Skua: 100lb or 500lb bombs hit Konigsberg?

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The limiting factor was the max weight that the center station could support and the strength of the bomb crutch. In theory, they could have done something with the wing stations, but the additional drag would have reduced range enough to notice.
I don't think I've ever seen a pic of the Skua on a carrier with its bomb attached. Maybe it's hiding in its recess?
 
The limiting factor was the max weight that the center station could support and the strength of the bomb crutch. In theory, they could have done something with the wing stations, but the additional drag would have reduced range enough to notice.

Quoting Cameron again, it seems the Skua was at "capacity" carrying the 500 pounder - to the point it where it was difficult to take-off.

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And a small footnote - they were lucky not to be shot at as they approached Bergen.

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Quoting Cameron again, it seems the Skua was at "capacity" carrying the 500 pounder - to the point it where it was difficult to take-off.

To add to that, 'Dickie' (Richard Stephens) Rolph of 800 Sqn as observer to Lt J. Rooper added that "The Skua, when fully loaded, needed all the runway that Hatston could provide and once airborne behaved like a pregnant porpoise".

Regarding diving angle, Lt C.H. Filmer of 803 Sqn later wrote that ".. by keeping the whole length of the vessel in front of me was of great assistance in determining when to release the bomb. I tried to keep as close to 60 degrees in my dive simply because it suited my approach... The lower and closer I got the more confident I became. I was very low when I pressed the button."

These come from Matthew Willis' book Blackburn Skua and Roc (Mushroom Model Publications, 2007)

This is how Eric Brown related his wartime training on the type:

"The technique we were taught was to approach the target at about 8,000 ft at right angles, keeping it in sight until it disappeared under the leading edge of the wingtip, pulling up until it reappeared at the trailing edge and then winging it over into a 70 deg dive, extending the Zap flaps fully and keeping the target at the top of the engine cowling. Release height was 3,000 ft and pull-out was commenced, simultaneously retracting the flaps, being completed at around 1,500 ft to avoid the bomb blast and any light flak. The elevator force required to pull out was heavy."

(Wings of the Navy, Flying Allied Carrier Aircraft of World War Two, Janes, 1980.)
 
Given the engines of the day and the wish for a monoplane, all metal design, was a better divebomber possible for the FAA for service in 1938?

No! The Skua was it. Remarkably for the time (as you probably know, Admiral, the learned fella that you are), the Skua entered production and service relatively swiftly for a British pre-war design following its first flight. This took place on 9 February 1937, the second prototype flew more than a year later on 4 May 1938 and by September that year, the type had entered FAA service. It was a close thing though, three months before it entered service, the Air Materiel Department of the Air Ministry recommended that it be cancelled because it was approaching obsolescence as a fighter. The Admiralty demurred owing to the fact that it had nothing modern to replace it with - the Fulmar would not be ready until 1940 and even then it was a stop gap.
 
No! The Skua was it. Remarkably for the time (as you probably know, Admiral, the learned fella that you are), the Skua entered production and service relatively swiftly for a British pre-war design following its first flight. This took place on 9 February 1937, the second prototype flew more than a year later on 4 May 1938 and by September that year, the type had entered FAA service. It was a close thing though, three months before it entered service, the Air Materiel Department of the Air Ministry recommended that it be cancelled because it was approaching obsolescence as a fighter. The Admiralty demurred owing to the fact that it had nothing modern to replace it with - the Fulmar would not be ready until 1940 and even then it was a stop gap.
Was it possible if it had been designed from scratch? Certainly, so long as the Royal Navy adopted modern carrier operational practices. However, they were either unaware of USN equipment and practices, ignored it, or decided they "weren't invented here."
 
Was it possible if it had been designed from scratch?

The specification O.27/34 called for a fighter dive bomber for the FAA and Avro and Vickers both tendered designs; Avro's was the 666, which was to be powered by a single AS Tiger and a mock-up might have been built. The Vickers design was the Type 280, which was to be powered by a Merlin and resembled the Supermarine Dumbo, but with a mid mounted elliptical profile folding wing.

Certainly, so long as the Royal Navy adopted modern carrier operational practices. However, they were either unaware of USN equipment and practices, ignored it, or decided they "weren't invented here."

I think we might be retrospectoscoping a bit here and to be honest I'm not sure what you are getting at. Britain's and the US Navy's needs for carrier aircraft in the 1930s were quite different, and the US equivalent to the Skua in terms of dates and type of construction, the Northrop BT-1 was a pure dive bomber and was not a success in service due to poor handling characteristics. It did however lead to the SBD Dauntless, so I guess something good came from it.

The Skua was a fighter dive bomber, a role that the US Navy built aircraft to, but the last to that time were biplanes of a previous generation. Let's also not forget that the admiralty did not have control of the FAA until 1937, the year the Skua first flew. Until then it was a branch of the RAF and all that that brought with it in terms of between-the-wars aircraft selection of specifications and priority of service requirements.
 
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Was it possible if it had been designed from scratch? Certainly, so long as the Royal Navy adopted modern carrier operational practices. However, they were either unaware of USN equipment and practices, ignored it, or decided they "weren't invented here."
When the Skua entered service the USN and IJN were still flying biplane divebombers. Britain was ahead of the game in the late 1930s.

When introduced in 1938, the Skua was the first all-metal, folding-wing, retractible undercarriage naval dive bomber. The USN and IJN wouldn't match those features until the 1942 introduction of the Curtiss SB2C and Yokosuka D4Y, four years after the Skua.
 
Britain was ahead of the game in the late 1930s.

Yup, agree. When the Skua entered service in 1938 the US Navy had one all metal modern monoplane in service on its carriers, the TBD Devastator torpedo bomber. Its principal fighter was the Grumman F3F biplane, albeit of metal construction and with retractable undercarriage and its principal dive bomber was the SBC Helldiver, again a biplane, but with retractable undercarriage. Mind you, the FAA's principal fighter was the Hawker Nimrod and its torpedoplane was the Fairey Swordfish. Nevertheless, the Skua fulfilled two requirements in FAA service; it just so happened that with the pace of aircraft development between-the-wars meant that the time between requirement issue (1934) and first flight (1937) meant it was nearly obsolete by the time it entered service a year later.
 
When introduced in 1938, the Skua was the first all-metal, folding-wing, retractible undercarriage naval dive bomber.

The folding wings were necessary because the RN couldn't use deck parks. A result of not having modern operational practices or equipment on the carriers. Even without folding wings, the U.S. carriers were able to carry two squadrons of SBDs.

Yes, yes, some of the U.S. carriers were bigger, but the Yorktowns were the same displacement as the RN fleet carriers and managed to operate 72 aircraft.
 
The folding wings were necessary because the RN couldn't use deck parks. A result of not having modern operational practices or equipment on the carriers.
Deck parks and the North Atlantic don't mix well. Perhaps the RN eschewed deck parking for operational expediences rather than a neglect of modern [sic] practices.

Here's footage of RN carriers in the North Atlantic. In such conditions, the FAA aircraft would be best stored below deck. And as for any criticism, of FAA equipment, the RN's Swordfish and Albacores could operate in sea states that the USN and IJN aircraft could not.




You can build more fragile carriers and get more aircraft on board, but even the Pacific can be tough. Here's USS Hornet and Bennington, both damaged after a Pacific storm. I imagine this encouraged the USN to adopt the enclosed squared-off bow for their 1955-57 postwar rebuilds of the Midway class, as demonstrated by HMS Ark Royal almost twenty years earlier.

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I'm in no way suggesting the RN had everything right, the pointed forward flight deck on HMS Hermes seems a ridiculous loss of potential deck space, but the British just approached their unique challenges differently, such as adopting enclosed bows in all carriers after the three Courageous class. When they moved to calmer Indian and Pacific waters, the RN adopted deck parking on their fleet carriers and expanded their air groups accordingly, for example, HMS Implacable carried 81 aircraft: 48 Seafire IIIs, 12 Fireflies and 21 Avengers. But the RN didn't completely abandon their preference for below deck aircraft stowage and large hangar capacity, with most of their carriers having some form of double level hangar. Of all fourteen RN fast fleet carriers, only the three Illustrious class and today's QE class have single level hangars.

You seem to want to convince us that the USN was better. If it'll settle you I'll agree to anything. If you want to tell us the US invented/introduced the enclosed bow, armoured flight deck, the mirror landing system, the angled flight deck, and the steam catapult, or just want to tell us the US did them all better, I'll nod, yes, sure.
 
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A result of not having modern operational practices or equipment on the carriers.

Again, this sentence needs to be quantified. You are attempting to apply something to a situation in hindsight. Let's not forget that the modern aircraft carrier was invented by the British, in Furious, Argus and a handful of seaplane tenders during the Great War, which gave the RN a vast amount of experience in the operation of aircraft at sea, unmatched by any other navy in the world. To be short, Britain wrote the rule book, applied the innovations and experienced the experience, so going into WW2, how can Britain be behind the curve in 'modern operational practises or equipment on the carriers' as you put it?

In terms of numbers of carriers between the wars, the Royal Navy is first. By the outbreak of WW2 in 1939, the Royal Navy had seven carriers that had been commissioned; Argus, Furious, Glorious, Courageous, Hermes, Eagle and Ark Royal, with Illustrious and Formidable commissioned within a year of the outbreak of the war and Victorious and Indomitable on their way. The IJN had Hosho, Akagi, Kaga, Ryujo, Hiryu and Soryu. The United States Navy comes in third place with Lexington, Saratoga, Ranger, Yorktown and Enterprise, with Hornet and Wasp hot on their tale less than a year later. By this time Langley had been converted to a seaplane tender. Britain also had by extension HMAS Albatross and invented the 'jeep' carrier with HMS Audacity - the concept of placing decks on top of merchant hulls originated during the Great War by the Royal Navy in planning for its attack against the High Seas Fleet using torpedo bombers in 1919.
 
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Hey elbmc1969,

The folding wings requirement for the Skua (and all subsequent FAA purpose built carrier airframes) was due to the need to fit on the armoured deck carrier lifts. A 22'-24' wide by 42'-45' long platform was planned for these ships.

Beginning at the end of WWI the RN and USN routinely exchanged a few officers and senior NCOs each year, for a combination of observation of the other navy's practices and general friendship building (a practice continued to this day). The RN was very aware of the USN's carrier operational methods. In the early-1930s (whether because of the exposure to the USN practice or on their own initiative) the RN experimented with deck parks on a few of their carriers, and from those experiments determined notional deck park capacities for all their carriers. They did not adopt the deck park at that time due to the lack of need, based on their own planned operations (including the North Atlantic conditions mentioned above) and on the fact that they did not have enough airframes to require deck parking at anytime before WWII.

Also, beginning about 1935 the RN/FAA decided that night operations were going to be a necessary practice and focused on developing the required methodology (night operations were a huge part of the RN/FAA plans for attacking shore targets). Night operations did not lend themselves to a deck park, as the USN found out toward the end of WWII when they began operating nightfighters off the Enterprise and Saratoga.

The Ark Royal was built with provision for a crash barrier (entering service in 1938) and it was intended to install it during her first planned refit. All of the subsequent armoured deck carriers from Illustrious on were fitted with crash barriers (I think all were completed with crash barriers fitted, except Illustrious who received hers during her first refit).
 
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The folding wings requirement for the Skua (and all subsequent FAA purpose built carrier airframes) was due to the need to fit on the armoured deck carrier lifts. A 22'-24' wide by 42'-45' long platform was planned for these ships.
IMO, the 45ft by 22ft lifts on Ark Royal and the Illustrious class (and the aft lifts on HMS Indomitable and the Implacable class) were a good call on future aircraft dimensions. Every single-engined folding wing monoplane aircraft (and all the biplane TSRs) operated by the FAA from the Blackburn Skua to the Grumman Tarpon could fit down those 45x22ft lifts. There's no point in making the lifts wider unless you need to stow unfolded types, like early Seafires, or Dauntless dive bombers to replace your rapidly obsolescent Skuas.
 
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I agree. If only the RAF/RN/FAA had planned better for a folding wing SeaHurricane or Seafire. (sigh)
Folding wing Hurricane would be a piece of cake. Stick a hinge on here below, and you're done. Clearly the ROI was no realized, or it would have been done. Same as the Hawker Sea Fury below.

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As for the Skua, I'd like to see the Henley replace it, with a folded Hurricane and Henley CAG.... plus Stringbags and Applecores of course.
 
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I agree. If only the RAF/RN/FAA had planned better for a folding wing SeaHurricane or Seafire. (sigh)

Actually, both Hawker and Supermarine planned for folding wing Sea Hurricane and Sea Spitfire before the war, but for one reason or another these didn't come to fruition when proposed. The Seafire did receive a folding wing, but the 1938 Sea Spitfire as drawn up by Joe Smith had a wing that sat along the fuselage like that on the Hellcat and Avenger. Obviously the Air Ministry intervened regarding Spitfire production that denied the admiralty the Sea Spitfire proposal, but the Hurricane had been discussed by the admiralty in 1937, around about the time it was entering RAF service. That it didn't evolve earlier was due to production schedules, although admiralty investigation and trials into its suitability as a carrier aircraft began in 1939/1940.
 
Since we're in the Skua thread, can we make a single seat fighter out of the Skua design? Four mgs is equal to the Ki-27 and A5M of the time. Toss out the rear seat, improve the streamlining, etc? Keep the 500 lb. bomb capability that started this thread.
 
Great stuff, Thomas. I'm trying desperately to dispell the ever present myth that the admiralty had no interest in single-seat fighters on its carriers at the outbreak of war and then scrambled to get them once it realised its mistake and that the Fulmar and Firefly are evidence of this - that ole' chestnut.
 

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