SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
That sounds to me like the Reggia Aeronautica was a more efficient torpedo attacker than other nations services, at least up to 1944. I am assuming that the RA was attacking moving targets.
Rn vs IJN
- Thread starter Shortround6
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Not always.
The first mission on 15 Aug 1940 was to attack shipping in bad weather, at night in Alexandria against searchlights and heavy AA from ships and shore batteries. 5 aircraft sent, 2 aircraft & 1 crew lost (the second aircraft crash landed behind Italian lines and may have been recovered) only 2 torpedoes dropped, no hits. Only on the third mission on 27th Aug were targets attacked at sea. The attack on Kent, while at sea was in the dark. The attack on Liverpool at sea on 14 Oct was undertaken beneath cloud and with the cruiser silhouetted against the moon. Glasgow was hit in Souda Bay, Crete while anchored behind the torpedo nets on 3 Dec. While the attack was in daylight, the two attackers were able to make their approach above cloud at about 3,300ft.
Most of the early 1940/41 operations were being flown by formations of just two TB with tactics being varied. Night/day/good/bad weather. Sometimes in conjunction with other SM.79 bombing the same targets and dividing the AA fire. Low level approches from a distance seem to have been the norm negating much of the advantage of early RN radar sets.
With such a small data set in 1940 I think it is difficult to draw any conclusion about their efficacy. But clearly the tactics they chose were to their advantage.
Admiral Beez
Major
All good points you've made before. In this instance I'm bemoaning an earlier interwar appreciation for RAF Coastal Command and RAF torpedo strike in general. Yes, it's give and take, so something will have to go elsewhere, but ideally you don't want to enter WW2 with the Vilderbeest as your torpedo bomber.
Last edited:
In retrospect, even 10% of the airframes dedicated to Bomber Command instead being diverted to Coastal Command would have worked wonders..
- Thread starter
- #1,445
Shortround6
Major General
Even 4 squadrons of Blenheims would have been a major improvement and pushed out air cover by around 200 miles for anti-sub work.
The Anson had two problems, the pitiful war load and the endurance of about 4 hours. If you want a patrol endurance/duration of 2 hours or more on "station" your operational range is rather limited.
Both the Germans and the British were operating using low numbers and not much sophistication in 1939 and early 1940.
The Type II coastal U-boats that made up about 1/2 of the German fleet had 3 torpedo tubes and 2 spare torpedoes. They also had limited range on the surface and limited battery capacity.
Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
- 1,637
- Dec 6, 2006
It didn't have the unreliable magnetic pistol used on the Marks 14 and 15. It was also slower which meant the contact pistol was less likely not to detonate.
Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
- 1,637
- Dec 6, 2006
The aircraft lost fruitless bombing French ports in 1942 could have been far better used in convoy escort.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
I believe you were the one who corrected me on that score and are the unmentioned "other poster". Thanks.
Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
- 1,637
- Dec 6, 2006
I like the name Other Poster maybe I should change to it.
Admiral Beez
Major
Given the situation in the Atlantic and MTO by end of 1940, is there anything Britain could have reasonably have done throughout 1941 to better prepare for the coming war with Japan?
The British Govt & Chiefs of Staff get a lot of criticism but they had very limited wriggle room with Britain fighting alone at the end of 1940 and fast running out of money. Resources had to be prioritised to those theatres where fighting was actually going on. Firstly a quick look at what Britain faced around the world from early 1941.
The Battle of the Atlantic was just a constant drain in this period.
The Luftwaffe Blitz on Britain went on until May 1941. The threat of the Luftwaffe switching to day raids had not gone away. The threat only scaled back significantly when the Luftwaffe moved east for Barbarossa.
The CoS only began to feel comfortable that the threat of invasion in 1941 had passed around Sept 1941 (the weather would be against the Germans after that), 3 months after Barbarossa.
After Barbarossa, the speed of the German advance generated a real feeling that a Soviet collapse could occur. If that happened a potential invasion would be back on the table for 1942. So keeping the USSR in the war became a priority. So the Russian convoys started in August 1941 to supply the material to keep them in the war (tanks, Hurricane fighters included) but at the same time tying down a chunk of the RN. By the time the various Lend Lease agreements had been negotiated & agreed, the USA was unable to supply virtually anything to the USSR in 1941.
That threat of a Soviet collapse also impacted the Middle East via a potential need to move into southern USSR to deny / destroy the Caucasian oilfields to deny them to Germany. And the threat of Turkey joining on the Axis side also existed. Those needs / threats meant transfer of troops & aircraft from Britain to the Middle East not North Africa.
There is a tendency to lump everything from Gibraltar to the Persian Gulf into the term "Middle East" or "MTO". But it really needs to be broken down into the war in the North African desert & Greece / Crete on the one hand and what was going on elsewhere in Palestine, Syria, Iraq & Persia / Iran on the other. 1 April 1941 saw a coup d'etat in Iraq which required British intervention to protect its interests in the oilfields there. Limited Luftwaffe support for the Iraqis came via Syria, necessitating invasions of Syria / Lebanon in June & July to eliminate that threat. Much of the effort was taken up by forces deployed from India. There was then the brief Anglo-Soviet invasion of Persia / Iran in late Aug to protect the southern supply line to the USSR and the oilfields and most importantly the large refinery at Abadan at the northern end of the Persian Gulf, again something which required resources & tied men down.
In the Western Desert of Egypt the war with Rommel was see sawing back and forth but started unexpectedly early.
Then there was Greece. A political decision to back the only other country fighting the Axis in early 1941 and also to show the USA that Britain was still in the fight. It would also have provided potential bases to bomb the Romanian oilfields. Initially reluctant to seek help, the Greeks finally agreed in March. Then, with Rommel not expected to attack for some time, troops and aircraft were withdrawn from the Desert & elsewhere in the Middle East and sent to Greece in April, just as both Greece & Yugoslavia were invaded. Then retreat via Crete in a disasterous campaign that lasted until the end of May 1941.
The arrival of Luftflotte X on Sicily in Jan 1941 & then later in Greece changed the whole balance of the war in the air and at sea and cost the RN dearly in ships both lost and damaged in the first half of 1941.
Away from the U-boat threat, German raiders were being dispatched to pick off merchant shipping around the world, necessitating an RN presence in the South Atlantic & Indian Ocean to patrol the shipping lanes. Hundreds of thousands of men were being moved around the world in troop convoys that had to be protected (tying down old capital ships and cruisers in the process). S & G had broken out into the Atlantic in Jan-Mar 1941 in Operation Berlin and then holed up in the Biscay ports so tying down RAF & RN resources. Bismarck & Prinz Eugen followed in May with well known results. The threat from the last named three ships didn't disappear until the Channel Dash in Feb 1942 saw them return to Germany.
There was some bright news however. Lend Lease started in March 1941 allowing ships to be repaired in the USA safe from bomb attack, and supplies to continue flowing without immediate payment. The USN agreed to shoulder part of the Atlantic convoy escort burden, even though it wasn't at war with Germany.
It also needs to be borne in mind the length of time it actually took to prepare & move assets from Britain to the Middle & Far East. From Britain everything had to go via the Cape of Good Hope and South Africa. Once a decision was taken to send a division it had to be prepared, overseas leave given and moved to a port of embarkation for loading. Shipping had to be found and allocated by the MOWT, a process that generally took two months or so ahead of the expected departure date. When a convoy sailed it generally took 6-8 weeks to arrive in the Middle East or Far East. The main port of arrival for the Far East was Bombay on the west coast of India. That often had to be followed by a long train trip across the country.
So once a decision is taken to reinforce Malaya it would take 3-4 months before those reinforcements arrive, unless they could be obtained from India or Australia. Once they arrive Major Stewart who trained the 2nd Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders believed it took them 6 months to acclimitise to the jungle (not much jungle where most of the troops in Malaya came from). The Argylls were reckoned to be one of the best trained jungle units in Malaya in Dec 1941, but they had been there for 2 years and had been trained hard in the jungle.
And much changed during 1941 to increase the threat level. While Japan had occupied Northern FIC in Sept 1940, it wasn't until the end of July 1941 that the occupied the southern half and so bringing their air forces within bombing range of Singapore. This seems to have been largely ignored despite there being intelligence available on Japanese aircraft performance. But given the the timescale for a reinforcement noted above, it is unlikely that, even had a decision been taken to reinforce and the units found, those reinforcements would have arrived in time.
So lets look at what was sent in 1941.
The main infantry units were the 9th (2 brigades only) & 11th Indian Divisions and the 8th Australian Div along with the Singapore Fortress Division & a reserve in the !2th Infantry Brigade. The latter two units had been in theatre since 1939 AFAICT. While the two Indian divisions had been formed in Sept 1940, some of their constituent Brigades were older and some younger. Most seem to have arrived in Malaya in Spring 1941 but one Brigade didn't arrive until Sept. The 8th Aus had formed in July 1940 with the intention that it should go to North Africa. Again it was subject to reorganisation in 1940 before it sent 1 brigade to Malaya in Feb with the second arriving in Aug (the third remained in Australia).
Undoubtedly more could have been done to train at least the earlier arrivals amongst these troops in jungle warfare.
As for the RAF, they had ordered 170 Brewster Buffalo Mk.I in early 1940 specifically for this theatre. But they only began to arrive at Singapore in Spring 1941. 5 new squadrons were equipped to operate them between March 1941 & Oct 1941 (67, 243, 21 RAAF, 43 RAAF & 488 RNZAF). Each was built around a small nucleus of experienced personnel in squadron & flight leaders, with the rest direct from OTUs in Britain, Australia & New Zealand. That was no different to what was happening with the rest of the squadrons being formed at home in the period as the RAF rapidly expanded. Beauforts were on order for the two Vildebeest TB squadrons from the Australian production line but production there had been delayed. It had been planned to send new Baltimores to the Far East but the decision was taken to route them to the Middle East instead. The RAAF had already supplied 2 Hudson squadrons in 1940 but had nothing else to offer (3 squadron in the process of converting to type in Dec 1941 & 3 others spread from Timor to Rabaul).
It was only from Spring 1941 that various US aircraft types began to enter service with squadrons in the Middle East. Tomahawks, Marylands & Bostons. Kittyhawks & Baltimores were only arriving at the end of the year. The RAF there was still terribly reliant on Hurricanes & Blenheims.
As for the RN, it was doing its best to create a fleet to deter the Japanese. With the US shouldering more of he burden in the Atlantic, the old R class battleships were freed up to refit and be sent out, working their passage en route as WS convoy escorts. Repulse had made the same journey starting at the end of Aug. A plan had been formulated to add Nelson, Rodney, Warspite & Ark Royal around April 1942 and have the Med Fleet at Alexandria based around QE, Valiant, Illustrious & Formidable in the same time period & able to transit the Suez Canal if required in the IO. Sending PoW and having it join Repulse to form Force Z was a decision only taken in late Oct.
But so much went wrong with that plan. Barham & Ark were sunk in Nov. Nelson was torpedoed in Sept. QE & Valiant put out of action in Dec on top of the loss of PoW & Repulse.
Against that background it is very difficult to see what could have been done to help Malaya without a major change of strategy and a different political outlook.
Edit:- The campaign I forgot to mention was that in East Africa against the Italians. It rumbled on from June 1940 until the end of Nov 1941 but surviving Italian troops carried on a guerrilla campaign until Oct 1943 when news of the Italian surrender finally filtered through to them.
Last edited:
ThomasP
Senior Master Sergeant
Design and construct a secure water supply for Singapore, make sure there were enough supplies for an extended siege, and improve the hard defenses.
While not a war winner, as far as I and my war-gaming friends can determine, this would have made the biggest single difference in the original timeline - and it was relatively cheap and easily doable. It could have bought a significant amount of time, but for whatever reason this was not done in the time available.
Otherwise, build and deploy more long range submarines and their support units.
Or both of the above.
Singapore has always had a water problem due to its expansion as a trading centre. It was only in 2016 that the Govt claimed it was self sufficient in water supply.
Water supply and sanitation in Singapore - Wikipedia
But lets start with the population:-
1840 - 35.5k
1900 - 220k
1920 - 400k
1931 - 558-560k per census
1939 - 767k per British estimate
1943 - 900k per Japanese estimate
1947 - 940k
1955 - 1.35m
1973 - 2.1m
1939-1941 saw a large influx of British & Commonwealth military personnel (see my previous post about pre-war reinforcements plus more in Dec/Jan 1942. c85k were captured in Singapore alone), and then, with the Japanese invasion of Malaya. a large influx of refugees.
With the need to service that vast increase in population it is understandable that the Govt took the decision to expand the water supply by the quickest & what I would presume to be, the most cost efficient route, doing the initial water deal with Johore in 1927 and doubling the capacity in 1939. I also fear that you underestimate the length of time and the complexity to build new dams, reservoirs and other infrastructure to make the island self sufficient in its water supply. It wasn't going to be done in the space of 1 year, let alone 2 or 3.
When it comes to the defence of Malaya & Singapore, the problem is that very few foresaw a Japanese invasion of Malaya interwar, let alone how speedy the whole exercise would turn out to be. More interestingly, the Japanese did not even begin to carry out any planning for an invasion of Malaya & Singapore until Aug 1940, and then only at a slow rate such that their plans were only completed in Oct 1941. In 1940 they didn't even have a detailed map of the Singapore area. When Yamashita (who commanded the Japanese troops in Malaya in 1941/42) visited Germany & discussed capturing Singapore, they insisted it would take 18 months and 5 divisions. Instead it took just over 2 months and many fewer troops.
The next problem is where do you place any defences and what type should they be? The decision was made to tackle an invasion in the north. But the problem as highlighted by Maj Stewart was that fixed defences in jungle terrain don't work very well because of the reduced visibility due the copious foliage. Agreed that there was a reluctance on the part of the civil authorities to do very much, even in the way of civilian defence works, which later resulted in panic when the bombs started falling.
The question of submarines is an interesting one because so many had been deployed at Hong Kong & Singapore pre-war only to be withdrawn between Sept 1939 & June 1940 as there was a greater need elsewhere.
In an earlier post I highlighted that submarines were controlled by the Treaty system throughout the interwar period. Britain was only allowed 52,700 standard tons of subs between 1930 & 1936 with a 2,000 ton limit it per vessel and minimum replacement period of 13 years. So there was always a balance to be struck between size & numbers. After 1936 the overal tonnage limit disappeared but the other factors remained. And there were competing demands on the money supply with other types of vessel. So the 1,800 ton O/P/R classes of the 1927-31 period were destined to be replaced by the 1,300 ton T class designed in 1934. The prototype was ordered in the 1935 Programme with a steady drumbeat of 3-7 pa after that. Those 15 completed between the end of 1938 & Jan 1941 with more being ordered through to the 1942 Programme.
Once war broke out the emphasis switched initially to the mass produced U class for operations in more restricted waters. But losses were such that in plain numbers the RN sub fleet did not increase in size much, if at all, between 1939 & 1942 (I posted the figures on this site somewhere in the past).
In the run up to WW2 Britain laid down the sub depot ships Maidstone, Forth (both completed 1938/39) & Adamant (completed 1942) between 1936 & 1939. But again once war broke out there were greater priorities. It was 1942 before 2 more large merchantmen were purchased & converted to depot ships in part as recogition of what would be needed in the Far East.
- Thread starter
- #1,454
Shortround6
Major General
In retrospect the keeping of 12-15 subs at Singapore may have been both easiest and most effective. Easy is relative, nothing was easy at the time. It also depends on proper deployment and training/tactics. Dutch did comparatively well with their 15 (?) boats and they were short of crews, over the 1/2 the boats were very old and small and they were trying to get several of them back into service from reserve status. The Number 15 is rather generous.
Americans with their crappy torpedoes and other problems are not a good indication of what the RN subs could achieve.
Japanese logistics, in retrospect, were crap. A few more sunken supply ships and a few more destroyed fuel/food depots in the retreats might have seen the Japanese surrendering begging for food had the siege lasted a few more weeks.
Effects in the Med war of 12-15 few boats? I don't know, I have read that the big boats were more vulnerable. Doesn't mean they were ineffective or didn't do good work.
The whole Greek campaign seems to have been a disaster. For all of it's political good will, swaying the Americans, it was a disproportionate drain on British resources compared the Axis at the time.
Americans with their crappy torpedoes and other problems are not a good indication of what the RN subs could achieve.
Japanese logistics, in retrospect, were crap. A few more sunken supply ships and a few more destroyed fuel/food depots in the retreats might have seen the Japanese surrendering begging for food had the siege lasted a few more weeks.
Effects in the Med war of 12-15 few boats? I don't know, I have read that the big boats were more vulnerable. Doesn't mean they were ineffective or didn't do good work.
The whole Greek campaign seems to have been a disaster. For all of it's political good will, swaying the Americans, it was a disproportionate drain on British resources compared the Axis at the time.
Admiral Beez
Major
I think the lack of pre-war situational awareness from late November onwards was notable. RAF Malaya had a total of 158 operational aircraft (60xBuffalo, 47xBlenheim, 24xHudson, 24×Vildebeest and 3×PBY) in thirteen squadrons. This to cover a territory larger than Great Britain, where in 1941 the RAF had hundreds of squadrons. When your force is small like RAF Malaya, instead of spreading out your units in penny packets across the entire territory, you must rely on intel on your enemy's intentions and then concentrate your forces to hit their spread out force. If Percival cannot gather intel on Japan's forces and likely intentions he's already lost. On the other hand, imagine that first landing attempt if it's attacked by over seventy bombers.
Of course this is all moot if Britain does not issue ROEs where British forces can begin combat ops BEFORE the Japanese land on Malay soil. The US fired the first shots on Japan, hours before the Pearl Harbour strike, when the destroyer USS Ward, conducting a precautionary patrol off the entrance to Pearl Harbor encountered an IJN submarine, attacked and sank it, thus firing the first shots of the Pacific War. Britain could have done the same when Japan's troopships arrived in Malay waters.
First, Operation Matador and Britain's seizure of Singora and Patani in Thailand should have been authorized and executed in November. Next, spend November and early December watching the Japanese movements in FIC (from our submarines, PBYs and convert ops/spies). Also, with good intel of Japanese intentions, Force Z should not remain at Singapore, but upon arriving on Dec 2nd would refuel and then immediately position itself up the Malay coast. Once the Japanese troop ships are heading for Malaya, the concentrated RAF and RN force strikes.
Naturally nothing happens in a vacuum, so if the British intentions are discovered the Japanese will alter their plans, especially if their spies report that the RAF bases are empty. But if the ROE remains that British combat ops cannot begin until the Japanese have landed on Malaya, then the campaign is already lost.
This is where even a half squadron of three RN submarines loitering off the FIC coast might have helped gather the intel on troop ships, etc.
Of course this is all moot if Britain does not issue ROEs where British forces can begin combat ops BEFORE the Japanese land on Malay soil. The US fired the first shots on Japan, hours before the Pearl Harbour strike, when the destroyer USS Ward, conducting a precautionary patrol off the entrance to Pearl Harbor encountered an IJN submarine, attacked and sank it, thus firing the first shots of the Pacific War. Britain could have done the same when Japan's troopships arrived in Malay waters.
First, Operation Matador and Britain's seizure of Singora and Patani in Thailand should have been authorized and executed in November. Next, spend November and early December watching the Japanese movements in FIC (from our submarines, PBYs and convert ops/spies). Also, with good intel of Japanese intentions, Force Z should not remain at Singapore, but upon arriving on Dec 2nd would refuel and then immediately position itself up the Malay coast. Once the Japanese troop ships are heading for Malaya, the concentrated RAF and RN force strikes.
Naturally nothing happens in a vacuum, so if the British intentions are discovered the Japanese will alter their plans, especially if their spies report that the RAF bases are empty. But if the ROE remains that British combat ops cannot begin until the Japanese have landed on Malaya, then the campaign is already lost.
Last edited:
Admiral Beez
Major
I suppose there were few surface actions between the RN and IJN to test each other. There are only two I can think of, one at the early stages of the Pacific War, the other at the end:
Java Sea, Feb 1942, with the cruiser HMS Exeter and three destroyers (HMS Electra, Encounter and Jupiter).
Malacca Strait, May 1945 with five destroyers (HMS Saumarez, Verulam, Venus, Vigilant, and Virago).
The biggest potential surface disaster of the entire war for the RN could have occurred off Malaya in Dec 1941, with the IJN's Malaya Covering force consisting of the battlecruisers Kongo and Haruna, heavy cruisers Atago, Maya and Takao plus 12 destroyers taking on Force Z: Prince of Wales, Repulse and 4 destroyers. You can see how close the two fleets got below.
www.forces.net
Can you imagine first Hood is lost in a gunfight, then PoW and Repulse.
Java Sea, Feb 1942, with the cruiser HMS Exeter and three destroyers (HMS Electra, Encounter and Jupiter).
Malacca Strait, May 1945 with five destroyers (HMS Saumarez, Verulam, Venus, Vigilant, and Virago).
The biggest potential surface disaster of the entire war for the RN could have occurred off Malaya in Dec 1941, with the IJN's Malaya Covering force consisting of the battlecruisers Kongo and Haruna, heavy cruisers Atago, Maya and Takao plus 12 destroyers taking on Force Z: Prince of Wales, Repulse and 4 destroyers. You can see how close the two fleets got below.
A World Turned Upside Down – British Defeat In Malaya And Singapore
A look at the colossal defeat suffered by Britain during the Second World War at the hands of the Japanese.
Can you imagine first Hood is lost in a gunfight, then PoW and Repulse.
Last edited:
Other, mostly very minor, surface actions that come to mind:-
Dec 1941 at Hong Kong 6 MTB attacked Japanese vessels carrying troops to Hong Kong Island. The old DD Thracian was also involved in similar actions there before being scuttled.
26/27 Jan 1942 Action off Endau on East coast of Malaya. Old DD Thanet & Vampire attacked a Japanese landing forces at night
en.m.wikipedia.org
11 Nov 1942 tanker MV Ondina and her escort HMIS Bengal (Bathurst class corvette) v 2 Japanese AMC. Result 1 AMC blew up.
en.m.wikipedia.org
July 1943, the New Zealand manned cruiser Leander was operating with US ships in the Solomon's and was involved in several actions. On 15 July she took a Long Lance torpedo in her boiler room that put her out of action for the rest of the war. (Earlier her sister Achilles had been bombed in sane area and was out of action for a year).
en.m.wikipedia.org
12 June 1945, the Tribal DD Tartar, Nubian & Eskimo sank the Kuroshima Maru No.2 and sub-chaser No 57 north of Sabang Island off Sumatra. This was just one of a number of anti-shipping sweeps undertaken by the RN in summer 1945 to intercept vessels engaged in the withdrawal of troops from the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, the most famous resulting in thinking of Haguro.
Dec 1941 at Hong Kong 6 MTB attacked Japanese vessels carrying troops to Hong Kong Island. The old DD Thracian was also involved in similar actions there before being scuttled.
26/27 Jan 1942 Action off Endau on East coast of Malaya. Old DD Thanet & Vampire attacked a Japanese landing forces at night
Battle off Endau - Wikipedia
11 Nov 1942 tanker MV Ondina and her escort HMIS Bengal (Bathurst class corvette) v 2 Japanese AMC. Result 1 AMC blew up.
MV Ondina - Wikipedia
July 1943, the New Zealand manned cruiser Leander was operating with US ships in the Solomon's and was involved in several actions. On 15 July she took a Long Lance torpedo in her boiler room that put her out of action for the rest of the war. (Earlier her sister Achilles had been bombed in sane area and was out of action for a year).
HMNZS Leander - Wikipedia
12 June 1945, the Tribal DD Tartar, Nubian & Eskimo sank the Kuroshima Maru No.2 and sub-chaser No 57 north of Sabang Island off Sumatra. This was just one of a number of anti-shipping sweeps undertaken by the RN in summer 1945 to intercept vessels engaged in the withdrawal of troops from the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, the most famous resulting in thinking of Haguro.
Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
- 1,637
- Dec 6, 2006
Not true. The only torpedo hits obtained by a Japanese light cruisers were at Savo Island when Tenryu hit Quincy with 2, but these were old fashioned wet heater 21" torpedoes NOT type 93. The Yubari hit Vincennes with one 24" torpedo but some doubt that Yubari was converted to use type 93s so that may have also have been a wet heater type. Note that this was launched at a range of 2400yds against a ship that had already been pounded into a flaming wreck so speed was irrelevant.
Bill announced he was quitting the forum back at the beginning of April and hasn't been seen since.
Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
- 1,637
- Dec 6, 2006
Can't say I'll miss him. I used to find his posts interesting but his habit of escalating exchanges into name calling became tedious and I stopped reading most of his posts. I was never personally offended, in fact the one time I recall him mocking me was actually funny. On the other hand I found some of what he said to others to be appalling. If you think someone is an idiot don't call him that, prove it. As far as I'm concerned if someone insults me I've won the argument.
