Rn vs IJN (2 Viewers)

[MIflyer]

Let's just say there are a lot of groups that caused the Shuttle to turn out the way it did:

The No.1 was Pres JFK. He focused the manned space program on the Moon mission. And that was all. Asked to support expanded manned space efforts he replied "I am not very interested in space. Just concentrate on getting to the Moon." In 1968 NASA realized that the moment Apollo 11 splashed down, the manned space program was over, lacking any further justification, and Congress was not going to step in and save them. The USAF's Manned Orbiting Laboratory orbital recon program was cancelled because the NRO's Corona program had already proved to be superior. NASA was going to propose a small manned spacecraft rather like the USAF X-20, launched on expendable boosters, but the Nixon Admin said they could give them more than just that. Then NASA hit upon the idea of making the manned space program bulletproof by forcing all of the programs that were already self-justifying dependent on their manned program. Most people do not realize that part and parcel of the Shuttle program was the deliberate elimination of all other US space launch systems, including even the destruction of many boosters already sitting in the warehouses.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

The Kongo's would have been speed bumps for the New US BBs. 8in Belt armor was not battleship armor in WW II.
They didn't have the armor or firepower to stand in the line of battle with the US ships any more than the Invincible and Indefatigable and any business trying to mix it up with the German capital ships in 1916.
The Kongos were very good against cruisers or even the Repulse and Renown. Against the North Carolina's and later, they were thorny targets.

The Kongos and the other 14in BBs fired 1489lbs shells, The Nagato and Mutsu fired 2249lb shells and the Yamato's fired 3219lb shells. Other sources may round off or convert KG to lbs a few figures off.
The US Maryland class of old BBs fired 2240lb shells and the all the new ones fired 2700lb shells. The new US BBs fired shells about 1/2 way between all the rest of 16in guns in the world (British and planned German) and the Yamato's guns. Maybe a Yamato was worth 3 Marylands? Was it worth 3 North Carolina/South Dakotas?

Agree the Kongos were battlecruisers when they were built and and when they died. For comparison HMS Renown and USS Alaska had 9" main belts. Renown was clearly a battlecruiser and while Alaska was hard to classify it certainly was not a fast battleship.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Well, the Japanese torpedo was considerably better than those of the Americans, of course, and also a good bit better (as in twice or three times) than the British torpedoes. And the neither the Americans nor the British were aware of it's true capabilities until quite late in the war.

Twice of three times better...nonsense. British destroyer torpedoes worked well and were very effective. Ask the Germans at Narvik or the survivors of the Scharnhorst or the Haruna.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Twice of three times better...nonsense. British destroyer torpedoes worked well and were very effective. Ask the Germans at Narvik or the survivors of the Scharnhorst or the Haruna.

The type 93 had 10 kilometer range advantage. And more explosives, and it was faster.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

The type 93 had 10 kilometer range advantage. And more explosives, and it was faster.

Agree but that doesn't make it 2 to 3 times more effective. That's a statement that cannot be substantiated.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Aircraft kills are usually credited to type of aircraft

I did some further research on Escort Carriers in the North Atlantic.

The title Escort Carrier is a bit of a misnomer, as the majority of them actually served in the role of assault carrier in both the Mediterranean and the Pacific. For example 22 CVEs were used in the invasion of Okinawa. Contrary to mythology escort carriers did not close the Mid Atlantic gap, which was done primarily by shore based VLR Liberators.

The original 6 C3 cargo ship conversions were very unreliable. Two were kept by the US, with the USS Long Island was relegated to training and ferry duties in the Pacific, while the USS Charger was used on training duties in the Chesapeake Bay area.

The T3 tanker conversions were much more successful, first serving in Torch. After that 3 of the 4 went to the Pacific to continue in the assault role will Santee stayed behind to serve in the ASW role through 1943 before joining them in the Pacific

The first of the original US built escort carriers to see combat was HMS Avenger which escorted Convoy PQ-18 to the USSR. This was primarily in the interceptor role as 12 Sea Hurricanes and only 3 Swordfish were embarked. That being said a Swordfish sighted U-589 on Sept 14, 1942 which was later sunk by HMS Onslow with participation by another Swordfish. This marked the first time aircraft flown from an escort carrier participated in the destruction of a U-boat.
A History of H.M.S. AVENGER

The first use of the other RN ships was to support Operation Torch. Avenger, Biter and Dasher served in the assault role. On the way home Avenger was sunk by U-155 on Nov 15, 1942 and Dasher blew up while on a training exercise on March 27th, leaving only Archer and Biter available for the ASW role.
A History of H.M.S. DASHER

HMS Archer suffered severe engine and drive train problems throughout its career. Because of this it missed Operation Torch, only ferrying P-40s to Casablanca after the landings. The history of the Archer is a record of constant problems. In fact Archer completed it last patrol on July 26, 1943 and was officially withdrawn from active service on Nov 6 1943.
A History of H.M.S. ARCHER
Archer did manage to perform Convoy escort duties with 4 EG, joining convoy ONS-6 on May 7, 1943. This convoy was not attacked by U-boats. On May 11th Archer switched to ON 182, again an uneventful trip. On May 21, 1943 Archer joined convoy HX-239. On May 23 a Swordfish sank U-752 with rockets marking the first time rockets sank a submarine.
After another round of repairs Archer sailed on July 19th but as noted this foray was abandoned on the 26th marking the end of Archer's naval career.

Biter joined 5 EG on April 21, 1943 escorting ON-4. On April 25 a Swordfish spotted U-203 and attacked with 2 depth charges, doing no damage, however HMS Pathfinder was summoned to the scene and sank the U-boat.
On May 5 EG joined convoy HX 237. A Swordfish spotted U-89 and attacked with no visible result. As before HMS Broadway and HMS Lagan were dispatched to the scene and dispatched the U-boat.
After Black May Biter escorted 3 more convoys in June before undergoing a refit, returning to North Atlantic escort duties in October.
A History of H.M.S. BITER
Note how much the flying was curtailed by the bad weather typical of the North Atlantic. Escort carriers were much more successful in the milder conditions on the Mid-Atlantic route from Norfolk to Casablanca. In fact the RN escort carriers scored no more U-boat victories in the rest of 1943.

The RN Bogues did not take part in North Atlantic convoy escort duties until Tracker did at the end of September 1943. The first 4 they received were converted to assault carriers and sent to the Mediterranean for the invasion of Sicily. Fencer and Ravager also started North Atlantic escort duties in October.
Actually, the primary use of RN escort carriers as escorts was escorting convoys to and from the Mediterranean and Russia. Of the 12 1/2 U boats sunk by Swordfish in 1944 (one shared with Avengers), 10 were sunk in the Arctic vs 3 sunk in the Atlantic.
The first 3 Bogues commissioned into the USN went to the Pacific. The 4th, the Bogue itself, went to the Atlantic. The first two convoy escort attempts by the Bogue in March 1943 were failures with the ship returning to home port early due to storm damage and general defects. Only on the 3rd attempt on April 25th did the Bogue finally make the full voyage to the UK with convoy HX-235. Bogue's 2nd convoy escort was ON-184 where she finally had success. Her aircraft sank U-89 on May 23, 1943 which the first time aircraft from an escort carrier sank a U-boat on their own. After that she left for the Middle Atlantic convoy route to protect the USG convoys from Norfolk, Virginia to Casablanca.

The escort carriers enjoyed by far their greatest success in USN service on the Middle Atlantic route, escorting the USG convoys and freelancing. Bogue switched to this route once Donetz gave up on the wolf packs on May 24, 1943 and withdrew from the North Atlantic. Bogue sank 2 U-boats in June. It was joined by Santee and Core in July combining for a total of 6. Core and Card got 5 more in August and Core, Card and Block Island added 6 more in October while Bogue finished the year with 2 in December, for a grand total of 21 U-boats sunk in 1943.
The USN deployed 5 Bogues in the Atlantic with the other 6 serving in the Pacific. Of the 50 Casablanca class, 5 were deployed to the Atlantic in 1944.

The sum total of U-boats sunk by the escort carriers (4 in 1943, 3 in 1944) on the North Atlantic route was meager and in no way comparable to shore based aircraft.
That was certainly a long winded post. To answer the actual question the grand total for Swordfish flying from escort carriers was 16 ½ with Avengers accounted for 33 ½.

 

[Shortround6]

Unfortunately for the US a lot of the Japanese success around Guadalcanal was due to US incompetence.

Not trying to take away from the courage that the men on either side showed or the skill displayed at low levels.

However if the Japanese had tried such tactics/methods against what the British forces had shown at the Battle of Cape Mattapan, a very large amount of the Japanese fleet would have been on the bottom. The British had doctrines and training and knew how to use what radar they did have. The US was not using radar at all effectively. They didn't have much in the way of Doctrine or if they did they didn't implement it.
Admiral Cunningham was very good and his officers and crews performed very well. Everything may not have gone exactly to plan but the US often didn't even seem to have a plan. Or not much of one.

The US performance a the Nov 12th 1942 Battle of Guadalcanal is inexcusable for the Fall of 1942.
A few quotes from Wiki.
" Callaghan was a few days senior to the more experienced Scott and therefore was placed in overall command."
This was a constant refrain, New officer shows up, unfamiliar with situation and takes command due to seniority just a few days before a major operation.

"The U.S. force steamed in a single column in Ironbottom Sound, with destroyers in the lead and rear of the column, and the cruisers in the center. Five ships had the new, far-superior SG radar, but Callaghan's deployment put none of them in the forward part of the column"
This is the 3rd time the US screws up it's deployment of it's radar equipped ships. It makes for a very long, costly learning curve if you do not learn from past mistakes.

"but Callaghan's deployment put none of them in the forward part of the column, nor did he choose one for his flagship".
2nd time a US commander choses his flagship for it's "prestige" vs it's ability to rely on it's own sensors for information instead of reports/signals from other ships. The reliance of reports/signals from other ships had NOT worked in the prior engagements.

"Callaghan did not issue a battle plan to his ship commanders"
Another failing of the US that kept repeating it self.
Once things had gone to crap he issued an order of "even number ships fire to Starboard and odd number ships fire to Port" ( I may have that reversed) but they had never assigned numbers to the ships in formation leading to confusion. Trying to come up battle plans on the fly (and with less than reliable communications ) in a night battle
He had ship commanders begging to open fire with torpedoes at targets they could see and were on their radars but because his own ship (with the crappy radar) could not see anything he refused until it was just about too late. Maybe the MK 15s wouldn't have hit anything anyway, but firing at thousands of yards further away at a worse angle certainly didn't help anything. He also didn't believe his destroyer commanders when they told him they were in range, He Believed the US torpedoes were much shorter ranged than they were. You have a cruiser/destroyer force commander who doesn't know his own ship's weapons capabilities?????His own officers had to convince him, in mid battle, that the US torpedoes could do what the Destroyer Commanders said they could do.

Now note that the ranges involved were within US Torpedo capability, The Japanese torpedoes were well, very well, within range. But the Japanese with their better night vision glasses, had no idea the American ships there until a minute or two more when the US opened gun fire (and alerted the Japanese to take evasive action).
The Japanese returned torpedo fire and that pretty much ended the US cruiser force. The US cruisers continued their course and speed fat dumb and happy in the belief that the Japanese torpedoes could not equal the American Torpedoes. Nov of 1942 remember?


I will repeat, expecting similar mistakes, all in the same battle, from the Royal Navy is not going to happen.

 

[Admiral Beez]

1. The Kongo and KGV classes both had main 14" guns.

So did all but two of the US battleships at Pearl Harbour. How does the USN's 14" gun compare?

After Pearl Harbour the US government approached Chile about purchasing their 14" armed battleship. I wonder where the USN would get shells for the old British guns considering the Brits scrapped all their 14 guns during the interwar. It would have been interesting to see Vickers 14" on Kongo vs Elswick 14" on the USS Latorre.

It has to be rare for British-made battleship calibre guns to face each other in combat, though not as rare as we may think. At the July 1940 Battle of Calabria, the Italian battleships were armed with Vickers and Elswick guns, though the Italians bored them out during the interwar period.

 

[Shortround6]

So did all but two of the US battleships at Pearl Harbour. How does the USN's 14" gun compare?

After Pearl Harbour the US government approached Chile about purchasing their 14" armed battleship. I wonder where the USN would get shells for the old British guns.

The US had two different 14 in guns in WW II, both had been upgraded in the 1930s from the originals.

14in/45 on the New York, Nevada, and Pennsylvania classes.
1500lb AP shells at 2600fps (new gun) but they used slightly different shells due the ammunition hoists/shell handling.

14in/50s on the New Mexico and Tennessee classes.
1500lb AP shells 2700fps (new gun) they had rebuilt (or built new guns) to solve dispersion problems.

Japanese 14in/45 guns
1400lbs AP shells at 2526-2543fps, please note that the older American guns had used 1400lbs shells in WW I

British 14in gun
1590lb AP shell at 2483fps (new gun), British were not happy with the 16in guns on the Nelson/Rodney and deliberately went for lower velocity.

The US could get 14 shells from several US suppliers. Not only from their own shells (modified) but since the US had supplied 14in guns to the British in WW I there may have been left over tooling. The Big problem was forging the basic shell. Finish machining the shell bodies to the right length, and actual difference in diameter, driving bands and interior machining was easy.

 

[WARSPITER]

The US had several marks of 14" gun with the oldest type being similar to the Kongo class gun in capability.
Later marks were significantly superior to the Kongo's. The other difference was in armour. As with a KGV
the Kongo was going to have to get to point blank battleship range to cause effective damage by which
time the US 14" guns would have caused massive damage in return.

As an example, you are at 20,000 yards range and need to get to 10000 yards to get real penetration shots
in. Your ship (Kongo) is capable of 29 knots full speed. At this speed you will move at close to 980 yards
per minute. Round that up to 1,000 for ease of calculation (tailwind) and you run the gauntlet for ten
minutes. Also allow for the fact that doing this means only your front guns can fire.
The earlier type US 14" ships had ten guns and would fire around 12 to 15 full broadsides in that time
(slowest type), with an ever increasing likelihood of hits as the range closes.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Unfortunately for the US a lot of the Japanese success around Guadalcanal was due to US incompetence.

Not trying to take away from the courage that the men on either side showed or the skill displayed at low levels.

However if the Japanese had tried such tactics/methods against what the British forces had shown at the Battle of Cape Mattapan, a very large amount of the Japanese fleet would have been on the bottom. The British had doctrines and training and knew how to use what radar they did have. The US was not using radar at all effectively. They didn't have much in the way of Doctrine or if they did they didn't implement it.
Admiral Cunningham was very good and his officers and crews performed very well. Everything may not have gone exactly to plan but the US often didn't even seem to have a plan. Or not much of one.

The US performance a the Nov 12th 1942 Battle of Guadalcanal is inexcusable for the Fall of 1942.
A few quotes from Wiki.
" Callaghan was a few days senior to the more experienced Scott and therefore was placed in overall command."
This was a constant refrain, New officer shows up, unfamiliar with situation and takes command due to seniority just a few days before a major operation.

"The U.S. force steamed in a single column in Ironbottom Sound, with destroyers in the lead and rear of the column, and the cruisers in the center. Five ships had the new, far-superior SG radar, but Callaghan's deployment put none of them in the forward part of the column"
This is the 3rd time the US screws up it's deployment of it's radar equipped ships. It makes for a very long, costly learning curve if you do not learn from past mistakes.

"but Callaghan's deployment put none of them in the forward part of the column, nor did he choose one for his flagship".
2nd time a US commander choses his flagship for it's "prestige" vs it's ability to rely on it's own sensors for information instead of reports/signals from other ships. The reliance of reports/signals from other ships had NOT worked in the prior engagements.

"Callaghan did not issue a battle plan to his ship commanders"
Another failing of the US that kept repeating it self.
Once things had gone to crap he issued an order of "even number ships fire to Starboard and odd number ships fire to Port" ( I may have that reversed) but they had never assigned numbers to the ships in formation leading to confusion. Trying to come up battle plans on the fly (and with less than reliable communications ) in a night battle
He had ship commanders begging to open fire with torpedoes at targets they could see and were on their radars but because his own ship (with the crappy radar) could not see anything he refused until it was just about too late. Maybe the MK 15s wouldn't have hit anything anyway, but firing at thousands of yards further away at a worse angle certainly didn't help anything. He also didn't believe his destroyer commanders when they told him they were in range, He Believed the US torpedoes were much shorter ranged than they were. You have a cruiser/destroyer force commander who doesn't know his own ship's weapons capabilities?????His own officers had to convince him, in mid battle, that the US torpedoes could do what the Destroyer Commanders said they could do.

Now note that the ranges involved were within US Torpedo capability, The Japanese torpedoes were well, very well, within range. But the Japanese with their better night vision glasses, had no idea the American ships there until a minute or two more when the US opened gun fire (and alerted the Japanese to take evasive action).
The Japanese returned torpedo fire and that pretty much ended the US cruiser force. The US cruisers continued their course and speed fat dumb and happy in the belief that the Japanese torpedoes could not equal the American Torpedoes. Nov of 1942 remember?


I will repeat, expecting similar mistakes, all in the same battle, from the Royal Navy is not going to happen.

So what? I could drag out dozens of examples of British, Royal Navy, and FAA incompetence. Ceylon wasn't exactly stellar. Every military had competent / lucky and incompetent / unlucky commanders. You are trying to suggest that the British were somehow way ahead of the US in training or Naval doctrine. I think that is a joke. I'll be glad to call your bluff on this. I won't hold my breath on your admitting that this was a spurious argument, because I suspect you know better. But I'll show it regardless.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I will repeat, expecting similar mistakes, all in the same battle, from the Royal Navy is not going to happen.

I will call this bluff

 

[Shortround6]

so call it.

The British were using Radar in the Spring of 1941, and using it pretty well. The US was screwing up in the fall of 1942. 18 months later.
Not the US radar operators so much but the US force commanders.
Now just a few days later Admiral Lee showed what a good US Commander could do with Radar, training and planning.

However that engagement also showed that the Japanese night vision binoculars were no match for radar.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

so call it.

The British were using Radar in the Spring of 1941, and using it pretty well. The US was screwing up in the fall of 1942. 18 months later.
Not the US radar operators so much but the US force commanders.
Now just a few days later Admiral Lee showed what a good US Commander could do with Radar, training and planning.

However that engagement also showed that the Japanese night vision binoculars were no match for radar.

Having radar is one thing. That doesn't mean that all commanders will use it equally well, but it is an advantage.

One example with Admiral Lee doesn't extrapolate to the entire war, nor does it mean that the binoculars and other night combat methods used by the Japanese were useless in the face of radar, or that WW2 era radar was a panacea in naval combat.

In aggregate, in fact, I suspect the Japanese had an advantage well into 1943, and nothing about the US Navy made them more likely to make serious mistakes in combat. To the contrary, guys like Lee were clearly extraordinary commanders. As were the various commanders in many of the carrier actions. But even Lee faced the limits of radar in his big engagement.

Meanwhile, the RN did indeed make serious blunders all the time during WW2. Do I need to go through a list of those?

Both the RN and the USN grossly underestimated the range and effectiveness of the IJN ship launched torpedoes, and their air strike capabilities more generally. This took a surprisingly long time to wear off. Both the USN and the RN were sufficiently impressed by the Japanese naval binoculars that they adopted them both during the war and after WW2 was long over, for decades. Both the USN and the RN were defeated and saw ships sunk in surface actions and as the result of IJN air strikes.

You are blowing smoke my friend. And I think it's beneath you. You clearly don't like this notion that the Japanese Navy was superior to the RN, but they were.

 

[Shortround6]

One example with Admiral Lee doesn't extrapolate to the entire war, nor does it mean that the binoculars and other night combat methods used by the Japanese were useless in the face of radar, or that WW2 era radar was a panacea in naval combat.

Well, if the other US commanders had been as good as Lee or even close, Iron bottom sound would have a different name. Like Japanese bottom sound.
Just how many time in row did it take for the Japanese to steam into an area, get spotted on radar, get to rifle distance of American ships and turn what should have been a crushing ambush into a catastrophic defeat for the Americans.

In aggregate, in fact, I suspect the Japanese had an advantage well into 1943,

Not looking for "suspect". How about some actual facts.
Scoreboard stats don't tell you how it was done.

Both the RN and the USN grossly underestimated the range and effectiveness of the IJN ship launched torpedoes

You are correct, however, since most of the Battles in the Guadalcanal area took place at 10,000 yds or under, the extra range of the Japanese torpedoes didn't make much difference to that series of battles. Believing that the Japanese could not make a 10,000yd torpedo was just stupid. Both the US and Britain had 10,000yd (and over) torpedoes in 1916. Believing the Japanese could not equal that 24-26 years later was just stupid.
As we now know the 13,000-15,000yd torpedo wasn't even close to what the Japanese could do but to believe the Japanese were stuck at 1910-1914 levels took an extra level of stupidity.

Both the USN and the RN were sufficiently impressed by the Japanese naval binoculars that they adopted them both during the war and after WW2 was long over, for decades. Both the USN and the RN were defeated and saw ships sunk in surface actions and as the result of IJN air strikes.

Everybody wants the best equipment they can get. Radar was a big help but it could not give accurate enough range and bearing for firing alone for much of the war. But knowing where to look was a big advantage, so was having a pretty good idea of how many enemy ships there were and where they were even if you can's see all of them with you binoculars was a big advantage.
Taking losses is one thing, things can happen. But snatching defeat from the Jaws of Victory because of stupid decisions, repeatedly, takes the total opposite of genius.

The "Battle of Friday the 13th" might not have been a huge victory for the US but it should not have been the colossal screw up it was. Better night glasses for the US would not have improved much. About 1/2 of the US ships knew where the Japanese were minutes before either side opened fire. They may not have known exactly what they were, but they knew were they were and pretty much the course and speed. Problem was the US commander didn't know (because he was on the ship with crappy radar) and he didn't believe the reports he was getting from the other US ships.
Japanese night glasses weren't "all seeing" either or the Laffey would never have passed the Hiei at 20 feet.

1942 communications were not good enough to pass targeting information from one ship to another.

Ships had star shell, but, a big but, you need to decide which ships or which guns on a ship, are going to provide star shell illumination for the formation as whole. The guns have to loaded with star shell to begin with or the shells handy for fuse adjustment when ordered. You need standard battle orders and you need specific battle orders, Ship X which was supposed to provide star shell, is down for refueling or repair, which ship/s take over the star shell job that night? Are the captains supposed to guess? This is so every ship/crew knows their job before the enemy shows up.

In the Spring of 1941 the British not only had the battle of Cape Mattapan, they had the Bismarck chase, which was greatly assisted by radar. Yes the cruisers lost the Bismarck at times but contact was held for considerable amounts of time by radar. In 1941 the British may not have been giving all of their secrets away to the Americans. There is a difference between giving away the radar itself and giving away the tactics/techniques or in some cases, just getting the tactics/techniques distributed.

 

[z42]

The Battle of Empress Augusta Bay on Nov 1 1943, while not remarkable in terms of sunk ships, was perhaps a watershed moment in the sense that the USN had learned the lessons of Guadalcanal and by using their superior radar and improved night fighting doctrine they were able to soundly beat the IJN in a night battle.

Solomon Islands Campaign XII The Bougainville Landing and the Battle od Empress Augusta Bay, 27 October - 2 November 1943

PDF Version [34.1MB]

www.history.navy.mil

View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=orGgm91ebCc&pp=ygUdQmF0dGxlIG9mIEVtcHJlc3MgQXVndXN0YSBCYXk%3D

 

[Admiral Beez]

The British were using Radar in the Spring of 1941, and using it pretty well. The US was screwing up in the fall of 1942. 18 months later.

To be fair, while radar itself was new, by autumn of 1942 the Royal Navy had been at war for three years, while the USN for only nine months or so. Once the USN had been at war for three years, Dec 1944 they were well in the lead on most capabilities and skillsets.

 

[WARSPITER]

To be fair, while radar itself was new, by autumn of 1942 the Royal Navy had been at war for three years, while the USN for only nine months or so. Once the USN had been at war for three years, Dec 1944 they were well in the lead on most capabilities and skillsets.

Yes and that is the point re what the difference would have been in 1942 actions had the RN been fully involved.

 

[Shortround6]

To be fair, while radar itself was new, by autumn of 1942 the Royal Navy had been at war for three years, while the USN for only nine months or so. Once the USN had been at war for three years, Dec 1944 they were well in the lead on most capabilities and skillsets.

radar had also advanced quite a bit and so did radio. So did CIC centers which didn't show up until late 1943 or early 1944 to help put all the information in one, easy to visualize location. For a lot of the war you had 3 and sometimes 4 different radar set ups, counting "none" as one of the set ups. At the Battle of Tassafaronga the US had a few destroyers with no radar for example. At least at Tassafaronga the radarless Destroyers were not leading the formation physically.

Ship to ship voice radio was just coming into use in 1941-42 and it required all ships in the formation to use the same frequency. Which sometimes lead to "chatter" and messages being garbled and/or over ridden/talked over. This was the fastest way for ships to communicate though. Anything else (radio, signal lamp, flags) required the message to be written down, taken to the transmitting location (even lamp station), coded (simple or complicated), transmitted, received/decoded, written down and carried to the officer/captain.
In later years they may have added more channels for the ship to ship voice?
Some of the British ships did not have the Bridge space to be upgraded easily.
Sometimes a flag officer had decisions to make as to which ship to command from. Some Cruisers were fitted as "command ships" with accommodations for not only a fancy cabin for the admiral but accommodations for 20-40 staff (extra signalmen mostly) and sometimes even a "flag Bridge" So the admiral and staff weren't getting in the way of the ships captain and normal bridge crew. Unfortunately Sometimes the ship with the command bridge accommodations didn't have the best radar in the fleet. And in the days before having a CIC that can really lead to problems.

 

[EwenS]

I did some further research on Escort Carriers in the North Atlantic.

The title Escort Carrier is a bit of a misnomer, as the majority of them actually served in the role of assault carrier in both the Mediterranean and the Pacific. For example 22 CVEs were used in the invasion of Okinawa. Contrary to mythology escort carriers did not close the Mid Atlantic gap, which was done primarily by shore based VLR Liberators.

The original 6 C3 cargo ship conversions were very unreliable. Two were kept by the US, with the USS Long Island was relegated to training and ferry duties in the Pacific, while the USS Charger was used on training duties in the Chesapeake Bay area.

The T3 tanker conversions were much more successful, first serving in Torch. After that 3 of the 4 went to the Pacific to continue in the assault role will Santee stayed behind to serve in the ASW role through 1943 before joining them in the Pacific

The first of the original US built escort carriers to see combat was HMS Avenger which escorted Convoy PQ-18 to the USSR. This was primarily in the interceptor role as 12 Sea Hurricanes and only 3 Swordfish were embarked. That being said a Swordfish sighted U-589 on Sept 14, 1942 which was later sunk by HMS Onslow with participation by another Swordfish. This marked the first time aircraft flown from an escort carrier participated in the destruction of a U-boat.
A History of H.M.S. AVENGER

The first use of the other RN ships was to support Operation Torch. Avenger, Biter and Dasher served in the assault role. On the way home Avenger was sunk by U-155 on Nov 15, 1942 and Dasher blew up while on a training exercise on March 27th, leaving only Archer and Biter available for the ASW role.
A History of H.M.S. DASHER

HMS Archer suffered severe engine and drive train problems throughout its career. Because of this it missed Operation Torch, only ferrying P-40s to Casablanca after the landings. The history of the Archer is a record of constant problems. In fact Archer completed it last patrol on July 26, 1943 and was officially withdrawn from active service on Nov 6 1943.
A History of H.M.S. ARCHER
Archer did manage to perform Convoy escort duties with 4 EG, joining convoy ONS-6 on May 7, 1943. This convoy was not attacked by U-boats. On May 11th Archer switched to ON 182, again an uneventful trip. On May 21, 1943 Archer joined convoy HX-239. On May 23 a Swordfish sank U-752 with rockets marking the first time rockets sank a submarine.
After another round of repairs Archer sailed on July 19th but as noted this foray was abandoned on the 26th marking the end of Archer's naval career.

Biter joined 5 EG on April 21, 1943 escorting ON-4. On April 25 a Swordfish spotted U-203 and attacked with 2 depth charges, doing no damage, however HMS Pathfinder was summoned to the scene and sank the U-boat.
On May 5 EG joined convoy HX 237. A Swordfish spotted U-89 and attacked with no visible result. As before HMS Broadway and HMS Lagan were dispatched to the scene and dispatched the U-boat.
After Black May Biter escorted 3 more convoys in June before undergoing a refit, returning to North Atlantic escort duties in October.
A History of H.M.S. BITER
Note how much the flying was curtailed by the bad weather typical of the North Atlantic. Escort carriers were much more successful in the milder conditions on the Mid-Atlantic route from Norfolk to Casablanca. In fact the RN escort carriers scored no more U-boat victories in the rest of 1943.

The RN Bogues did not take part in North Atlantic convoy escort duties until Tracker did at the end of September 1943. The first 4 they received were converted to assault carriers and sent to the Mediterranean for the invasion of Sicily. Fencer and Ravager also started North Atlantic escort duties in October.
Actually, the primary use of RN escort carriers as escorts was escorting convoys to and from the Mediterranean and Russia. Of the 12 1/2 U boats sunk by Swordfish in 1944 (one shared with Avengers), 10 were such in the Arctic vs 3 sunk in the Atlantic.

You might find the following of interest:-

RN Escort carriers
In the summer of 1943 there were voices in the USN querying the length of time it was taking the RN to get the US built CVE into service compared to their own CVE. This eventually reached the ears of Admiral King CinCUS and questions were being raised about whether fewer ships should be allocated to the RN in future. The Admiralty felt compelled to respond on 7 Sept 1943 in the following terms, as a result of which no more was heard of the matter:-

"Letter from Admiralty1 to Deputy Secretary, British Admiralty Delegation, Washington [ADM 1/ 12857] 7 September 1943
Delays in getting American-built Escort Carriers into service

In reply to your Message 252149Z/ August, I am to inform you that the main cause of delay in getting your carriers into service is our endeavour not only to improve the petrol system, but to get all these carriers capable of full fighter operation and not merely fit for A/ S work.

2. It must be remembered that we differ from the United States Navy since we have not in sight so large a force of Fleet and Light Fleet Carriers. For this reason we shall in future have to depend more than the Americans upon fighters operated from Escort Carriers in support of amphibious operations. We have also to consider the anti-aircraft protection of trade (e.g. in the Bay and possibly North Russian routes). Their Lordships therefore consider that the above policy is fully justified.

3. The nature of the preliminary delays which have occurred in America, and the time taken for fitting out after completion, are matters which are known better to you than to the Admiralty, but would presumably have been the same whether the ships had been coming to us or to U.S.N.

4. Our records show that it has been anything from 1 ½ to 3 months from completion date before the ships are ready to leave Norfolk for U.K., though in a few cases this period has included a short work up of the squadron embarking for operation on passage.

5. The passage from Norfolk to U.K. should normally take two weeks but three ships which have come via Casablanca in order to deliver U.S. aircraft have taken at least a month.

6. On arrival in U.K., ships have been given seven weeks in dockyard hands to incorporate As and As, and this has been followed by five to six weeks work up so that the minimum time from leaving Norfolk to being in service has been fourteen to fifteen weeks, though in some cases other small delays have occurred.

7. The delays in America, and the time for passage and working up are presumably not subject to criticism. It is undoubtedly the delays due to the incorporation of what appear to the Americans to be unnecessary As and As which provoke criticism, and which the Vancouver scheme will presumably do nothing to allay.

8. The length of the initial refit is governed by the modifications of the petrol system and fitting RADAR required for fighter direction. Other items are undertaken only if they can be done in this period, e.g. extending flight deck or arcticisation. In TRACKER class modifications to bomb room bulkheads had also to be undertaken.

9. Had the Admiralty accepted the policy that certain Escort Carriers should be used for A/ S work only and cut out any petrol or other modifications, there would undoubtedly have been about four more carriers in operation in the Atlantic at this moment. We should, however, have been unable to meet unexpected calls for fighter support which we are now meeting in the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean early in 1944. There are four Escort Carriers taking part in Mediterranean operations, and we are now accepting the full burden of supplying all naval forces for operations in the Indian Ocean next spring.

10. In fact, with the present decrease, (even if only temporary), of U-Boat activity against Atlantic convoy routes in our zone, and the growing requirement for fighter escort carriers in all spheres, Their Lordships consider that our policy has proved sound.

11. Regarding future carriers which are being modified at Vancouver, Their Lordships naturally want to carry on this policy and not produce carriers in service unless they are capable of being used for all purposes. Some saving of time will undoubtedly be effected with carriers that are being initially equipped with aircraft for A/ S work only, as they will work up at Vancouver and should therefore be ready for operation there within eighteen weeks of their official completion dates. Their Lordships intend, however, that certain selected carriers, which are being earmarked at the outset for fighter operations in support of the Army in amphibious operations, should come to U.K. to work up their squadrons in cooperation with the Army, and will therefore still take up to six months to get into full operational service.

12. In the event of re-assignment of carriers becoming likely, we might perforce consider dispensing with modifications in certain carriers (using these for A/ S and ferrying duties only), but it must be stressed that in Their Lordships' opinion this step would be basically unsound, and would sooner or later adversely affect the deployment of maximum air strength in support of operations in the Eastern theatre.

13. I am, therefore, to request that you will ascertain from the United States Navy Department:–
(a) what proportion of their Escort Carriers are now and will in the future be capable of full fighter operation;
(b) what modifications, if any, have been carried out in the Escort Carriers so selected;
(c) of the experience they have gained hitherto in operating fighters from Escort Carriers.

The answers to these questions will make it clear whether our policy involves unnecessary modifications in the American view, or whether the cause of discontent is largely due to the different purpose to which British Escort Carriers will be put.

14. At QUADRANT it became clear that the United States Navy have no conception of the congestion and restriction on building and repair facilities in the United Kingdom at the present time. This matter is being taken up separately, and it is hoped that the Controller will be able to pay a short visit to Washington in the near future in order that our difficulties may receive greater sympathy in future.

15. Their Lordships have in hand a review of manning programme for 1944 in the light of the naval manpower situation. It may prove that manpower limitations will force us to reduce our claims to the assignment of certain types of vessel from the U.S. production in the future. You will be informed as soon as the result of this investigation is known.

16. A history of each carrier is attached as appendix to this letter.

J.D. Higham

HISTORY OF ESCORT CARRIERS
Dates of arrival of Escort Carriers at U.K. ports for modification, after discharging ferried aircraft, and dates of readiness for operational service after modification and work up with squadrons, are given below with summary of employment and achievements to date:–

(1) AVENGER. Arrived U.K. 11.5.42. Operational 31.7.42. Escorted P.Q. 18 Sept. 42.

(2) BITER. U.K. 23/ 6/ 42. Operational 30/ 9/ 42. With Home Fleet Oct. '42. N. African landing Nov. '42 – followed by refit. Escort duties in N. Atlantic from 12/ 4/ 43. Attacked 5 U-boats and assisted in sinking 2.

(3) ARCHER. U.K. 3/ 12/ 42. Operational March, 1943. Allocated for escort duties. Sustained weather damage April, 1943. Supported ONS 6 and HX 239 in May. Sank 1 U-boat and attacked 2 others. In dockyard for defects June. Sweep in Bay July, 1943. Engaged and drove off several aircraft. No U-boats sighted. Now in dockyard hands again with main engine defects.

(4) DASHER. U.K. 10/ 9/ 42. Operational 1/ 11/ 42. N. Africa landings Nov. '42. With H.F. early 1943. Sustained weather damage while operating to cover Russian convoy. Sunk by internal explosion 27/ 3/ 43.

(5) ATTACKER. Operated aircraft on passage with CU. 1. March '43 and drove off aircraft. U.K. 4/ 4/ 43. Operational 15/ 7/ 43. Sailed Mediterranean 3/ 8/ 43 for special operation.

(6) BATTLER. U.K. 10/ 1/ 43. Operational 1/ 5/ 43. Supported convoys OS 49, KMS. 16 and XK. 9. Shot down 1 F.W. 200. Sailed Mediterranean 3/ 8/ 43 for special operation.

(7) STALKER.) (8) HUNTER.) Ferried U.S. aircraft to Casablanca. Operated aircraft on passage from Gibraltar and drove off E.A. U.K. 12/ 4/ 43. Operational 15/ 7/ 43. Sailed Mediterranean 3/ 8/ 43 for special operation.

(9) FENCER. U.K. 22/ 5/ 43. Working up.

(10) TRACKER. Ferried U.S. aircraft to Casablanca. U.K. 4/ 6/ 43. Working up.

(11) CHASER. U.K. 22/ 7/ 43. Operated aircraft on passage. Now being modified.

(12) SEARCHER. U.K. 14/ 7/ 43. Now being modified.

(13) STRIKER. U.K. 23/ 7/ 43. Now being modified.

(14) RAVAGER. U.K. 28/ 7/ 43. Being employed for D.L.T.

(15) PURSUER. U.K. 12/ 8/ 43. Now being modified."

The "special operation" referred to was Operation Avalanche, the invasion of Italy at Salerno. Three things to note about the 4 ships involved (Attacker, Battler, Hunter & Stalker)
1.They did not participate in the invasion on Sicily Operation Husky in July 1943. They only left Britain for the Med on 2/3 Aug 1943.
2. Even though they operated only fighters at Salerno, at that point they had not undergone conversion to assault carriers. That conversion happened to Attacker, Hunter & Stalker after they returned to Britain in Oct 1943.
3. Battler was not converted to an assault carrier. After Salerno she went to the Indian Ocean to operate as an AS carrier in light of the increased U-boat threat in those waters.

The modifications of the 11 Bogue/Attacker class and 4 of the early ships of the later Prince William / Ruler / Smiter group took place in Britain. The other ships were converted in Vancouver.
Modified by Burrards

Note the need to fix the defective LP turbine rotors on the early ships. Slinger, which was converted in Britain, did not have this done and in April 1945 it came back to haunt her. Despite repairs her speed was reduced to 12 knots and she became a ferry carrier rather than a replenishment carrier.

The other point of note from the table on that link is that delivery of these ships after RN conversions continued until Jun/July 1944.

Finally, it should be noted that 10 of these US built CVE were used at various times to support Home Fleet strikes in Norwegian waters from April 1944 to the end of the European war. In addition 5 were loaned to the USN for use with the Carrier Transport Squadron Pacific for periods from Dec 1944 to the end of the war to help move aircraft around that theatre.

MAC ships
The lack of use by the RN of its escort carriers to protect the North Atlantic convoys masks the work of the MAC ships. The first of these completed in May 1943 to be followed by another 13 in 1943 and 5 more through to May 1944. As numbers built up they began to operate in pairs in 1944, so relieving the strain on the 3/4 Swordfish aircraft carried by each vessel. Only a handful of merchant ships were lost from convoys protected by these ships.

FAA Avengers
The various Avenger squadrons intended for AS operations all formed in the USA, but only 4 arrived in Britain before the end of 1943 to be joined by 832 which had been on board Victorious in the Pacific. 845 & 846 worked their passage from the USA on Chaser & Ravager in June and July 1943 respectively, providing convoy cover before undertaking more training, while 848 & 849 arrived as cargo on Trumpeter & Khedive in Oct & Nov.

846 became operational on Tracker in Jan 1944, 832 & 845 were shipped to Ceylon in Feb 1944 as an emergency response to the arrival of the IJN at Singapore, while 848 & 849 after more training joined Coastal Command in April 1944 ahead of the Normandy invasion.

The first 3 Bogues commissioned into the USN went to the Pacific. The 4th, the Bogue itself, went to the Atlantic. The first two convoy escort attempts by the Bogue in March 1943 were failures with the ship returning to home port early due to storm damage and general defects. Only on the 3rd attempt on April 25th did the Bogue finally make the full voyage to the UK with convoy HX-235. Bogue's 2nd convoy escort was ON-184 where she finally had success. Her aircraft sank U-89 on May 23, 1943 which the first time aircraft from an escort carrier sank a U-boat on their own. After that she left for the Middle Atlantic convoy route to protect the USG convoys from Norfolk, Virginia to Casablanca.

The escort carriers enjoyed by far their greatest success in USN service on the Middle Atlantic route, escorting the USG convoys and freelancing. Bogue switched to this route once Donetz gave up on the wolf packs on May 24, 1943 and withdrew from the North Atlantic. Bogue sank 2 U-boats in June. It was joined by Santee and Core in July combining for a total of 6. Core and Card got 5 more in August and Core, Card and Block Island added 6 more in October while Bogue finished the year with 2 in December, for a grand total of 21 U-boats sunk in 1943.
The USN deployed 5 Bogues in the Atlantic with the other 6 serving in the Pacific. Of the 50 Casablanca class, 5 were deployed to the Atlantic in 1944.

So many things came together at one point to increase the US kill rate which get hidden in your post:-
1. 24 May 1943 Donitz moves his U-boats from the North Atlantic to the Central Atlantic. Away from a British / Canadian area of responsibilty to a US one.
2. Admiral Ingersoll orders a change of tactics. Bogue, when she departs Argentia on 30 May 1943 is the first to benefit. No longer tied to a single convoy she is free to roam around the convoy route chasing down contacts.
3. By July the tactics change again with Core & Santee the first to perform full blown hunter-killer operations in an area of ocean. Their target is the MIlch Cow U-boats operating around the Azores who have a limited opportunity to move away from the area.
4. Generally better weather in the Central Atlantic allows more flying and with it more chance of finding a U-boat.
5. Great use is made of new weapons like the Mk24 mine or Fido, an acoustic homing torpedo

Oct 1943 saw Britain setting up a new airbase on the Azores into which 2 squadrons of Coastal Command Fortresses moved.

The RN did engage in some hunter-killer operations in the spring of 1944. See for example Vindex's operations, which amongst other things targetted weather reporting U-boats ahead of D-Day.

The sum total of U-boats sunk by the escort carriers (4 in 1943, 3 in 1944) on the North Atlantic route was meager and in no way comparable to shore based aircraft.
That was certainly a long winded post. To answer the actual question the grand total for Swordfish flying from escort carriers was 16 ½ with Avengers accounted for 33 ½.