Scharnhorst vs Alaska

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I have to say I am very pleased to be proven wrong. thankyou for the rethink and the information you have provided. It does appear that with these new penetration tables, the penetration rates of the 14/45 are better than the 12/50 (Edit: But I dont agree that they are "much" better....They are a "little" better at best) . I am still unsure that the penetration rates of the skc34 are better than the 12/50, and I am still unsure that at range the Scharnhorst could overpower the Alaska. I note that was your position in your initial posts in this thread.

And the main argument was about whether the gunpower of the Alaskas wa sufficient to knock out the Scharnhorst. The argument about the 14/45 and the 12/50 arose from a claim by Kurfurst (I think) that the 14/45 could not penetrate the german ship. Thats something you are clearly not accerpting at this point.


I dont agree with your summation about the Bismarcks last fight for the reasons pretty much the same as Juhas. She was a target, but ahe succumbed quickly to the british gunnery in her last fight. Firing cycles are generally not 1 per minute in a gunfight, they are usually somewhat less than that.

Bismarck put up a ferociuos and heroic fight. i dont think anyone is saying otherwise. The issue is whether her armouring not only kept her afloat, but also kept her a battelworthy unit. I dont think that can be claimed, neither do I think it valid to claim she stayed in the fight for long.
 
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Night won't prevent a German air attack during 1943. They can locate enemy ships with ASV radar and drop aerial flares. By the fall of 1943 Germany also had guided Hs293 and Fritz X weapons.

Stormy weather is an entirely different matter.
 
No missile carriers were in Norway at that time, and in fact those missiles were not so good against freely manoeuvring ships firing back. I cannot recall any successful LW late war divebombing night attack against heavy warship and don't recall any hits by LW torpedo bombers on Western Allied heavy unit, Italians got one hit on HMS Nelson, Japanese of course had several successes and even night time hits but LW wasn't IJNAF or RA.

Juha
 
davebender said:
Night won't prevent a German air attack during 1943. They can locate enemy ships with ASV radar and drop aerial flares. By the fall of 1943 Germany also had guided Hs293 and Fritz X weapons.

Stormy weather is an entirely different matter.
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Do you have ANY examples of LW attacks on Arctic attacks in the winter months above the Arctic Circle.

I looked at this site (http://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsRussianConvoys.htm4) and couldnt find any evidence of any strikes in winter.'

Might be worth looking at SeeKrieg to see if there are any recods of such strikes.

I am doubtful any exist
 
The objective should be destruction of the merchant convoy. I am confident Hs293 missiles can hit cargo ships whether they are maneuvering or not. So can Ju-87 dive bombers and Ju-88 torpedo bombers. Even Me-109s and Me-110s could hit merchant ships with 250kg bombs.

Ignore HMS Duke of York. It will steam into Murmansk unscratched and without any merchant ships.
 
Hello Dave
so why the Artic convoys after PQ-18 got through with minimal losses? IIRC at least in 42 after PQ-18 they avoided long summer days even if late autumn-winter time sailings meant sailing nearer to Northern Norway because of the ice. So attacking convoys was much more difficult (and costly) than you seem to think.

Juha
 


The objectives are good, but there was a distinct lack of success for the LW in the Arctic after 1942. One problem for the LW was that was already stretched very thin, so only limited resources could be spared for the theatre.

There were virtually no losses to the 1941 convoys, and no attacks by air were made over the winter. From April 1942 the LW began to enjoy considerable success, culminating in the massacre of PQ17. In April the cruiser trinidad was sunk by a JU88. PQ16 lost 7 ships out of 31 despite increased AA support and CAM ships. PQ17 was a dfeat of the first magnitude. He111s carrying torpedoes sank 3 merchant ships of the covoy on July 1, followed next day after the fateful dispersal order had been given, by 9 others in the following days. In addition 10 ships were sunk by U-Boats. Only 11 ships of the Convoy reached port.

It was an unmitigated disaster, but the forces that the LW could spare for this TO were never going to be able to stem the flow of materiel. In 1943 the allies delivered many times that amount of Lend lease (though not through the northern route) , whilst the size of the LW had stedily shrunk in the Theatre. by 1943 the first carrier escorts for the convoys were appearing, and AA efficiency was vastly improved. In that scenario, the LW, unless significantly reinforced was going to have a minimal effect on the flow of ships.


PQ18 which followed PQ17 was hit alsmost as badly. Despite being more heavily escorted, including the CVE Avenger, 13 of the 40 ships in the Convoy were sunk. However, German losses in their attacks were not light, 41 aircraft lost and 4 subs. this was as unsustainable for them as the allied losses were for them. And, these were all attacks delivered outside of winter.

here were no losses in merchant ships for the whole of 1943 and 1944 that I can find. By 1943 the convoys were being provided with aircover, including ASW support, which paid off in a big way from April 1944. Over 30 U-Boats were lost, including 4 to aircraft in April 1944 alone.


In 1945 there was one aircraft sinking, and it was in winter, but the aircraft was carrying a torpedo, not an FX bomb. It occurred on the 23rd Feb, when straggler "Henry Bacon" was sunk by Ju88 torpedo bombers, this was the last ship of the war sunk by German aircraft.

There simply is no evidence that the LW could hit targets on a regular basis in the winter months. and further, from 1943 onwards the level of protection being provided to the Russian convoys, and the paucity of aircraft available to the germans simply preculdes their effective employment
 
That's putting it mildly. Only 40 Ju-88s to cover all of Norway and most were probably occupied fighting the Soviet Union.

If the German Navy is serious about stopping Lend-Lease shipments to Murmansk an entire full strength Kampfgeschwader must be devoted to maritime attack. However you could probably make do with He-111 torpedo bombers for attacking merchant ships.

German surface warships such as KM Scharnhorst should attack only when a convoy lacks battleship escort.
 
I think you are understimating the committment level made by the LW. A single KG would represent aa reduction in force committment in 1943-4, at least according to this site:

Luftwaffe in Norway

moreover the germans had already tried a blockade by air of sea communications, in the med, and eventually failed. Attcks by more than 600 axis aircraft couold not stop the Allies from getting convoys through when they really needed to do that. Costly for both sides, but the allies could afford that kind of battle, not so the LW.

The Germans best bet in the Arctic were their subs, until the middle of '43, but every sub sent to the north was one less in the Atlantic.


The KM surface units were unused resources, in the end they probably represented the best resources to use. In my opinion the Germans should have concentrated on upgrading their AA and radar suites, and used the ships as an integrated force. More balance was needed....more esccorts less heavy ships, although heavy ships are still fine. sending the gneisenau off for a rebuild in 1942 was a mistake.

The other thing needed was true co-operation between the Navy and the Air Force. If proper recon and lr fighter cover had been provided to the KM whilst at sea, it might have stood a chance. LW was never going to play second fiddle to the Navy, however.
 
I'm also very skeptical!

Such a szenario or an air war in the arctic night, is a more a"what if" szenario LW/Germany without a war in the east.

You need very good trained crews as nightfighter and seafighter with very different duties. Pilot, navigator, radar operator and arms operator, this and as parsifal wrote highly integrated aircrafts in numbers. to control the Norway seas.

For the normal LW at 1943/44 to my opinion impossible.

I agree that there is a technical possibility, but you need the aircrafts and very good trained crews and a lot of training and operating experience!
 
davebender said:
If the German Navy is serious about stopping Lend-Lease shipments to Murmansk an entire full strength Kampfgeschwader must be devoted to maritime attack. However you could probably make do with He-111 torpedo bombers for attacking merchant ships.
Click to expand...

KM had no resources for that and as has been said, LW was too streched.

davebender said:
German surface warships such as KM Scharnhorst should attack only when a convoy lacks battleship escort.
Click to expand...

That was what Germans thought they were doing, when operation started, they didn't know that DOY was so near and when a recon plane saw the RN battlegroup (several ships including one large one) LW HQ in Norway didn't react immediately and there was a delay in relaying the info to relevant KM HQ and there there was some delay before the importance of it was understood and the info was sent to Bey on Scharnhorst. It was then too late or Bey didn't even get it before the contact with DOY, I cannot remember exactly which was the case.

Juha
 
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I agree, Northern Norway made the situation even more difficult, the presence of open sea and the nearness of Arctic icecap made weather rather unpredicted and the mountainous terrain made sudden change of weather to worse even more deadly than in many other areas.

IMHO RN and IJNAF were the AFs that had best trained into night operations against naval targets and IMHO also they would have found the Barents Sea enviroment very challenging during winter.

Juha
 
what I thought might be interesting would be to "reenact" scharnhorst last battle, but replace the DoY with the Alaska. We would be comparing Scharnhorst as she went into battle with the Alaska as commissioned. We would try to take into account as many of the differencesd as we could.....the various differences in speed and ROF, and of course armour penetration. We would assume hits as historical, and try to estimate any additional hits that may arise as a result of Alaskas higher ROF. We would need to start the battle from the initial moment that Scharnhorst was detected, and then reacted to by DoY to take into account the more rapid closure and ability to hold or control range for th Alaska due to her high speed.

I am not trying to produce a balanced scenario here. It means that Scharnhorsts options are a bit limited. I am basically trying to substitute Alaska for DoY, factor in her different characteristics and try and see if it had been Alaska in the box seat instead of DoY whether the outcome would have been different. I would not mind your help guys as this wil not be an easy task

The first thing I think is to get an agreed statement of basic facts of the battle, so I will start by posting from the Arctic Convoys site their version and maps of the battle:

Russian Convoys, 1941-1945
and
Scharnhorst - The History - Operation "Ostfront" - The Battle off the North Cape

If people are basically happy with that as a basic outline from which to "build" our hypothetical scenarion we should proceed I think and see what happens.

According to Barnett, DoY began steaming on an intercept line at 0939 at 24 knots. Scharnhorst can be more or less treated as a fixed point as we are not going to assume any changes in her course or speed. But it is worth noting that Scharnhorst was steaming basically ssw at nearly 30 knots. DoY was capable of 28 knots but chose (or was forced) to close at 24 knots

First question to consider is, how fast could Alaska have travelled through these seas. as fast as DoY or as fast as Scharnhorst. Why was Scharnhorst able to travel as fast as she did because of her proximity to her home base, or because of her ability to cope with the conditions better

I am inclined to believe that the DoY was forced to move at less than her top speed because of endurance issues. The KGVs only carried 3700 tons of fuel oil which restricted their range to 5,400+ nm at 18 knots . By comparison the Scharnhorst carried ? tons of fuel oil and possessed a range of Scharnhorst: 7,100 nmi at 19 kn. Alaska carried 3619 tons of fuel oil and a range of 12000nm at 15 knots (note American ships were always designed with far greater endurance than British ships, and it was endurance over top speed that usually dictated the top speed of a ship).

I therefore think that the Alaska wo9uld have been able to close at or close up to her top speed.....thats 33 knots. That means that she could reach engagement range by as early as 2pm in the afternoon, but that may not be to her best advantage. Instead of arriving at the engagement at 1650 (7.3 hours after initial call to action) as the DoY took, the Alaska could arrive at anytime from 1400. that gives her the fleibility to pick an earlier time to commence her attacks if she so chosses

If we look at the battle map, that places Scharnhorst about 75 miles further to the north than she was engaged historically. It does not give her the Destroyers that had been detached that morning, but if the Alaska goes onto action much before 1500 she will do so in daylight which will deny her surprise and in fact favour Scharnhorsts optics over Alaskas radars. If I were the Alaskas skipper, I would wait till sundown to maximise my radar advantages and maintain surprise on the Scharnhorst. Scharnhorst was completely unaware of the DoY until she opened fire, so one has to assume the same for Alaska.

If Alaska waits for sunset, she will need to wait until at least 1530 before moving on the German ship. So, my best estimate is that the battle would likely commence at 1530, if the Alaska was deployed in place of the DoY. That places battle commencement at roughly 45 miles north of where it actually commenced.

.
 

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The DOY was a poor vessel in a high seas, the specification insisted that she be able to fire forwards at 0 degree elevation. As a result she easily took water over the bows and in the sea state in which the battle took place I very much doubt that she would have been able to go full speed.
 
In other words KM command and control was incompetent. So KM Scharnhorst was doomed before the first shot was fired.
 
so, now we are up to the tricky bit....at what range would the Alaska move to before opening fire. We know that with the very first salvo, the DoY hit the Scharnhorst, but the DoY skipper didnt know that was goinbg to happen, and neither would our hypothetical Alaska skipper. DoY positioned herself for an ideal firing solution.....for the DoY, basically positioned herself in such a way as to minimise the Scharhorst broadside, while maximising her own. She waited until the range was down to 11250 yards before opening fire. at that range her guns had the ability to penetrate 20.2 inches of german EFF steel. Fraser might not have known as much as we do about armouring schemes and armour prenetration rates of his guns, but he would have known that the Scharnhorst was faster than him, and would get away unless he maximised his chances of a deadly hit. He would have been worried about minimising the risk to his ship, hence the careful positioning of his ship would be fairly confident that at that range, his guns could defeat the armour of the enemy ship.

Alaska would be in a slightly different situation. The ships skipper would be aware of his ships lightweight armouring scheme, and would also be aware of his ships superior speed. Unless the Scharnhorst hits him first, he is going to be able to dictate the range, and to a large extent the ship positioning. German ships throughout the war laboured under very strict rules of engagement which required them to withdraw in the face of an equal or superior enemy. as soon as the Allied Heavy revealed itself the german ship had to withdraw, which means it will have its available boadside time severely curtailed. Scharnhorst has to get lucky and hit the Alaska early, or she faces an uphill battle. Alaska will consistently have a a heavier broadside and a higher ROF than the DoY, as awell as a speed advantage which means she can take and hold the range. This was something initially the DoY could not do. because she was slower than Scharnhorst was initially able to open the range, until hit in the boiler. alaska doesnt have to do that....she can maintain or change the range as necessary, and doesnt have to hope for a hit that will cause loss of speed for the Scharnhorst (though of course that would be an advantage).

Without cheating and looking up the tables on nathan Okuns site before making the call, if I was the skipper I would look at the Scharnhorst main armment an estimate its penetration capabilities and then look at my own. I would work out where the minimal risk for my ship lay, whilst maximising the chances of damage by my guns. Im thinking of aninitial engagement range of 20-22000 yds. athat range the Alaskas guns are going to be able to penetrate 11.1 to 11.8 inches of german armourplate. With that performance, the U ship is not able to penetrate the german belt with every hit, which according to Conways is between 6.25" and 13.75". However some hits would penetrate, and all hits are going to damge, likley to impair the fighting efficiency of the ship. The turrets are 6-14" thick, which means that frontal hits are unlikley to do anything, but elswhere on the turret there is likley to be damage and a risk of the turet jamming if hit

At that range, the Germans guns could penetrate the 9.9-10.9 inches of US armour plate, which enough just to penetrate the US armouring scheme, though blast effects and damage might still be limited by the continment effect of the armour. Ther is no doubt, however the german ship is better protected, and the US ships has to hope that her superior radar and her higher number of trainable guns will give her a higher hit rate than the Scharnhorst.

If Scharhorst does hit the US ship, ther is a likelihood of werious damage.
 
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davebender said:
In other words KM command and control was incompetent. So KM Scharnhorst was doomed before the first shot was fired.
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yes, probably true, but once I have done with working through probability scenario for the alaska, we might just briefly consider what the Scharnhorst could do differently that might give her victory. I feel there would be lots of possibilities to be honest
 
I should also point out that the DoY positioned herself ahead of the Scharnhorst at the beginning of the engagement. Scharnhorst at the commencement of the engagement was bearing due north (roughly) of DoY, whilst her heading was almost due sth. DoY essentially was crossing her T on a heading due East (roughly). The first salvo hit and knocked out A turret of the German battlecruiser.

If I had been the skipper of the Alaska, with plenty of time to position my ship, I think the best option would be to position the US ship on the northern side of German ship so that she was presenting her stern to my ship. She initially could only respond to me with her aft turret which reduces her broadside weight and hit probability to only 1/3 of her full broadside. Moreover the operational restrictions placed on the scharnhorst ("do not engage enemies equal or superior") means that the most likely reaction of the Schanrhorst would be to continue to head South toward home, thus maintaining that mismatch of firepower. Alaska would turn to follow from one beam to the other, thus enabling more opportunity to present a full broadside more often. If instead of choosing an initial enagement range of 20-22000 yards she picked an intial engagement range of about 13000 yds, she could veer off from port to starboard quarters for longer, thus increasing her firepower advantage even more. Scharnhorst would gradually increase the range as she more or less raced for home, whilst Alaska would be hoping for a hit before the range opened up too far (this assumes that the Alaska want4ed to maximise her broadside all of the time, whilst Scharnhorst was not, and wa sticking to her operatinal restrictions).

Historically the Scharnhorst turned initially north, and then assumed a base course of approximately east, hoping to draw out of range of the DoY before turning south and heading home . Over th next 80 minutes the range gradually increased to 18000 yds. Thats a relative speed differential of 2.5 knots per hour. Against the alaska, the Scharnhorst could be held at any range of Alaskas choosing (however to hold or close range the Alaska would need to accept periods of a less than full broadside....ie less opportunity to cross the stern on the the beam of the germans ship). Given the operational limits placed on the Scharnhorst, that means that the german ship is simply going to have to turn for home (south) and put up with a reduced broadside that such a course would bring( that is not to say that she ould not periodically heave to to fire broadsides, but that would intermittent, and would be interred with by demonstronstrations by the RN light forces also engaged). Alaska would be firing with either 6 or 9 guns, to Scharnhorst's 3 and occasional 6 or 9 . If the rear turret is knocked out (which i think the Alaska can do), Scharnhorst can only return fire by heaving to every so often to fire her forward guns.....something she would not be keen to do and which casn be interred with by the brit cruisers abnd destoyers. Its not a good tactical situation for the German ship.

My opinion is that the alaska will win this engagement.

Time now to analyse the "alternative" battle from the german perspective and see what might be done to maximise her chances. This will be harder to envisage, since my opinion is that Scharnhorst was lost mostly by circumstances and restrictions operating outside the control of the ship.
 
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Its an interesting theory ut as the range increases so the probability of a hit decreases. The Scharnhorst was a very well protected ship and I would suggest that the Scharnhorst will probably get away damaged. The sea state was high and this would also hinder accurate shooting. To get enough hits to sink the Scharnhorst, then you will need to get close but that of course increases the chances of receiving serious damage or at least sufficient to slow hyou down. You pays your money and take your chances.

The ships were well matched and to be honest, its probably down to the one that gets the first hit on a critical area. As we know that is in the lap of the gods.

PS the Scharnhorst always has the option of getting close and using her 5.9in. They will not penetrate the main areas but with the all or nothing approach of the US they can do a lot of damage, starting fires, damaging fire control radars ect.

PPS where do you get the idea that the Alaska has a consistantly heavier Broadside than the DOY?
 
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