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The RN was also far ahead of the USN in night fighting training and technology. Radar was icing on the cake of the RN's intensive night action training.To be fair, while radar itself was new, by autumn of 1942 the Royal Navy had been at war for three years, while the USN for only nine months or so. Once the USN had been at war for three years, Dec 1944 they were well in the lead on most capabilities and skillsets.
Well, if the other US commanders had been as good as Lee or even close, Iron bottom sound would have a different name. Like Japanese bottom sound.
Just how many time in row did it take for the Japanese to steam into an area, get spotted on radar, get to rifle distance of American ships and turn what should have been a crushing ambush into a catastrophic defeat for the Americans.
Not looking for "suspect". How about some actual facts.
Scoreboard stats don't tell you how it was done.
You are correct, however, since most of the Battles in the Guadalcanal area took place at 10,000 yds or under, the extra range of the Japanese torpedoes didn't make much difference to that series of
battles. Believing that the Japanese could not make a 10,000yd torpedo was just stupid. Both the US and Britain had 10,000yd (and over) torpedoes in 1916. Believing the Japanese could not equal that 24-26 years later was just stupid.
As we now know the 13,000-15,000yd torpedo wasn't even close to what the Japanese could do but to believe the Japanese were stuck at 1910-1914 levels took an extra level of stupidity.
Everybody wants the best equipment they can get. Radar was a big help but it could not give accurate enough range and bearing for firing alone for much of the war. But knowing where to look was a big advantage, so was having a pretty good idea of how many enemy ships there were and where they were even if you can's see all of them with you binoculars was a big advantage.
Taking losses is one thing, things can happen. But snatching defeat from the Jaws of Victory because of stupid decisions, repeatedly, takes the total opposite of genius.
The "Battle of Friday the 13th" might not have been a huge victory for the US but it should not have been the colossal screw up it was. Better night glasses for the US would not have improved much. About 1/2 of the US ships knew where the Japanese were minutes before either side opened fire. They may not have known exactly what they were, but they knew were they were and pretty much the course and speed. Problem was the US commander didn't know (because he was on the ship with crappy radar) and he didn't believe the reports he was getting from the other US ships.
Japanese night glasses weren't "all seeing" either or the Laffey would never have passed the Hiei at 20 feet.
1942 communications were not good enough to pass targeting information from one ship to another.
Ships had star shell, but, a big but, you need to decide which ships or which guns on a ship, are going to provide star shell illumination for the formation as whole. The guns have to loaded with star shell to begin with or the shells handy for fuse adjustment when ordered. You need standard battle orders and you need specific battle orders, Ship X which was supposed to provide star shell, is down for refueling or repair, which ship/s take over the star shell job that night? Are the captains supposed to guess? This is so every ship/crew knows their job before the enemy shows up.
In the Spring of 1941 the British not only had the battle of Cape Mattapan, they had the Bismarck chase, which was greatly assisted by radar. Yes the cruisers lost the Bismarck at times but contact was held for considerable amounts of time by radar. In 1941 the British may not have been giving all of their secrets away to the Americans. There is a difference between giving away the radar itself and giving away the tactics/techniques or in some cases, just getting the tactics/techniques distributed.
I really don't think that is true.In the Spring of 1941 the British not only had the battle of Cape Mattapan, they had the Bismarck chase, which was greatly assisted by radar. Yes the cruisers lost the Bismarck at times but contact was held for considerable amounts of time by radar. In 1941 the British may not have been giving all of their secrets away to the Americans. There is a difference between giving away the radar itself and giving away the tactics/techniques or in some cases, just getting the tactics/techniques distributed.
Good point, had the RN been able to be fully involved. It's a shame to the PTO that by autumn 1942 the RN had already taken massive losses:Yes and that is the point re what the difference would have been in 1942 actions had the RN been fully involved.
Well, Samurai swords of not, the Japanese were not flying around China with old Newport Biplanes from WW I, They were not using French Renault F 17 tanks in ChinaIt's easy to call it stupidity in hindsight. But the Japanese were still walking around with Samurai swords around the time Willis Lee was born. They had come a very, very long way. And in wartime, it is very, very difficult to know even basic facts about the enemy. At the time of most of these battles, the traits of the main Japanese fighter planes were not even well known, and certainly the high level of professionalism of the IJN was not understood by either the US or UK, though they were learning hard lessons.
You are right, good binoculars are important, but it is fact that most of the time the Allies knew something was out there, roughly where it was and in what direction it was going in well before the Japanese did during most or all of the Night battles around Guadalcanal. The Allies could have had surprise every time. They only managed it once or twice.The radar also had it's limitations. You can't necessarily tell what is a friendly or enemy ship. Or what is even real vs clutter or something else that you misinterpreted, a flock of birds whatever. Sometimes it was enough to tell them something was out there, give them early warning. A good set of binoculars was more likely to correctly identify what it was you were looking at.
Did no shipbuilder in Japan have a straight edge? What's with the undulating deck surface and scuttles?
Japanese crews were very well fed.Did no shipbuilder in Japan have a straight edge? What's with the undulating deck surface and scuttles?
They still haven't found one https://navalpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/JS-Haguro-1068x801.jpgDid no shipbuilder in Japan have a straight edge? What's with the undulating deck surface and scuttles?
While the carriers returned to service in early 1942 after repairs in the USA and Britain, the battleships took longer.This included two carriers (HMS Illustrious, Formidable) and two battleships (HMS Valiant, Queen Elizabeth) crippled in the MTO in 1941 and not reentering service until early 1942.
And of those four were clapped out Revenge class. Dark days indeed.At the end of 1941 Britain had only 9 capital ships operational to cover its world wide commitments.
It is a gross oversimplification to blame Sir James Lithgow and the closure of yards in the early 1930s for the effects on battleship building capacity. Why?And of those four were clapped out Revenge class. Dark days indeed.
It's too bad Britain ran down its shipbuilding capability between the wars. One could argue that in those days of post-WW1 naval treaties and depression economics that a rundown was inevitable, but it was not in the nation's interest for the government to facilitate the industry's decline. The UK went from a nation that in a span of ten years from 1906 to 1916 could build AND complete thirty-five dreadnought battleships and eleven battlecruisers, to one that struggled in the 1930s to build for the new war.
The Shipbuilding Plunderer of Scotland & England : Sir James Lithgow With the help of Montagu Norman, 1st Baron Norman, and the Bank of England, Sir James Lithgow was allowed to buy and close a third of the British Shipbuilding industry with disastrous future consequences.The Shipbuilding Plunderer of Scotland & England : Sir James Lithgow -
The Shipbuilding Plunderer of Scotland & England : Sir James Lithgow : The Shipbuilding Plunderer of Scotland & England : Sir James Lithgowwww.rebellionresearch.com
Very informative post overall but it's the first time I've ever heard "Nelrods".It is a gross oversimplification to blame Sir James Lithgow and the closure of yards in the early 1930s for the effects on battleship building capacity. Why?.....
The Nelson & Rodney with 16" guns that Britain was allowed to build in the mid-1920s under the WNT.Very informative post overall but it's the first time I've ever heard "Nelrods".
I wonder if the exodus of talent from lack of orders led to the NelRods having the worst 16" guns. Someone thought high velocity, lightweight shells would do the trick.The Nelson & Rodney with 16" guns that Britain was allowed to build in the mid-1920s under the WNT.
These guns were designed in 1922 for the planned but never built G3 Battle Cruisers. This was before the WNT and the restrictions on capital ship construction. Navweaps gives the following explanation:-I wonder if the exodus of talent from lack of orders led to the NelRods having the worst 16" guns. Someone thought high velocity, lightweight shells would do the trick.