Spitfire mk VB/Seafire vs Zero

[HoHun]

Hi Parmigiano,

>Totally different technology, i.e. the DB601 of the MC202 (and of the Bf109 Trop) had fuel injection, the Merlin had carburettors.

Hm, I don't think this had much to do with it. The advantage of the Axis fighters was the "clamshell" shutter of their air filters that made it possible to feed unfiltered air under ram pressure to the engine once the aircraft was above the altitude at which dust was usually found. This air filter type was an Italian invention, and it seems to have been highly successful - though it inevitably surrendered a bit of performance in comparison to filter-less aircraft, too.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[HoHun]

Hi John,

>As for how the FAA Seafire squadrons might have done if they had gone up aginst the Zero before 1944, that's an interesting question. Because of course they would not have had the LIII. It did not reach the squadrons until February 1944.

Hm, if we're talking about such a late date, it might be better to bring in a later Zero variant with a two-speed supercharger for comparison.

The problem is that there is little good data on these later Zero variants. The TAIC intelligence manual provides some engine data for the Sakae 11, 21 and 31A as used in the A6M2, A6M3 and A6M5 respectively, but it looks awfully generic to me, and it doesn't seem to match the performance graphs also provided by TAIC too well in my opinion.

I've included an A6M3 comparison, based on the assumption that the TAIC engine data for the Sakae 21 is correct, and that the A6M3 gained no net drag over the A6M2, its smaller wing making up for any effects of the larger engine (in high-speed flight).

Note that this is a relatively rough estimate only - however, A6M test data is entirely inconsistent (as you can see from the graphical summary I posted earlier in this thread), and at least the A6M3 data point of 540 km/h at ca. 5 km is closely matched by my calculation - though one really has to ask why the Australians would select the gear change altitude (where the aircraft is especially slow) as a reference point.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[parsifal]

Examples of the C202 with sand filter. As can be seen it was a much more clean fiting aerodynamically speaking

 

[Soren]

John Davies,

It is simply not true that the Seafire turned at a higher rate than ANY version of the Zero. The A6M2, 3 5(a,b,c) all enjoyed a considerably higher turn rate than the Spitfire Seafire at all speeds up to 275 mph where the elevators would stiffen up to a level where the average pilot would find it hard to achieve full elevator authority.

As for the Seafire's climb rate, it didn't go past 4,100 fpm AFAIK, which is the same as the A6M5.

The A6M5's performance was as follows:
Max SL speed: 485 km/h (WEP)
Top speed: 565 km/h at 6km (WEP)
Climb rate: ~4,200 ft/min

 

[John Davies]

John Davies,

It is simply not true that the Seafire turned at a higher rate than ANY version of the Zero. The A6M2, 3 5(a,b,c) all enjoyed a considerably higher turn rate than the Spitfire Seafire at all speeds up to 275 mph where the elevators would stiffen up to a level where the average pilot would find it hard to achieve full elevator authority.

As for the Seafire's climb rate, it didn't go past 4,100 fpm AFAIK, which is the same as the A6M5.

The A6M5's performance was as follows:
Max SL speed: 485 km/h (WEP)
Top speed: 565 km/h at 6km (WEP)
Climb rate: ~4,200 ft/min

The problem with this sort of performance comparison is the figures are pretty meaningless unless the source also specifies some extra data; like what mark are we talking about, at what height, and at what speed, is the rate of climb or rate of turn obtained, are we talking about normal continuous power or 5 minute emergency power, etc etc? Brown, who is my main source, is better than most, and seems to have done his research well, but even so he is not perfect.

Anyway, for the Seafire LIII, the main mark deployed in the Pacific, he quotes 4160 fpm at sea level, which accords pretty well with your 4,100 fpm, but the higher rate of 4,310 fpm at 6,000 feet, both at full combat boost. These figures are fairly close to Henning's calculated figures, if my reading of his excellent graphs, and conversions from metres per second to feet per minute are anywhere near right. The graphs also show that the Seafire LIII's climb advantage over the A6M2 ran out after about 8,100 feet, making it plain that this version of the Seafire was very much a low-level special.

As for rate of turn, Brown is unequivocal about this. I must admit, this did surprise me a lot, because I was under the impression that nothing turned inside a Zero, but it's all there on page 156 of the hardback edition.

He says that the Seafire's rate of turn (i.e degrees per second around a 360 degree circle) was greater than the Zero's, even though the radius of its turn was also greater; i.e the Seafire was going around a larger circle, but going round much faster; BUT (and it's a vitally important "BUT"), only if the Seafire pilot kept his speed up into his best fighting range, and above the Zero's best fighting speed…. because, as you quite correctly state, the controls of the Zero tended to stiffen up as speed increased. The aim was therefore to keep the speed up into the range where the Zero's manoeverability deteriorated. Pilot reports I've read, as well as Jeff Quill's "Spitfire", (a highly recommended read, BTW) suggest that the Spitfire's elevators remained light and positive at all normal speeds, but the ailerons did tend to stiffen above about 300. I expect the Seafire was much the same, as it was the same basic airframe.

Brown gives the Zero's best fighting speed as 180 mph, and the Seafire's as anything between 220 and 280 mph.

Incidentally, I was a little puzzled by one thing. Brown quotes speeds in mph, but to the best of my knowledge the ASIs of naval aircraft were calibrated in knots. However, his figures seem to check out well enough in mph against other published sources, so they are probably about right. Brown is also quite clear that at the Zero's best fighting speed, which he gives as about 180 mph, both its rate of turn and its radius of turn were quite definitely superior to the Seafire's.

I think I may have quoted Seafire fighting speeds in knots in an earlier post. If so, my mistake.

This was why the FAA's Air Fighting Notes made it clear that when fighting a Zero, it was very important to keep the speed up into the Seafire's best range, and fight in a series of climbing and diving near-stall turns. Being drawn into slowing down to the Zero's best speed was a recipe for disaster, so FAA pilots were strongly briefed not to do it.

Unfortunately, Brown does not give any figures for either radius of turn at different speeds, or rate of turn at different speeds, for either the Seafire or the Zero. It is this sort of thing that so often annoys me about printed sources.

Going back to page 12 of this thread, Parsifal comments that pilot quality may have had more to do with it than anything else. I have to agree. On p128 of the hardback edition, Brown describes a combat where Sub-Lieutenant G.J. Murphy, RNVR, took on not one but two A6M5s, in a turning battle, at their best fighting speed, not his, and shot them both down. (Maybe he hadn't read the FAA's Air Fighting Notes !) By any reasonable standards, he should not have won. He should have been shot out of the sky. This suggests that by this stage, well towards the end of the war, the Japanese pilots the Seafires met were not very good, and this may have as much to do with the Seafire's excellent kill ratio as anything else.

Two final points; firstly, quoted differences of a couple of hundred feet per minute one way or the other probably don't mean very much in practice. Quoted best rate-of-climb figures will have been derived from tests with a new aircraft in top condition, flown by a test pilot. How much service an individual aircraft has seen, what standards of maintenance are like, the way it is rigged, and pilot technique, can all account for at least 5% difference one way or the other, and if we are talking of rates in the 4,000 fpm range, that's 200 fpm, or about the quoted difference between Seafire and A6M5. So perhaps the only really safe conclusion is that both these aircraft had a best rate of climb somewhere over 4,000 fpm, and both were far ahead of any other carrier-based fighters of the period in this respect.

Secondly, the best-climbing Seafire of all was the LIIC, which was capable of 4,600 fpm at 6,000 feet at combat boost. Compared to this, the later-mark LIII, which was capable of the lower rate of 4,310 at the same height, seems like a retrograde step. Or maybe not.

On p22 of the hardback edition, Brown comments that the Merlin 55 and 55M, fitted to the FIII and LIII, had "….an automatic boost control and barometric governing of the full-throttle height. Hitherto these had had to be controlled by the pilot, and only experience could give an individual the ability to make the most of the engine's performance, at its best only under certain conditions of outside air temperature and atmospheric pressure."

Now I confess I don't really know enough about the care and feeding of large supercharged liquid-cooled piston aero-engines to understand exactly what that means in practice. If anyone can educate me, please do.

But I suspect it means that to get the best out of the LIIC's Merlin 32 meant fiddling with fine adjustments on the engine controls, feasible under test but undesirable in combat, whereas the LIII's full power was obtainable just by pushing the lever forward. So while it had a lower theoretical rate of climb than the LIIC, it was more easily attainable in practice.

So, quite possibly, the mark with the less favourable rate of climb according to the numbers might perform better in a practical situation in combat. Quite honestly, the further I get into the data, the more confused I get. It is very clear that there are no simple answers.

 

[Soren]

John Davies,

Brown has made some strange comparisons in his time and was perhaps a bit too fond of the Spitfire, so I wouldn't take what he says as gospel.

HoHun's tables are more accurate as they rely on the undeniable real world physics, so they are excellent reference points.

But that put aside, in terms of max turn rate I can tell for a fact that the A6M Zero's was considerably higher than that of the Seafire Spitfire's up to 275 mph, where the elevator forces reached a level where it was hard to achieve full deflection. So Brown's claim that the Seafire/Spitfire could complete a 360 faster just simply isn't true if the Zeke pilot is pulling full deflection.

But all in all we pretty much agree though, on the climb rate issue as-well, 200 ft/min is really not important in combat, esp. not if you're line abreast at 300y and you both enter a climb cause then there was plenty of time for you to blow the enemy fighter to pieces.

 

[John Davies]

John Davies,

Brown has made some strange comparisons in his time and was perhaps a bit too fond of the Spitfire, so I wouldn't take what he says as gospel.

HoHun's tables are more accurate as they rely on the undeniable real world physics, so they are excellent reference points.

But that put aside, in terms of max turn rate I can tell for a fact that the A6M Zero's was considerably higher than that of the Seafire Spitfire's up to 275 mph, where the elevator forces reached a level where it was hard to achieve full deflection. So Brown's claim that the Seafire/Spitfire could complete a 360 faster just simply isn't true if the Zeke pilot is pulling full deflection.

But all in all we pretty much agree though, on the climb rate issue as-well, 200 ft/min is really not important in combat, esp. not if you're line abreast at 300y and you both enter a climb cause then there was plenty of time for you to blow the enemy fighter to pieces.

I must admit I was never too happy about relying on one main source too heavily. Trouble is, there isn't much written about the Seafire. David Brown's book seems to be about the only full-length treatment, and it does seem to be mostly well researched.

He has been described as a "Seafire apologist", but on the other hand he does give a pretty good account of its failings, and as well as performance statistics he does produce some very interesting other figures. Like 26 pounds per square foot wing loading. That's a Seafire's wing loading with only a little fuel left; low enough to float in the ground effect for quite some distance if the approach speed is even a tiny bit too fast. Not a problem on a big grass field, which was what the basic airframe had been designed for, but on deck this means a float over all the wires and into the barrier if the pilot does not get his approach lined up absolutely exactly right. Add to that very light elevators, with stick forces measured in ounces, so unintended changes of attitude can all too easily occur, plus very poor ahead vision in the landing attitude, and I suppose it is a tribute to everyone that there were not more aircraft written off in the barriers than was in fact the case. Also a measure of just how desperate the FAA was to contemplate taking such an aircraft to sea in the first place.

There was one UK printing of the book in hardback, in 1973. There's one for sale on ebay right now (Item number: 270246568016, if anyone is interested). The United States Naval Institute thought well enough of the book to re-publish it in paperback in 1989, which suggests that it is a reasonably good source. If it was rubbish, presumably they would not have taken it on.

But turn inside a Zero? Although Brown is quite unambiguous, I must confess I did wonder if he had got that bit right. Which I suppose leaves two closely related questions; why did the FAA Air Fighting Notes technique of keeping the speed up and fighting in a series of alternately climbing and diving turns work? Because descriptions of individual combats, presumably drawn from pilots combat reports, make it plain they did. And secondly, why did the Seafire establish such an excellent kill ratio against what does seem to have been a more nimble opponent? The FAA lost ONE Seafire to A6M5s, and that was because of a radio failure. The pilot didn't hear the warning to break.

I'm perfectly happy to accept you are right, and at any given speed, the Zero was superior in both radius and rate of turn. But what if the two aircraft were flying at different speeds, if the Zero was at about 180 mph trying to pull as tight a turn as possible, and the Seafire was at about 250-ish plus? Then you might get the "larger turn radius but higher turn rate" situation Brown describes. As I said in my last post, he is infuriatingly vague about specific turn rates, specific turn radii, and how these changed for both aircraft as speed changed. Of course, to allow such a situation to arise, the Zero pilots would be failing to exploit the best characteristics of their aircraft.

Maybe it really does very largely come down to pilot quality, and by the time the Seafire arrived in the Pacific, most of the better IJN pilots were already dead…….. killed off by the USN, no doubt!

 

[parsifal]

Hi John

I thought Hennings graphs show that Zeke was faster in a sustained turn , could outclimb it above 3000 metres (roughly), and also enjoyed a speed advantage above a certain height. Perhaps we should ask Henning to give a plain english instruction on how to read is graphs???

For the record I am a great fan of the Zeke, but I would be surprised if the A6M5 could outperform the late war seafires. Tactics, pilots, and dive/speed as wel as roll rate made the Seafire a better propsition IMO. My earlier comments were just trying to point out that your comparisons were not on a level playing field. Given two pilots of equal quality, it would be a much closer affair than the 16:1 ratio you had reported.

 

[John Davies]

Hi John

I thought Hennings graphs show that Zeke was faster in a sustained turn , could outclimb it above 3000 metres (roughly), and also enjoyed a speed advantage above a certain height. Perhaps we should ask Henning to give a plain english instruction on how to read is graphs???

For the record I am a great fan of the Zeke, but I would be surprised if the A6M5 could outperform the late war seafires. Tactics, pilots, and dive/speed as wel as roll rate made the Seafire a better propsition IMO. My earlier comments were just trying to point out that your comparisons were not on a level playing field. Given two pilots of equal quality, it would be a much closer affair than the 16:1 ratio you had reported.

You are quite right, a lot depends on height. As I read Henning's graphs, the Seafire outclimbed the A6M3 Zero by roughly 500 fpm up to about 3,000 feet. That is a significant advantage, and enough to make a real difference in combat. According to the graphs, the A6M3 reached its best rate of climb around 7,500 feet, by which point the Seafire's rate of climb had deteriorated to well below the Zero's rate.

Henning's calculated values differ bit from figures I've seen quoted. He places the Seafire's best rate of climb at about 3,000 feet, whereras figures I've seen place it at about twice that. But despite that, the principle remains the same. The Seafire held the advantage in climb very low down, the A6M3 (and almost certainly the A6M5 too) did so above that.

So it would be very interesting to know at exactly what height the encounters between Seafires and A6M5s took place. This is just where Brown is annoyingly vague. He refers to a couple of occasions where Seafires on "Jack" patrols intercepted (and splashed) A6M3 kamikazes runing in at 500 feet. And he says that the majority of over-water interceptions took place fairly low down. But he does not give specific heights for most of the combats he describes and lists. It's a pity, because this would really shed a lot of light on the matter.

I suppose if I really wanted to know badly enough, I could get a reader's ticket to the Public Records Office and request sight of the original pilots' combat reports. This is in accordance with the best research methods, which are always to go back to primary sources wherever possible. Secondary sources (i.e any published book) are always influenced by the author's biases and selection of material. But I don't have time, and there is too much else to do, as ever.

There is another possible factor. Most Seafire/A6M5 combats took place in 1945. By then the IJN was short of fuel, and some of what it had was poor quality and improperly refined. The FAA had spent much of January 1945 attacking the Sumatran oil refineries. So, were the engines of the A6M5s the Seafires met in 1945 running on the proper brew, and developing full power? There is such a lot that it is not really possible to know at over sixty years distance.

 

[Soren]

Parsifal,

I am unaware of what stick force figures Henning has used for his calculations or what engine power (Or thrust) figures he has used, all of which are very influential on the final outcome of the calculations. So if he could provide them then we would get a more complete picture.

I speculate that Henning is using too low power figures for the A6M3, as in reality the A6M3 climbed at some 4,500 ft/min while running on WEP (1,130 HP), while the 200 kg heavier A6M5 climbed at some ~4,200 ft/min and was faster because of extra thrust provided by newly designed exhaust pipes.

Now on the other hand the A6M3 is surprisingly fast in Hennings calc's, some 10 km/h faster than the listed speed of the A6M5 in many books (565 km/h), while in reality the A6M5 was the faster of the two as far as I can tell from my sources. But perhaps these figures are not for when running on WEP??

 

[Soren]

John Davies,

The 16:1 kill ratio I personally doubt very much, and it is undoubtedly an overblown figure. The RAF RAFN's confirmation procedures weren't the most thurough in the world.

Now that having been said I am in no doubt about the Spitfire Seafires superiority over the Zeke, as long as they didn't get suckered into a turn and burn dogfight. The Zero's achilles heel was its low redline speed and high control forces above 275 mph, and once the Allies knew about it they started blasting it out of the sky in increasing numbers.

A Spitfire or Seafire pilot in the hot spot with a Zeke on his tail could do as the USN pilots did; Roll over, dive dive dive, pull out, climb climb climb and vupti you've suddenly turned the tables and have gained an energy advantage over the trailing Zeke. This was the no.1 evasive tactic if you had a Zeke on your tail, anything else being extremely hazardous, the very reason behind why it was important NOT fly at low alt in areas where there were Zeros present.

When operating in areas where Zeros were present the USN RAFN fighters flew high enough for them to be able to escape by diving away if they were unlucky enough to be unsuspectingly bounced by Zeros.

 

[John Davies]

John Davies,

The 16:1 kill ratio I personally doubt very much, and it is undoubtedly an overblown figure. The RAF RAFN's confirmation procedures weren't the most thurough in the world.

Now that having been said I am in no doubt about the Spitfire Seafires superiority over the Zeke, as long as they didn't get suckered into a turn and burn dogfight. The Zero's achilles heel was its low redline speed and high control forces above 275 mph, and once the Allies knew about it they started blasting it out of the sky in increasing numbers.

A Spitfire or Seafire pilot in the hot spot with a Zeke on his tail could do as the USN pilots did; Roll over, dive dive dive, pull out, climb climb climb and vupti you've suddenly turned the tables and have gained an energy advantage over the trailing Zeke. This was the no.1 evasive tactic if you had a Zeke on your tail, anything else being extremely hazardous, the very reason behind why it was important NOT fly at low alt in areas where there were Zeros present.

When operating in areas where Zeros were present the USN RAFN fighters flew high enough for them to be able to escape by diving away if they were unlucky enough to be unsuspectingly bounced by Zeros.

I'm quite prepapred to admit that the FAA's claims are a bit exaggerated. Everyone overclaimed to some extent, because in the heat and confusion of battle, it's impossible to be really sure; also all fighter pilots are optimists, or they would not be fighter pilots! But even knocking off a bit for over-claiming, it is still an impressive record.

Since low level was the area where the Seafire did have a climb advantage over the Zero (the Zero's best rate of climb came in higher up), the FAA seem to have used a mirror-image of the tactic you describe; pull into a hard climb, exploiting the Seafire's high rate and angle of climb to the full, break into the enemy, then dive, then if needs be climb again; classic "boom and zoom" tactics, as you describe. A power to weight ratio of about four and a half pounds per horsepower meant very good accelleration, as well as a very good rate and angle of climb, in its best height range.

Of course, if anyone else tried this tactic; if you tried it in a fighter with a more usual climb rate (say about 2,750-3000 fpm, rather than the Seafire's 4000 fpm plus), it would be suicide. (And this includes the Spitfire Vb trop with that horrible great filter nailed on the front!) But the results indicate that the Seafire could do it and get away with it, pretty consistently.

Obviously, it was important not to leave it too late to break into a climb once the Zeroes were on the way down. The Seafire's sole loss to A6Ms was when an experienced pilot (he was leader of his section) suffered a radio failure, did not get the warning, and left it too late.

Interestingly, Johniie Johnson, in his autobiography "Wing Leader", describes a comparable tactic used by pilots of the Spitfire XII against FW 190s. The Mk XII was the first griffon-engined version. It had a single-stage supercharger, and like the Seafire LIII was very much a low-level special, with a pretty startling performance in its best height range, and not-so-very-much outside it.

The tactic Johnson described was to draw the FWs down; in effect to allow yourself to be bounced, and as the FWs were on the way down, (but presumably before they had got too close!) to out-accellerate them, break into them, climb above them and turn the tables. He said the first time he flew with a Mark XII squadron, he was not at all happy about this, because it went flatly against everything he had learned as a fighter pilot, but the squadron leader assured him that it did work.

 

[drgondog]

Parsifal,

I am unaware of what stick force figures Henning has used for his calculations or what engine power (Or thrust) figures he has used, all of which are very influential on the final outcome of the calculations. So if he could provide them then we would get a more complete picture.

I speculate that Henning is using too low power figures for the A6M3, as in reality the A6M3 climbed at some 4,500 ft/min while running on WEP (1,130 HP), while the 200 kg heavier A6M5 climbed at some ~4,200 ft/min and was faster because of extra thrust provided by newly designed exhaust pipes.

Now on the other hand the A6M3 is surprisingly fast in Hennings calc's, some 10 km/h faster than the listed speed of the A6M5 in many books (565 km/h), while in reality the A6M5 was the faster of the two as far as I can tell from my sources. But perhaps these figures are not for when running on WEP??

Soren - I finally had some spare time and I am nearly finished with the modifications to Gene's well done performance spreadsheet - by incorporating the ability to insert Hp as a function of altitude and also insert air density at that altitude. Gene's model, which uses EAS - assumes constant Hp and SL for his calcs, as well as constant density (at SL). EAS will require SQRT(RHOalt/RHOsl) which is simply 1 on the deck.

All of these fighters had different strike zones for peak performance 'bands'

One of the issues to obtain better values for Turn calcs at same altitude is to get the Hp at the altitudes we wish to compare and there will be variations depending on supercharger and turbo designs.

 

[Soren]

Excellent Bill, looking forward to see them.

 

[JoeB]

I'm quite prepapred to admit that the FAA's claims are a bit exaggerated. Everyone overclaimed to some extent, because in the heat and confusion of battle, it's impossible to be really sure; also all fighter pilots are optimists, or they would not be fighter pilots! But even knocking off a bit for over-claiming, it is still an impressive record.

Gee, this has been gone over a bunch of times, there just weren't many combats between Zeroes and Seafires. This 16:1 keeps coming up as if maybe the simplification of the fraction 160/10 or 64/4. No, there was 1 known Seafire loss to Zeroes, in the *only* combat between the two where it's known the Japanese opponents were fighters and not kamikazes, on the last morning of the war August 15 1945, claiming 7 Zeroes. The Japanese losses per their accounts were only 1 Zero lost pilot bailed out WIA and one other pilot WIA but plane apparently not destroyed (see posts above). In all other cases the Seafires were defending carriers close in and it's likely most or all the fighter types they claimed were kamikazes. There just isn't a sufficient track records to draw any firm operational conclusion about Seafire v Zero. Though also as mentioned multiple times, *every* Allied fighter of 1945 that *did* have a significant track record v the Zero claimed to have had a substantial exchange ratio advantage, and where real results are known the typical result was at least some advantage (though usually signficantly more than 'a bit' had to be knocked off the claims, sometimes a lot, as typical throughout WWII).

As always, calculation of performance is an interesting exercise, but the assumptions used can vary the results significantly. Good to see the thread at least getting into that a little. I doubt we'll resolve it though to the point where presented calculations can be treated as solid facts as to how the real a/c really performed in the real situation, there's always be significant doubt, IMO, if trying to draw conclusions based on relatively small performance differences.

And, we still haven't found the formula by which we can convert a couple 10's mph or few 100 fpm speed or climb difference into a % advantage in effectiveness in combat in the hands of the same pilot. All we know from basic logic is we'd rather have a faster plane, *if* it was at least as good in all other performance measures. Once there's a small advantage in one category and a small disadvantage in another, there's no way to resolve that deductively in terms of combat effectiveness, it's a matter of opinion. Where planes differ a lot in performance, then it's obvious. I'm still not convinced that intensive study of small performance differences is very meaningful to understanding air combat results in WWII.

Joe

 

[HoHun]

Hi John,

>He said the first time he flew with a Mark XII squadron, he was not at all happy about this, because it went flatly against everything he had learned as a fighter pilot, but the squadron leader assured him that it did work.

He was right to be unhappy - these are rather dangerous tactics, and the main reason they worked was that the Luftwaffe pilots were not aware of the increased performance of the Spitfire XII. Inviting high-flying fighters to dive on one's own formation is rather dangerous even if they have a performance disadvantage as trying to even out an energy advantage by climbing is a rather slow way, and trying to evade an enemy attack by turning can be very difficult if the enemy formation splits up to attack - pretty much standard tactics.

(I'm sure you're aware that it was Johnnie Johnson who said "Turning doesn't win battles".)

Clostermann's unhappiness with the "cropped" Spitfire he was flying had the same roots as Johnson's - as Boelcke pointed out, one should hold as many advantages as possible before the fight begins, and altitude is a rather important advantage.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[John Davies]

Gee, this has been gone over a bunch of times, there just weren't many combats between Zeroes and Seafires. This 16:1 keeps coming up as if maybe the simplification of the fraction 160/10 or 64/4. No, there was 1 known Seafire loss to Zeroes, in the *only* combat between the two where it's known the Japanese opponents were fighters and not kamikazes, on the last morning of the war August 15 1945, claiming 7 Zeroes. The Japanese losses per their accounts were only 1 Zero lost pilot bailed out WIA and one other pilot WIA but plane apparently not destroyed (see posts above). In all other cases the Seafires were defending carriers close in and it's likely most or all the fighter types they claimed were kamikazes. There just isn't a sufficient track records to draw any firm operational conclusion about Seafire v Zero. Though also as mentioned multiple times, *every* Allied fighter of 1945 that *did* have a significant track record v the Zero claimed to have had a substantial exchange ratio advantage, and where real results are known the typical result was at least some advantage (though usually signficantly more than 'a bit' had to be knocked off the claims, sometimes a lot, as typical throughout WWII).

As always, calculation of performance is an interesting exercise, but the assumptions used can vary the results significantly. Good to see the thread at least getting into that a little. I doubt we'll resolve it though to the point where presented calculations can be treated as solid facts as to how the real a/c really performed in the real situation, there's always be significant doubt, IMO, if trying to draw conclusions based on relatively small performance differences.

And, we still haven't found the formula by which we can convert a couple 10's mph or few 100 fpm speed or climb difference into a % advantage in effectiveness in combat in the hands of the same pilot. All we know from basic logic is we'd rather have a faster plane, *if* it was at least as good in all other performance measures. Once there's a small advantage in one category and a small disadvantage in another, there's no way to resolve that deductively in terms of combat effectiveness, it's a matter of opinion. Where planes differ a lot in performance, then it's obvious. I'm still not convinced that intensive study of small performance differences is very meaningful to understanding air combat results in WWII.

Joe

Of course, there weren't that many combats between Zeroes and Seafires (possibly not enough to make up a "statistically valid sample", whatever that means) …… but what there were seem to indicate a decisive advantage for the Seafire, at least within its best height band. At least as significant as the Zeroes shot down is the Seafire's sole loss; one only, and that because of a radio failure.

I'm not quite sure that your point is in emphasising that some Zeroes lost to Seafires were kamikazes. Fighter vs fighter combat may get a lot of the glamour and glory, but splashing kamikazes before they hit the ships was a far more valuable and important job, and if the Seafire had not had a performance advantage, it could not have caught them.

IJN records of aircraft lost not according with FAA kill records; well yes, we've been here before. But if I had to trust one or the other, I'd tend to trust the FAA. By the end of the war the IJN was in pretty complete disarray. From other documents I've seen, their "official view" was also pretty completely divorced from reality….. emphasising the need for a "firm belief in victory" in mid-1945, when it was obvious that the war was lost. I hardly think IJN records at this stage of the war are reliable enough to base any firm conclusions on.

Besides, there are two general points; firstly, authoritarian regimes, be they Nazi, Fascist, Soviet or Tojo's military government, are a bit prone to shooting the messenger if they don't like the message. This leads to all sorts of information distortion, because people become understandably unwilling to pass on information that might be unwelcome. Records from a free society will almost certainly be more reliable.

Secondly, as I've pointed out twice already in this thread, if we are to take the position that a kill is only considered valid if it is confirmed by the records of both sides, and if we are to be consistent, then we have to revise every successful fighter pilots' total; Hartmann, Kojedub, Bong, Johnson, the whole lot of them. Let's not go there. That's not a sensible position to take by any standards. It is also completely impractical, because it assumes all the records from all sides are complete, accurate and available, which is a very large and very fragile assumption. Safest, I think, to say that at over sixty years distance, it is impossible to be really sure; that everyone over-claimed a bit, (maybe, as you say, more than a bit) and leave it at that.

As for whether details of aircraft performance are important in understanding what went on; of course they are not the only thing that's important. That's obvious. There was a lot more besides; tactics, pilots, training, leadership, morale, maintenance standards, etc etc.

But that's not to say that aircraft performance was not important. Tactics were designed to exploit the strengths of your aircraft's performance and the weaknesses of your enemy's, going into battle in an aircraft with an inferior performance can have a disastrous effect on morale, etc etc. It all fits together, each aspect is one part of the whole, and every aspect affects the other aspects.

As for speed being the most important performance variable; sorry, I'm not convinced. Yes, it was important. But rate of climb and manoeverability are also of great importance, and overall, assuming aircraft of fairly closely comparable performance, I wouldn't like to isolate one performance variable as the most important. Looking at tactics, it seems that pilots of all sides did their best to force the combat into areas where they held the advantage and their opponents did not. A Zero pilot would try to get his opponent to fight in a turning battle at about 180 mph, the Seafire pilot would, if he was wise, respond by refusing to slow down. He would use his higher rate of climb at low level to best effect to "zoom and boom", fighting in a series of climbing and diving near-stall turns. I'm not quite sure what the poor unfortunate flying the Spitfire V trop could do, as there doesn't seem to be any area at any height where he could exploit a decisive performance advantage of any kind.

 

[Soren]

if the Seafire had not had a performance advantage, it could not have caught them.

John Spitfires caught and brought down V-1's, so are you now going to suggest that means they were faster ?

You jump to conclusions rather quickly, esp. regarding the above and that because only a single Seafire was lost to a Zero it must in your opinion have been because the Seafire was better. Ever thought about the guys behind the controls or the circumstances in which the various victories were gained ? Like JoeB points out the Seafires pretty much only achieved to shoot down Kamikaze Zeros.

You have to be a bit more objective on the subject.

 

[John Davies]

John Spitfires caught and brought down V-1's, so are you now going to suggest that means they were faster ?

You jump to conclusions rather quickly, esp. regarding the above and that because only a single Seafire was lost to a Zero it must in your opinion have been because the Seafire was better. Ever thought about the guys behind the controls or the circumstances in which the various victories were gained ? Like JoeB points out the Seafires pretty much only achieved to shoot down Kamikaze Zeros.

You have to be a bit more objective on the subject.

I'm sorry, but that's completely unwarranted. I don't "Jump" to conclusions. I try to reach them, on the basis of the information and evidence available. Of course I've "thought about the guys behind the controls". I've commented more than once in this thread that pilot quality is probably the most important factor of all. Have you actually been reading any of my posts? As for telling me I "need to be more objective"; well first of all there is no such thing as objectivity (balance is another matter, and I do try to reach that), and secondly, it isn't for you or anyone else to tell me what I "need" to be. That's for me to judge. I suppose I ought to add that this sort of sententious remark is characteristic of someone who has run out of good points to make, and is now resorting to "argumentum ad hominem".

 

[John Davies]

Hi John,

>He said the first time he flew with a Mark XII squadron, he was not at all happy about this, because it went flatly against everything he had learned as a fighter pilot, but the squadron leader assured him that it did work.

He was right to be unhappy - these are rather dangerous tactics, and the main reason they worked was that the Luftwaffe pilots were not aware of the increased performance of the Spitfire XII. Inviting high-flying fighters to dive on one's own formation is rather dangerous even if they have a performance disadvantage as trying to even out an energy advantage by climbing is a rather slow way, and trying to evade an enemy attack by turning can be very difficult if the enemy formation splits up to attack - pretty much standard tactics.

(I'm sure you're aware that it was Johnnie Johnson who said "Turning doesn't win battles".)

Clostermann's unhappiness with the "cropped" Spitfire he was flying had the same roots as Johnson's - as Boelcke pointed out, one should hold as many advantages as possible before the fight begins, and altitude is a rather important advantage.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

I think I agree with you. Johnson describes flying along in his borrowed Mk XII, rather uneasily looking up at a formation of FWs; above them. They refused to come down to play. I tell you, it would terrify me!