Rn vs IJN (1 Viewer)

[RCAFson]

To be fair, while radar itself was new, by autumn of 1942 the Royal Navy had been at war for three years, while the USN for only nine months or so. Once the USN had been at war for three years, Dec 1944 they were well in the lead on most capabilities and skillsets.

The RN was also far ahead of the USN in night fighting training and technology. Radar was icing on the cake of the RN's intensive night action training.

I will add another link to this dissertation which carefully explains how far behind the curve the USN was in terms of night fighting:

The Evolution of the U.S. Navy into an Effective Night-Fighting Force During theSolomon Islands Campaign, 1942 - 1943

https://etd.ohiolink.edu/acprod/odb_etd/ws/send_file/send?accession=ohiou1214239278&disposition=inline

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Well, if the other US commanders had been as good as Lee or even close, Iron bottom sound would have a different name. Like Japanese bottom sound.
Just how many time in row did it take for the Japanese to steam into an area, get spotted on radar, get to rifle distance of American ships and turn what should have been a crushing ambush into a catastrophic defeat for the Americans.

Willis Augustus Lee was an unusually skilled commander by the standards of any navy. He was literally the head gunnery instructor for the surface fleet. He also got a little bit lucky, as the Washington could have easily been hit by torpedoes in that battle. Even Lee underestimated the type 93.

More average, or unlucky commanders were the norm on both sides in the Pacific War, and in the Royal Navy as well. Blunders were far from rare.

It's also worth pointing out, surface ship combat, especially at night, was an extremely dangerous, terrifying, and very, very difficult endeavor. Something very hard to do well. With numerous opportunities for mistakes to be made. Commanders had to very quickly make a large number of highly fraught decisions, which then must be implemented successfully by hundreds of people, coordinated together using primitive and very limited communications technology, with very limited perception / detection / reconnaissance available, in fact almost blind.

It's not easy to do right. It's very easy to screw up at many different levels (look at the electrical problem with the South Dakota in Lee's big fight). Overall both the USN and IJN made grave mistakes in the Pacific War, but also showed a very high degree of professionalism and skill on balance.

Not looking for "suspect". How about some actual facts.
Scoreboard stats don't tell you how it was done.

Facts are tricky to ascertain because there is a subjective element and an enormous number of details, but I have posted the basic facts of numerous surface engagements in the Pacific War. I'll post some other ones from other areas too in the near future, for comparison.

You are correct, however, since most of the Battles in the Guadalcanal area took place at 10,000 yds or under, the extra range of the Japanese torpedoes didn't make much difference to that series of

Many, though not all of the battles took place in tight confines, but that doesn't mean all, nor does it mean that an RN vs IJN war would have been the same, and there were numerous cases in the actual Pacific War that the IJN was able to take advantage of range and superior detection capabilities.

battles. Believing that the Japanese could not make a 10,000yd torpedo was just stupid. Both the US and Britain had 10,000yd (and over) torpedoes in 1916. Believing the Japanese could not equal that 24-26 years later was just stupid.
As we now know the 13,000-15,000yd torpedo wasn't even close to what the Japanese could do but to believe the Japanese were stuck at 1910-1914 levels took an extra level of stupidity.

It's easy to call it stupidity in hindsight. But the Japanese were still walking around with Samurai swords around the time Willis Lee was born. They had come a very, very long way. And in wartime, it is very, very difficult to know even basic facts about the enemy. At the time of most of these battles, the traits of the main Japanese fighter planes were not even well known, and certainly the high level of professionalism of the IJN was not understood by either the US or UK, though they were learning hard lessons.

Everybody wants the best equipment they can get. Radar was a big help but it could not give accurate enough range and bearing for firing alone for much of the war. But knowing where to look was a big advantage, so was having a pretty good idea of how many enemy ships there were and where they were even if you can's see all of them with you binoculars was a big advantage.

The radar also had it's limitations. You can't necessarily tell what is a friendly or enemy ship. Or what is even real vs clutter or something else that you misinterpreted, a flock of birds whatever. Sometimes it was enough to tell them something was out there, give them early warning. A good set of binoculars was more likely to correctly identify what it was you were looking at.

Taking losses is one thing, things can happen. But snatching defeat from the Jaws of Victory because of stupid decisions, repeatedly, takes the total opposite of genius.

The "Battle of Friday the 13th" might not have been a huge victory for the US but it should not have been the colossal screw up it was. Better night glasses for the US would not have improved much. About 1/2 of the US ships knew where the Japanese were minutes before either side opened fire. They may not have known exactly what they were, but they knew were they were and pretty much the course and speed. Problem was the US commander didn't know (because he was on the ship with crappy radar) and he didn't believe the reports he was getting from the other US ships.
Japanese night glasses weren't "all seeing" either or the Laffey would never have passed the Hiei at 20 feet.

Every military in WW2 made colossal mistakes. One wrong assumption or bad guess amid the fog of war can easily cascade into a grotesque disaster.

1942 communications were not good enough to pass targeting information from one ship to another.

That is true, and it's a good point. There were serious errors in basic communication all over the Pacific War, on both sides.

Ships had star shell, but, a big but, you need to decide which ships or which guns on a ship, are going to provide star shell illumination for the formation as whole. The guns have to loaded with star shell to begin with or the shells handy for fuse adjustment when ordered. You need standard battle orders and you need specific battle orders, Ship X which was supposed to provide star shell, is down for refueling or repair, which ship/s take over the star shell job that night? Are the captains supposed to guess? This is so every ship/crew knows their job before the enemy shows up.

The Japanese, and I think the Americans too, also routinely used aircraft to drop flares and illuminate targets.

In the Spring of 1941 the British not only had the battle of Cape Mattapan, they had the Bismarck chase, which was greatly assisted by radar. Yes the cruisers lost the Bismarck at times but contact was held for considerable amounts of time by radar. In 1941 the British may not have been giving all of their secrets away to the Americans. There is a difference between giving away the radar itself and giving away the tactics/techniques or in some cases, just getting the tactics/techniques distributed.

I'll find and post some examples, it will take me a little while to dig up though.

 

[EwenS]

In the Spring of 1941 the British not only had the battle of Cape Mattapan, they had the Bismarck chase, which was greatly assisted by radar. Yes the cruisers lost the Bismarck at times but contact was held for considerable amounts of time by radar. In 1941 the British may not have been giving all of their secrets away to the Americans. There is a difference between giving away the radar itself and giving away the tactics/techniques or in some cases, just getting the tactics/techniques distributed.

I really don't think that is true.

USN/USMC/USAAF officers were attending British radar schools in 1940/41 and gaining the information needed to go home and set up their own fighter direction and nightfighter programmes from about Sept 1941.

There were US naval liasion officers attached to British ships in 1940/41. Lt Cdr Opie was aboard Illustrious between Aug & Nov 1940 and witnessed the Taranto raid. His official status was Assistant Naval Attache in London. In theory he shouldn't have been aboard her.

British ships were being repaired in US yards from March 1941 with the introduction of Lend Lease. So USN officers got to study British equipment and discuss things with RN officers.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Yes and that is the point re what the difference would have been in 1942 actions had the RN been fully involved.

Good point, had the RN been able to be fully involved. It's a shame to the PTO that by autumn 1942 the RN had already taken massive losses:

• 5 battleships/battlecruisers: HMS Royal Oak, Barham, Prince of Wales, Hood, Repulse
• 5 aircraft carriers: HMS Courageous, Glorious, Ark Royal, Hermes, Eagle (plus CVE Audacity)
• 23 cruisers (up to HMS Curacao, sank Oct 1942)
• 97 destroyers (up to HMS Martin, sank Nov 1942)
• 48 submarines (up to HMS Utmost, sank Nov 1942)
• 27 minesweepers (up to HMS Algerine, sank Nov 1942)
• 19 corvettes and sloops (up to HMS Gardenia, sank Nov 1942)

The above does not include the heavy losses incurred by the Commonwealt/Empire fleets, namely the RCN and RAAN. Also into 1942, many important RN vessels are out of action. This included two carriers (HMS Illustrious, Formidable) and two battleships (HMS Valiant, Queen Elizabeth) crippled in the MTO in 1941 and not reentering service until early 1942.

Had the RN had more luck and fewer losses, we might have seen a greater participation of the RN in the I/PTO. For instance, imagine a two dozen of those lost 48 submarines instead operating in the Gulf of Thailand, Malacca Strait and South China Sea from spring 1941 onwards. And at Coral Sea, HMS Courageous and Glorious (ideally after deep refits and CAG upgrades) operating out of Western Australia under U.S. Admiral Fletcher.

As it was, here we saw the USN fighting to defend Britain's colonies in the Solomons, while the British have little involvement, only to see the British administration return to Honiara, the capital of the Solomons in 1945. To be fair, the governor in 1945 had stuck around to do his bit in the PTO, Alexander Nicol Anton Waddell - Wikipedia

 

[Shortround6]

It's easy to call it stupidity in hindsight. But the Japanese were still walking around with Samurai swords around the time Willis Lee was born. They had come a very, very long way. And in wartime, it is very, very difficult to know even basic facts about the enemy. At the time of most of these battles, the traits of the main Japanese fighter planes were not even well known, and certainly the high level of professionalism of the IJN was not understood by either the US or UK, though they were learning hard lessons.

Well, Samurai swords of not, the Japanese were not flying around China with old Newport Biplanes from WW I, They were not using French Renault F 17 tanks in China

As the caption says. In England in 1937 for the Coronation of KGVI.
Guided tours may not have been given but you don't show up with that and have your enemies expect your torpedoes date from 1912.

The radar also had it's limitations. You can't necessarily tell what is a friendly or enemy ship. Or what is even real vs clutter or something else that you misinterpreted, a flock of birds whatever. Sometimes it was enough to tell them something was out there, give them early warning. A good set of binoculars was more likely to correctly identify what it was you were looking at.

You are right, good binoculars are important, but it is fact that most of the time the Allies knew something was out there, roughly where it was and in what direction it was going in well before the Japanese did during most or all of the Night battles around Guadalcanal. The Allies could have had surprise every time. They only managed it once or twice.
At Tassafaronga the Americans not only had radar images, they had visual on one Japanese ship 6 minutes before the Japanese spotted them. Both sides waited before opening fire.
The Japanese were trying to run supply drums to the men on shore. The American squadron was blown out of the water by a supply run so yes, it was a major blunder.
It was a strategic victory for the Americans because the supplies did not reach shore. A high price was paid for shortening the campaign by a few days or a week.
US commander made several errors.
He didn't know the capabilities of his own weapons.
He didn't trust his ship commanders.
He ordered the torpedo launce too late.
He ruined the torpedo attack by opening fire with his cruiser guns about 1 minute after the torpedoes were launched which gave the Japanese warning to start evading. Maybe the MK 15s would have missed anyway or malfunctioned but that does not excuse basic tactical mistake.
American cruisers did not take evasive action of their own (except for one ship) which resulted in four cruisers taking torpedo hits at within US MK 15 torpedo effective range. No extra long range needed. It's the 4th night battle (and 6th night?) and the US is still believing that it is Japanese subs operating in the waters causing them problems??

yes I have hind sight and hind sight says there was some "cover your ass" going on.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Battle of the Pips - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Battle of the Pips - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Poor pips!

 

[Admiral Beez]

View attachment 755238

Did no shipbuilder in Japan have a straight edge? What's with the undulating deck surface and scuttles?

 

[WARSPITER]

Did no shipbuilder in Japan have a straight edge? What's with the undulating deck surface and scuttles?

Japanese crews were very well fed.

 

[Shortround6]

It was an attempt to get the decks to actually follow where the highest stress points were and would result in a lower weight structure.

If Spitfire wings cost a lot because they didn't have straight surfaces these things must have been a nightmare

This started back in 1917-22 with the Yubari

In an attempt to get a 5500ton cruiser fighting ability from a 3500ton or under ship. The undulation was nowhere near as severe but it was there. Some of the other weight saving tricks didn't work quite as well as intended but the Japanese seemed to stick with this one for quite a number of ships.
Although a lot of the post 1930 ships tended to have only a passing acquaintance with actual treaty displacements.

 

[WARSPITER]

If you look at Z42's link to The Battle of Empress Augusta Bay you can see the USN had learned a lot pretty quickly.

A telling factor during the action was constant use of course changes which made torpedo launches far less effective.
The other was the use of smoke at night to cover ships against star shell illumination which also fully negated the
use of binoculars. At the same time the USN ships continued engaging and hitting the enemy by using radar fire control.

Things can change when counter tactics are employed.

As to the type 93 torpedo. Undoubtedly the premier torpedo of the war but again it's effect was mitigated by counter tactics.
In 1942 the type 93 was responsible or was involved in (in conjunction with shelling or bombs) sinking 17 allied vessels.
1943 gives only four sinkings and 1944 only one.

2600 type 93 torpedoes were produced in WWII with around 1350 available at the start. For the sinkings achieved against
naval vessels this gives .846 of 1 percent effectiveness. Note also from the year figures that the percentage dwindles as the
war goes on.

 

[cherry blossom]

Did no shipbuilder in Japan have a straight edge? What's with the undulating deck surface and scuttles?

They still haven't found one https://navalpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/JS-Haguro-1068x801.jpg

 

[EwenS]

This included two carriers (HMS Illustrious, Formidable) and two battleships (HMS Valiant, Queen Elizabeth) crippled in the MTO in 1941 and not reentering service until early 1942.

While the carriers returned to service in early 1942 after repairs in the USA and Britain, the battleships took longer.

Valiant was able to be patched up at Alexandria before sailing for full repairs at Durban and she re-entered service in July 1942.

QE was more extensively damaged and had to await Valiant being patched up before she could be dry-docked. Alexandria only had a single floating dry dock large enough for these ships. She finally left Alexandria at the end of June 1942 for the USA where repairs lasted until June 1943, with further work needed in Britain after that. It was the end of Aug 1943 before she began her work up at Scapa Flow.

At the other end of the Med, Nelson was torpedoed by an Italian aircraft on 27 Sept 1941 during Operation Halberd. She wasn't returned to service until mid-April 1942.

In the space of 3 months in late 1941 Britain lost 3 capital ships (Barham, PoW and Repulse) and a carrier (Ark Royal) with another 3 capital ships put out of action for varying lengths of time as noted above as well as 3 cruisers lost and more damaged. Warspite was already under repair in the USA following damage off Crete and didn't rejoin the Eastern Fleet until late March 1942.

At the end of 1941 Britain had only 9 capital ships operational to cover its world wide commitments. The USN had 8 in service after PH (Colorado was refitting and didn't rejoin until March 1942).

Carrier wise at the end of 1941, Britain only had Argus, Victorious and Indomitable in anything like operational service. Illustrious & Formidable had just arrived back in Britain, colliding en route, delaying their return to service. Hermes, Eagle & Furious were refitting (Eagle had the work cut short and was returned to service in Jan 1942).

Dark days indeed for the RN.

Edit:- Or looked at another way, over 3 months the RN suffered at least the same kind of losses and damages as the USN suffered in a few hours at PH. And that from an already weakened position. Is it really any wonder the RN couldn't fight in the Pacific in 1942, as well as the IO, Mediterranean, Atlantic (North & South) and Arctic Oceans.

 

[Admiral Beez]

At the end of 1941 Britain had only 9 capital ships operational to cover its world wide commitments.

And of those four were clapped out Revenge class. Dark days indeed.

It's too bad Britain ran down its shipbuilding capability between the wars. One could argue that in those days of post-WW1 naval treaties, government war debt repayments and depression economics that a rundown was inevitable, but it was not in the nation's interest for the government to facilitate the industry's decline. The UK went from a nation that in a span of ten years from 1906 to 1916 could build AND complete thirty-five dreadnought battleships, eleven battlecruisers and over fifty turbine-powered light cruisers (20xTown, 14xC-Class, 8xArethusa, 3xActive, 2xBoadicea, 2xBlonde) to one that struggled from the mid-1930s onwards to build for the new war. For example, Britain needed five and half years (65 months) to complete the carrier HMS Implacable, even though by autumn 1942 Britain had lost five carriers and was desperately short of the type.

The Shipbuilding Plunderer of Scotland & England : Sir James Lithgow -

The Shipbuilding Plunderer of Scotland & England : Sir James Lithgow : The Shipbuilding Plunderer of Scotland & England : Sir James Lithgow

www.rebellionresearch.com

The Shipbuilding Plunderer of Scotland & England : Sir James Lithgow With the help of Montagu Norman, 1st Baron Norman, and the Bank of England, Sir James Lithgow was allowed to buy and close a third of the British Shipbuilding industry with disastrous future consequences.

 

[EwenS]

And of those four were clapped out Revenge class. Dark days indeed.

It's too bad Britain ran down its shipbuilding capability between the wars. One could argue that in those days of post-WW1 naval treaties and depression economics that a rundown was inevitable, but it was not in the nation's interest for the government to facilitate the industry's decline. The UK went from a nation that in a span of ten years from 1906 to 1916 could build AND complete thirty-five dreadnought battleships and eleven battlecruisers, to one that struggled in the 1930s to build for the new war.

The Shipbuilding Plunderer of Scotland & England : Sir James Lithgow -

The Shipbuilding Plunderer of Scotland & England : Sir James Lithgow : The Shipbuilding Plunderer of Scotland & England : Sir James Lithgow

www.rebellionresearch.com

The Shipbuilding Plunderer of Scotland & England : Sir James Lithgow With the help of Montagu Norman, 1st Baron Norman, and the Bank of England, Sir James Lithgow was allowed to buy and close a third of the British Shipbuilding industry with disastrous future consequences.

It is a gross oversimplification to blame Sir James Lithgow and the closure of yards in the early 1930s for the effects on battleship building capacity. Why?

Firstly, if memory serves, only 2 of those had been involved in building the Battleships you refer to - Palmers on the Tyne and Beardmore on the Clyde, and they built relatively few.

A bigger problem was that over time Battleships, and other ships for that matter, became much larger and much more complex. Newer ships outgrew many of the yards. Many had been built in the Royal Dockyards at Portsmouth, Devonport and Chatham. But, with the exception of one slip at Devonport, the slips there could not accommodate anything larger than a QE. Same thing with Thames Iron Works and Scotts at Greenock.

In 1916 Fairfield had to realign its longest slip and demolish part of one of its sheds to accommodate the Admiral class Rodney. A number of yards had to look into extending slips in WW2 to accommodate the Malta class carriers and sought Govt funding for at least part of the cost involved. Dry dock facilities were limited in size and number for new larger ships.

The real problem were the guns, gun mounting and armour producers. Post WNT the only market for these was the RN which wasn't allowed to build any new Battleships beyond the Nelrods until 1931 later extended to 1937. Cruisers didn't need so much armour and it was thinner. The Govt was not prepared to subsidise the companies sufficiently to allow them to keep these facilities mothballed. And new Cruisers in particular were vastly more complex, with turrets that competed with battleship mount facilities.

By 1937 there were plenty of slips on which Battleships could be built. But armour, gun mountings and guns limited production to 2 per year with a third every 2 two years. 12,500 tons of armour had to be ordered from Czechoslovakia for Cruisers and the Illustrious class (everyone else including the US and Germany turned down the offer of the work). 10,000 tons was delivered, with the last arriving in Aug 1939 after a journey through Germany.

But Britain wasn't the only country with these problems. The US invested heavily in its naval Dockyards from 1938 (new building docks had to be built before work on the Montanas could even be started). France also had to build new facilities.

 

[SaparotRob]

It is a gross oversimplification to blame Sir James Lithgow and the closure of yards in the early 1930s for the effects on battleship building capacity. Why?.....

Very informative post overall but it's the first time I've ever heard "Nelrods".

 

[EwenS]

Very informative post overall but it's the first time I've ever heard "Nelrods".

The Nelson & Rodney with 16" guns that Britain was allowed to build in the mid-1920s under the WNT.

 

[SaparotRob]

I 'figgered that part out. I've heard them referred to as the "Nelsols" because of their perceived similarities to oil tanker silhouettes. Even I know some stuff.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The Nelson & Rodney with 16" guns that Britain was allowed to build in the mid-1920s under the WNT.

I wonder if the exodus of talent from lack of orders led to the NelRods having the worst 16" guns. Someone thought high velocity, lightweight shells would do the trick.

 

[EwenS]

I wonder if the exodus of talent from lack of orders led to the NelRods having the worst 16" guns. Someone thought high velocity, lightweight shells would do the trick.

These guns were designed in 1922 for the planned but never built G3 Battle Cruisers. This was before the WNT and the restrictions on capital ship construction. Navweaps gives the following explanation:-

"From inadequate firing trials, a mistaken theory was promulgated by the Director of Naval Ordnance (DNO) that held that a high-velocity, low-weight projectile would have superior armor penetration characteristics at large oblique angles of impact, a conclusion which was the opposite of previous findings. This theory was not substantiated by later trials, but these took place too late to affect the decision to use a lightweight APC projectile for new designs. As a result, these guns proved to be only marginally better in terms of armor penetration than the previous 15"/42 (38.1 cm) Mark I and much less satisfactory than those older guns in terms of accuracy and barrel life."