Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
17 people killed by Shuttle.While the 7 astronauts lost don't compare to the hundreds estimated lost due to shitty Mk 14s, in terms of both money and institutional stupidity the loss was the equal of the torpedo imbroglio.
17 people killed by Shuttle.
In 1977 NASA knew that a Space Shuttle launch would cost $14 to conduct and would bring in at least $18M and as much as $36M from payload charges. And they had claimed they would launch up to 50 missions a year.
An outfit did a cost per launch estimate of the Shuttle missions, and it came out to $1.5 Billion a launch. And that almost had to be too low; they did not know where to look for all the costs. Income from payloads all but ended after the loss of the Challenger. The most number of launches they attained was 9, attained in only one year, most years it was a maximum of 8 and some years it was zero.
If the Torpedo Debacle had been handled the same as Shuttle, they would have had Goat Island keep right on making their defective torpedoes, even if they had competent firms make better ones. As it turned out, the USN decreased the RI Torpedo Factory workforce by the end of the war and sold the whole place off soon after the war.
Unauthorized work voided the warranty, of course.With the early US torpedoes they found that the depth settings had been based on tests WITHOUT a warhead or even a simulated weight. The reason was that they had wanted to recover the test specimens to save money. So the torps ran deeper than they were supposed to.
After finally setting them at a depth to impact rather than go under the target they found that sometimes the torps did not detonate. The sub people in HI decided ta'hell with what they were being told and shot some with dummy warheads. The first thing they found was the depth problem. The second thing was that the firing pin was too flimsy, given that for some reason it had been designed to work through a 90 degree angle. The result was that a straight on perfect hit usually would not result in a detonation but an angled hit sometimes would. They wanted to replace the firing pins with stronger ones and the only material they access in HI was the propeller blades from the IJN aircraft shot down on 7 Dec 1941. The new firing pins machined from the tougher aluminum worked.
It's not really fair to exclusively blame NASA for the shuttle disasters, as the design was basically reworked by Congress for political reasons. Similarly BuOrd had a lot of political interference/influence on weapon design and development due to the reporting structure of the USN's Bureaus.17 people killed by Shuttle.
In 1977 NASA knew that a Space Shuttle launch would cost $14 to conduct and would bring in at least $18M and as much as $36M from payload charges. And they had claimed they would launch up to 50 missions a year.
An outfit did a cost per launch estimate of the Shuttle missions, and it came out to $1.5 Billion a launch. And that almost had to be too low; they did not know where to look for all the costs. Income from payloads all but ended after the loss of the Challenger. The most number of launches they attained was 9, attained in only one year, most years it was a maximum of 8 and some years it was zero.
If the Torpedo Debacle had been handled the same as Shuttle, they would have had Goat Island keep right on making their defective torpedoes, even if they had competent firms make better ones. As it turned out, the USN decreased the RI Torpedo Factory workforce by the end of the war and sold the whole place off soon after the war.
Wow that is amazing!With the early US torpedoes they found that the depth settings had been based on tests WITHOUT a warhead or even a simulated weight. The reason was that they had wanted to recover the test specimens to save money. So the torps ran deeper than they were supposed to.
After finally setting them at a depth to impact rather than go under the target they found that sometimes the torps did not detonate. The sub people in HI decided ta'hell with what they were being told and shot some with dummy warheads. The first thing they found was the depth problem. The second thing was that the firing pin was too flimsy, given that for some reason it had been designed to work through a 90 degree angle. The result was that a straight on perfect hit usually would not result in a detonation but an angled hit sometimes would. They wanted to replace the firing pins with stronger ones and the only material they access in HI was the propeller blades from the IJN aircraft shot down on 7 Dec 1941. The new firing pins machined from the tougher aluminum worked.
A lot of this true. However The Japanese carriers launched very few (any?) long range torpedo strikes, as in much over 200-240nm?
Swordfish book range was 452NM with torpedo, B5N2 range with Torpedo was 528NM? Range as a recon plane was 1075NM?
Swordfish actually had better defensive armament, as in crappy beats none out the front and bad beats truly crappy out the back. A Lewis gun in 1942Japanese yype 92 was a Lewis gun.
British were putting Vickers K guns on Swordfish.
Granted the B5M2 cruised around 25-35kts faster than the Swordfish.
We are not really comparing the Swordfish to the Avenger here. And even with radar the TBF didn't have a working torpedo until well into 1943.
Again lets compare the actual performance of the B5N2 to the Swordfish.
The B5N2 was not 2 times faster over distance with a torpedo. It may have been 33% faster which is good advantage but not resulting in the Swordfish taking 2 to 3 times to conduct a strike. Talking 1942- early 43 here. The B6N didn't show up until mid 1943 and that was the version with the Mamoru engine which was not really suitable for operations.
The B5N suffered rather similar losses at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. None the 1942 Japanese attack aircraft were very survivable in the face of decent (sufficient numbers) of fighters.
I would note that the TBD is sort of a red herring. They only built 129-130 of them (fewer than Skuas) and by Dec 1941 there were only about 100 left due to attrition. They had been out of production for over two years and there were never going to be any more. The replacement by the TBF was part of plan that had started in 1939.
A bit like the Buffalo which engaged in two combats in US colors, the total record of the TBD was several raids on Japanese Islands that had no aircraft and the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway. Not a large number of battles to draw conclusions from. given the defective torpedoes and the crappy US tactics (not enough escort fighters for even TBFs) the TBD gets a lot of blame for things that were not it's fault. It was obsolete, there is no question.
It's not really fair to exclusively blame NASA for the shuttle disasters, as the design was basically reworked by Congress for political reasons. Similarly BuOrd had a lot of political interference/influence on weapon design and development due to the reporting structure of the USN's Bureaus.
While at the Pentagon I was given the task of creating a "Sand Chart" so named because it looked like layers of sand, showing the funding for US Govt space launch capabilities from 1988 through 1999. This was a bit of a challenge, since it went past the current budget and thus had t be estimated. The chart showed that the Space Shuttle program, even years after the loss of the Challenger, still consumed the vast majority of US Govt space launch funding. Imagine what a similar chart would have looked like BEFORE we lost Challenger!It's not really fair to exclusively blame NASA for the shuttle disasters, as the design was basically reworked by Congress for political reasons.
MIT's OCW has a course on the design history of the STS, Aircraft Systems Engineering | Aeronautics and Astronautics | MIT OpenCourseWareIt's not really fair to exclusively blame NASA for the shuttle disasters, as the design was basically reworked by Congress for political reasons. Similarly BuOrd had a lot of political interference/influence on weapon design and development due to the reporting structure of the USN's Bureaus.
That's the mantra for every government program.I still hear claims that the Shuttle cost so much because we did not spend enough money on it. Heh.
I am not saying that the British torpedoes were flawless but they had over two years to sort problems out by Dec 1941.
Surface torpedoes
Wild_Bill_Kelso In another thread did the work of sorting through 13 Naval engagements in in 1942-43 involving the Japanese torpedoes.
They never got any hits at over 20,000yds and than one may have been iffy (or hit different target?) 17,000 yds may have been the longest on record?
By his count only 4 of these engagements were actually at "long range". He didn't define it (or I missed it) but we may be talking about 10-15,000yds.
The British torpedoes worked.
They were faster at the same ranges at the American torpedoes, not as fast as the Japanese.
British torpedoes would do 41kts to 11,000yds.
The Japanese torpedoes had heavier warheads.
Japanese ships carried more torpedoes.
British cruisers carried at least 6 torpedoes (except for some of the counties) but may destroyers had one bank taken out so a near useless AA gun (except for moral) could be fitted.
Aerial torpedoes.
Both sides had torpedoes that worked.
Warheads changed a bit but at the same time they were often within 10-15% of each other.
Speeds and ranges were also close even if not identical.
Submarine torpedoes.
Both sides worked.
Japanese had heavier warheads.
Japanese torpedoes were about 10% faster and started with longer range, as the war went on they swapped heavier warheads for shorter range. (6000yds)
Neither side really carried a large amount of torpedoes per sub although the Japanese often carried 18. The US carried 24 on most of the new boats, The German total of 22 on the type IX is part illusion, 10 of them were carried in under deck tubes that required a number of hours on the surface, in calm waters, to get through the loading hatches into the torpedo rooms.
A sub operating at periscope depth has very little visual range. Long range doesn't do a lot of good.
There isn't any doubt in my mind the IJN would (at least in most cases) out-range the RN with their torpedoes, and we have also forgotten their major advantage in optics. The IJN seaplane scouts also used flares at night to assist in spotting in several engagements.
The effective range have have been 5-8km longer but the max range was very dubious advantage. And compared to the US, the British advantage is there but harder to figure out. The British torpedoes had a high speed setting that was 4kts slower than the Americans but was 5000yds further. Or it offered same range as the US medium speed but was about 6kts faster.You have a point in that the RN torpedoes worked, while the USN ones basically didn't until late 1943 at the earliest, and I agree that the RN would gain advantage from that in naval combat, but I IJN still has an advantage of 5-10km effective range, and maybe double that in maximum possible range. Plus the optics which I suspect will help more than radar in the early battles, as we know it took a while to get the hang of using radar in naval combat.
The range advantage is there but the double the range is dubious.But the IJN air forces, as I've noted, will be much better and more deadly, with double the range and vastly superior daytime fighter cover.
I'll concede RN probably has an overall advantage in both submarine and ASW warfare. But I don't think that is necessarily enough to account for all the other IJN advantages. But maybe, who knows.