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True but the RN ships were far more efficient.Kongo v KGV. The gun performance should be better. 1910 designed gun with a WW2 era 1,485lb APC shell v 1937 designed gun with a 1,590lb APC shell.
I don't think anybody's ammunition expenditure generated the expected hit rates in WW2
Many of the Japanese escorts or even fleet destroyers did not have radar in the early part of the Pacific war which was more than a bit late by European standards.
The Japanese asdic was several generations behind the British and the gap increased. It also did not not help that some of the late Japanese escorts were noisy.
About as advanced as the Japanese got for ahead throwing weapons was a single 80mm army mortar mounted ahead of the Bridge. This arrived late and obviously was not very effective.
While the British Hedgehog showed up in late 1942 poor training delayed it's use for quite a number of months. Crews did not have confidence in it's ablities or proper training in use. There as a lot more too it than point the ship at the suspected area and fire away.
However the Japanese never even got close even in 1945.
A lot of British or American hunter teams used one or more ships to 'fix' the subs (locate and track) and would then use the radio to coach the firing ship into position. The ships own asdic would not point down enough and the target would be lost on the attack runs. If the first run did not work they would often swap and one of the trackers would make an attack run while the first attacker reloaded it's launcher/s while providing asdic support for the new attack ship.
However this also needs practice, training and good voice radios. This was also going into 1944.
The Japanese in late 1941 were behind, well behind, where the RN was in late 1939 as far as ASW.
However in a somewhat similar historical pattern the numerous (by Japanese standards) escorts don't show up until 1944-45, leaving most of the early war work to be done by a few handfuls of converted destroyers, steam torpedo boats and patrol boats. And in 1942 few had radar, not all had Asdic, DC storage was small and so on.
Much of the ASW was done by fleet destroyers "on loan" in the first part of the war as they didn't have enough escort ships.
In April of 1942 the were only two escort groups (this is after all of the early conquests')
The 1st escort group had 10 old destroyers, two torpedo boats and 5 converted gun boats for the Japan to Singapore route.
The 2nd escort group had 4 old destroyers, two torpedo boats and 1 converted gun boat for the Japan to Truk route.
There were a few other odds and sods but obviously they needed fleet destroyers to fill in. And that leads to poor training or team work. The Japanese never had a ASW school. In fact some of their escort commanders (late in the war?) were from the merchant marine academy and not the Naval Academy and we can imagine how well that worked in mixed groups.
The RN was not perfect but the distinction between the regular navy and "wavy navy" was probably the least marked in any navy.
Even a blind pig finds an acorn once in while?That's all very interesting, considering the US lost 41 submarines in the Pacific Theater. Did they all sink themselves with defective torpedoes?
Kind of gets us into another thread
As we know the Japanese planned for two more Yamatos.
The Design work for the Iowa's was started in 1938 with rumors of Japanese 46,000 ton BBs.
4 were ordered before 1940.
In the massive naval bill of July 19th 1940 there were another two ordered and five Montana class (Twelve 16in guns) and they may have decided on the Twelve 16in gun option as taking less time than designing/developing/building the 18in gun option.
It would have been very messy but the Yamato's were never going to be facing US 16in BBs one to one. It was always going to be 2.5-4 to 1.
The US could afford to lose ships, the Japanese could not.
The Dutch subs sank over twice (?) as many ships as the 29 US boats did.
We had cracked the IJN codes and the Japanese subs were careful to radio their positions and plans.It would seem that being an American submariner was much safer than being a Japanese submariner.
All warships were highly vulnerable to big explosey thingies. What's your point? All the big navies had some things that were better, sometimes substantially so, than the equivalent things in other navies. Like the Japanese Long Lance torpedoes, yes. But were they some kind of wunder weapon that would have decided a fleet battle? Most likely not.But the problem with that formula, at least in the real world as distinct from planning, that the US (or say, UK) warships were highly vulnerable to torpedo attacks by not just the ostensible fleet subs, but smaller Japanese surface warships like DDs and CLs, and even CAs. Not to mention aircraft.
All warships were highly vulnerable to big explosey thingies. What's your point? All the big navies had some things that were better, sometimes substantially so, than the equivalent things in other navies. Like the Japanese Long Lance torpedoes, yes. But were they some kind of wunder weapon that would have decided a fleet battle? Most likely not.
In any case the point is moot, as the USN were never going to be sucked into some kind of Mahanian ultimate fleet battle early in the war where losing it might have forced them to the negotiation table. Strategically, they were happy to hold the line while the war industry at home went BRRRT.
3 times the range does not equal 3 times the effectiveness. Better yes.
I have posted diagrams of Japanese cruisers earlier. You usually cannot hit what you can't see, accidents do happen though, including own goals. Destroyers have lower bridges/fire control positions than cruisers with less visual range. Each ship needs to work out their own firing solution. No data sharing
Japanese torpedoes were faster, faster gives shorter time to impact which is better, What is 20% worth? what is 15% worth and so on.
Torpedo warheads varied, a lot. Japanese torpedoes used heavy warheads, The Allies got better explosives later on, 1941-42 was pretty much TNT.
All Three navies used 3 different torpedoes (at a minimum).
All three used a different aerial torpedo than most surface ships/subs.
All three used different sub torpedoes than surface torpedoes.
and for torpedoes 4 and 5 (and 6/7) all three used different different sub and surface torpedoes depending on the age of the the ships.
For the US this meant that the S type subs used different torpedoes than the new boats (not problem free but fewer) and that the old 4 stack destroyers used different torpedoes than the newer destroyers. Granted a lot of the old stuff disappeared in the first 3-6 months of the Pacific war.
Trying to do long range torpedo shots on a 5-9 ship formation doing 24+ kts is different than trying to do long range shots at 15-20 ship formation (or 30 including destroyers?) doing 18kts. The old American battlefleet was NOT going to do 21 kts even in battle (actual shooting) do to slightly different speeds and turns/maneuvering needing a margin for formation keeping. Besides, 21kts was with clean bottoms.
IJN fast battleships included Kongo, Hiei, Haruna and Kirishima, rebuilt during the interwar and very active in WW2.
That's interesting! Do you have any more on the Dutch submarine fleet in the Pacific?
They crossed over. The S boats in the Philippines used the older torpedoes which had one common flaw with the MK 14s, not 3.Yes if I am understanding you correctly, the very early war US torpedoes (early 1942) worked better than what came after (mid 1942-late 1943)
The point is that the Japanese never used the type 93 in it's intended role of attritting the main US Battle fleet. Things had changed in the years between the adoption of the torpedo and actual war. Long range shots at a Jutland style/size fleet never happened, in part because of the Japanese success at Pearl Harbor. There was no US battle fleet of 10-12 BBs and associated CAs and Cls traveling together with DDs screening them. The Actual actions involved mush smaller numbers of ships which which means smaller target area which usually called for closer ranges. Yes the Japanese fired at longer ranges than the Allies did and took them by surprise but the over 30,000meter range may neve have been used in practice?Well I'm not sure what is your point here but we know historically IJN surface ships very effectively launched spreads of torpedoes that wrought great havoc on Allied warships in the actual battles.
They were all good but in different degrees.My understanding is that all types of the Japanese torpedoes - air launched, surface launched, and submarine launched, were exceptionally good.
two different types of coordination, having flotilla flagship signal "attack enemy at bearing 115" is not giving firing solutions. A destroyer 4 ships back from the flagship is going to have a range 2000-4000yds different and a slightly different bearing. Same for float plane/s. The firing ship/s need to work out the exact range and correct bearing for the torpedoes to run at to hit the target or target area when the torpedoes get there. No two ships will fire at the exact same bearing because of their own locations in the formation.Japanese ships did have radios, and they did coordinate attacks. They also used seaplane scouts for targeting, including at night in some of the battles in the Solomons for example
The Japanese Long Lance torpedoes not only had longer range and more of a punch than US torps, but also they were much more RELIABLE.
The US torps were built by the USN owned and operated Goat Island facility in Rhode Island, which proved to be the equivalent of having your local Dept of Motor Vehicles design and build your car. The US torps suffered from totally inadequate testing and reliance on a magnetic exploder designed to explode the warhead as the torp passed under the ship, theoretically enabling a single torp to sink a ship by breaking its back. But the magnetic exploder proved to be very unreliable due to varations in the Earth's magnetic field. Also, in order to save money so they could hire more govt civilian workers the contact detonater was not thoroughly tested and proved to be unreliable as well. And the Federal Civilian Workers used a craftsman approach rather than mass production methods in order to ensure they could not be fired. They were very proud of the fact that by really working hard they could produce as many as 50 torpedoes a month. The actual USN WW2 combat requirements proved to be 1500 torpedoes a month. To complaints of an inadequate supply of torps they responded that the incompetent sub skippers were wasting them.
And of course the command of the RI torpedo factory was a coveted assignment reserved for only the USN's top officers, those headed for flag rank - and once at the top they KNEW their fine torpedoes were superb.
Ironically the secret of the Long Lance was simply using O2 rather than air to supply the engine, and that was inspired when a IJN officer noted O2 equipment on board a RN ship, which led to the IJN assuming it was a good idea since the RN obviously was using it. But that was just test equipment for the RN, which had abandoned the idea before it went operational.
The sad story of the USN torps is well covered in "Silient Victory" by Clay Blair and "Hellions of the Deep" by Robert Gannon. They USN finally fixed the problems when they had a Harvard/GE team develop the acoustic homing torpedo and when that proved to be an outstanding success from the Gitgo gave them the job of fixing the existing torps. Meanwhiile, when the RI factory proved to be totally incompetent at duplicating captured German electric torps, they gave gave that job to Westinghouse.
They crossed over. The S boats in the Philippines used the older torpedoes which had one common flaw with the MK 14s, not 3.
Sort of the same for the old destroyers, which used MK 11 (?) or mk 12 torpedoes instead of MK 15s. However the old torpedoed used rather light warheads.
The point is that the Japanese never used the type 93 in it's intended role of attritting the main US Battle fleet. Things had changed in the years between the adoption of the torpedo and actual war. Long range shots at a Jutland style/size fleet never happened, in part because of the Japanese success at Pearl Harbor. There was no US battle fleet of 10-12 BBs and associated CAs and Cls traveling together with DDs screening them. The Actual actions involved mush smaller numbers of ships which which means smaller target area which usually called for closer ranges.
Yes the Japanese fired at longer ranges than the Allies did and took them by surprise but the over 30,000meter range may neve have been used in practice?
They were all good but in different degrees.
Japanese 18in aerial torpedoes don't seem to have much advantage over British 18in Torpedoes for most of the war. Both types were modified several times during the war so let's make sure we are comparing the correct versions and not comparing 1944 specs for earlier battles, for both sides.
two different types of coordination, having flotilla flagship signal "attack enemy at bearing 115" is not giving firing solutions. A destroyer 4 ships back from the flagship is going to have a range 2000-4000yds different and a slightly different bearing. Same for float plane/s. The firing ship/s need to work out the exact range and correct bearing for the torpedoes to run at to hit the target or target area when the torpedoes get there. No two ships will fire at the exact same bearing because of their own locations in the formation.
A simultaneous launch rarely happened, there were often ripple launches or launches in turn as the firing fleet turned away. A lot depends on the bearing the enemy is at and the maneuver (turn) needed to clear the tubes to launch.
Now find an account that ship XXX fired their torpedoes on bearing 115 without seeing an enemy ship because the Flotilla commander said "fire torpedoes on bearing 115!"
They didn't fire guns that way, they at least fired at gun flashes.