered safe to open the breech.

—John Roberts, The Final Action[97]

 

[DonL]

At about 0930 hours a 16in shell from RODNEY penetrated BISMARCK's deck armour and exploded in the port engine room killing most of the crew and putting the engine room out of action

This is physical not possible. A shell from 8000 to 6000 yards fired at Bismarck can't hit the deck armor from angle of fall.
Also I have never heared of this hit. BS citadell (superstructure under the main deck) wasn't penetrated at the end fight.

Neither was there a hit through the belt and slopes nor through the main armor deck (what was impossible through the very short distance)

 

[jim]

The battle of the North Cape was fought in appalling weather, weather so bad a large cruiser like HMS Belfast was only able to reach 24 knots and still suffered storm damage. Duke of York was sailing at top speed into a Sou Westerly gale pitching 40 plus feet rolling 20 plus degrees shipping water over the bows, had all pumps working to clear water getting into the gun mounts and was at action stations for 10 1/2 hours, at shooting stations for 3 and a 1/2 hours and only managed to fire 77 salvos of which 52 were straddles.

We dont have Scharnhorsts records so we cant know how many failed to fire she suffered but under the same conditions as DoY she didnt manage to fire much faster even though theoretically she had a firing rate twice as fast as DoY. I imagine Sch-t had similar problems with 700 pound AP shells jumping out of hoists and crews getting tired and resulting in errors.

That both DoY and Sch-t managed to fight in such bad weather is astonishing that DoY managed to shoot 70% of possible shots is astonishing.

If anyone can find an action fought under similar conditions by similar units where the ships managed to fire better than 70% then we can talk about reliability.

HOW IS POSSIBLE TO COMPARE DoY conditions of fire with that of S? S was under attack by many ships,was taking damage by many ships, damaged by previus fight, with her main radar destroyed ,with a useless and dangerous commander, and under the threat of DDs . Also had lost Anton turret immediately. She had to run and was running. Only occasionaly was turing south to fire her guns.
And you use her rate of fire on such conditions to justify DoY s rate of fire? Unbelievable

 

[fastmongrel]

HOW IS POSSIBLE TO COMPARE DoY conditions of fire with that of S? S was under attack by many ships,was taking damage by many ships, damaged by previus fight, with her main radar destroyed ,with a useless and dangerous commander, and under the threat of DDs . Also had lost Anton turret immediately. She had to run and was running. Only occasionaly was turing south to fire her guns.
And you use her rate of fire on such conditions to justify DoY s rate of fire? Unbelievable

I did not use anything other than the weather to justify DoYs or Schts rate of fire and I am particulary annoyed that you attack me without even apparently reading what I wrote. If English isnt your first language then that is understandable if English is your first language then you are simply trolling. Scharnhorst fought bravely and I respect the memory of her crew, Captain Hintze and Adm Bey. I do not know which particular person you are referring to as useless and dangerous, if either Bey or Hintze made mistakes then so be it no one is perfect. Your attack on a man who died at his post doing his best is revolting and you obviously have no understanding of the action nor any understanding of the pressure of command when facing superior forces and given an impossible mission by a lunatic Charlie Chaplin impersonator who obviously understood even less than you do of naval combat.

Go away do some reading about the action and Beys responses to circumstances. Then you can come back and we can discuss the Battle of the North Cape. However I wont discuss with you the conduct of men whom Adm Fraser eulogised, saying after the battle to the crew of DoY "Gentlemen, the battle against Scharnhorst has ended in victory for us. I hope that if any of you are ever called upon to lead a ship into action against an opponent many times superior, you will command your ship as gallantly as Scharnhorst was commanded today"

 

[DonL]

I did not use anything other than the weather to justify DoYs or Schts rate of fire and I am particulary annoyed that you attack me without even apparently reading what I wrote. If English isnt your first language then that is understandable if English is your first language then you are simply trolling. Scharnhorst fought bravely and I respect the memory of her crew, Captain Hintze and Adm Bey. I do not know which particular person you are referring to as useless and dangerous, if either Bey or Hintze made mistakes then so be it no one is perfect. Your attack on a man who died at his post doing his best is revolting and you obviously have no understanding of the action nor any understanding of the pressure of command when facing superior forces and given an impossible mission by a lunatic Charlie Chaplin impersonator who obviously understood even less than you do of naval combat.

Go away do some reading about the action and Beys responses to circumstances. Then you can come back and we can discuss the Battle of the North Cape. However I wont discuss with you the conduct of men whom Adm Fraser eulogised, saying after the battle to the crew of DoY "Gentlemen, the battle against Scharnhorst has ended in victory for us. I hope that if any of you are ever called upon to lead a ship into action against an opponent many times superior, you will command your ship as gallantly as Scharnhorst was commanded today"

I think you are very offended.

Jim wanted to point out that SH had other circumstances than DoY!

With the second salvo from DoY turrent Anton and Bruno were out of action, turrent Bruno joined again action very late in the fight (17.30-17.45).
Also I think what Jim wanted to point out, were the many mistakes of Admiral Bey!

He was a man from the Destroyers and wasn't very experienced with BB's.
The remove of the Destroyers, with the simultaneously balackout of the main radar set (from Norfolk) and the very agressive performance to the convoy from SH were very heavy mistakes.
Also the moving under switch off the remaining radar sets, with the result that DoY could manage to move to SH undiscovered till 11000 yards was a very major mistake!

After a successful fight it is very easy to say the enemy fought gentle, but to my opinion the Battle of North Cap was nothing but luck and a very bad performance from the commanding german Admiral! Luck through the lucky hit with the second salvo and the disableing of two turrents and the disableing of the machenary at 18.20 through a normal breakdown! That's strictly my personal opinion, but till now nobody could confirm or prove that SH's machinary was disabled through a hit from DoY.

Admiral Bey had done very big mistakes and SH wasn't fighting under the same circumstances then DoY, that was to my opinion, what was Jim wanted to say and this are very hard and proved facts!

 

[jim]

I did not use anything other than the weather to justify DoYs or Schts rate of fire and I am particulary annoyed that you attack me without even apparently reading what I wrote. If English isnt your first language then that is understandable if English is your first language then you are simply trolling. Scharnhorst fought bravely and I respect the memory of her crew, Captain Hintze and Adm Bey. I do not know which particular person you are referring to as useless and dangerous, if either Bey or Hintze made mistakes then so be it no one is perfect. Your attack on a man who died at his post doing his best is revolting and you obviously have no understanding of the action nor any understanding of the pressure of command when facing superior forces and given an impossible mission by a lunatic Charlie Chaplin impersonator who obviously understood even less than you do of naval combat.

Go away do some reading about the action and Beys responses to circumstances. Then you can come back and we can discuss the Battle of the North Cape. However I wont discuss with you the conduct of men whom Adm Fraser eulogised, saying after the battle to the crew of DoY "Gentlemen, the battle against Scharnhorst has ended in victory for us. I hope that if any of you are ever called upon to lead a ship into action against an opponent many times superior, you will command your ship as gallantly as Scharnhorst was commanded today"

You used S rof as point of reference for DoY rate of fire
I imagine you do know that Bey was commanding the german DDs at Narvik . As for the 26/12/1943 Scharnhorst (my favourite capital ship) fought bravely to the end but not skillfully. Bey s terrible mistakes during the entire operation are subject of teaching in naval academy s . Actually it s questionable if ANY of its orders was correct. He was even worse than Lutjens. If S had even an average level of command would never sunk on that particular action.
As for the english s admiral comment about S, by saying good things about its victim further gloryfeid his victory.
If he had ANY respect for S crew ,instead of eulogising them, would be better to pick them up from the frozen seas . They deid a torturing death with the english DDs ,fully of respect for them, over their heads.

 

[fastmongrel]

Jim wanted to point out that SH had other circumstances than DoY!

A fair comment and thank you for making it but did he have to attack me personally whilst doing it. It is possible to make your point of view without being offensive, it is also possible to put your point of view over without taking someone elses comments out of context.

 

[fastmongrel]

You used S rof as point of reference for DoY rate of fire

I am only going to answer that one comment because I think the rest of your disgraceful post is not worthy of comment. I did not Use Scharnhorst as a point of reference I pointed out that the sea conditions meant that Scharnhorstt was probably suffering similar failures to fire. We do not know and never will unless a diver finds the gunnery logs how many rounds that were fired, how many failures to fire and how many salvoes were fired.

I have never served at sea but I did serve in the Army as tank crew most of that time as a gun loader and I have close personal experience of how hard it is to do your job whilst the surface you are standing on is pitching, yawing and rolling. Fortunately I never had to do my job whilst someone fired supersonic pointed lumps of metal at me.

I will never criticise any man for his decisions taken whilst under combat conditions no matter the colour of the flag he fights under, the colour of his skin nor the colour of his politics.

 

[Tante Ju]

Fair comments from all partipants IMHO.

I do not see though many reason to bash Bey. Yes, different decisions could have been taken, but that's very much with the benefit of hindsight. Bey for example could have no idea of the disposition of the DoY task force, and I find it hard to particularly blame him for maintaining radio and radar silence. He wanted to disengage and loose his pursuants, and he probably knew very well that his radar would give away his position far beyond the range it would pick up contacts. The Germans had fairly effective naval passive systems, and assumed (probably right) that the enemy task force has such too. Come to think of it, Bismarck's passive sets were capable of picking up the pursuing PoW's radar signals even by when the PoW had already lost contact. If he had switched on radar he might as well turned on all searchlights and put a big sign on the bridge saying 'Here I am, come catch me'..

I wonder though if Scharnhorst passive sonars had picked up anything though before DoY made radar contact.

 

[jim]

Fair comments from all partipants IMHO.

I do not see though many reason to bash Bey. Yes, different decisions could have been taken, but that's very much with the benefit of hindsight. Bey for example could have no idea of the disposition of the DoY task force, and I find it hard to particularly blame him for maintaining radio and radar silence. He wanted to disengage and loose his pursuants, and he probably knew very well that his radar would give away his position far beyond the range it would pick up contacts. The Germans had fairly effective naval passive systems, and assumed (probably right) that the enemy task force has such too. Come to think of it, Bismarck's passive sets were capable of picking up the pursuing PoW's radar signals even by when the PoW had already lost contact. If he had switched on radar he might as well turned on all searchlights and put a big sign on the bridge saying 'Here I am, come catch me'..

I wonder though if Scharnhorst passive sonars had picked up anything though before DoY made radar contact.

Mr Tante Ju
I have huge respect for your opinion. However on this case :
Bey had exchanged fire with british forces twice that day. so he knew that the english knew his presence. Additionaly it would be very logical to assume that the cruisers were shadowing him. So the radar silence was pointless. Or at least he should turned it on for brief periods. HE SHOULD suspect that a british battleship was somewhere , or at least take precaution measures against susch a possibility.His passive recievers were giving him strong radar activity Also he should turned into the weather in order to lose the cruisers .
Early that day had allowed the cruisers to pass him at just 12000 and position themselfs between him and the convoy because of his radar silence. Again his passive recievers were giving him strong radar emmisions. Besides ,while he refused radar use, had no problem to use the radio which is easier to be located
The above and much much more is not my critisism.This battle has been widely analyzed and Bey convicted by professional naval officers.
The first one that heavily critised him was his supreme commander Donitz

 

[jim]

Fair comments from all partipants IMHO.

I do not see though many reason to bash Bey. Yes, different decisions could have been taken, but that's very much with the benefit of hindsight. Bey for example could have no idea of the disposition of the DoY task force, and I find it hard to particularly blame him for maintaining radio and radar silence. He wanted to disengage and loose his pursuants, and he probably knew very well that his radar would give away his position far beyond the range it would pick up contacts. The Germans had fairly effective naval passive systems, and assumed (probably right) that the enemy task force has such too. Come to think of it, Bismarck's passive sets were capable of picking up the pursuing PoW's radar signals even by when the PoW had already lost contact. If he had switched on radar he might as well turned on all searchlights and put a big sign on the bridge saying 'Here I am, come catch me'..

I wonder though if Scharnhorst passive sonars had picked up anything though before DoY made radar contact.

Mr Tante Ju
I have huge respect for your opinion. However on this case :
Bey had exchanged fire with british forces twice that day. so he knew that the english knew his presence. Additionaly it would be very logical to assume that the cruisers were shadowing him. So the radar silence was pointless. Or at least he should turned it on for brief periods. HE SHOULD suspect that a british battleship was somewhere , or at least take precaution measures against susch a possibility.His passive recievers were giving him strong radar activity Also he should turned into the weather in order to lose the cruisers .
Early that day had allowed the cruisers to pass him at just 12000 and position themselfs between him and the convoy because of his radar silence. Again his passive recievers were giving him strong radar emmisions. Besides ,while he refused radar use, had no problem to use the radio which is easier to be located
The above and much much more is not my critisism.This battle has been widely analyzed and Bey convicted by professional naval officers.
The first one that heavily critised him was his supreme commander Donitz

 

[delcyros]

Some quick notes as I am running short in time.

[A] Somebody suggested that BIMSARCK has something to do with the BADEN design. This is probably correct, but only for the kitchen, whiches layout in design is similar to that of BADEN. Otherwise, both vessels have a very different design history and very different capabilities. The similarities are superficial only, and Breyer (where did he said this?) is incorrect. Otherwise one could also say that MARYLAND is a warmed over SOUTH CAROLINA or VANGUARD is a warmed over REVENGE class. All these statements are incorrect. If You browse the board, You will find more on that.

British 14" and 15" APC projectiles had roughly identic capabilities with regard to armour penetration. Differences of the manufacturer are important for both designs, though. Until late 1944, projectiles were dissimilar, depending on the manufacturer and often were found to be defective when striking face hardened armour (shattering at velocities, where they should theoretically penetrate). The issue is not trivial, basically a repeat of RN ww1 experience with shatter problem of their armour piercing period. Eventually, these defects were overcome.

[C] Britain in the interwar period had a political interest to keep armament races limited. This was the principal reason to adopt the 14in design. The UK industrial gun making industry had been thoroughfully destroyed in the twenties (most manufacturer went bancrupt) and production and designing capabilities are poor by the mid 30´s. A 15in armed BB is possible but would likely take longer to construct and test as the ship would have to get bigger. The UK produced a very credible armour protection for their new, fast BB´s (abandoning their average protected ww1 schemes). Time however, is a critical component in the defense of the North Atlantic, it doesn´t buy You anything if You can have ships ready in 1943, You need to have them aviable in 1940 and 1941. That beeing said, the RN was well provided for with the KGV´s and made good use out of them.

 

[nuuumannn]

I though I might chime in now all the excitement has died down. I'm surprised no one has mentioned the Lion Class battleships, which were intended on being 16" gun versions of the KGVs. Construction of the name ship and the Temeraire was actually started, but was never completed and the remains scrapped. Machinery and so forth were to be the same as the KGVs, but main armament was to be 9 X 16" in three turrets that were to be of the same structural design as the KGVs.

There was even an idea to complete the Lion as a battleship carrier, with a carrier deck aft and main armament forward and island superstructure to one side.

Lion class battleship - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia