Some thoughts from reading No Right to Win

[Skywalker Jin]

My deepest impression of this book is that it provides me a "soaked" atmosphere to experience,feel and think about that piece of history.
And it showed me how to take full advantage of Internet during discussing.
If the roundtable grew bigger, it would be possible that veterans meet in an online group

 

[Skywalker Jin]

Guys I had finished a new chapter, but what is the "Tarao" CV??
Tarao, if it was Takao , then it should be classified as CA;
if it was Taiho, did USN know this carrier in 1942? This carrier was launched in 1943.
Confused.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

View attachment 875080
Guys I had finished a new chapter, but what is the "Tarao" CV??
Tarao, if it was Takao , then it should be classified as CA;
if it was Taiho, did USN know this carrier in 1942? This carrier was launched in 1943.
Confused.

American intel often misnamed Japanese ships. I don't know what the Tarao was supposed to have been, but I know Junyo was misidentified by USN intel as Hayataka, which mis-ID was based on the characters of the ship's name being read in the wrong flavor of Japanese.

 

[EwenS]

Well it must be one of the IJN carriers not listed (if indeed US intelligence thought it was a carrier and not a typo or mistranslation) :-

With the various elements of the IJN Midway force, Hosho & Zuiho
Junyo & Ryujo were with the Aleutian force.

The following escort carriers were also in service:-
Taiyo (ex-Kasuga Maru) converted in 1941. Just completed a docking period at Kure at end of May 1942.
Chuyo (ex-Yawata Maru) recommissioned after conversion at Kure 31st May 1942.

It is highly unlikely to be a reference to Taiho. The Office of Naval Intelligence references for mid-1942 only include the carriers up to Shokaku & Zuikaku. Until Coral Sea these were considered to be improved Soryus on which the data they had was more than a little incomplete. It was only the photos of Shokaku in that engagement that was forcing a rethink of their size.

 

[Skywalker Jin]

Really angry when I knew some insects ruined Captain Rochefort's career.
In China, we have a writer named Lu Xun who once wrote: 'A warrior with flaws remains a warrior; a perfect insect is still merely an insect.' The codebreaker Rochefort was such a warrior—his achievements saved lives, while his detractors, however 'perfect' in bureaucratic games, were ultimately just insects in history's eyes.

 

[Skywalker Jin]

Guys long time no see.
As I had finished reading "The codebreakers", my after-reading thoughts made something wonderful:
I translated and arranged this chapter, then I posted them to social media just like an serial historical dramatisation focused on The Pacific War.
Many people knew this epic war better or deeper through my posts and they discussed in my comment area.

And now I got some media in 1942, just to have another sight revising the war.
I will continue sharing my thoughts.

Also I'm planning an interesting project: making models colored by their namesake
Kingfisher-colored OS2U
Wurger-colored FW190

 

[Skywalker Jin]

I would share an interesting name of the event that US fooled IJN by sending "AF is lacking water"
In my country, we call this "The great international telecommunication fraud"

 

[Skywalker Jin]

I had read the chapter which describes men from Yorktown insisted that "VF-42" and "VF-3" were the real arrangement of fighter group.
As Mr Leonard noted that there was NO WRITTEN ORDER assigning pilots from VF-42 to VF-3, I would notify my model(Thach's #1) as "a fighter from VF-42/VF-3"
I found more evidence that proved this thought: men from USS Fulton changed "VF-3" to "VF-42",what's more, they noted a notable "VF-42" at the upper left.

But when it comes to official list on USS Enterprise, there is no VF-42.

 

[R Leonard]

I wouldn't make that modification. The squadron was VF-3 with John S Thach, commanding so to label his plane as a VF-42/VF-3 craft would not be accurate.. Pilots from VF-42 were TAD to VF-3, VOComCarPac. All of the F4F-4's on Yorktown were assigned to VF-3 inventory at NAS Kaneohe. The erstwhile VF-42 planes, all F4F-3's, were parked at MCAS Ewa. The VF-42 enlisted troops were not TAD to VF-3, they were assigned to VF-42. Personnel matters can get convoluted. The only VF-42 personnel on Enterprise were the pilots TAD to VF-3. After 5 June, there were, perhaps two of those still aboard Enterprise, the rest, and their VF-3 mounts had moved over to Hornet to replace the VF-8 losses.

And on your officer's list, while someone made a valiant effort to note the rated pilots, there are a few who were and are not so noted.

 

[R Leonard]

deleted see above

 

[Skywalker Jin]

I wouldn't make that modification. The squadron was VF-3 with John S Thach, commanding so to label his plane as a VF-42/VF-3 craft would not be accurate.. Pilots from VF-42 were TAD to VF-3, VOComCarPac. All of the F4F-4's on Yorktown were assigned to VF-3 inventory at NAS Kaneohe. The erstwhile VF-42 planes, all F4F-3's, were parked at MCAS Ewa. The VF-42 enlisted troops were not TAD to VF-3, they were assigned to VF-42. Personnel matters can get convoluted. The only VF-42 personnel on Enterprise were the pilots TAD to VF-3. After 5 June, there were, perhaps two of those still aboard Enterprise, the rest, and their VF-3 mounts had moved over to Hornet to replace the VF-8 losses.

And on your officer's list, while someone made a valiant effort to note the rated pilots, there are a few who were and are not so noted.

The list I provide is another evidence to prove that such arrangement made men of Yorktown (at least) unpleasant, so they made effort to clarify this

 

[Skywalker Jin]

I am reading "Aboard the carriers" now.
Tom Cheek said "The muzzle blast and recoil of the six fifties was all that was needed to push my overloaded, underpowered F4F over the edge into a control-sloppy stall."
and after this he said"With airspeed increasing, the Grumman began to respond to my mind's commands rather than my deliberate moves."
So,can we make the conclusion that"F4F is harder to control at low speed rather than at a relatively high speed"?

According to the pic below, it seems that shoulder harness wasn't always reliable.

 

[Skywalker Jin]

I wouldn't make that modification. The squadron was VF-3 with John S Thach, commanding so to label his plane as a VF-42/VF-3 craft would not be accurate.. Pilots from VF-42 were TAD to VF-3, VOComCarPac. All of the F4F-4's on Yorktown were assigned to VF-3 inventory at NAS Kaneohe. The erstwhile VF-42 planes, all F4F-3's, were parked at MCAS Ewa. The VF-42 enlisted troops were not TAD to VF-3, they were assigned to VF-42. Personnel matters can get convoluted. The only VF-42 personnel on Enterprise were the pilots TAD to VF-3. After 5 June, there were, perhaps two of those still aboard Enterprise, the rest, and their VF-3 mounts had moved over to Hornet to replace the VF-8 losses.

And on your officer's list, while someone made a valiant effort to note the rated pilots, there are a few who were and are not so noted.

Mr Leonard, I had read some reports that pilots from Yorktown complained
'The F4F-4s had 2 more guns but the amount of ammo didn't had an increase and it result in some of them ran out of ammo when defending Yorktown'
What's your comment? Thank you.

 

[R Leonard]

Mr Leonard, I had read some reports that pilots from Yorktown complained
'The F4F-4s had 2 more guns but the amount of ammo didn't had an increase and it result in some of them ran out of ammo when defending Yorktown'
What's your comment? Thank you.

The change from four guns to six was the result of the G-36B version contact with the British for their Martlet II.

Along with folding wing hardware and two additional guns (albeit with less ammunition for each than that carried for the four gun F4F-3) there was considerable weight gain but no engine improvement. So more weight and no power improvement.

Yes, the pilots noted the performance drop in general (and so did everyone else including the powers that be) and the gun battery situation left one with deciding which was better, slightly longer firing time with four guns or harder delivery with six.

My father said he preferred the -3 version, even though it was straight no-folding wings, in terms of performance and handling, but the six gun battery certainly delivered a harder punch. Nobody was likely to run through all his ammunition at one go, so one simply had to keep in mind his available firing time.

I'm not aware of anyone running out of ammunition while defending Yorktown.

One might note that the FM version built by Eastern, except for the very first 10 completed, reverted to the four gun battery and more ammunition.

 

[Skywalker Jin]

The change from four guns to six was the result of the G-36B version contact with the British for their Martlet II.

Along with folding wing hardware and two additional guns (albeit with less ammunition for each than that carried for the four gun F4F-3) there was considerable weight gain but no engine improvement. So more weight and no power improvement.

Yes, the pilots noted the performance drop in general (and so did everyone else including the powers that be) and the gun battery situation left one with deciding which was better, slightly longer firing time with four guns or harder delivery with six.

My father said he preferred the -3 version, even though it was straight no-folding wings, in terms of performance and handling, but the six gun battery certainly delivered a harder punch. Nobody was likely to run through all his ammunition at one go, so one simply had to keep in mind his available firing time.

I'm not aware of anyone running out of ammunition while defending Yorktown.

One might note that the FM version built by Eastern, except for the very first 10 completed, reverted to the four gun battery and more ammunition.

Thank you. It's really helpful.

 

[Skywalker Jin]

Guys I am back.
I had finished the first wave of reading this book and I'm quite impressed about what the team had done.
As I had mentioned before, this book values a lot for words from veterans. This book also states that as long as anyone of the author's team cared, those who fought for a better tomorrow would never gone.
Very moving and highly recommended.

Then let me talk about something interesting.
First of all,Nagumo used smokescreen to shield his fleet from VT-8 but this smokescreen actually drew attention of VT-6 and VB-3.
As it was widely known,VB-3 from USS Yorktown(CV-5) knocked out Soryu in a single wave.
I played a popular game named "World of warships" and some aircraft carriers(Essex,Yorktown) have the same ability to set smokescreen, which makes the story above more funny.
In the field of aircraft carrier campaign, Nagumo was a noob and may be reported if he played this game.

Second, about the movie MIDWAY(2019). R/G Murray said"McClusky was supposed to attack the far carrier." This book mentioned two versions of saying:
Best "The leading squadron should attack farther target"
Murray "The squadron loaded heavier flew lower and should attack nearer target."
According to Admiral Hopkins(6-B-12)"Due to someone's oxygen failure(that means Dick Best) VB-6 had to fly lower and ahead of VS-6" Best's opinion was VB-6 should hit Akagi and Murray's opinion was the opposite.
Anyway, those squadrons had done well and put three Jap carrier dead in water.

 

[R Leonard]

Midway dive bomber bomb load outs.

The VB-6 report for Midway, dated 10 June 1942, for the morning attack states:
"The attack group was led by the Enterprise Air Group Commander and consisted of thirty-two SBD's; fifteen from VB-6, loaded with one 1000 lb bomb each, sixteen from VS-6, loaded with one 500 lb bomb and two 100 lb bombs each, and the EAGC plane loaded with one 500 lb and two 100 lb bombs."

For the afternoon attack on Hiryu and its escorts the report shows:
"The attack group was led by Commander Scouting Squadron Six, and consisted of planes of VS-6, four planes of VB-6, each loaded with one 1000 lb bomb, and fourteen planes of VB-3."

The next day, in an evening attack on a destroyer the narrative reports:
"The attack group was led by Lieutenant D. W. Shumway, VB-3, and consisted of a total of 32 SBD's from VB-3, VB-5, VB-6, and VS-6. All planes were armed with one 500 lb bomb."

And for the attack on the Mikuma and Mogami group on Saturday, 6 June:
"The attack group was lead by Lieut. Short, VS-5, and consisted of 31 SBD's from VB-3, VS-5, VB-6, VS-6; 3 TBD's from VT-6 and 12 F4F-4's from VF-6. All VB-6 planes carried 1000 lb bombs as did most of the other SBD's."

The VS-6 report for Midway, dated 20 June 1942, shows:
"The attack group was led by the Enterprise Air Group Commander and consisted of thirty-two SBD's; fifteen from VB-6, loaded with one 1000 lb bomb each, sixteen from VS-6, loaded with one 500 lb bomb and two 100 lb bombs each, and the EAGC plane loaded with one 500 lb and two 100 lb bombs."

For the Hiryu attack in the afternoon, the VS-6 does not mention ordnance loading.

On the 5 June attack on a destroyer:
"The attack group was led by Lieutenant D. W. Shumway, VB-3, and consisted of a total of 32 SBD's from VB-3, VB-5, VB-6, and VS-6. All planes were armed with one 500 lb bomb."

And for the VS-6 Mikuma/Mogami attack of Saturday 6 June, there is no mention of ordnance loading.

Also, neither of the VB-6 nor the VS-6 reports mention fuse settings for the noted ordnance.

In the narrative portion of the VB-3 report of 10 June 1942 the following appears related to the Thursday morning attack on the Japanese carriers:

"Thirteen Mk.13, 1000 lb. bombs with Mk.21 nose and Mk.23 tail fuzed were dropped . . ."

Further in the narrative relating to the afternoon attack on Hiryu and its escorts appears:

"Eleven Mk. 13, 1000 lb bombs and 3 Mk. 12, 500 lb bombs were dropped by this squadron at an average altitude of 2,500 ft. Fuses were Mk. 21, nose and Mk, 23, tail, detonating at 1/100 second after impact."

In the attack of 5 June on a Japanese destroyer (universally noted as a light cruiser in all the reports) the VB-3 narrative shows:
"Ten Mk. 12, 500 lb demolition bombs were dropped by Bombing Three. Mk. 21, nose and Mk. 23, tail fuses were used, detonating 1/100 sec. after impact."

And on 6 June in the attack on the Mikuma/Mogami group:
"Ten Mk. 13, 1000 lb bombs were dropped by Bombing Squadron Three from an average release altitude of 2,500 ft. Nose and tail fuses were Mk. 21 and Mk, 23 respectively, detonating at 1/100 second after impact."

VB-5 (temporarily designated VS-5) report dated 7 June 1942 shows for the morning scouting mission:
"Five two plane scout-bomber sections of this squadron were launched at about 1330 ZT +10 to search relative sectors 280° - 20° from the YORKTOWN didtance 200 miles. Each plane was armed with a 1000 lb bomb, fused for 1/100 sec."

On 5 June: "Planes were armed with one 500 lb bomb, fused for 1/100 sec."

And on 6 June: "The attack group with 7 VS-5 planes ere launched about 1245, armed with 1 – 1000 lb. bomb used to 1/100 sec."

The VB-8 report, 7 June 1942, does not mention ordnance until the evening attack on the Hiryu and escorts group where it states:
"Attacked out of the sun from 15,000' altitude. Dropped six 500# bombs. Released at 2,500' to 2,000' altitude."

For the 5 June attack on the destroyer: "10 - 500# bombs 1/100 second delay fuses.

For the 6 June attack: "Twelve 1,000# bombs 1/100 second delay fuse."

The VMSB-241 report makes no mention of ordnance loading.

Regret that I do not have a VS-8 report on file.

 

[Skywalker Jin]

Midway dive bomber bomb load outs.

The VB-6 report for Midway, dated 10 June 1942, for the morning attack states:
"The attack group was led by the Enterprise Air Group Commander and consisted of thirty-two SBD's; fifteen from VB-6, loaded with one 1000 lb bomb each, sixteen from VS-6, loaded with one 500 lb bomb and two 100 lb bombs each, and the EAGC plane loaded with one 500 lb and two 100 lb bombs."

For the afternoon attack on Hiryu and its escorts the report shows:
"The attack group was led by Commander Scouting Squadron Six, and consisted of planes of VS-6, four planes of VB-6, each loaded with one 1000 lb bomb, and fourteen planes of VB-3."

The next day, in an evening attack on a destroyer the narrative reports:
"The attack group was led by Lieutenant D. W. Shumway, VB-3, and consisted of a total of 32 SBD's from VB-3, VB-5, VB-6, and VS-6. All planes were armed with one 500 lb bomb."

And for the attack on the Mikuma and Mogami group on Saturday, 6 June:
"The attack group was lead by Lieut. Short, VS-5, and consisted of 31 SBD's from VB-3, VS-5, VB-6, VS-6; 3 TBD's from VT-6 and 12 F4F-4's from VF-6. All VB-6 planes carried 1000 lb bombs as did most of the other SBD's."

The VS-6 report for Midway, dated 20 June 1942, shows:
"The attack group was led by the Enterprise Air Group Commander and consisted of thirty-two SBD's; fifteen from VB-6, loaded with one 1000 lb bomb each, sixteen from VS-6, loaded with one 500 lb bomb and two 100 lb bombs each, and the EAGC plane loaded with one 500 lb and two 100 lb bombs."

For the Hiryu attack in the afternoon, the VS-6 does not mention ordnance loading.

On the 5 June attack on a destroyer:
"The attack group was led by Lieutenant D. W. Shumway, VB-3, and consisted of a total of 32 SBD's from VB-3, VB-5, VB-6, and VS-6. All planes were armed with one 500 lb bomb."

And for the VS-6 Mikuma/Mogami attack of Saturday 6 June, there is no mention of ordnance loading.

Also, neither of the VB-6 nor the VS-6 reports mention fuse settings for the noted ordnance.

In the narrative portion of the VB-3 report of 10 June 1942 the following appears related to the Thursday morning attack on the Japanese carriers:

"Thirteen Mk.13, 1000 lb. bombs with Mk.21 nose and Mk.23 tail fuzed were dropped . . ."

Further in the narrative relating to the afternoon attack on Hiryu and its escorts appears:

"Eleven Mk. 13, 1000 lb bombs and 3 Mk. 12, 500 lb bombs were dropped by this squadron at an average altitude of 2,500 ft. Fuses were Mk. 21, nose and Mk, 23, tail, detonating at 1/100 second after impact."

In the attack of 5 June on a Japanese destroyer (universally noted as a light cruiser in all the reports) the VB-3 narrative shows:
"Ten Mk. 12, 500 lb demolition bombs were dropped by Bombing Three. Mk. 21, nose and Mk. 23, tail fuses were used, detonating 1/100 sec. after impact."

And on 6 June in the attack on the Mikuma/Mogami group:
"Ten Mk. 13, 1000 lb bombs were dropped by Bombing Squadron Three from an average release altitude of 2,500 ft. Nose and tail fuses were Mk. 21 and Mk, 23 respectively, detonating at 1/100 second after impact."

VB-5 (temporarily designated VS-5) report dated 7 June 1942 shows for the morning scouting mission:
"Five two plane scout-bomber sections of this squadron were launched at about 1330 ZT +10 to search relative sectors 280° - 20° from the YORKTOWN didtance 200 miles. Each plane was armed with a 1000 lb bomb, fused for 1/100 sec."

On 5 June: "Planes were armed with one 500 lb bomb, fused for 1/100 sec."

And on 6 June: "The attack group with 7 VS-5 planes ere launched about 1245, armed with 1 – 1000 lb. bomb used to 1/100 sec."

The VB-8 report, 7 June 1942, does not mention ordnance until the evening attack on the Hiryu and escorts group where it states:
"Attacked out of the sun from 15,000' altitude. Dropped six 500# bombs. Released at 2,500' to 2,000' altitude."

For the 5 June attack on the destroyer: "10 - 500# bombs 1/100 second delay fuses.

For the 6 June attack: "Twelve 1,000# bombs 1/100 second delay fuse."

The VMSB-241 report makes no mention of ordnance loading.

Regret that I do not have a VS-8 report on file.

So that which squadron should hit Kaga depends on both bomb loads and wing position.
Best said that VS-6 was ahead of them but as I mention above #12 said VB-6 was ahead of VS-6.

Another interesting point was that Lt. Colonel Lloyd Childers, who had been flying as a Navy R/G that morning with pilot Harry Corl said:

The Yorktown SBDs had those faulty arming switches. They starting arming their bombs and a few of them accidentally released, almost through our formation.

Seems that not only torpedo had problem, fortunately it doesn't matter——Soryu was bombed.

 

[R Leonard]

With two squadrons and two targets the trick is to attack both targets without mixing up your squadrons. The solution was simple, whichever squadron was in the lead attacked the far target and the trailer attacked the near. If neither squadron was in the lead, then the high squadron attacked the far target and the low squadron attacked the near. This kept the lead or high squadron from diving through the trailing or low squadron formation. Best knew he was leading the low squadron and was setting up to attack Kaga when VS-6, led by the EAG group under McClusky, a fighter pilot by trade, dropped into his already attacking formation. Best was only able to collect the two wingmen of his section but then executed a killing attack on Akagi whilst the rest of VB-6 contributed to the smothering of Kaga. Which squadron was carrying what loadout had nothing to do with it.

Errant bombs from faulty arming switches . . .

Hold on. You have to think about that one for a minute.

I'm pretty familiar with the realities and how this stuff works. I knew Lloyd Childers and what he once told me makes absolute sense and I believe him. He told me, sitting in the back seat of his TBD, facing aft, he could see in the far distance behind him two or three explosions on the water while the flight was on the way to the Japanese fleet.

So here you have a gaggle of TBDs droning along at about 110 kts or so. Way above them, enroute to a rendezvous point (where they would actually then be above the TBDs) and simultaneously having climbed to about 15000 feet (something one does slowly and mindful of fuel consumption on a mission profile such as this, meaning their forward progress is not much better than VT-3 ahead of them), VB-3 starts to arm their bombs using the new electrical arming switch. Four bombs immediately drop towards the ocean and Max Leslie breaks radio silence to stop the electrical arming and revert to the manual arming lever. Now only 14 of his 18 planes have retained their bombs.

So, what happened when those bombs fell? When you drop a bomb from a plane in level flight it falls behind you from the moment of release. Without jumping through the calculations, trust me, a bomb dropping from 15000 feet takes about 32 seconds to reach the ground, or in this case, the water.

We already know that VB-3 was behind VT-3, been slowed by a climb to altitude, and playing catch up. If we suspend that reality for a moment and pretend that VB-3 had already caught up and was actually overhead, the bombs still had to fall for about 32 seconds before hitting the water. Well, from the moment of release, VT-3, down below and plugging along at 110 kts, would have travelled some 5939 feet (185.6 feet/kt x 32 sec) . . . roughly 1.1 miles from the release point, thus the bombs could only have hit the water behind the VT-3 formation.

Reality suspension, however, does not allow us to put VB-3 out ahead of VT-3 when the accidental drops occur simply because that would fly in the face of the entire Yorktown "running rendezvous" concept.

So the reality was that VB-3 was somewhere behind VT-3 playing catchup, so that puts the falling bombs even farther behind, as Childers told me, ". . . in the far distance".

Kind of goes back as to why dive bombing of maneuvering ships is by far and away more effective than level bombing from high altitude despite what the AAF thought or claimed.

 

[Skywalker Jin]

With two squadrons and two targets the trick is to attack both targets without mixing up your squadrons. The solution was simple, whichever squadron was in the lead attacked the far squadron and the trailer attacked the near. If neither squadron was in the lead, then the high squadron attacked the far target and the low squadron attacked the near. This kept the lead or high squadron from diving through the trailing or low squadron formation. Best knew he was leading the low squadron and was setting up to attack Kaga when VS-6, led by the EAG group under McClusky, a fighter pilot by trade, dropped into his already attacking formation. Best was only able to collect the two wingmen of his section but then executed a killing attack on Akagi whilst the rest of VB-6 contributed to the smothering of Kaga. Which squadron was carrying what loadout had nothing to do with it.

Errant bombs from faulty arming switches . . .

Hold on. You have to think about that one for a minute.

I'm pretty familiar with the realities and how this stuff works. I knew Lloyd Childers and what he once told me makes absolute sense and I believe him. He told me, sitting in the back seat of his TBD, facing aft, he could see in the far distance behind him two or three explosions on the water while the flight was on the way to the Japanese fleet.

So here you have a gaggle of TBDs droning along at about 110 kts or so. Way above them, enroute to a rendezvous point (where they would actually then be above the TBDs) and simultaneously having climbed to about 15000 feet (something one does slowly and mindful of fuel consumption on a mission profile such as this, meaning their forward progress is not much better than VT-3 ahead of them), VB-3 starts to arm their bombs using the new electrical arming switch. Four bombs immediately drop towards the ocean and Max Leslie breaks radio silence to stop the electrical arming and revert to the manual arming lever. Now only 14 of his 18 planes have retained their bombs.

So, what happened when those bombs fell? When you drop a bomb from a plane in level flight it falls behind you from the moment of release. Without jumping through the calculations, trust me, a bomb dropping from 15000 feet takes about 32 seconds to reach the ground, or in this case, the water.

We already know that VB-3 was behind VT-3, been slowed by a climb to altitude, and playing catch up. If we suspend that reality for a moment and pretend that VB-3 had already caught up and was actually overhead, the bombs still had to fall for about 32 seconds before hitting the water. Well, from the moment of release, VT-3, down below and plugging along at 110 kts, would have travelled some 5939 feet (185.6 feet/kt x 32 sec) . . . roughly 1.1 miles from the release point, thus the bombs could only have hit the water behind the VT-3 formation.

Reality suspension, however, does not allow us to put VB-3 out ahead of VT-3 when the accidental drops occur simply because that would fly in the face of the entire Yorktown "running rendezvous" concept.

So the reality was that VB-3 was somewhere behind VT-3 playing catchup, so that puts the falling bombs even farther behind, as Childers told me, ". . . in the far distance".

Kind of goes back as to why dive bombing of maneuvering ships is by far and away more effective than level bombing from high altitude despite what the AAF thought or claimed.

My confusion about two bombing squadron is now completely gone