Rn vs IJN

[EwenS]

This is a map of the shipping routes in the Pacific in 1938/39 and illustrates Japan's problems attacking merchant shipping. It also highlights the importance of Truk and Rabaul in any submarine campaigns.

War breaks out so take away the Japan - US/Canada/Hawaii traffic and US-Philippines traffic and increase the US - Australia traffic. Most of the Australia - India traffic was via the DEI and Singapore. It is then 1944 before the US Central Pacific campaign starts to putnlarge volumes of shipping into that central Pacific area again.

I've never been able to figure out just how much traffic there was between Australia and India / Middle East in IO in WW2 beyond the military troop convoys or warships redeploying. There was some merchant shipping as evidenced by incidents like the MV Ondina being attacked SW of Cocos Islands in Nov 1942.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/australias-trade-since-federation.pdf

Semaphore: Australia, Imperial Trade and the Impact of War | Royal Australian Navy

Royal Australian Navy

www.navy.gov.au

https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/tradethroughtimegovau/site/index.html

Try and find the relevant Yearbooks, now mostly in archive storage.

From some notes looking at the world food situation in the 1940's and to repeat if Europe had kept fighting into 1946 it would have seen large scale famines. Wheat was not Australia's biggest export, wool was, then Britain rearranged trade in 1939 in favour of closest location (North America) Australia unloaded much wool on Japan in 1940. It also helped the US agreed to allow importation of Australian wool.

Pre war Australia exported around 76.5 million bushels of wheat, including over 45 million to Britain. The 1943/44 exports in bushels Britain 321,000, Ceylon 3,435,000, India 8,404,000, New Zealand 2,831,000, Rhodesia 81,000 South Africa 813,000 other British countries 4,145,000, Egypt 3,705,000, French Dependencies 667,000, Italy 5,636,000, Iraq 1,899,000, other countries 2,718,000 total 33,658,000 bushels

Export price per bushel, shillings pence, 1939 2s4d, 1944 5s4p, 1946 10s11p, 1947 16s8p, 1948 18s8p

Flour exports, short tons, pre war Britain had 142,000 out of 647,000 tons, 1943/44 Ceylon 313,505, India 28,698, Mauritius 40,709, New Zealand 137, South Africa 258, other British countries 117,362, Egypt 56,880, French dependencies 17,189, other countries 13,806, total 590,544 short tons.

 

[WARSPITER]

Australia's war economy also provided vast amounts of clothing to hundreds of thousands of American service personnel in the Southwest Pacific. Huge quantities of basic materials for road and base building, as well as armaments, transport and signal equipment, were also supplied. In 1943, Australia supplied 95% of the food for 1,000,000 American servicemen. In commenting on this wartime support, President Harry Truman wrote in his 1946 report to the US Congress on the Lend-Lease Act, 'On balance, the contribution made by Australia, a country having a population of about seven millions, approximately equalled that of the United States'.

Above is an excerpt from this site. The role of Australian industrial power in the defeat of Japan in World War II | The Strategist

Food production as well as military production in Australia was high considering the population. A lot of production looks to have gone directly into the Pacific theatre
rather than the other way.

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you gentlemen.

From a prewar point of view the Japanese do not have a volume of trade to interdict like the Germans had or the Americans vs Japanese.
The Japanese needed bases further out than they had in 1939-40.
If the Americans stayed in the Philippines as per prewar thinking then the Japanese subs could have been used to greater effect?

In this scenario things only get more difficult for the Japanese in that American trade would continue to flow to and from the Philippines but the Japanese subs could not sink those ships but might be able to attack/sink ships trading with DEI and Australia/NZ? Might depend in cargo which brings in the trade rules and having the subs inspect the ships papers/cargo or imposing certain forbidden zones. American isolationism is only going to go so far.

With the US base/s in the Philippines and Hawaii and possible (?) US bases at Midway, Wake and Guam the US could build smaller, slower boats than the Japanese could in prewar thinking.

The situations are also different in that the Japanese can not starve out either Australia or the DEI from a food standpoint. Stop war material and fuel from getting where it was needed but stopping food was not happening.


In any case there were differences in Japanese Sub design from other navies and they were for more than just the battlefleet doctrine. The US subs were called fleet boats for much the same reason/s. The design started when a 21kt boat could keep up with "battlefleet" did 21kts. But with the advent of the South Dakota class that doctrine was not going to work anymore. Trying to build 26-28kn subs was going to lead to the same sort of growth the Japanese had.

Back the IJN vs RN, the Japanese have boats that are long range but ill suited to attacking defended convoys. Defended means several escorts with the convoy, a single escort is just about worthless except to pick up survivors. The Japanese are several years behind the British in ASW. The British have boats of different capabilities but all can be used for Singapore/DEI defense and the longer range boats can interdict trade going to Japan.

Both sided can inflect losses and both sides will suffer losses, but the ratio will be in favor of the RN.

 

[WARSPITER]

Back the IJN vs RN, the Japanese have boats that are long range but ill suited to attacking defended convoys. Defended means several escorts with the convoy, a single escort is just about worthless except to pick up survivors. The Japanese are several years behind the British in ASW. The British have boats of different capabilities but all can be used for Singapore/DEI defense and the longer range boats can interdict trade going to Japan.

That was my point about the missed opportunity in mid 1942. The merchant shipping supplying 8th army and India through the Indian ocean
was not in convoys and was not protected due to the situation in the Atlantic. The six tube I subs could operate from Penang to the coastal
areas of East Africa as they had a range of 16,000 miles. It was lucky the Japanese doctrine for subs was what it was.

 

[Shortround6]

That was my point about the missed opportunity in mid 1942. The merchant shipping supplying 8th army and India through the Indian ocean
was not in convoys and was not protected due to the situation in the Atlantic. The six tube I subs could operate from Penang to the coastal
areas of East Africa as they had a range of 16,000 miles. It was lucky the Japanese doctrine for subs was what it was.

You are right. The Japanese could have done more, but to do a lot more requires more than a shift in thinking.

The I. 9 through I. 12 were, as a class the most successful class of merchant raiders the Japanese had, sinking some 20 ships and damaging 3 and damaging the HMAS Hobart. (Most by the I.10)
Part of the trouble was that they around 2-3 years to build in peace time.
And the 3rd boat was laid down in April 1939. and the 4th wasn't laid down until Nov 1942 and commissioned May 1944.
The Japanese did build a lot of subs but the big ones were as I have said expensive.

The Japanese could not plan for the operations into the Indian Ocean until sometime in late 1940 or early 1941 when they started thinking about the expansion into southeast Asia. It was over 2500 miles from Formosa to Penang, which was doable with the big boats but it would knock 3-4 weeks off the patrol time in the Indian ocean without a closer base.

If the Japanese boats became a bigger threat than the German boats (like in the South Atlantic) then resources (escorts/aircraft) could be shifted. The Japanese big boats were easier to spot and attack. With their longer build times things get very tricky for the Japanese.

Historic Japanese Sub numbers.

year...........................in service start........................built..................in service end of year
1942...............................64..........................................20...................................64
1943...............................64..........................................37...................................77
1944...............................77..........................................39...................................57
1945...............................57..........................................30...................................50 (?) many obsolete/training


The Japanese sank 184 ships totaling 907,000 GRT.
Even if the Japanese had doubled their effectiveness this was would have been about 4 months of what the Germans did at their peak. Germans also were operating 259 boats in Jan 1942 and ended at 397 boats in Dec 1942.
German losses were 88 boats in 1942 and 245 in 1943.

Using hindsight the Japanese could not afford much of a trade shipping war.
Penang was used, at first, because the Japanese could tie up a few sub tenders and supply ships to create a base that could support 4-6 subs. How much they added to that I don't know. They also sometimes used the some of the Indian Ocean boats for operations in the South Pacific when things got tight. They did not have the subs to go around. But it is true, they did not make very good use of them.

 

[WARSPITER]

I was thinking more along the lines of the B2 class which had a larger compliment available.

It is interesting how much submarines were discounted between the wars, even by their own navies.

I have read accounts from World War One of Royal navy sailors being so frustrated at being able to see German submarines
going their merry way submerged and having nothing to hit them with.

At one stage of the First World War Admiral Jellicoe wrote that if German subs continued to be able to attack merchant shipping
with impunity then the war would be lost within six months. Lessons learned and then forgotten.

 

[EwenS]

Interwar there were attempts to limit submarine operations against merchant shipping in light of the WW1 unrestricted campaigns by Germany.

Alongside the main 1922 Washington Treaty was the "Treaty relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases". It sought to impose rules on the use of submarines against merchant shipping, effectively outlawing it. This Treaty did not come into effect because France refused to ratify it.

https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/washington-treaty-1922

Then the 1930 London Treaty imposed limits on submarine tonnage available to Britain , US and Japan. 52,700 tons each (Article XVI). Tonnage limit per sub 2,000 tons and 5.1" gun BUT each nation could have up to 3 of up to 2,800 tons with up to 6.1" guns (allowing Britain to keep the X1 but France got to keep Surcouf) and keep anything already completed of less than 2,000 tons with guns above 5.1". But all within the overall tonnage limit. Replacement age was 13.

Article XXII sought to limit the war on merchant shipping including by submarines.

"The following are accepted as established rules of International Law:
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of International Law to which surface vessels are subject.
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.

The High Contracting Parties invite all other Powers to express their assent to the above rules."

Against that interwar political background it is obvious why nations saw the enemy's naval vessels as the principal target of its own submarines.

Come the 1936 London Treaty submarines were again limited to 2,000 tons and 5.1" guns and replacement at 13 years, but this time with no overall tonnage limit. Japan of course had withdrawn from the Treaty system effective 31 Dec 1936. Germany by the Anglo German Naval Treaty 1935 Article 2(f) was limited to 45% of British submarine tonnage (while staying within the overall 35% limit).

I wouldn't say that the lessons of WW1 were complerely forgotten by the RN inter-war. But with funding restricted it was ASW that came low on the totem pole. When rearmament came from 1936 onwards the priority was on the complex ships that took time to build. Cheap AS vessels could be and were built quickly. But no one expected war in 1939 and no one envisaged the fall of France which increased the U-boat threat for Britain exponentially.

When it came to the Indian Ocean not all sailings were independent. The big troop convoys, including the near monthly WS convoys, were escorted but the main threat was seen as surface raiders.

WS (Winston Specials) Convoys in WW2 - 1942 Sailings

www.naval-history.net

WS Convoys

www.convoyweb.org.uk

Convoys were also instituted at different times during periods of increased danger. For example the BC series from Biera Mozambique to Durban S.A..July-Sept 1942 & Aden to Bombay in Nov 1942. Wiki has a list of various IO routes that can then be cross referenced with Convoyweb.

List of Allied convoys during World War II by region - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

In 1942, there was a shortage of escort vessels in the IO. At times, with the diversion of destroyers to the protection of merchant shipping both there and in the Med, the Eastern Fleet had to remain in harbour at Kilindini.

Convoying however increases shipping demand due to time taken to assemble the ships in the first place and then to disperse them at the end. It also creates bottlenecks in ports suddenly having many ships arrive at the same time. Many of the IO ports already suffered due to the increased volume of wartime traffic.

If you look at the shipping losses in the IO (see U-boat.net link posted previously) most, especially in 1942, were concentrated in the Mozambique Channel between the African coast and Madagascar. Had losses looked like getting too great it would have been a simple task to reroute them East of Madagascar into the wider expanse of the IO. While it might extend journey times, it would make the job of the submarines much harder.

 

[EwenS]

This is the map of the IO shipping routes around 1925

From May 1940 the route to the Far East via the Med was closed, so all traffic then had to go via the Cape (the first through convoy from Gib to Alexandria again left at the end of May 1943). Cape traffic began to tail off significantly from around Sept 1943.

From the Cape it was up the East African Coast to to Aden for Egypt and the Persian Gulf.Indian traffic had 2 choices
1. from top end of the Mozambique Channel via the Seychelles to India & Ceylon.
2. east of Madagascar to Mauritius and then up through Diego Garcia (Chagos Archipeligo) & the Maldives to India Ceylon.

Traffic from Australia to India had to route further west, heading for Diego Garcia. While the Cocos (Keeling) Islands remained in British hands throughout the war it lay low as far as possible so as not to attract Japanese attention (although the Japanese submarine I166 bombarded it on 25 Dec 1942 and there were a couple of single bomber attacks in 1944 along with regular recce overflights by the IJAAF). There was a cable station there that formed a key link from Australia via Cocos to Mauritius and on to Durban and from there it connected onwards to the Middle East & India. As a security measure they were even deleted from maps! From mid-1943 they became an emergency stop only for the Qantas Catalinas operating on the Kangaroo route between Ceylon & Australia on the "Double Sunrise" flights. In early 1945 development of an airfield began with 136 Spitfire squadron moving in in April 1945 to provide air defence, followed by 2 Liberator squadrons in July. Other Liberator squadrons had detachments operating though the islands and 217 Beaufighter squadron would have moved had the war gone on beyond mid-Aug 1945.

Christmas Island 550 miles east of Cocos was occupied by the Japanese in March 1942.

Traffic to/from the Persian Gulf also increased dramatically as it became a significant route for Lend Lease supplies to Russia as well as oil from the APOC refinery at Abadan which became the main source of oil for the war in the CBI as well as a significant contribuor to the war in the Middle East. The big US T2 tankers ran from The Gulf to Calcutta.

Around India the bulk of supplies had to travel by sea due to the limited capacity of the trans-India railway system from Karachi & Bombay and where there were complications with differing rail gauges (and still are).

Around the Indian Ocean there were, and still are, 6 significant choke points. Clockwise these are:-

1. Mozambique Channel
2. Gulf of Aden (entrance to the Red Sea & Suez)
3. Gulf of Oman (Straits of Hormuz entry to Persian Gulf)
4. Malacca Strait (between Malaya & Sumatra)
5 Sunda Strait (between Sumatra & Java)
6. Lombok Strait (between Bali & Lombok Islands south east of Java)

At different times these were individually of greater or lesser importance to the Allies with the last 3 being under Japanese control from March 1942 to the end of the war.

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you again.

Shows the Japanese problem in the 1930s. Without taking bases in the DEI or Burma/Malaya they will have a very difficult time trying to use even big subs in the Indian Ocean. Some yes but even with subs that have 90 day patrol times it would be difficult to have very many operating at one time. Against the US? the US was Japan's largest trading partner in the 1930 (?) so in the event of a war that target avenue/arena (merchant ships in the Pacific) changes considerably.

That is is you can convince the Admirals that they should abandon the "fleet battle" role.
They know they cannot fight the US in a traditional battle with the US having 15 BBs to the Japanese 10.
It gets worse in the late 30s thru 1942. The Japanese know about the US 28kt 16in BBs. The US does not know about the Yamato and Musashi, they may well suspect something but the details are unknown. Problem for the Japanese is that the the Musashi commissions the same month as the 6th 28kt US BB (neither is ready for actual service) so each Yamato has to fight 2-3 28kt BBs.
The Japanese are counting on the subs and the Long Lance torpedoes to attrite the US before the Grand Battle as we all know. Until 1940 and Taranto nobody really expects the carriers to decide the battle, help yes, decide no.

Switching Japanese submarine doctrine/planning/training and construction programs from the "fleet battle" role to the merchant raider role is going to take both time and the ability to capture/equip bases in enemy territory.

 

[EwenS]

This summarises what the USN knew about the Yamatos and when:-

History and Technology - "What did the USN know about Yamato and when?" - NavWeaps

www.navweaps.com

Note the comment from Japanese sources in 1936 i.e. after Japan had given notice of its departure from the Treaty system in Dec 1934 (they left on 31 Dec 1936) and before the US decided to upgun the North Carolinas from the agreed 1936 London Treaty 14" limit to 16" (the US did not invoke the Treaty "escalator clause" until 15 July 1937 some 3 months after the Japanese did not reply about agreeing to stick to the 14" limit) :-

"...as a result of the coming no-treaty period we shall enjoy freedom of action in construction of warships in respect to category, quality and characteristics. With this freedom we may construct those ships particularly adapted for our national requirements, thereby gaining an advantage which obviates the necessity for numerical equality."

The South Dakota designs showed 14" guns as late as July 1937 (see Friedman's US Battleships")

Edit
Yamato laid down Nov 1937 & Musashi March 1938.
North Carolina laid down Oct 1937 & Washington June 1938.

 

[SaparotRob]

Are there agreed upon displacements of the Yamatos now?

 

[Shortround6]

in construction of warships in respect to category, quality and characteristics. With this freedom we may construct those ships particularly adapted for our national requirements, thereby gaining an advantage which obviates the necessity for numerical equality."

Kind of gets us into another thread

As we know the Japanese planned for two more Yamatos.
The Design work for the Iowa's was started in 1938 with rumors of Japanese 46,000 ton BBs.
4 were ordered before 1940.
In the massive naval bill of July 19th 1940 there were another two ordered and five Montana class (Twelve 16in guns) and they may have decided on the Twelve 16in gun option as taking less time than designing/developing/building the 18in gun option.

It would have been very messy but the Yamato's were never going to be facing US 16in BBs one to one. It was always going to be 2.5-4 to 1.
The US could afford to lose ships, the Japanese could not.

 

[Shortround6]

Getting back to the original premise with the US deciding at some point to sit out the Pacific war with enough warning that Japan does not attack Pearl Harbor and the Philippines and yet the Japanese are presented with an opportunity to size the DEI with little resistance from the British/French/Dutch we have a few avenues.

The Japanese are one of the 3s of the 5 : 5 : 3 : 3 : 3 treaties. If Europe is not at war and the US is out that would leave the Japanese facing a 5 : 3 : 0.5 to 3 combination so the Japanese were not stupid. They need both France and Britain occupied (busy) so they can take on the Dutch.
They need France out so they can get access to at least air fields in French Indo China and staging areas for troops. They don't the French sending even a part of the fleet and ground troops while they deal with the British and DEI forces.
Things got even better for the Japanese with France sidelined and with the fight against Italy sucking up so much of the British effort in 1940 and 1941.

To make something of a decent fight out of this scenario we need to both reduce a few early British losses (At least either the Courageous or Glorious) and change the course of the war in NA. French NA colonies sides with the British before Mers-el-Kébir? British manage to clear out Tripoli by early 1941?

British need a lot fewer losses in the Med in ships, aircraft and men.
Enough stuff relocated to the Far East to strengthen the British position but not so much that the Japanese cancel plans.

Japanese cannot ignore the US entirely. They need to keep a reserve incase the US changes it's mind 6 months to year after the fight starts, even if the US canceled or postponed some of the July 19th 1940 program in the summer of 1941.

The whole Japanese plan was huge gamble, the Japanese had no idea how bad the US subs and torpedoes were. The Dutch subs sank over twice (?) as many ships as the 29 US boats did.
The British and Dutch could conceivably keep part of Malaya (Singapore), Burma and the Sumatra-Timor arc and turn it into a battle of attrition. The invasion of the Borneo through New Guinea depends a lot on carrier air power instead of land based air that leap frogged down the Philippines.

 

[Alan Stevens]

Kind of gets us into another thread

As we know the Japanese planned for two more Yamatos.
The Design work for the Iowa's was started in 1938 with rumors of Japanese 46,000 ton BBs.
4 were ordered before 1940.
In the massive naval bill of July 19th 1940 there were another two ordered and five Montana class (Twelve 16in guns) and they may have decided on the Twelve 16in gun option as taking less time than designing/developing/building the 18in gun option.

It would have been very messy but the Yamato's were never going to be facing US 16in BBs one to one. It was always going to be 2.5-4 to 1.
The US could afford to lose ships, the Japanese could not.

IJN fast battleships included Kongo, Hiei, Haruna and Kirishima, rebuilt during the interwar and very active in WW2.

The USN also had 6 other fast battleships (NC and SD class).

But if all the unbuilt were built that would be 17:7 in favor of the USN.

Six Alaska large cruisers were authorized and some would argue that they could have stood on the battle line with their advanced 12 inch guns.

The USN had far more cruisers and destroyers as well.

 

[SaparotRob]

The Alaskas would probably have been with the cruiser screen.

 

[Shortround6]

IJN fast battleships included Kongo, Hiei, Haruna and Kirishima, rebuilt during the interwar and very active in WW2.

The Kongo's would have been speed bumps for the New US BBs. 8in Belt armor was not battleship armor in WW II.
They didn't have the armor or firepower to stand in the line of battle with the US ships any more than the Invincible and Indefatigable and any business trying to mix it up with the German capital ships in 1916.
The Kongos were very good against cruisers or even the Repulse and Renown. Against the North Carolina's and later, they were thorny targets.

The Kongos and the other 14in BBs fired 1489lbs shells, The Nagato and Mutsu fired 2249lb shells and the Yamato's fired 3219lb shells. Other sources may round off or convert KG to lbs a few figures off.
The US Maryland class of old BBs fired 2240lb shells and the all the new ones fired 2700lb shells. The new US BBs fired shells about 1/2 way between all the rest of 16in guns in the world (British and planned German) and the Yamato's guns. Maybe a Yamato was worth 3 Marylands? Was it worth 3 North Carolina/South Dakotas?

 

[Shortround6]

Getting back to some of the Japanese problems in this scenario.

It is about 3000 miles from the invasion beaches in Thailand/Malaya to Wewak, New Guinea. So the scale of invasion is huge. If the Philippines are "neutral" there is about a 600-650 mile wide gap in the approaches that the Japanese have to go around.
Japanese air bases would have to be in Southern FIC or captured bases in Malaya for the western part of DEI and and it could 1000 miles to eastern Borneo.
Japanese land based air for the Center/Eastern end has to come from Palau with distances of 750 miles to the tip of Sulawesi, 560 miles to Maluku, 540 miles to West Papua, 790 miles to Jayapura Papua.
Japanese land based air from Rabaul is around 580 miles from Wewak, other points in Eastern New Guinea are closer.


If the Japanese are not attacking Pearl Harbor they can use their carriers to supplement the land based air. But the carriers may only be able to be on station/striking for 3-5 days before magazines and aviation fuel is low and resupply needed. From an area south of Philippines it is around 1400-1600 miles to a Main Japanese base (Truk or Formosa).

One account says that the Japanese used 799 (strangely precise?) aircraft during the Malay campaign against about 250 British aircraft.
How many planes do the British need to delay the Japanese for 2-3 weeks and the Japanese run out of supplies (food) before Singapore falls?


What is the US status in this?
Active neutral, Lend-lease in place for both the British and Dutch?
Somewhat active neutral, no lend lease but selling stuff for cash?
US shuts of the flow of stuff in 1940 and/or embargos stuff.

 

[EwenS]

This helps illustrate the Japanese problem and the historical operations they carried out

Note the order of the invasions in 1941:-

8 Dec - Malaya
10 Dec - Northern Philippines &
12 Dec - Central Philippines
16 Dec - British Borneo
20 Dec - Southern Philippines (Davao becomes the major staging base for the move into the southern DEI)


Then in 1942
11 Jan - Menado (northern Celebes) & Tarakan (Dutch Borneo)
23 Jan - Balikpapan
24 Jan - Kendari (southern Celebes)
30 Jan - Amboina (Ceram)
14 Feb - Southern Sumatra (with Singapore on verge of falling)

Each step secures airfields to support the next jump. Without the southern Philippines to use as a jumping off base carrier support is essential. But the carriers operated almost continuously in the DEI / New Britain area from the beginning of 1942, so if they are not at PH then they would be available to cover an earlier invasion of the DEI. And with no Philippines campaign, perhaps the whole DEI campaign can be speeded up.

 

[WARSPITER]

The guns on the battleships/battlecruisers are also interesting.

The RN/USN guns had better shells than the Japanese equivalents.

Two examples;

1. The Kongo and KGV classes both had main 14" guns. The Kongo shell had around 6" penetration around 20,000 yards.
The KGV shell was 11". As far as damaging armoured sections goes this a real problem for IJN ships with 14" guns unless
they can get to whites of the eyes range.

2. The Nagato class - 16" guns. Queen Elizabeth class - 15" guns. Nagato 16" shell at 21,800 yards - penetration 10.6".
QE 15" shell at 21,800 - 11"+.

IJN gunnery during the war wasn't their forte either. Rounds expended for little result was quite high. Whether that was
lack of training, fire direction or both I don't know but it wasn't good.