Tank busters for the air forces?

[Altea]

Hello,

Why not the Polikarpov VIT -1 and VIT-2 ?
Polikarpov VIT-1 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Exceptionnal punch (2 x 37mm canons, 2 x 20 mm + ShKases) and performance for 1937/1938. Even i'm more impressed by the gigantic size of the TsAGI wind tunnel (look at the man inside) than by the plane as itself.

The problem is that soviets were fighting hard for years in Spain and China on the same time. With R-5, R-Zet, I-15 and SB in ground support rules. From obvious reasons that you can only see by practical war experience, tha CAS/Tank-buster as aperfect boxer should not only have the ability to kick hard himself, but also have to roll well with the punches (withstand heavy damage).

That's why the Il-2 was adapted, the VIT abandoned. The Il-2 was not really a tank-buster.

In conclusion: having heavy punch is not enough, you have to survive in the battlefield first to get the opportunity to use it.

Regards

 

[Altea]

Was the Ju 87 vulnerable? It would seem only for certain kinds of mission. As a tank buster I believe its loss rate was half that of the FW 190 in the same role. As a low level night harrasment aircraft it had among the lowest loss rate of any bomber of the war.

Do you believe, or do you know?
There are two very different things...
Considering all (reliable?) sources, for instance:
Mister kit et G. Aders " Junkers Ju-87 STUKA", Spécial la Dernière Guerre, Éditions Atlas 1979.
as well as
Herbert Leonard et André Jouineau, Junkers Ju87 de 1936 à 1945, collection Avions et Pilotes, Édition Histoire et Collections

...Stukas were specially replaced by FW-190 because of their high attrition rate and full inability to fulfill mission, even in the eastern front when opposed by soviet fighters...

Regards

 

[tomo pauk]

Hi, parsifal,

Lee mallory had overly ambitious objectives for the 1941 offensive over france, but just be aware that there were many other objectives that were achieved. It never ceases to amaze me that because the RAF failed in one of its self imosed objectives, and that one objective was so unrealistic as to be surreal, yet the whole campaign is then judged to be a failure.

The RAF had no choice bu to attack in small packets of bombers in 1941. The RAF had oodles of fighters, but 2 Gp (the tactical day bomber force) consisted of all of five squadrons (of Blenheims) at that time. There were roughly 300 bombers ( Septemeber) undetaking deep penetration strategic ops over Germany, and a few score engaged in Coastal Command. The RAF was not strong in bombers in 1941....

In fact there was a great deal of success to the '41 campaign. The Germans were defeated in the skies over britain. Britain gained air superiority over the Channel, and made seaborne traffic relatively safe, whilst denying or substantially denying Axis freedom of movement over the coastal seas of Western Europe. The RAF gained substanial control of the coastal areas of NW europe and they also gained substantial freedom of movement and operation over the coastal regions (of france). what they failed to do was force or entice the Germans to come up and get themselves killed.

Most of the allied objectives were achieved. One was not. overall, thats still a success in my book. Without those operations, the subsequent offensive ops in 42-3 would not have been possible.

RAF BC had on the disposal circa 730 bombers, May 1941.

 

[riacrato]

The point is that without local air superiority the Ju87 was so vulnerable to enemy fighters that it became unuseable,as in the BoB.
...This was a lesson not lost on the RAF and was one of the arguments used against not just dive bombing but CAS generally in the debates of 1941.
Cheers
Steve

The Ju 87 was used outside of its capabilities in the BoB. And CAS was definetly not what it was doing.
So drawing a conclusion about whether or not a dive bomber or CAS in general is a worthwhile undertaking based on its loss rate in the BoB has to be faulty. In a typical CAS scenario the defender would have less time to react and much less information about the attacker (the extreme would be he only realizes the attacker once the attack has begun or is about to). That doesn't mean the CAS aircraft in question can go without escort, but it does make life a whole lot harder for the defending force.

Since there was a budget for the A-36... there must've been some people, at least in the USAAF, who were pro-dive bombing, no?

In general though I agree, from a certain point in time, maybe post early 42, the useful bombload of the average fighter is high enough and developing and fielding specialized aircraft (if they are anything other than modifications of existing fighters) doesn't seem economical to me.

 

[stona]

The Ju 87 was used outside of its capabilities in the BoB. And CAS was definetly not what it was doing.
So drawing a conclusion about whether or not a dive bomber or CAS in general is a worthwhile undertaking based on its loss rate in the BoB has to be faulty.

Dive bombing radar stations was surely exactly the sort of thing the Ju87 was supposed to excel at. The Ju87 wasn't outside its capabilities it simply met,for the first time,an organised and integrated air defence system which caused it to be caught without even local air superiority.
Apart from that I agree 100%,nonetheless this was one of the arguments used by senior airmen in 1941 and again in 1942 after experiences with the Vengeance in the Far East. As I said before it was an argument (vulnerability and need for escort) used to bolster the senior airmen's distaste for any kind of role supporting the Army and to reinforce their belief that such a role was a fundamental misuse of air power.

Cheers
Steve

 

[Shortround6]

In the build up to the start of the war and even in the US until late in the war there wasn't enough capacity to build and man all the planes that might be wanted for all the jobs possible. Air staffs had to prioritize where their money and effort would go. Tactical support of the army (and second class status for the air service) or strategic bombing and 1st class status for the air service. Trying to both jobs with the resources in hand (money or appropriations) would almost guarantee failure at both. Look at the rather dismal job bomber command did in 1940-41-42. Crews trying their best and dying but the actual effect on Germany was pretty small. Now cut that by 30, 40, or 50% for increase CAS and/or tactical bombing. Dismal becomes pathetic. Would the effort put into CAS or tactical bombing really pay off that much better?
For effective CAS or tactical bombing you need command of the air, at least in the operational areas, you need to be able to suppress Flak to some extent, if heavy flak is present. You need a command structure that allows for a fast and flexible response for air support and/or very good tactical reconnaissance.

German air support in Poland worked well for a number of reasons. Germans had effective command of the air, The Polish defenders didn't have much in the way AA defenses for the field armies. The Germans had an adequate if perhaps not an outstanding command system.

The German air support was given more credit than it was due. A standard German infantry division had more artillery tubes than a standard Polish division. More importantly the tubes were bigger, more 105mm howitzers vs 75mm guns and more 150mm howitzers vs Polish 105s and 155s. And just as important the German divisions had more motor transport, not that they were anywhere near fully motorized but even a few hundred more trucks per division meant the average German Division had dozens more tons of artillery ammunition than an average Polish division. This basic firepower advantage is often overlooked and more credit is given to the Luftwaffe than it really deserved.
I have not seen a similar analysis of the western campaign but would not be surprised if the Germans did not have a similar artillery advantage over the French. The Luftwaffe did provide some notable examples of support but they were not everywhere, supporting every division.
The British army got screwed because in the budget process in the 30s the RAF "claimed" they could provide support for the army and the army wouldn't need any/many large expensive pieces of modern heavy artillery. in the late 30s the RAF finally admitted it could provide no such support and the Army scrambled to design/build up it's heavy artillery park.

 

[davebender]

Germany produced 4,881 Ju-87s during 1939 to 1945. Not all were lost in combat.

Anyone who thinks B-17 survivability was better then Ju-87 survivability might want to look at official USAF loss statistics. We lost 5,548 heavy bombers (B-17 plus B-24) in Europe alone. Army Air Forces in World War II

 

[stona]

You are comparing apples and oranges.
Steve

 

[parsifal]

Germany produced 4,881 Ju-87s during 1939 to 1945. Not all were lost in combat.

Anyone who thinks B-17 survivability was better then Ju-87 survivability might want to look at official USAF loss statistics. We lost 5,548 heavy bombers (B-17 plus B-24) in Europe alone. Army Air Forces in World War II

You have got to be kidding. B-24 and B-17 production amounted to 31000 airframes for the entire war. Ju87 production amounted to about 5000. I will dig out bergstrom when I get home, as well as one or two other sources. i gurantee that Ju87 losses as a percentage of the total production run will be four or five times higher per sortie than Heavy Bomber losses. I will not be at all surprised to find the outright numbers of Ju87s destroyed in the air being greater than the outright number of B-17s and B-24s lost in combat. numbers lost to attritional causes (not relating to enemy action) will be higher for the heavy bombers, simply because they out numbered the German type by roughly 5:1....

Ju87s represented good value for what they were....cheap, easily built low cost aircraft built to deliver pinpoint attacks at the cost of all other considerations. they were not built for durability, and were certainly not built with high performance in mind. Trying to argue the Ju87 was all these things is just patently untrue. even the germans themselves admitted that.

 

[Altea]

Germany produced 4,881 Ju-87s during 1939 to 1945. Not all were lost in combat.

J'v got some other numbers : 5700 in 39-45 in my books, even more: 6513 in 35-44
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/av...2-stukas-left-tact-today-7603.html#post238294

Whatever, how many Stukas were lost in combat, written-off for combat damage, and written-off for just for tear and wear?

 

[Altea]

Gun armed tank busters are slow flying aircraft if they want to hit anything.

True... But they also need to be nimble, and it's not the Ju-87 with 2 x 37mm case!

So I don't think drag would be an issue. You just need an adequate power to weight ratio for hauling around heavy cannon plus significant cockpit armor.

That mean poor power to weight ratio and high wing loading one. It makes not only a slow, but also an unmanoeuvrable aircraft...

 

[stona]

Apples and oranges.
Some RAF Bomber Command statistics that demonstrate that Ju87 operations were of a different scale,never mind nature.

Bomber Command flew on 1,481 nights during the war (71.4% of all nights during the war)

They flew 307,253 night sorties

They lost 7,953 aircraft (2.6%) at night,which is far more than total Ju87 production. What percentage of Ju87s were lost operationally? I can't find a total figure but of those comitted to the BoB more than 20% were lost.

They also flew 80,163 day sorties,losing 1,000 aircraft (1.2%). This loss percentage is skued by the majority of daylight sorties being flown in the last year of the war under allied air supremacy.

Statistics from "The Bomber Command War Diaries-An Operational Reference Book 1939-1945" by Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt.

Cheers
Steve