Partly indicated by my post count, I am unable to spend as much time here as I would like, for similar reasons as to why I have not started to properly read your book.
If anyone could point me to discussions about the video produced by G's A&A about Thunderbolt range(or associated material) I would appreciate it.
Shouldn't you refrain from advocating a POV absent serious research on your own?
I suggest you pull Boylon's "USAF Study 136 Long Range Fighter Escort" for an exceptionally well researched history that is also richly cited from AAF written documents?
If less time is your only option, I suggest that you read "P-51B Mustang; North American's Bastard Stepchild that Saved 8th AF" and/or Paul Ludwig's "P-51 Mustang - Development of the Long Range Escort Fighter".
Each, and all the referenced documents reference common themes that somehow escaped Greg's attention because his underlying theme was:
- P-47 did not achieve 'rightful place' in history as a Long Range Escort
- The Bomber Mafia conspired to withold combat tanks in order to make the P-47 'look inadequate' when in fact it ould have easily been capable of escorting 8th AF to Schweinfurt/Regensburg on August 17, 1943.
- That even with the 75 gal combat tank, such long range would have been practical
Each point, as well as his anlytical process to construct His values in contrast to AAF Combat Radius tables vis extensive flight testing, were seriously flawed. He could have realized such by examining actual historical documents of the period. including actual flight tests of P-38F and P-47C.
Greg failed to recognize that the issue in 1941 was five fold:
1. AAC /AAF had a safety policy regarding use of unsealed Ferry tanks for combat operations.
2. No sealed combat tanks existed in US. In fact most AAF frontline Fighters/Pursuit were not produced with internal combat fuel cells.
3. No Pursuit in production or nearing production save the P-39 and P-40 had centerline racks for Ferry purposes.
4. Ony the P-38 achieved wng rack and plumbing by the end of 1941.
5. Nobody (Globally) believed a single engined Pursuit could be developed with combied range and performanceto escort B-17s and compete with German or English interceptor capabilities.
That said, General Arnold re-arranged the recommended R&D priorities to move "Pursuit with 1500 mile Range" from No. 4 to No. 1. Based onobservations of Spainish Civil War and Great Britain, he was NOT convinced hat the 'bomber would always get through'.
Of the existing airframes in hand of the AAF (P-38, P-39, P-40, P-47, XP-51) only the P-38 was remotely capable of extended range coupled with high altitude capability. Of those only the XP-51 had the same ferry range as the P-38 on internal fuel. The disadvantage of the P-47 from day 1 was that a.) the R-2800 was a gas hog compared to Allison V-1710, and b,) It was designed as a 'point' interceptor with less range than the P-38. With two engines and same fuel, the P38 range was greater than the P-47 (and XP-51).
When the P-47C was deployed to ETO, it did ot even have a.) Water Injection, b.) C/L rack to carry bomb or Ferry tank, c.) Pressurization scheme to feed fuel from the external tank when first available as the 200 gallon 'tub' tank. When the 200gal tank was first installed (in desparation during Blitz Week - July 1943) while awaiting the new 75 gal combat tanks from US - it would not feed above 18000 feet - therefore suitable nly for extended penetration support range from 125mi to approx 200 mi combat radius. Had escort of VIII BC B-17s been performed at 18000 feet, the 'new' combat radius could have been extended to ~ 250 mi.
On this most crucial point Greg was seriously confused regarding the assumptions planners placed to define 'Combat Radius' in order to present a reasonable set of assumptions to launch, climb to escort altiude, R/V with bombers , escort closely (S track instead of straight line), fight for 20 minutes to internal fuel still remaining, cruise home alone at optimal cruise speed and altitude (10,000 feet) in a straight line to then decend and lurk for 20 minutes before landing. I all seriousness the 'bomber mafia' wished for their escorts to live and fight another day - rather than fly to the target, fight and then bail out due to empty tanks.
The rat in the woodpile was Materiel Command - which did not light a fire under the combat tank development which was initiated at high Prority by Arold when he hosted his top staff to organize priorities for fighter and bomber enhancements in January 1942 nFighter Conference - Immediately after WWII began for US. A mouse in the honeypot was Eaker's insufficient attention to securing local solutions in UK that were available to subcontract development of external fuel tnks for P-47 more suitable that the very draggy, very insufficient/non-sealed 200gal tub tank. That wasn't 'bomber mafia' mentality by Eaker. He was bitter about losing his P-38s to Africa campaign six months earlier - just a recognition that combat tanks were in the pipeline and that the P-47 was not in the picture as a long term solution for POINTBLANK.
Eaker was generally aware of the 'promise/potential' of the new P-51B as he was continually briefed by Ambassador Winant and Col Hitchcock and General Lyons CO of Air Services Command n UK. Following tour of 8th AF Operations by Asst War Secy Bob Lovett, Lovett returned to report to Arnold in July that Eaker wanted P-38s and Mustangs - which led to a short study to return a recommendationfor the P-51B, and subsequent delivery of first P-51B FGs to 9th AF ETO. Recall (maybe you don't) but the initiatives to add major internal fuel was already in prototype testing for P-51B-1 and P-38J in parallel with Lovett's visit - but the same plan for P-47D didn't result in first first flight testing until six months later.
So, 'Greg" completely whiffed in the root cause of the P-47C/D lack of combat radius, completely whiffed on the concept of a combat radius that included a.) actually escorting the B-17/24 at 25,000 feet - and actually engaging in combat, and completely whiffed regarding a 'mysterious bomber mafia conspiracy to hold a great fighter from achieving its natural place in history'.
Summary - P-47C/D had neither internal fuel capacity, nor wing pylons and plumbing to feed the fuel until production numbers of first the P-47D-15 (wing pylon/plumbing) and P-47D-25 (May/June for 'dribbles of P-47D-25). By that time it was clear that P-51B/C was clearly superior as long range/high altitude escort and air superiority airframe for 8th and 15th AF (and later for 20th AF). The decision to shed P-38/P-47 to 2nd TAF/9th AF was easy - as early as Big Week in February 1944.
One final note - had Arnold, Spaatz, Eaker been alive when Greg spouted trash about 'bomber mafia conspiracy' to sacrifice thousands of crews to hold back the P-47, I suspect he would have been tarred and feathered, then beaten senseless. That was an outrageous comment and thesis.