The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war.

I just don't see the offensive happening in August 1942. It's one thing to meet the Japanese head on in a naval battle (like Midway) but when you are going to be launching a ground campaign, you need to be able to stay on station. That means staying on station with enough force to meet the enemy at the enemy's peak power. In 1942, the US Navy had not mastered the underway replenishment that was the hallmark of the fast carrier force in 1944-45. The on-duty carriers had to rotate on and off station. Under the hypothetical, starting with 5 carriers, including the Yorktown, the US at best would have been able to keep three carriers on station, and again, under the hypothetical, Japan could have thrown six fleet carriers and several light carriers against them. True, the IJN was short of tankers and oil, but the US Navy also had a shortage of tankers. Per Neptune's Inferno, that was the main reason the old reconditioned battleships were not committed to battle at Guadalcanal. Even if the Yorktown had not been touched at Midway, the ship was going to need some substantial yard time to make proper repairs to the damage suffered at the Coral Sea and to generally update the ship. That would make participation in a Solomons campaign in August pretty iffy. Without the Yorktown, the USN would have had exactly the same carrier lineup it had historically, except under this hypothetical, it would be facing up to four (but probably fewer) additional front-line Japanese carriers. Other than the Yorktown, the earliest the USN could get additional carriers to a Solomons battle would be after the Operation Torch carriers finished in the Atlantic, and these ships would have to travel halfway across the world to get there. Historically the Sangamon, Suwanee, and Chenango arrived in theater in Mid-January 1943. These carriers weren't first line, but they were at least as capable as Japan's light carriers. (They were also needed to protect convoys, which was their main job historically.) If the US had taken up the campaign against a Japan with 6 intact fleet carriers, and if the US would suffer additional loss like the torpedoing of the Saratoga and Wasp, the US Navy would be looking at fighting a second Midway-type battle at a worse numerical disadvantage.

Finally, coming full circle to the original topic, if as you assert the US Navy was looking for a fight to cause attrition against the IJN, the main tool they were counting on to cause that attrition was the good old SBD Dauntless, my #1 pick for "turn the tide".

MarkinTex said:

A big part of why Barbarossa wasn't going well (and why the Brits had been able to hang on till '42) was Lend-Lease, and if the US hadn't entered the war, the Brits would have never been able to do anything in North Africa which means no Italian invasion, and would not have been able to successfully invade France. The Eastern Front might have ground to a standstill, which would have meant that the Germans and Russians would have come to a separate peace just like they did at Brest-Litovsk in the first war, which would have freed up Germany to go after Britain.

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A bit provocative but I think Markin actually makes some good points. I do not think the British could have taken over control of North Africa without American help - especially in three key areas - tanks, aircraft and general logistics.

Tanks in North Africa
Parsifal already outlined the basic situation with the tanks, but let me spell that out a little bit further. British tanks like the Cruiser and Crusader and even the Matilda infantry tank were carrying either anti-tank or HE weapons. You had a lot with 2 pounder QF (40mm) medium velocity AP guns, and some designated as 'CS' (close support) tanks with 3 inch (75mm) low velocity HE guns. But it was an 'either / or' thing. Later some had the 6 pounder (57mm high velocity) which was a much better AP weapon, but still not very good against non vehicle targets. Most of the British tanks were fast, but also didn't carry a lot of machine guns (usually just one .30 cal weapon) and with the exception of the Matilda had poor armor protection by the standards of the day and a tendency to catch fire when hit.



Here is the big problem with the British tanks - the 2 pounder and the 6 pounder were both pretty good AP guns for use against tanks - the 2 pounder was roughly equivalent to the American and German 37mm guns, while the 6 pounder was very good at relatively short range - better than the German 50mm. But the 2 pounder had no HE shell, neither did the 6 pounder - at least not then during the Desert campaign. Conversely, the 3 inch HE gun on the 'CS' tanks had no AP capacity. German defenses in the North African tank battles tended to be a mix of tanks and AT guns, (including the famous 88 but much more significant were smaller 37mm, 50mm and 75mm guns).



So if a column of Cruiser Mk IV and V or Crusader tanks runs into Panzer Mk III's, they have a reasonable chance of success, but if they are faced at the same time with some well placed German 50mm AT guns, they have really no way to answer back. They can shoot with their 40mm AP gun (2 lber) but AP ammo isn't very effective against enemy gun positions. By the time a CS tank rolls up they are likely to be wiped out. They also don't have any way to silence machine gun positions, mortars, or artillery they encounter.



By contrast the German tanks by the time of Tobruk are made up mainly of Pz III and IV, StuGG III plus some Italian and captured British tanks, but most of the German tanks are armed with 50mm medium velocity, with some 75mm low velocity and the F2 Special armed with 75mm high velocity guns. All dual purpose and effective against both soft targets (infantry, spotters, artillery or AT guns) and hard targets (tanks and other armored vehicles). Plus usually two fast firing machine guns per tank. The German 50mm gun outranged the 2 pounder and the 75mm outranged the 6 pounder. This was one of the reasons why they usually won out in more or less numerically and situationally equal tank battles against the British. The British are highly vulnerable to German AT guns, don't have enough effective radios, and also lose out in tank vs. tank encounters.

You can really see how this plays out in more realistic tabletop or even computer war games simulating tank battles in this era.



Enter the US kit. The M3 / Stuart was roughly equivalent in most significant respects to the older British Cruiser tanks, fast and lightly armored with a small high velocity (37mm gun), but it did have AHE ammo for it's small gun which was close in HE effect to a 60mm mortar round (and also very effective cannister shells for short range) and more machine guns and radios. It was never designed to be a medium tank but it was useful for recon and screening etc. But overall no major improvement, incremental at best, over a Cruiser Mk IV and a little less useful than a Crusader.

However the M3 Medium (with both the same 37mm high velocity gun of the Stuart and a 75mm bow gun) was very useful because of it's medium velocity 75mm. In spite of limited traverse etc., it's gun had good AP and HE rounds and could knock out both German tanks and gun positions fairly efficiently.



When the M4 (Sherman) showed up, contrary to the tropes it was probably the best tank on the battlefield at the time. It had good and reliable radios. Heavy armor by the standards of the day - more than the German Pz IV. It's medium velocity 75mm gun (a little more powerful than the gun on the M3) had a long range, could kill any German tank of the time except the very rare Tiger, could outrange all the German guns except the 88 and the high velocity 75mm on the (also pretty rare) Pz IV F2 Special and some precious Pak 40 AT guns. could also flatten anti-tank gun positions, spotters and artillery as quickly as they were detected and even had a gyrostabilized gun which could shoot on the move. They also carried multiple machine guns including .50 cal heavy machine guns which were much more effective against light vehicles (including German light tanks and armored cars) and soft targets out to a far greater range than the LMG's.

That also goes for American made self propelled artillery, half-tracks, and even trucks - everything had a .50 caliber machine gun on it. The Germans who fought in the Afrika Korps commented on the .50 cal quite a bit and clearly feared it.

The planes
In the early days in North Africa the British were making do with Lysanders and Gladiators, facing mostly Italian Cr 32 and Cr 42 fighters with a mix of obsolete bombers on both sides. The Germans upped the ante by sending some Bf 110s and the Italians sent more capable MC 200 and Fiat G.50 fighters. The British answered with the Hurricane which had it's day and could handle the opposition at first, but when the Germans sent Bf 109s to the Theater, the Hurricane quickly showed it's limits. The main bombers at the time were Blenheims on the British side and a mix of Ju 87, SM. 79, CANT 1007 and Ju 88s on the German side.

Very quickly from Spring of 1941 it became clear that the Hurricane was no longer in the game. The Blenheim was notoriously ineffective as a bomber in this Theater and crews took even worse casualties than the Hurricane squadrons. US made P-40 Tomahawks and later Kittyhawks may not have turned the tide, but they quickly became the main air superiority type and stabilized the disaster. American made bombers, some coming via the French some directly from Lend Lease, quickly formed the backbone of the British bomber force - Martin Marylands and Baltimores were first, then A-20s, and eventually B-25s and B-26's in American hands.

By the time of El Alamein US made P-40s were definitely taking the brunt of the fighting and shooting down the majority of enemy aircraft, as well as dropping the bombs which directly led to the key breakouts, notably by 112, 250 and 260 Squadrons RAF and the US 57th Fighter Group, while US made medium and heavy bombers had the most impact on enemy airfields, supply and communication assets. Not long after El Alamein by the way the Hurricane was basically retired from the front line even for fighter-bomber missions, they taper off you don't see them in action almost at all after the 1st quarter of 1943.

TL : DR I don't think the British / Commonwealth forces could have won El Alamein without Sherman tanks, US artillery, ammunition, trucks and food and fuel, and the P-40 fighter and a variety of US made bombers. Furthermore I'm not sure the British could have turned the tide in North Africa alone. I definitely don't think they could have captured Sicily and thus secured their Malta supply line alone.

For Barbarossa, it's a bit trickier to say for sure but I know American and British tanks were important in the Soviet Army by 1942 and I know for a fact that US aircraft were important in the defense of Moscow and Leningrad, and to a lesser extent in Stalingrad as well. All of these were basically 'tipping points' in the War.

michael rauls said:

I think Schweiks" we'd all be typing Japanese" statement was meant as a bit of hyperbole.

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Yes I was kidding, though maybe they would have been in Hawaii. I think it's an interesting scenario to consider: what happens if the Japanese had won Midway. The SBD certainly played a major role in that victory, as did radar, and the code breaking and good planning by US leadership and bravery by US flight crews including the fighter pilots and the torpedo bomber pilots who were basically sacrificed for the victory.

But lets be real- there was also a fair amount of luck. Luck is often very significant in warfare in any era. With the split second timing of some of the key moments of that battle, things like spotter planes and the vagaries of clouds, timing etc., it was clearly a major element of the victory.

And if it had gone the other way, well it's interesting to think about isn't it.

My angle on the SBD, is that it was useful in two ways - the 'Blitzkrieg' type victory of all or nothing in a key moment, a few hours condensed down to minutes or seconds where a squadron of dive bombers tries to sink a Strategic naval asset like an aircraft carrier, (or the Battleships such as the Bismark which it's quite clear they could have very easily sunk).

And I would say Pearl Harbor and a few other engagements show us that the Japanese naval bombers were also effective in this sense - they too could sink capital ships like CV's and BB's as well as lesser but still expensive and / or important vessels like CA's and CL's, DD's, fuel tankers and transports. If you sunk all the transports in the invasion fleet, or killed the carrier - it didn't really matter if you lost half your air planes. You won a Strategic victory.

But it was also critical for these aircraft to be useful in a war of attrition. This is where the SBD shined and outperformed the deadly Japanese D3A and B5N - they could get the job done and sink ships, but at too high a cost in machines and aircrew. This is why I point out that Coral Sea, Milne Bay and the Solomon's Campaign were as important in a way, as Midway. You needed both. Midway made it possible for the US to ultimately win in that attrition war because it balanced the scales in terms of available naval assets. As someone noted upthread 2 or 3 posts, Neptune's Inferno explains how the US also did face critical supply and fuel shortages and felt the squeeze of logistics nightmares themselves, and that is why they had so few battleships available to take on the Japanese fleet in those deadly battles and Japanese victories like at Savo Island. Apparently the amount of fuel used by those older BB's especially was so huge that it would have effectively used up all the fuel used by the rest of the fleet.

The SBD really stood out among the kit used on both sides as an asset which could do it's main job (sink important enemy ships) but also survive at a fairly good ratio while doing it, win Strategic carrier duels but also longer attritional campaigns such as the struggle for Guadalcanal... and also effectively do a lot of other jobs like CAS for the Marines and ASW etc.


And no Shortround, the Vought Vindicator could not have done the same job. But I'll get to that in another post.

Schweik said:

A bit provocative but I think Markin actually makes some good points. I do not think the British could have taken over control of North Africa without American help - especially in three key areas - tanks, aircraft and general logistics.

Tanks in North Africa
Parsifal already outlined the basic situation with the tanks, but let me spell that out a little bit further. British tanks like the Cruiser and Crusader and even the Matilda infantry tank were carrying either anti-tank or HE weapons. You had a lot with 2 pounder QF (40mm) medium velocity AP guns, and some designated as 'CS' (close support) tanks with 3 inch (75mm) low velocity HE guns. But it was an 'either / or' thing. Later some had the 6 pounder (57mm high velocity) which was a much better AP weapon, but still not very good against non vehicle targets. Most of the British tanks were fast, but also didn't carry a lot of machine guns (usually just one .30 cal weapon) and with the exception of the Matilda had poor armor protection by the standards of the day and a tendency to catch fire when hit.

View attachment 530658

Here is the big problem with the British tanks - the 2 pounder and the 6 pounder were both pretty good AP guns for use against tanks - the 2 pounder was roughly equivalent to the American and German 37mm guns, while the 6 pounder was very good at relatively short range. But the 2 pounder had no HE shell, neither did the 6 pounder - at least not then during the Desert campaign. Conversely, the 3 inch HE gun on the 'CS' tanks had no AP capacity. German defenses in the North African tank battles tended to be a mix of tanks and AT guns, (including the famous 88 but much more significant were smaller 37mm, 50mm and 75mm guns).

View attachment 530654

So if a column of Cruiser Mk IV and V or Crusader tanks runs into Panzer Mk III's, they have a reasonable chance of success, but if they are faced at the same time with some well placed German 50mm AT guns, they have really no way to answer back. They can shoot with their 40mm AP gun (2 lber) but AP ammo isn't very effective against enemy gun positions. By the time a CS tank rolls up they are likely to be wiped out. They also don't have any way to silence machine gun positions, mortars, or artillery they encounter.

View attachment 530655

By contrast the German tanks by the time of Tobruk are made up mainly of Pz III and IV, StuGG III plus some Italian and captured British tanks, but most of the German tanks are armed with 50mm medium velocity, with some 75mm low velocity and the F2 Special armed with 75mm high velocity guns. All dual purpose and effective against both soft targets (infantry, spotters, artillery or AT guns) and hard targets (tanks and other armored vehicles). Plus usually two fast firing machine guns per tank. The German 50mm gun outranged the 2 pounder and the 75mm outranged the 6 pounder. This was one of the reasons why they usually won out in more or less numerically and situationally equal tank battles against the British. The British are highly vulnerable to German AT guns, don't have enough effective radios, and also lose out in tank vs. tank encounters.

You can really see how this plays out in more realistic tabletop or even computer war games simulating tank battles in this era.

View attachment 530656

Enter the US kit. The M3 / Stuart was roughly equivalent in most significant respects to the older British Cruiser tanks, fast and lightly armored with a small high velocity (37mm gun), but it did have AP ammo for it's small gun (and also very effective cannister shells for short range) and more machine guns and radios. It was never designed to be a medium tank but it was useful for recon and screening etc. But overall no major improvement, incremental at best, over a Cruiser Mk IV and a little less useful than a Crusader.

However the M3 Medium (with both the same 37mm high velocity gun of the Stuart and a 75mm bow gun) was very useful because of it's medium velocity 75mm. In spite of limited traverse etc., it's gun had good AP and HE rounds and could knock out both German tanks and gun positions fairly efficiently.

View attachment 530657

When the M4 (Sherman) showed up, contrary to the tropes it was probably the best tank on the battlefield at the time. It had good and reliable radios. Heavy armor by the standards of the day - more than the German Pz IV. It's medium velocity 75mm gun (a little more powerful than the gun on the M3) had a long range, could kill any German tank of the time except the very rare Tiger, could outrange all the German guns except the 88 and the high velocity 75mm on the (also pretty rare) Pz IV F2 Special and some precious Pak 40 AT guns. could also flatten anti-tank gun positions, spotters and artillery as quickly as they were detected and even had a gyrostabilized gun which could shoot on the move. They also carried multiple machine guns including .50 cal heavy machine guns which were much more effective against light vehicles (including German light tanks and armored cars) and soft targets out to a far greater range than the LMG's.

That also goes for American made self propelled artillery, half-tracks, and even trucks - everything had a .50 caliber machine gun on it. The Germans who fought in the Afrika Korps commented on the .50 cal quite a bit and clearly feared it.

The planes
In the early days in North Africa the British were making do with Lysanders and Gladiators, facing mostly Italian Cr 32 and Cr 42 fighters with a mix of obsolete bombers on both sides. The Germans upped the ante by sending some Bf 110s and the Italians sent more capable MC 200 and Fiat G.50 fighters. The British answered with the Hurricane which had it's day and could handle the opposition at first, but when the Germans sent Bf 109s to the Theater, the Hurricane quickly showed it's limits. The main bombers at the time were Blenheims on the British side and a mix of Ju 87, SM. 79, CANT 1007 and Ju 88s on the German side.

Very quickly from Spring of 1941 it became clear that the Hurricane was no longer in the game. The Blenheim was notoriously ineffective as a bomber in this Theater and crews took even worse casualties than the Hurricane squadrons. US made P-40 Tomahawks and later Kittyhawks may not have turned the tide, but they quickly became the main air superiority type and stabilized the disaster. American made bombers, some coming via the French some directly from Lend Lease, quickly formed the backbone of the British bomber force - Martin Marylands and Baltimores were first, then A-20s, and eventually B-25s and B-26's in American hands.

By the time of El Alamein US made P-40s were definitely taking the brunt of the fighting and shooting down the majority of enemy aircraft, as well as dropping the bombs which directly led to the key breakouts, notably by 112, 250 and 260 Squadrons RAF and the US 57th Fighter Group, while US made medium and heavy bombers had the most impact on enemy airfields, supply and communication assets. Not long after El Alamein by the way the Hurricane was basically retired from the front line even for fighter-bomber missions, they taper off you don't see them in action almost at all after the 1st quarter of 1943.

TL : DR I don't think the British / Commonwealth forces could have won El Alamein without Sherman tanks, US artillery, ammunition, trucks and food and fuel, and the P-40 fighter and a variety of US made bombers. Furthermore I'm not sure the British could have turned the tide in North Africa alone. I definitely don't think they could have captured Sicily and thus secured their Malta supply line alone.

For Barbarossa, it's a bit trickier to say for sure but I know American and British tanks were important in the Soviet Army by 1942 and I know for a fact that US aircraft were important in the defense of Moscow and Leningrad, and to a lesser extent in Stalingrad as well. All of these were basically 'tipping points' in the War.

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You need to differentiate between "US made" and "lend lease" in your post. The 2 are not synonymous. The early P-40 Tomahawks that arrived in the spring of 1941 were all bought and paid for using UK gold reserves. Exactly how would Britain have failed in North Africa given that it was out-producing Germany? Exactly what was the proportion of lend-lease equipment in the British front-line in North Africa? I'd be surprised if it was more than 10% overall...and, frankly, given the production totals, that isn't a big enough proportion to have a direct impact in the outcome of the campaign.

I tend to be of the opinion that even without the U.S. the British win in north Africa and probably the whole shebang as well although it's certainly not nearly the surefire bet as it is with the U.S. Fortunately we'll never know for sure.
I base this opinion on industrial output and resources( manpower and material).
The Brits had the whole of the Empire to draw from. I think in a prolonged war of attrition(which is what would be probable, I don't see the Germans successfuly crossing the channel and occupying England) eventually the Germans just run out of both man and machine.

buffnut453 said:

You need to differentiate between "US made" and "lend lease" in your post. The 2 are not synonymous. The early P-40 Tomahawks that arrived in the spring of 1941 were all bought and paid for using UK gold reserves. Exactly how would Britain have failed in North Africa given that it was out-producing Germany? Exactly what was the proportion of lend-lease equipment in the British front-line in North Africa? I'd be surprised if it was more than 10% overall...and, frankly, given the production totals, that isn't a big enough proportion to have a direct impact in the outcome of the campaign.

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At El Alemain it was roughly 50/50 Kittyhawks and Hurricanes plus 3 of Spitfire IIRC. IMO the Tomahawk/Kittyhawk were the right planes for the job in North Africa, in their role of supporting an army in the field. The Hurricane was okay up against the Italians, but the Hawks were better for use against the Germans. The Spitfire not sufficiently developed for that role by the time of El Alemain, the Vc, the VIII far superior, but they came later. So the Hawks were essential for victory in 1942.

Dimlee said:

And someone can say that this just "European" or "pro-Soviet" revisionism.
Operation Barbarossa did not succeed even before serious lend lease supplies started to arrive, indeed. But Barbarossa brought USSR to the brink of collapse. And there were other German operations later which threatened the very existence of the Soviet Union.
Regarding US war materials... If we change the topic of this thread to "which vehicle did the most to turn the tide of the war", I'd suggest Studebaker trucks (probably US6 should be singled out) and Liberty ship. I see no opportunity for the Red/Soviet Army to conduct its large offensive operations in post Kursk period without this equipment.

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Can we please add the 2,000 locomotives and 17,000 railroad cars and just call it "rolling stock"? with the Liberty ship? ('cuz it don't help if you ain't where the fight is gonna be!)

Conslaw said:

I just don't see the offensive happening in August 1942. It's one thing to meet the Japanese head on in a naval battle (like Midway) but when you are going to be launching a ground campaign, you need to be able to stay on station. That means staying on station with enough force to meet the enemy at the enemy's peak power. In 1942, the US Navy had not mastered the underway replenishment that was the hallmark of the fast carrier force in 1944-45. The on-duty carriers had to rotate on and off station. Under the hypothetical, starting with 5 carriers, including the Yorktown, the US at best would have been able to keep three carriers on station, and again, under the hypothetical, Japan could have thrown six fleet carriers and several light carriers against them. True, the IJN was short of tankers and oil, but the US Navy also had a shortage of tankers. Per Neptune's Inferno, that was the main reason the old reconditioned battleships were not committed to battle at Guadalcanal. Even if the Yorktown had not been touched at Midway, the ship was going to need some substantial yard time to make proper repairs to the damage suffered at the Coral Sea and to generally update the ship. That would make participation in a Solomons campaign in August pretty iffy. Without the Yorktown, the USN would have had exactly the same carrier lineup it had historically, except under this hypothetical, it would be facing up to four (but probably fewer) additional front-line Japanese carriers. Other than the Yorktown, the earliest the USN could get additional carriers to a Solomons battle would be after the Operation Torch carriers finished in the Atlantic, and these ships would have to travel halfway across the world to get there. Historically the Sangamon, Suwanee, and Chenango arrived in theater in Mid-January 1943. These carriers weren't first line, but they were at least as capable as Japan's light carriers. (They were also needed to protect convoys, which was their main job historically.) If the US had taken up the campaign against a Japan with 6 intact fleet carriers, and if the US would suffer additional loss like the torpedoing of the Saratoga and Wasp, the US Navy would be looking at fighting a second Midway-type battle at a worse numerical disadvantage.

Finally, coming full circle to the original topic, if as you assert the US Navy was looking for a fight to cause attrition against the IJN, the main tool they were counting on to cause that attrition was the good old SBD Dauntless, my #1 pick for "turn the tide".

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Historically, the US carriers were withdrawn 8th August , leaving behind a cruiser force that was thought strong enough to deal with the local IJN forces at hand. Unfortunately for the allies, the socalled Japanese 8th fleet, based at Rabaul had been strengthened somewahat, unknown to the allies (though the allies did receive advance coastwatcher reports of the approach of that fleet down the slot. What the allies failed to appreciate was the night fighting capabilities of the Japanese, which is unforgivable really, since they had already encountered it in a major sea battle (java Sea)

Guadacanal was initially a "smash and grab" exercise...….get ashore, get the airfield going, wait for the Japanese to react, and start the attrition process. Fletchers decision to clear the area was over the protests of the allied cruiser commander (Adm Turner), but it was consistent with the general concepts worked out in the planning phases behind the operation.

Given that these fundamental principals were worked out before Midway, it follows that the mission was planned to go ahead with or without midway. The only scenario where Guadacanal would not play out from August (in fact the original concept was for the operation to take place in July) was in the situation that the US carriers suffered catastropjic and one sided losses. That scenario would make it impossible to mount effective re-supply operations and place the marines in an exposed and indefensible position.

A few notes on tank guns if I may.

Schweik said:

Parsifal already outlined the basic situation with the tanks, but let me spell that out a little bit further. British tanks like the Cruiser and Crusader and even the Matilda infantry tank were carrying either anti-tank or HE weapons. You had a lot with 2 pounder QF (40mm) medium velocity AP guns, and some designated as 'CS' (close support) tanks with 3 inch (75mm) low velocity HE guns. But it was an 'either / or' thing. Later some had the 6 pounder (57mm high velocity) which was a much better AP weapon, but still not very good against non vehicle targets. Most of the British tanks were fast, but also didn't carry a lot of machine guns (usually just one .30 cal weapon) and with the exception of the Matilda had poor armor protection by the standards of the day and a tendency to catch fire when hit.

Click to expand...

Schweik said:

Here is the big problem with the British tanks - the 2 pounder and the 6 pounder were both pretty good AP guns for use against tanks - the 2 pounder was roughly equivalent to the American and German 37mm guns, while the 6 pounder was very good at relatively short range. But the 2 pounder had no HE shell, neither did the 6 pounder - at least not then during the Desert campaign. Conversely, the 3 inch HE gun on the 'CS' tanks had no AP capacity. German defenses in the North African tank battles tended to be a mix of tanks and AT guns, (including the famous 88 but much more significant were smaller 37mm, 50mm and 75mm guns).

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Yes the 2pdr was AP only, but the situation for the British was worse that described as far as HE went. The early 3.7in tank 'gun"(mortar) and the later 3in "howitzer were pretty much smoke throwers not HE throwers. Ammo load outs were heavily biased towards smoke shells. Smoke shells are not a whole lot of fun in a miniatures game though

I would also note that on the 3in howitzer the velocity was extremely low (600-650fps) not meters per second like this web sight claims.
http://www.wwiitanks.co.uk/tankdata/1940-Britain-Matilda-InfTankMkIIMatildaIIICS.html
Which makes long range gunnery (trying to land an HE shell in gun pit) more than a bit challenging.

Machine guns are another thing many miniatures rules get wrong. Bow machine guns were pretty much useless much over 200 meters and for the most part they had lousy sights. A lot times they had no sights, the bow gunner observed his fire using a periscope or vision slot using tracers and trying to correct. Yes the Germans did use a small scope.
The co-ax gun is aimed using the main gun sight. It was mounted pretty solid, it used the same traverse and elevation mechanisms as the main gun and should be just about as accurate, at least out to 600-800 meters. Perhaps further.

The Germans used the MG 34 as the turret gun and used either the 75 round saddle drum or the 50 round belt in a can or pouch.
The British besa gun used a 225 round belt in a box. Took a bit longer to change the box but once done you had a fair amount of time before you had to change it again.

More important than the number of machine gun barrels is the amount of MG ammo in the tank. The German MK III (at least the most common versions in NA officially carried 2700 rounds. The Crusader carried well over 4000 rounds, especially after they got rid of the bow machine gun turret. A Matilda carried 2925 rounds. Some Valentines carried 3,150 rounds.
What the crews could cram in may be a bit different.

Another thing that minature rules often get wrong is that the 2pdr gun was in different catagory than the German and American 37mm guns. The British 2pdr was actually closer to the German short 50mm gun in performance (armor punching anyway).
2pdr AP shot weighed 2.375lbs (at least all the early stuff did) while German 37mm AP weighed 1.5lbs and American 37mm AP weighed 1.92lbs. The German 37mm had MV of 2500fps while the early British 2pdr was 2600fps (a supercharge was introduced that boosted velocity to 2800fps) and the American round was 2900fps.

Now please note that ALL of these guns were better than the short 75mm gun first used in the German MK IV and that "By August 1942, Rommel had only received 27 Panzer IV Ausf. F2s, armed with the L/43 gun"

Schweik said:

and that is why they had so few battleships available to take on the Japanese fleet in those deadly battles and Japanese victories like at Savo Island. Apparently the amount of fuel used by those older BB's especially was so huge that it would have effectively used up all the fuel used by the rest of the fleet.

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Just perhaps many of those battleships were still undergoing repair?

as far as fuel usage goes. Some of those old battleships were lucky to have 30,000hp engines (many had gotten new boilers in the late 20s or early 30s) and yes while they did hold a fair amount of fuel they were nowhere near the fuel hogs you are making them out to be. A New Orleans class cruiser had engines of around 108,000hp and would hold (standard) 1650 tons of fuel oil.
The main problem was speed. They weren't fast enough to keep up with either the carriers or the cruisers. Of course this also meant they didn't burn fuel like the cruisers (or carriers)
As built the West Virginia, for example was supposed to go 5130 N miles at 12 kts, and 2400 N miles at 20kts on 1900-2000 tons of oil (with the bottom fouled, clean she could do much better). The New Orleans/Astoria class needed 1900 tons to go 7,100NM at 15kts bottom condition unknown.

Yes the old battleships would burn oil but not that far out of line with what a cruiser would burn. and once the cruiser went much over 21 kts the fuel burn goes up dramatically.

There were only about 3-4 of the newer old battleships available in the summer of 1942, Anything older than the Nevada probably shouldn't have been sent to face the Japanese at this time anyway. ALL of the old battleships had received refits but the oldest got their refits first, The Colorado missed Pearl Harbor because she was being refitted. But there was a big difference between a ship refitted in the mid 20s and one refitted at the end of the 30s.

Neptune's Inferno makes a very convincing case that the issue was fuel. I highly recommend reading that book.

I've never seen a battleship with wings

As has been raised by a few other posts by others, both sides were suffering from a shortage of fuel transport capability in 1942. however, of the two, Japans problems were more acute. Continental USA had something like 2 years of military reserves, whilst the home islands were down to about 6 months or less in same time frame. It was possible to increase the overseas reserves of oil, at the forward bases, but not desirable to do so . For the Japanese, the decisive battle was intended to be fought somewhere in the Carolines as far north as the Marianas. There were plenty of fuel stocks at the main fleet base at Truk.....pushing the fuel reserves forward of that point would expose the fuel to destruction by air and naval bombardment (the reserves on truk were held in secure bunkers, moving those reserves to say Rabaul, would require their storage in far less secure storage facility. Just hanging around a bit further with the japanese, many of their ships, particularly their older BBs had limited endurance....about 4000 tonnes of bunker fuel. Somewhere I have the range data that amount of fuel gave them. It was not far enough for them to operate from Truk into the Sth Pacific. So not only would attempting to operate the IJN dreadnoughts in the Sth Pacific be contrary to their strategic battle plan, it would also entail a dangerous and costly transfer of fuel to Rabaul (probably) where the oiler fleet (and the Battleships) would be placed at risk from Allied Subs and a/c. The Japanese wanted to hold that ace, they wanted the Allies to suffer attritional losses to the IJN subs and aircraft (the fact that when this opportunity did arise, it was a monumental failure is another story).


In the case of the US Pacific Fleet, there were several issues at work. They too suffered from fairly short legs, which again raised the question of the increased logistics needed to keep them at the front. Not applicable to the US fast BBs (or IJN fast BBs either). The USN also still did not have effective older BBs, many were still under repair and/or were being modernised. most would not be ready until 1944 for front line work and by then they were no longer needed as gunline ships. They were instead used very effectively as mobile bombardment platforms.

The other thing that discouraged the deployment of the older BBs was their speed. Like all BBs they required lavish levels of escort, and with an effective fleet speed of just 17 knots, could not operate at the new fleet speed of around 28knots. These ships if deployed in 1942 would have required the fast carrier TFs either slow right down, or accept massive reductions in thir escort numbers.

For similar and also different reasons, neither side was able or willing to use their older battleships in the SWPac.

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Shortround6 said:

A few notes on tank guns if I may.






Yes the 2pdr was AP only, but the situation for the British was worse that described as far as HE went. The early 3.7in tank 'gun"(mortar) and the later 3in "howitzer were pretty much smoke throwers not HE throwers. Ammo load outs were heavily biased towards smoke shells. Smoke shells are not a whole lot of fun in a miniatures game though

I would also note that on the 3in howitzer the velocity was extremely low (600-650fps) not meters per second like this web sight claims.
http://www.wwiitanks.co.uk/tankdata/1940-Britain-Matilda-InfTankMkIIMatildaIIICS.html
Which makes long range gunnery (trying to land an HE shell in gun pit) more than a bit challenging.

Machine guns are another thing many miniatures rules get wrong. Bow machine guns were pretty much useless much over 200 meters and for the most part they had lousy sights. A lot times they had no sights, the bow gunner observed his fire using a periscope or vision slot using tracers and trying to correct. Yes the Germans did use a small scope.
The co-ax gun is aimed using the main gun sight. It was mounted pretty solid, it used the same traverse and elevation mechanisms as the main gun and should be just about as accurate, at least out to 600-800 meters. Perhaps further.

The Germans used the MG 34 as the turret gun and used either the 75 round saddle drum or the 50 round belt in a can or pouch.
The British besa gun used a 225 round belt in a box. Took a bit longer to change the box but once done you had a fair amount of time before you had to change it again.

More important than the number of machine gun barrels is the amount of MG ammo in the tank. The German MK III (at least the most common versions in NA officially carried 2700 rounds. The Crusader carried well over 4000 rounds, especially after they got rid of the bow machine gun turret. A Matilda carried 2925 rounds. Some Valentines carried 3,150 rounds.
What the crews could cram in may be a bit different.

Another thing that minature rules often get wrong is that the 2pdr gun was in different catagory than the German and American 37mm guns. The British 2pdr was actually closer to the German short 50mm gun in performance (armor punching anyway).
2pdr AP shot weighed 2.375lbs (at least all the early stuff did) while German 37mm AP weighed 1.5lbs and American 37mm AP weighed 1.92lbs. The German 37mm had MV of 2500fps while the early British 2pdr was 2600fps (a supercharge was introduced that boosted velocity to 2800fps) and the American round was 2900fps.

Now please note that ALL of these guns were better than the short 75mm gun first used in the German MK IV and that "By August 1942, Rommel had only received 27 Panzer IV Ausf. F2s, armed with the L/43 gun"

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As is typical here you seem to have gone off on a tangent about something I never wrote and then made an assumption & really ran with it.

I never said anything about miniaitures games.

You are right abour the 'smoke thrower' nature of the CS tanks and their 3 inch howitzer. They did carry a lot of smoke shell vs HE. But that doesn't change the point I was making - the CS tanks were insufficient to allow British tank units to cope with AT guns. Why they couldn't put a slightly better howitzer preferably with a HEAT shell I'll never understand. Even the French 75 / 1897 would have been better.

On the machine gun commentaey again I don't see a salient point. Earlier Mk III's actually had two coax guns by the way and the one bow gun. The lack of a second mg on the Cruiser and other British tanks made them more vulnerable to infantry as well as less effective against gun positions.

Its all well and good to have the extra ammo but if you ever shot a machine gun you know they are prone to stoppages, jams, overheating etc. and have to have ammo belts or cans changed. Inconvenient while under fire or being swarmed by infantry needless to say. Especially when you have no HE or cannister rounds.

This is why nearly every tank in the world had 2 or 3 mg's after 1942. Really after 1941, the Beitish were just lagging in this respect. And HMG mgs were much better.

Bottom line is still that the M3 and later M4 Mediums were major improvements which changed the tide for the Desert Rats at the critical moment in 1942. The British tankers knew it, Rommel knew it etc.

As for Logistics alone being enough for victory - if that was true the US would have won Korea and Vietnam. And Afghanistan

American armour at Alamein did make a big difference to the survivability of Allied tanks. The biggest tank killers of allied tanks was not German tanks, it was their AT screens. An 88m ATG could take out a Sherman at 3 miles so the number of MGs at those ranges was rather academic.

US 75mm HE rounds could allow the allied tankers to return fire on Axis ATGs and did not need a direct hit to destroy it. That was a huge morale and material boost, but effect air to ground asupport or artillery support could substitute if necessary. And had US armour not been available in such quantitiy, there would have been a delay, for sure, but I also think the Brits would have prioritised getting HE capability into their 6 pdrs to do the same job. This capability was only months away, so it is plausible that the bris might gave sped things up a bit if they did not have access to the Sherman

Kevin J said:

At El Alemain it was roughly 50/50 Kittyhawks and Hurricanes plus 3 of Spitfire IIRC. IMO the Tomahawk/Kittyhawk were the right planes for the job in North Africa, in their role of supporting an army in the field. The Hurricane was okay up against the Italians, but the Hawks were better for use against the Germans. The Spitfire not sufficiently developed for that role by the time of El Alemain, the Vc, the VIII far superior, but they came later. So the Hawks were essential for victory in 1942.

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Agreed ...a while back I crunched all the numbers in anorher thread on here somewhere for Oct 1942 based on Shores MAW and the lions share of victory claims, sorties and air atrikes, as well as losses, were from P 40 units.

The Germans and Italians actually took about the same number of losses overall but they flew far fewer air strikes.

parsifal said:

American armour at Alamein did make a big difference to the survivability of Allied tanks. The biggest tank killers of allied tanks was not German tanks, it was their AT screens. An 88m ATG could take out a Sherman at 3 miles so the number of MGs at those ranges was rather academic.

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True but most kills were actually by 75mm and 50mm AT guns. 88s were notoriously deadly but there werent that many of them and being very big and high they wre dufficult to hide. They also kicked up a lot of dust when firing. They were priority targets for fighter bombers and artillery - in fact one of the key breakouts at El Alamein was proceeded by effective air strikes from 260 RAF Kittyhawks on seversl 88 batteries.

Smaller 50 and 75mm guns while still very effective against Cruiser tanks etc. were much harder to spot from the air.

US 75mm HE rounds could allow the allied tankers to return fire on Axis ATGs and did not need a direct hit to destroy it. That was a huge morale and material boost, but effect air to ground asupport or artillery support could substitute if necessary. And had US armour not been available in such quantitiy, there would have been a delay, for sure, but I also think the Brits would have prioritised getting HE capability into their 6 pdrs to do the same job. This capability was only months away, so it is plausible that the bris might gave sped things up a bit if they did not have access to the Sherman

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Also true but the 6 pounder was a 57mm shell, as HE definitely better than nothing but not exactly superb vs infantry or AT guns, especially compared to the US 75 or more importantly, the German one. The US 75 also has much better range from what I gather.

Its also worth noting that the best planes for knocking out those 88s etc. by late 42 in NA was the P 40. With just Hurricanes, Spit 5 and Blenheims DAF would have been far less effective. Spit VIII and IX would help but werent available in #'s until 43 and still had range issues.

Lets say the British did hold out through the end of 1942 without US kit and get their 6 pounder HE shells for their Crusader tanks. Now they are up against Pz IVG, StuGg IIIF and G, etc. Still a step or two behind in other words.

I think without US tanks, fighters, bombers and Naval suppoer the fight in North Africa could have gone on into 1944 and Italy would have still been in the war.

Another minor point - AT guns killed mist of the Allied tanks when the Allies were attacking, but when the Germans were attacking, or counterattacking (as they typically did after being hit by doctrine), it was indeed the German tanks, as well as Stukas and artillery, that did most of the damage.

Kevin J said:

At El Alemain it was roughly 50/50 Kittyhawks and Hurricanes plus 3 of Spitfire IIRC. IMO the Tomahawk/Kittyhawk were the right planes for the job in North Africa, in their role of supporting an army in the field. The Hurricane was okay up against the Italians, but the Hawks were better for use against the Germans. The Spitfire not sufficiently developed for that role by the time of El Alemain, the Vc, the VIII far superior, but they came later. So the Hawks were essential for victory in 1942.

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Don't disagree the P-40 was the right aircraft but it's a unique case in that theatre. Also your response still doesn't dig into how many of those airframes were direct purchased and how many were lend lease. I just don't know when shipments of the latter started arriving but it probably wasn't until Q3 of 1941 at the absolute earliest. I'm pretty sure all the Tomahawks were direct purchased but I don't know what the situation was for Kittyhawks.

For the Desert War, we also need to consider the tanks which were a major component of victory. Again, I'd be interested in knowing what proportion of British front-line strength was made up of M3 Medium tanks in October 1942 given that they didn't start showing up until May 1942.

buffnut453 said:

Don't disagree the P-40 was the right aircraft but it's a unique case in that theatre. Also your response still doesn't dig into how many of those airframes were direct purchased and how many were lend lease. I just don't know when shipments of the latter started arriving but it probably wasn't until Q3 of 1941 at the absolute earliest. I'm pretty sure all the Tomahawks were direct purchased but I don't know what the situation was for Kittyhawks.

For the Desert War, we also need to consider the tanks which were a major component of victory. Again, I'd be interested in knowing what proportion of British front-line strength was made up of M3 Medium tanks in October 1942 given that they didn't start showing up until May 1942.

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Have you ever seen this site?
US Warplanes
Production and delivery details of American combat aircraft in WW2.
The P-40 was a superb aircraft in all theatres except over Western Europe where we needed fast climbing interceptors with a good combat ceiling.