Which is even more baffling as the USAF was fitting ferry tanks to P47's in 1943 which only gave them an escort range of around 370 miles give or take when at the same time Spitfires could have gone to 450-500 miles. Why the RAF were so against adding fuel when the need for escort fighters was there is mind blowing.
There are a whole lot of moving parts involved and which are selected often says more about the writer. The USAAF delayed its order for drop tanks from British sources in the first half of 1943, the need became more urgent as the year went on, but it took until October for the final decision of no unescorted raids. The P-47 could range out to 280 miles with a 75 gallon drop tank in August 1943, 325 miles with a 108 gallon tank in September 1943, and 375 miles with a 150 gallon tank in February 1944. The standard Spitfire VIII with a 20 gallon fuel reserve allowance could range out to around 300 miles with a 90 gallon external tank and the ability to transfer fuel from the external tank to the main ones, a 33 gallon rear fuselage tank would add another 80 miles. As it was Spitfires did insert and withdrawal cover and did score kills on these missions, there is a story about James Stewart's B-24 formation having the arrival of Spitfires drive off attacking Luftwaffe fighters.
As of end 1942 the Spitfire had just had a major upgrade, was needed in numbers as soon as possible, no one was asking for even longer range, the RAF had number of a longer range and faster fighter on the way, and as we know the Spitfire had stability problems when rear fuselage tanks were fitted that took time to resolve. The 1943 priorities became production and an even higher performance. You make your predictions of the future and then wait for time to reveal how correct you were.
The RAF did not think in terms of US long range, rather something like being able to fight over say all of France, from both the point of view of a performance penalty from the extra fuel and the workload on the pilots, like the time in the air and need for navigation. The phased fighter escort tactics had the bonus an escort mission to a target around 500 miles away at fighter speeds took around an hour less than at heavy bomber speeds.
Consider the war situation at the end of 1942, capturing North Africa was behind schedule, with the Luftwaffe contesting the airspace quite well. The U-boats had been very effective in 1942, and were moving back into the North Atlantic in numbers. Would the allies be able to sustain even defensive operations in Europe against continued U-boat successes? The eastern front had established the pattern of German advance in summer, Red Army advance in winter, would that continue? Given this how important was it to be able to insert an allied ground force into France in 1943, what had to be done for a 1944 invasion? The Luftwaffe still had a viable bomber force and Britain had plenty of targets the Luftwaffe wanted to attack. Day fighter defences had to be maintained and quality improved as the average Luftwaffe bomber improved, rotating the RAF home fighter forces through southern England to give them combat experience was important. Both the German and Japanese advances seemed to have been stopped but that had taken a lot of fighting and evicting them from further territory was, if anything, proving even harder.
At the end of 1942 the Spitfire was the only allied single engine fighter proven to match German fighter performance, with a pushing year long gap in 1941/42 where it did not. Given the level of improvement in German fighters 1938 to 1942 what chance their performance would keep improving, say like the Bf109K and Fw190D arriving in late 1943 or early 1944?
The British economy was working flat out in 1942/43, major changes to an aircraft would reduce the numbers produced and in 1942/43 every front wanted Spitfires and the 2 stage Merlin ones in particular, special shipments were sent to Tunisia and an elite fighter unit formed to use them (The Polish Fighter Flight) with a brief to only hunt for Luftwaffe fighters for example. The demands helped push mark IX production, versus switching to mark VIII. The invasion of France was expected to provoke a major air fight, so lots of reserve aircraft were needed to replace the expected losses, the fights happened but the Luftwaffe was much less effective than any planner was willing to believe.
The USAAF indifference to the P-51, versus the RAF's only US fighter we want attitude end 1942 meant the RAF could look forward to a large Merlin P-51 force in 1943/44 as per the current deliveries schedule, the P-51 easily reaching the France Germany border at least. And the USAAF would have the remainder available for Europe. Production was delayed and a greater percentage allocated to the USAAF versus that original schedule.
The USAAF build up in Britain was behind schedule due to delays and diversions, would the USAAF force grow to the planned size and when? The USAAF in Britain was not talking about long range escort, even as the USAAF in the Mediterranean was moving to escorting all raids. In any case as flown by the 8th Air Force the early B-17F radius of action was around 300 miles. If the USAAF wanted escorts, how many? Was there a difference in the number of escorts needed for say a B-17 versus B-26 or versus a Lancaster? How would the Luftwaffe react, keep its fighters dispersed near the front lines or pull many of them back to Germany and/or France? Would it increase the size of the force? Would the escort missions be flown at bomber speeds?
The planned standard USAAF fighter was the P-47, would all that extra weight provide the performance to at least break even with the 1943 and 1944 German fighters?
The allies had plenty of potential fighter bombers, the Hurricane and P-40 for a start, along with twin engine bombers whose day targets tended to be within fighter escort range. Fundamentally an allied escort fighter needed to range out a couple of hundred miles to cover most operations being run or would be run in support of the armies, the tactical targets. As Germany had not really used the economies of France, Belgium and Holland, plus most Italian Industry was in the north of the county, plus places like Ploesti in Romania, there was a disconnect between the fighter range required for tactical operations and the 500 to 600 miles needed for the strategic strikes. As we know now the Spitfire extreme limit, assuming it could handle the fuel load, was around 500 miles radius under European conditions, and more under Pacific conditions.
The longest range missions are when you are sure enemy reaction will only be around the target, the shortest is probably when you have to cope with layered defences where your aircraft could easily find themselves in multiple combats on the way in and out. Would there be a layered defence of Germany and if so would shorter range allied airpower help defeat or push the first defence line further back? How much could the allies control the 1943 air war, where, how, when and why missions were undertaken?
To the Spitfire, the 1941/42 changes had increased the internal fuel from 87 to 124 gallons, giving a 150 miles radius, less reserves, a 45 gallon external tank would add around 100 miles, at 320 mph, and longer at 240 mph. Which covered range requirements wanted at the time. In 1943 the main effort was upgrading to the Griffon engine at 1,980 pounds versus the Merlin 66 at 1,650 pounds, 6 mark VIII airframes allocated to the program, the intention being to give either a superior performance versus the German fighters or at least matching any upgrades.
In early 1943 the Spitfire was still mostly needed as an interceptor, it had just received a major performance and range upgrade, the P-51 was on the way which was faster and longer ranged, while every Spitfire was needed at once. We now know the outcomes, 1943 would be a year of allied advances, the 8th Air Force could do with every escort it could find in 1943, even getting standard Spitfire VIII into Fighter Command would have helped, adding a 33 gallon rear fuselage tank helping further, medium term switching to VIII instead of IX would have given the RAF a more effective Spitfire for the operations it ended doing. However the Spitfire was sensitive enough work was needed to allow for rear fuselage fuel tanks and that took a while, it became the 1944 project. The expected upgrades in German fighter performance were delayed until the final quarter of 1944.
Effort in man hours, Spitfire production, mark / design / jigging and tooling
I / 339,400 / 800,000
II / 9,267 / unknown
III / 91,120 / 75,000
V / 90,000 / 105,000
VI 14,340 / 50,000
IX 43,830 / 30,000
XII / 27,210 / 16,000
VII / 86,150 / 150,000
VIII / 24,970 / 250,000
XIV / 26,120 / 17,000
21 / 168,500 / unknown
PR XI / 12,415 / unknown
Seafire I / 10,130 / 18,000
Seafire II / 3,685 / 40,000
Seafire III / 8,938 / 9,000
Seafire XV / 9,150 / unknown
Spitfire on floats 22,260 / 35,000