One more time, just for you.

All airplanes weigh more at takeoff than at landing because they burn their fuel. In the P-39 this difference was 900# (120 gal). For ratios or performance calculations involving aircraft weight, the problem is what weight to use? And the difference was a substantial 900#. The plane could not fight on the runway at takeoff nor could it fight in the landing pattern. So they used a calculation (that I'm sure is a lot more complex than my "half fuel" generalization) to come to an average weight during that one flight to base their weight ratios on.
I read this somewhere and can't locate the source again, but there you go.
Do not bring fists to a gunfight in a fact oriented group. Please.
First a better rule of thumb for high octane aviation fuel is 6#/gallon ----------> 120 gallons -----------> 720 pounds.
Professional flight testing for Range/Speed/Climb for USAAF during WWII ALWAYS stated the condition and load out of the airframe. The guidelines you should use for Performance comparisons should begin with full internal combat load out of fuel, guns, ammo and oil.
You keep referring to 1:1 ratio of P-39 vs IJN in SWP. What are your sources?
You constantly reference the P-39N performance as superior to IJN fighters as well as, Army fighters - yet IIRC there was only One P-39 Ace in the SWP (none in North Africa) for US pilots that flew them in combat before wholesaling them to the Italians and French. By contrast there were many F-4F, P-40 aces in SWP and by Commonwealth pilots in North Africa - all in a target rich environment.
The extreme climb to altitude capability relative to other top 'in service' fighters such as F6F, Spit IX, FW 190 and Bf 109 somehow failed to materialize in the key US battles in desperate times, namely Guadalcanal and the Solomons campaigns - to the extent that even when the vaunted P-39N arrived, it was never a choice for air superiority over P-40K through L or P-38 - and remained in service in 1943 simply because the much needed P-38 and P-47 and even P-51A were not available in sufficient numbers to entirely replace them.
The VVS used them in low to mid altitude - AKAIK, never as high altitude interceptors. What do you cite as the reasons that USAAF theatre commanders used to plead for replacements? And given influx of newer P-40 and P-38 and P-47, shuttled the P-39 fleet to CAS role and short range role at that?
Perhaps, take a cut at the reasons you think that AAF pulled them from Theatre combat planning and TO&E in mid 1943 as US production of the P-51B and P-47D ramped up? Well before first deployment of the P-51A and P-51B?
If more than 'a feeling', please cite sources?
If not, I have a suggestion ---------> dive into research of the Med Air Force and Air Marshall Coningham, then into noted AWPD planners Generals Lawrence Kuter (developer of FM-100 7/43) and Muir Fairchild as the AAF doctrine for Tactical Air requirement included aircraft capable of air superiority over the battlefield in addition to CAS. These two gentlemen were Essential to the acquisition and increased Prioritization of the P-51A and Merlin P-51B over Oliver Echols objections - and for a brief time, responsible for the dedication of the first year of P-51B to TAC for Recon and CAS - before clearer heads pulled them into subordination to 8th AF in November 1943.