Thumpalumpacus
Colonel
No; they had to fly what they had and clearly had need for CAP. That's no to say the Firefly was ideal in the role, but it at least had the endurance that if the Brits set things up right it could be useful.
Rn vs IJN
- Thread starter Shortround6
- Start date
No; they had to fly what they had and clearly had need for CAP. That's no to say the Firefly was ideal in the role, but it at least had the endurance that if the Brits set things up right it could be useful.
The Firefly could carry two wing mounted 1,000lb bombs, had four 20mm cannon, and could also carry eight 60lb rockets.
It was certainly capable of causing damage to shipping or enemy bomber types.
Admiral Beez
Major
In reality by 1944, much of the IJN's best pilots, mechanics, fitters, and experienced seamen have been lost. According to Wikipedia, Taihō was fitted with both Type 21 and Type 13 radars, with max effective ranges of 80 and 54 nmi. Shōkaku had a single Type 21 radar. Accordingly to this source, the Japanese Navy's radar sets were unreliable, with faulty vacuum tubes. And then there's the shoddy radios in the IJN's aircraft, presumably causing trouble with fighter direction. Clearly, Japanese electronics had come a long way to go before they reached their postwar rock solid quality.
But for the sake of this comparison, we'll give the IJN the best possible, so the best vacuum tubes and radar techs are aboard. I do not know if the IJN's carriers had fighter director offices (FDO) or CIC where info from the radar operators is used to assign fighter assets, but I assume the radar data was useful. What about the rubbish Type 96 radio in the A6M? Was there a better radio available in 1944 that we could give to our dream team IJN CBG?
How was British radar and aircraft radios at this time? What about AA? IIRC, Japan's AA guns were poor, but without US proximity fuses, are the British any better?
- Thread starter
- #1,484
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
This is easy.
Japanese light AA needed to climb 6 rungs up the ladder to even get to poor.
HMS Indefatigable had 5 octuple pom poms and one quad, ALL were power operated (traverse and elevation) and were director controlled and the directors had radar.
The British carriers also were carrying 19 twin and 17 single 20mm guns as built. When sent to the Pacific they got some single 40mm Bofors guns to replace some of the 20mm guns.
As far as heavy AA goes, the British had 16 4.5in guns compared to 16 5in guns but the British guns fired faster after the first few minutes, they traversed faster and elevated faster.
And the directors had their own radar sets.
British were a lot better in 1944.
Admiral Beez
Major
I'm trying to remove the benefits of US lend lease and tech. By 1943 the best aircraft in the FAA were US as well. But I'm considering how a British CBG stands on its own.
The proximity fuse system was shared tech anyway. The radar in use by the RN, including in aircraft, was clearly
superior to IJN radar.
The only known fight between the Zero and Seafire resulted in a clear superiority to the Seafire as well.
Japanese dive bombers never carried a bomb capable of getting through the armoured carriers decks either.
The torpedo bombers were basically a case of which one could get through to launch.
superior to IJN radar.
The only known fight between the Zero and Seafire resulted in a clear superiority to the Seafire as well.
Japanese dive bombers never carried a bomb capable of getting through the armoured carriers decks either.
The torpedo bombers were basically a case of which one could get through to launch.
Just my 2c : was the training level of the IJN airmen of 1943 on par with those of 1945 ?
On the other end in 1945 the attacks would include Kamikaze raids, and there RN carriers armored decks reveal a clear superiority.
Admiral Beez
Major
Fair enough.
While the best trained IJN airmen are likely dead by now, I think there's a significant difference in the IJN between this engagement in spring 1944 and those in 1945.
Last edited:
302nd Kokutia was the unit which bounced the FAA formation. 302nd was one of few elite units left
and were usually tasked with going after B-29 formations (they had Raidens as well).
The 302nd Kokutia pilots were experienced so the performance of the two aircraft isn't down to pilot
experience only.
and were usually tasked with going after B-29 formations (they had Raidens as well).
The 302nd Kokutia pilots were experienced so the performance of the two aircraft isn't down to pilot
experience only.
While the Japanese had air warning radar in WW2:-
"A post-war US evaluation placed naval radar at the end of the war about where the United States had been early in 1942. There was nothing remotely comparable to a CIC [AIO in RN parlance] and no radar plot (even though, like the Royal Navy and the US Navy, the Japanese had employed tactical plotting and indeed had better plotting facilities than other navies). There was no attempt at shipboard fighter direction using radar (late in the war there was land-based fighter direction), no anti-jam facilities on any radar, no B-scan or PPI displays (except for an experimental airborne set), no repeaters and no effective form of IFF.
However, the Japanese were well aware of US and other Allied radar. They knew and catalogued radar characteristics and their aircraft exploited weaknesses in Allied radars. For example, they chose the right altitudes, they used land shadows whenever they could and they also knew at what ranges they would be detected. A post-war evaluation placed Japanese countermeasures at about the stage the United States had reached in 1942, but added that the Imperial Navy made the most effective use of Window (chaff). There was no confirmed wartime use of a jammer (at the end of the war the navy had one jammer, FD-7, operating at 140 to 160 MHz). The Imperial Army had the lead in developing such equipment. Three types of intercept receivers were operational, one of which was intended for all major ships and another (W-27) for all large naval aircraft.
Japanese exploitation of increasing understanding of US radar-based tactics helped drive the development of US Navy fighter direction and tactics."
Friedman "Fighters over the Fleet. Naval Air Defence from Biplanes to the Cold War" Chapter 4 The Second World War: Fighters Under Radar Control.
Taiho had 2 x Type 21 air search radars and a single Type 13 air search set. She had no Type 22 surface search radar.
Taiho also had a metre wave intercept receiver (E-27) capable of detecting radar transmissions of wavelengths 0.75-4m at ranges up to 300km. There was also a centimetre wave intercept receiver fitted.
From Ahlberg & Lengerer "Taiho Vol. 2"
And on Japanese use of Window / chaff (from Pacific War online
"Both sides employed chaff, bundles of aluminum foil strips dropped from aircraft to produce false blips on the enemy's radar screens. The British called their version Window, while the Japanese knew it as deceiving paper (giman-shi). The Japanese version was invented by a Navy lieutenant commander, Sudo Hajime, and first used with some success to confuse Allied gunlaying radars in the Solomons in 1943. The Japanese successfully decoyed a few fighters away from the American carrier force at the Battle of the Philippine Sea, using chaff dropped from a lone Judy, but this had little effect on the outcome of the battle. The Japanese generally considered aluminum too scarce a resource for the production of large quantities of chaff, but it was used in small quantities throughout the remainder of the war and in larger quantities during the kamikaze raids at Okinawa. The Japanese generally dropped the chaff thirty miles from the target, and it was successful at blocking metric radar but not centimetric radar. It was also used with some success to confuse radar-controlled antiaircraft fire."
"A post-war US evaluation placed naval radar at the end of the war about where the United States had been early in 1942. There was nothing remotely comparable to a CIC [AIO in RN parlance] and no radar plot (even though, like the Royal Navy and the US Navy, the Japanese had employed tactical plotting and indeed had better plotting facilities than other navies). There was no attempt at shipboard fighter direction using radar (late in the war there was land-based fighter direction), no anti-jam facilities on any radar, no B-scan or PPI displays (except for an experimental airborne set), no repeaters and no effective form of IFF.
However, the Japanese were well aware of US and other Allied radar. They knew and catalogued radar characteristics and their aircraft exploited weaknesses in Allied radars. For example, they chose the right altitudes, they used land shadows whenever they could and they also knew at what ranges they would be detected. A post-war evaluation placed Japanese countermeasures at about the stage the United States had reached in 1942, but added that the Imperial Navy made the most effective use of Window (chaff). There was no confirmed wartime use of a jammer (at the end of the war the navy had one jammer, FD-7, operating at 140 to 160 MHz). The Imperial Army had the lead in developing such equipment. Three types of intercept receivers were operational, one of which was intended for all major ships and another (W-27) for all large naval aircraft.
Japanese exploitation of increasing understanding of US radar-based tactics helped drive the development of US Navy fighter direction and tactics."
Friedman "Fighters over the Fleet. Naval Air Defence from Biplanes to the Cold War" Chapter 4 The Second World War: Fighters Under Radar Control.
Taiho had 2 x Type 21 air search radars and a single Type 13 air search set. She had no Type 22 surface search radar.
Taiho also had a metre wave intercept receiver (E-27) capable of detecting radar transmissions of wavelengths 0.75-4m at ranges up to 300km. There was also a centimetre wave intercept receiver fitted.
From Ahlberg & Lengerer "Taiho Vol. 2"
And on Japanese use of Window / chaff (from Pacific War online
"Both sides employed chaff, bundles of aluminum foil strips dropped from aircraft to produce false blips on the enemy's radar screens. The British called their version Window, while the Japanese knew it as deceiving paper (giman-shi). The Japanese version was invented by a Navy lieutenant commander, Sudo Hajime, and first used with some success to confuse Allied gunlaying radars in the Solomons in 1943. The Japanese successfully decoyed a few fighters away from the American carrier force at the Battle of the Philippine Sea, using chaff dropped from a lone Judy, but this had little effect on the outcome of the battle. The Japanese generally considered aluminum too scarce a resource for the production of large quantities of chaff, but it was used in small quantities throughout the remainder of the war and in larger quantities during the kamikaze raids at Okinawa. The Japanese generally dropped the chaff thirty miles from the target, and it was successful at blocking metric radar but not centimetric radar. It was also used with some success to confuse radar-controlled antiaircraft fire."
Admiral Beez
Major
For a nation and navy that invested so much of their time, treasure and talent into developing a world class aircraft carrier force, Japan seemed to miss so many fundamentals. No early radar program, no concept of CIC/AIO nor the reliable radios to support it.
US strategy and tactics for Midway if IJN has radar, CIC and radios in the Zeros
From my earlier post.... Imagine Midway with working radar connected to experienced CIC, and working/shielded radios in the Zeros. Nagumo's dilemma is no more. All Zeros can be recalled, refueled and rearmed and pilots rested between attacks. Kate and Val strikes can be orderly launched and...
ww2aircraft.net
Considering they were speedrunning the whole industrialization thing after the Meiji restoration, maybe it's not that surprising they had large gaps here and there?
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
I never knew the Japanese employed chaff. Heck, I think this is the first time I read chaff was used in the PTO.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
That's because the IJN weren't besties with the RN.For a nation and navy that invested so much of their time, treasure and talent into developing a world class aircraft carrier force, Japan seemed to miss so many fundamentals. No early radar program, no concept of CIC/AIO nor the reliable radios to support it.
US strategy and tactics for Midway if IJN has radar, CIC and radios in the Zeros
From my earlier post.... Imagine Midway with working radar connected to experienced CIC, and working/shielded radios in the Zeros. Nagumo's dilemma is no more. All Zeros can be recalled, refueled and rearmed and pilots rested between attacks. Kate and Val strikes can be orderly launched and...
Admiral Beez
Major
But they were with the Germans. Now, AIUI the Kreigsmarine focused on surface fire control radar rather than air search, but there still must have been opportunities for early learning.
And who outside of the USA makes better radio communications equipment in the late 1930s than the Germans?
Luftwaffe radio equipment of World War II - Wikipedia
Last edited:
Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
- 1,776
- Dec 6, 2006
Actually the British made better radios than the Americans at least as far as aircraft were concerned. I was flabbergasted to discover that the USN was using still using obsolete HF radios at Midway when the RAF had started using the far superior VHF radios 2 years before. USAAF aircraft were arriving in Europe in 1942 with obsolete HF set which were replaced by British built VHF radios. The US VHF radio that they belatedly produced was a failure and the US pragmatically decided to produce the British radio. They did improve it by making it smaller.But they were with the Germans. Now, AIUI the Kreigsmarine focused on surface fire control radar rather than air search, but there still must have been opportunities for early learning.
And who outside of the USA makes better radio communications equipment in the late 1930s than the Germans?
Luftwaffe radio equipment of World War II - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
The sordid story of US aircraft radios is presented here:
Scroll down to the heading "Signal Corps Provides VHF Command Radio for Army Airplanes"
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
I missed the parts about the Reich's technical prowess integrating flight ops, radar plotting, combat information control centers and fighter direction with their carrier task forces.But they were with the Germans. Now, AIUI the Kreigsmarine focused on surface fire control radar rather than air search, but there still must have been opportunities for early learning.
And who outside of the USA makes better radio communications equipment in the late 1930s than the Germans?
Luftwaffe radio equipment of World War II - Wikipedia
Admiral Beez
Major
Yes you did, lol. Japan will have to do some thinking of their own on how to transfer German tech.
Reluctant Poster
Tech Sergeant
- 1,776
- Dec 6, 2006
The USN didn't have CICs until the British showed them what they needed to do. All through 1942 they didn't have CICs, only crowded radar plotting rooms. See the following for a history of the USN CIC :For a nation and navy that invested so much of their time, treasure and talent into developing a world class aircraft carrier force, Japan seemed to miss so many fundamentals. No early radar program, no concept of CIC/AIO nor the reliable radios to support it.
US strategy and tactics for Midway if IJN has radar, CIC and radios in the Zeros
From my earlier post.... Imagine Midway with working radar connected to experienced CIC, and working/shielded radios in the Zeros. Nagumo's dilemma is no more. All Zeros can be recalled, refueled and rearmed and pilots rested between attacks. Kate and Val strikes can be orderly launched and...
As for their radios may have been better than the Japanese but they were still crap.
They looked good against the Japanese but in the land of the blind the one eyed man is king..
