Well, if the other US commanders had been as good as Lee or even close, Iron bottom sound would have a different name. Like Japanese bottom sound.
Just how many time in row did it take for the Japanese to steam into an area, get spotted on radar, get to rifle distance of American ships and turn what should have been a crushing ambush into a catastrophic defeat for the Americans.
Willis Augustus Lee was an unusually skilled commander by the standards of any navy. He was literally the head gunnery instructor for the surface fleet. He also got a little bit lucky, as the Washington could have easily been hit by torpedoes in that battle. Even Lee underestimated the type 93.
More average, or unlucky commanders were the norm on both sides in the Pacific War, and in the Royal Navy as well. Blunders were far from rare.
It's also worth pointing out, surface ship combat, especially at night, was an extremely dangerous, terrifying, and very, very difficult endeavor. Something very hard to do well. With numerous opportunities for mistakes to be made. Commanders had to very quickly make a large number of highly fraught decisions, which then must be implemented successfully by hundreds of people, coordinated together using primitive and very limited communications technology, with very limited perception / detection / reconnaissance available, in fact almost blind.
It's not easy to do right. It's very easy to screw up at many different levels (look at the electrical problem with the South Dakota in Lee's big fight). Overall both the USN and IJN made grave mistakes in the Pacific War, but also showed a very high degree of professionalism and skill on balance.
Not looking for "suspect". How about some actual facts.
Scoreboard stats don't tell you how it was done.
Facts are tricky to ascertain because there is a subjective element and an enormous number of details, but I have posted the basic facts of numerous surface engagements in the Pacific War. I'll post some other ones from other areas too in the near future, for comparison.
You are correct, however, since most of the Battles in the Guadalcanal area took place at 10,000 yds or under, the extra range of the Japanese torpedoes didn't make much difference to that series of
Many, though not all of the battles took place in tight confines, but that doesn't mean all, nor does it mean that an RN vs IJN war would have been the same, and there were numerous cases in the actual Pacific War that the IJN was able to take advantage of range and superior detection capabilities.
battles. Believing that the Japanese could not make a 10,000yd torpedo was just stupid. Both the US and Britain had 10,000yd (and over) torpedoes in 1916. Believing the Japanese could not equal that 24-26 years later was just stupid.
As we now know the 13,000-15,000yd torpedo wasn't even close to what the Japanese could do but to believe the Japanese were stuck at 1910-1914 levels took an extra level of stupidity.
It's easy to call it stupidity in hindsight. But the Japanese were still walking around with Samurai swords around the time Willis Lee was born. They had come a very, very long way. And in wartime, it is very, very difficult to know even basic facts about the enemy. At the time of most of these battles, the traits of the main Japanese fighter planes were not even well known, and certainly the high level of professionalism of the IJN was not understood by either the US or UK, though they were learning hard lessons.
Everybody wants the best equipment they can get. Radar was a big help but it could not give accurate enough range and bearing for firing alone for much of the war. But knowing where to look was a big advantage, so was having a pretty good idea of how many enemy ships there were and where they were even if you can's see all of them with you binoculars was a big advantage.
The radar also had it's limitations. You can't necessarily tell what is a friendly or enemy ship. Or what is even real vs clutter or something else that you misinterpreted, a flock of birds whatever. Sometimes it was enough to tell them something was out there, give them early warning. A good set of binoculars was more likely to correctly identify what it was you were looking at.
Taking losses is one thing, things can happen. But snatching defeat from the Jaws of Victory because of stupid decisions, repeatedly, takes the total opposite of genius.
The "Battle of Friday the 13th" might not have been a huge victory for the US but it should not have been the colossal screw up it was. Better night glasses for the US would not have improved much. About 1/2 of the US ships knew where the Japanese were minutes before either side opened fire. They may not have known exactly what they were, but they knew were they were and pretty much the course and speed. Problem was the US commander didn't know (because he was on the ship with crappy radar) and he didn't believe the reports he was getting from the other US ships.
Japanese night glasses weren't "all seeing" either or the Laffey would never have passed the Hiei at 20 feet.
Every military in WW2 made colossal mistakes. One wrong assumption or bad guess amid the fog of war can easily cascade into a grotesque disaster.
1942 communications were not good enough to pass targeting information from one ship to another.
That is true, and it's a good point. There were serious errors in basic communication all over the Pacific War, on both sides.
Ships had star shell, but, a big but, you need to decide which ships or which guns on a ship, are going to provide star shell illumination for the formation as whole. The guns have to loaded with star shell to begin with or the shells handy for fuse adjustment when ordered. You need standard battle orders and you need specific battle orders, Ship X which was supposed to provide star shell, is down for refueling or repair, which ship/s take over the star shell job that night? Are the captains supposed to guess? This is so every ship/crew knows their job before the enemy shows up.
The Japanese, and I think the Americans too, also routinely used aircraft to drop flares and illuminate targets.
In the Spring of 1941 the British not only had the battle of Cape Mattapan, they had the Bismarck chase, which was greatly assisted by radar. Yes the cruisers lost the Bismarck at times but contact was held for considerable amounts of time by radar. In 1941 the British may not have been giving all of their secrets away to the Americans. There is a difference between giving away the radar itself and giving away the tactics/techniques or in some cases, just getting the tactics/techniques distributed.
I'll find and post some examples, it will take me a little while to dig up though.
en.m.wikipedia.org
www.rebellionresearch.com
