the BoB was lost for England, if the FAT MAN would have continued the bombing of RAF radar installations. I read somewhere that the RAF could only hold for a couple more weeks.
then for some reason, the FAT MAN decided to stop sending fighters to England.
besides, the REAL hero for the BoB was the Hurricane.. certainly not the spitfire.
The Battle of Britain becomes more difficult for the British if the Luftwaffe continues to bomb the radar station and, more particularly, RAF fighter fields. Whether it means a German victory is another question entirely - just a single 11 Group fighter field was shut down during the airfield bombing campaign.
The RAF was certainly never a couple of weeks from defeat during the Battle of Britain. This is one of those myths that have grown up around the Battle. Some elements of Fighter Command believed that another two weeks of Luftwaffe attacks on fighter fields COULD (not would) force the retirement of some 11 Group squadrons from the most exposed airfields to more defensible positions, possibly north of the Thames. This still leaves .
Withdrawing some of 11 Group does not represent the defeat of the RAF though. 10 Group and 12 Group were relatively unaffected by the attacks on airfields. Apart form the pilot losses, the major problem with 11 Group dispersing to satellite fields was spare parts and servicing. Notably, Park and Dowding refused to canvas withdrawing 11 Group squadrons northward, despite the pressure of the attacks.
In 1940, the Luftwaffe only had the slimmest chance of defeating Fighter Command to its satisfaction (ie air supremacy to allow an seaborne invasion), through a combination of its own mistakes and the British pilot/aircraft replacement rates. Through July and August, RAF fighter and pilot strength increased. It was only in the late August to early September period that rates of attrition at Fighter Command, particularly for pilots, exceeded rates of replacement.
At the rate of loss between 24-August and 07-September, Fighter Command would have lost around 50% of its pilot strength in 10 weeks and only replaced around 20-30% of these losses. Weakened, yes, but not defeated.
However, on the other side of the Channel, things were even worse, a point that is often ignored. The late August/early September period was proportionally more costly for the Luftwaffe than the RAF. By mid September, Luftwaffe 109E and 110 fighter strengths were lower than in July - a reversal of the RAF position, where Hurricane and Spitfire fighter strength increased.
In terms of the battle of attrition, switching to bombing London was proportionally less costly for the Luftwaffe than it was for the RAF. While it provided relief for RAF pilots, the exchange rate was worse for the RAF in mid September to October than it had been in July and August.