Tank busters for the air forces?

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Yes, I agree steve, Perhaps i am repeating what you are saying, but to me, it wouldnt have mattered even if divebombing had been adopted. the hostility about providing direct support to the army on the battlefield was so deep it wouldnt have mattered what delivery system or bombing technique adopted.

People tend to atribute the German successes in direct support to divebombing alone. In fact this was just one element in their recipe for success. there was a deep level of co-operation at all levels, that ensured timely and sufficient support in the right places at the right times. more than anything it was the german integrated command structures, and the priority given to ground support that handed the germans their early successes.

I would go so far as to say, if the British had developed a similar level of co-operation in their training and mission priorities....making ground support their main mission prior to the outbreak of the war, but went to war with Battles as was historically the case, they would have gotten a lot more out of the Battles than they actually did. Level bombing,, glide bombing, fighter bomberws were all less effective than dive bombing when it came to accuracy, but they would have still been 'good enough" if only the RAF had had a different mindset about CAS
 
Indeed,I do nonetheless think that the RAF attitude at the time had some grounds for justification. There is no excuse for the petty rivalry and "junior service complex" (a phrase repeatedly used in Army reports about relations with the RAF). The predominant thinking in most interwar Air Forces was bomber orientated. The airmen were going to pulverise the enemy's means of production and infrastructure and more or less nullify the need for the Army to take to the field. Of course this was pie in the sky and by 1941 the senior airmen were becoming aware of just what a blunt tool air power in the 1940s was going to be. It is no accident that in the months after the invasion there was such a propensity for allied aircraft to attack friendly forces that many Army units would open fire on any aircraft overhead!
This is not the place for a discussion of bomb lines and/or marking techniques,nor the evolution of forward air control,sufficeth to say that all these things took time to develop.
We live in an era when CAS has become one of the principle roles of any Air Force but the communcations and weapons systems to achieve the sort of results we see on the news (or Liveleak or Youtube) simply didn't exist during WW2. It's also noteworthy that the multi role aircraft is the backbone of most modern Air Forces and this is a direct descendant of the WW2 fighter bombers,aircraft forced into multiple roles for which they were never intended. It is easily forgotten that the Typhoon was designed as an air superiority fighter.
The dive bomber was a dead end,useful in its time,but whose days were always numbered.
Cheers
Steve
 
Glider said:
In 1939/40 I do totally agree with you on this. The RAF could have done a lot worse than replace the Battle with the Skua
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Perhaps but they weren't designed to do the same job. The Battle was an oddball aircraft. It was designed with political considerations and no real idea of the effectiveness of it's armament. It was never intended to be a close support aircraft but rather a strategic bomber. The Battle could carry twice the bomb load of a Skua and carry it several hundred miles further. To do this required a large airplane. 8 feet more wingspan and 34% more wing area. It was sort of a less extreme Vickers Wellesley.
The Blenheim was another aircraft that was misused and whose reputation suffered as a result. It carried the same bomb load as the Battle ( a bit of a mistake in requirements but there you are) even further and a bit faster.

Neither planes was intended for low level bombing against defended targets. The Battle carried a bomb aimer who laid prone in the bottom of the plane underneath the pilot and used his bomb sight through a window in the bottom of the plane. Hardly the preferred method of low level bombing.

The idea of using single engine long range bombers with small bomb loads may have appealed to both politicians and peace advocates in the early/mid 30s ( a provision or possible provision of one treaty called for an empty weight of 6000lbs for all future bombers) even though such aircraft didn't really make very good weapons.

The RAF would not substitute The Skua for the Battle because the Skua could not do the Battles job. Of course it was found that even the Wellington could not do the Battles job, fly hundreds of miles without escort into enemy airspace in daylight to bomb infrastructure.
 

I cant see why this is not the place to discuss FACs. Its such an integral part of delivering effective CAS, so why not discuss it.

FACs is considered to have been invented during the American Civil War in the Union Army Baloon Corps, by its commander Thaddeus Lowe. Its most effective applications were during the sieges of Richmond and Petersburg, when Union artillery was accurately directed by the balloon crews using portable telegraph

Im not sure if there was any effective FACs in the allied camp at the outbreak of the war, and that certainly shows in the abysmal showing made in the first years of the war. Conversely I am fairly sure the Germans had an effective FACs system grafted or embedded into their unit command structures. i hav idea how it worked or how it was organized, but you dont get the level of effectiveness that they di by having aircraft flying around the battle unco-ordinated (in an immeediate sense).

For the allies, by 1943, the situation had completely changed. Significant strides were made in defining the role of airpower in close support of ground forces. Forward air control concepts were tried with limited success by the South African Air Force as part of the Royal Air Force in the African campaigns but it wasn"t until the war in Italy that the concepts of ground and airborne forward air controlling were well defined.

The Rover system was developed by the British and adopted by the Americans. A Rover unit consisted of an RAF controller, and an Army Air Liaison Officer, and VHF radio for aircraft communications. Their function was to apply air power to targets, often fleeting, close to the front line. A fundamental feature of the system was use of waves of strike aircraft, with pre-briefed assigned targets but they were required to orbit near the line of battle for 3-20 minutes, subject to Rover preemption and use against fleeting targets of higher priority or urgency. If the Rovers did not direct the fighter-bombers, the latter attacked their pre-briefed targets. U.S. commanders, impressed by the British at the Salerno landings, adapted their own doctrine to include many features of the British system. One important aspect of the Rover system was the willingness to use large numbers of tactical attack aircraft, which were only available after air supremacy had been achieved in the area.

The Rover system was complimented by the use of airborne Forward Air Controllers flying light aircraft (British Lysanders and USAAF L-5 Sentinels). These FACs used the collective call sign Horsefly. Success of the Horsefly operations was tempered by inadequate communications equipment and extreme vulnerability to hostile air-to-air action and Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA).

For the Normandy invasion each beachhead was assigned an LST with a combined Army and Air Force control element to coordinate Army requirements for close air support. Rover parties went ashore with all the ground forces. However, it wasn"t until the fall of 1944 that Horsefly-type FACing became common. Increased resources and the full use of the expanded air-ground liaison teams produced a functional system of airborne FACs.

There are many stories of individual heroism by Forward Air Controllers in WW II but perhaps none is more impressive than the story about Captain James E. Parker. Captain Parker was in charge of the air support party that had been rushed to Bastogne on 18 December 1944. It was his job to integrate Close Air Support (CAS) into the fight throughout the siege. Captain Parker, a veteran fighter-bomber pilot with considerable experience in both the Pacific and European theaters, was also an experienced Forward Air Controller. Parker talked to flight leaders en route to Bastogne, gave them approach instructions, and helped them identify intended targets. P-47s came in low and fast, catching the Germans by surprise. On more than one occasion, ground troops received CAS within fifteen minutes of requesting an air strike. Enemy flak was heavy and elusive, with German batteries apparently moving from position to position around the Bastogne perimeter. On 28-29 December, Captain Parker coordinated a series of combined arms air-artillery attacks that finally silenced the threat and enabled the American Army to break the siege.

At the conclusion of WWII the US seems to have forgotten many of the hard lessons of WWII and in their haste to demobilize disbanded the airborne Forward Air Controller concept and relegated it to a ground based system using radio equipped jeeps. This is where the system was at the beginning of the Korean War, and it explains the generally lower accuracy rates achieved by the USAF and USN for the early parts of that conflict.

It was probably true that FACS did not exist in the allied armies at the beginning of the war



True, but some adapted to the job better than others. I dont know all that much about Typoons, but Furies and fireflies achieved impressive results during the Korean war

The dive bomber was a dead end,useful in its time,but whose days were always numbered.
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Absolutely.
 
There was no such thing as FACs in France in 1940 in the way we understand it.
After the German breakthrough and encirclement of the Anglo-French forces in France the rudimentary system that did exist really broke down. Most of the "Air Component" was operating from bases in Southern England,seperated from RAF headquarters in France,while the AASF withdrew to bases further South,away from the Germans but also virtually cut off from the BEF.
Army officers in France were reduced to telephoning the War Office in London to try and arrange bomber attacks!

Books have been written on the adoption of the so called "tentacle" system developed by the British following their experience in North Africa and refined in 1942. This system was also adopted as the basis of the American system.
I will scan a couple of diagrams from Gooderson's book when my other half vacates the office in lieue of typing a thousand words.

One problem that was never solved was a lack of personnel in these new and vital roles. There was all sorts of petty squabbling about appropriate/equivalent ranks and responsibilities. It's a miracle that we ever managed to get any fighting done.

Cheers
Steve
 
Britain was never short of fighter aircraft and probably had a surplus from 1941 onward. If they were unable to furnish fighter escort for dive bombers the RAF must have had leadership problems.
 
pbfoot said:
On the staff of Lord Gort in France was a single RAF liason officer so the chance of CAS was a non eveent
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There was a joint RAF/Army School of Army Cooperation at Old Sarum. Here,under No.22 Group,junior Army officers were trained for liason duties with the squadrons detailed to support the BEF. They were in no sense FACs,rather they would liase with their RAF counterparts over the provision of tactical and photographic reconnaissance and artillery spotting. This is WWI stuff and completely out of date by 1939/40.
Cheers
Steve
 
davebender said:
Britain was never short of fighter aircraft and probably had a surplus from 1941 onward. If they were unable to furnish fighter escort for dive bombers the RAF must have had leadership problems.
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I was referring to the period of the Battle of France. The RAF most certainly did not have a surplus of fighters available for such duties. Most squadrons in France were scrambling from one airfield to another usually without sufficient motor transport. They were arriving on unsuitable airfields with a lack of basic communication equipment,spares,ground crew or sometimes fuel and ammunition. Later in the campaign they returned to England whilst many of the units you would have them escort moved South of the German's advance on the channel coast.

After the BoB it was one of Leigh Mallory's less brilliant ideas to send large numbers of fighters across the channel supporting a few bombers which would act as bait to lure the Luftwaffe to its destruction. This cost the RAF many pilots' lives and singularly failed to do the damage to the Luftwaffe envisaged by the new C-in-C Fighter Command. It was always pilots not aircraft that was a potential shortfall for the RAF.Would they have done any better escorting dive bombers? I very much doubt it.

My personal view is,that for Fighter Command at least, Leigh Mallory was a leadership problem incarnate,but that's another matter

Cheers
Steve
 
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Would the Luftwaffe made the same reaction on the, say, 300 (any-type of) bombers, as it was making at appearance of few bombers?
 
Would the Luftwaffe made the same reaction on the, say, 300 (any-type of) bombers, as it was making at appearance of few bombers?
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That depends on what the RAF decide to bomb.

Most Circus raids were pinprick affairs against French targets that had little military or economic value to the German war effort. Why should Germany spend a bunch of resources intercepting such raids? Every French citizen killed and every French property destroyed is more incentive for France to cooperate with Germany.
 
Lee mallory had overly ambitious objectives for the 1941 offensive over france, but just be aware that there were many other objectives that were achieved. It never ceases to amaze me that because the RAF failed in one of its self imosed objectives, and that one objective was so unrealistic as to be surreal, yet the whole campaign is then judged to be a failure.

The RAF had no choice bu to attack in small packets of bombers in 1941. The RAF had oodles of fighters, but 2 Gp (the tactical day bomber force) consisted of all of five squadrons (of Blenheims) at that time. There were roughly 300 bombers ( Septemeber) undetaking deep penetration strategic ops over Germany, and a few score engaged in Coastal Command. The RAF was not strong in bombers in 1941....

In fact there was a great deal of success to the '41 campaign. The Germans were defeated in the skies over britain. Britain gained air superiority over the Channel, and made seaborne traffic relatively safe, whilst denying or substantially denying Axis freedom of movement over the coastal seas of Western Europe. The RAF gained substanial control of the coastal areas of NW europe and they also gained substantial freedom of movement and operation over the coastal regions (of france). what they failed to do was force or entice the Germans to come up and get themselves killed.

Most of the allied objectives were achieved. One was not. overall, thats still a success in my book. Without those operations, the subsequent offensive ops in 42-3 would not have been possible.
 
I admit to believing that the fighter units in SE England would have been better used in the Med and Far East. The RAF Hurricanes were seriously outclassed by the Me109 and Spits from earlier in the campaign would have had significant advantages
 



Was the Ju 87 vulnerable? It would seem only for certain kinds of mission. As a tank buster I believe its loss rate was half that of the FW 190 in the same role. As a low level night harrasment aircraft it had among the lowest loss rate of any bomber of the war.


There was no time to complete "the job in the west". The BoB was only about forcing the British to negotiate. It was necessary to turn East before Stalin turned West.
 

All divebombers have inherent vulnerabilities. Not unique to the Ju 87 but neither was the ju 87 immune to those effects. Divebombers achieve their accuracy by a slow rate of descent, and a steep angle of attack. At both the top of the dive, and the bottom of the dive they are basically flak magnets . Even during the descent they have to carry out the manouver in a straight line, and slowly, all of which greatly increases their vulnerability.

Ju87s were certainly effective at Night Harassment, but they are far from the most resilient. all aircraft types on the eastern front suffered massive attrition rates, which immediately eliminates all German aircraft from that sort of mantle. Dont know about the comparison of Ju87 to FW 190, but they did suffer more heavily at Kursk compared to both the ju88 and the Hs 129. Ju87 losses at Kursk were quite heavy compared to other types, and Kursk was really the first time the VVS mounted a sustained challenge to german Air superiority.

There was no time to complete "the job in the west". The BoB was only about forcing the British to negotiate. It was necessary to turn East before Stalin turned West
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.

That sitaution only arose from the comprehensively poor planning and assessments made by hitler. if preprations for dealing with britain had been made from the very beginning, instead of basing their assessments on racist claptrap, they would have had plenty of time to "finish the job. if the occupied territories and the axis partneers had been better integrated, which hitler and his economics minister (Goring) could easily have done instead of basing their decisions on whacko 'lebenraum" theories, and the german economy had been made more ready prewar for the war, the resources at germany's disposal would have been massively greater. germany as an economic entity was twice as powerful as britain in 1940, and to that could have been added the entire economic potential of the other occupied nations. instead the economies the germans controlled were comprehensively trashed.

Lastly, you dont deal with mutiple threats by not dealing with the most vulnerable first. that flies in the face of every theory on concentration of force known in miliatry theory.

hitler and his mate goring were just breathtakingly incompetent when it came to higher grand strategyh
 

I agree with the body of your post but not your conclusions regarding Leigh Mallory. Bad leadership is repeating your's or other's mistakes and that's what he did. The RAF was commited over France/NW Europe to fight at the same disadvantage experienced by the Luftwaffe a year or so earlier. It cost hundreds of lives. I believe the same objectives could have been achieved using different tactics and achieved less expensively.

Cheers
Steve
 
An unprotected formation of Ju87s certainly was vulnerable to fighters. The RAF found them easiest to attack after they had made their dive and were reassembling at low altitude. A Ju87 is a relatively slow,large,poorly armed target and lacking manoeuvreability relative to any contemporary fighter worthy of the name.
I think it was Lacey (not sure) who described the Ju87 as his favourite target because it would burst into flames at the wing root as soon as it was hit. This is an important consideration given the resilience of other Luftwaffe types to rifle calibre machine guns.
Cheers
Steve
 
Ju87 is a relatively slow,large,poorly armed target and lacking manoeuvreability relative to any contemporary fighter worthy
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The Ju-87 was not exceptionally vulnerable. Lancasters and B-17s cruising to the target @ 180mph were just as vulnerable to enemy fighter aircraft.
 
davebender said:
The Ju-87 was not exceptionally vulnerable. Lancasters and B-17s cruising to the target @ 180mph were just as vulnerable to enemy fighter aircraft.
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Except that the Lancasters went by night and the B-17 was both heavily armed and,eventually,heavily escorted.

The point is that without local air superiority the Ju87 was so vulnerable to enemy fighters that it became unuseable,as in the BoB.
They were effectively withdrawn after losses on 18th August,though they did make some anti-shipping strikes in the channel later. The dive bombers were escorted but one unit (I./StG 77) was seperated from its escort and lost 10 of 28 aircraft,5 in the initial interception by the Hurricanes of 43 Squadron (according to Patrick Bishop).
Other Ju87 Gruppen came under attack from 153,601 and 602 Squadrons. In total 16 were shot down and 2 more crashed on returning to France. 4 more were badly damaged.
I'd call that vulnerable. Facts are facts and opinions are just opinions.
This was a lesson not lost on the RAF and was one of the arguments used against not just dive bombing but CAS generally in the debates of 1941.
Cheers
Steve
 
There is just no comparison between the vulnerability of aircraft like the Ju87 and B-17s. It was a bad day for a B-17 if a formation lost 10% of the force. it happened, but not generally. 10% losses for a formation of Ju87s in a hostile airspace would be incredibly low, even on the eastern front. it was nothing for stukas to lose 20-40 or even 50% of their forces when employed in a defended airspace
 
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