I know its a subjective shot (and I have my emergency hair-splitting wig on!) , but I don't think the ordinary citizens of London, Bristol, Sheffield, Birmingham or Coventry thought the effects were 'minimal'. Or even their more cynical political or military leaders, tbh. These raid were conducted by those early war 1930s designs, remember - and in comparatively small numbers and bombloads . As a stone mason, I still see bomb splinter damaged buildings in Bath, fire damaged stone in Bristol and missing houses in terraced streets, even in the heart of sleepy Wessex. One grandmother in Croydon had glass imbedded in the plaster of her front room where the windows had been blown through,). One grandfather was an ARP who had to help clear away the remnants of some civilians who'd been blown through chain link fencing round Croydon airport after the infamous raid in 1940. The other grandmother was deaf in one ear where a V1 landed a few streets away in '45 (OK, that ones cheating a bit, but still part of the bombing of the UK! All anecdotal, but 1940 to 45, ordinary people the length and breadth of the country saw real widespread death and destruction. Widespread damage to industrial targets (wether intentional or not) was also the direct cause of the widespread dispersal of manufacturing that had an impact on production
The Blitz Around Britain
I do think its fair to say that despite the damage, it obviously failed to cause the collapse of civilian morale as predicted by the likes of Douhet, which was one of the key aspects to the bomber mafia's doctrine. Its moral effects were vastly over estimated, and the strategic effects on manufacturing were fairly limited in the long run in the UK, but the destruction was very real.
But if Brits thought they'd had it bad, its was as nothing compared to the experience of the burghers of countless other towns and cities such as Hamburg, Dresden and Tokyo. Again, it can't be claimed that the damage was anything like 'minimal'. Perhaps overall, the lack of civilian collapse on the home front was that because neither side felt that they were completely undefended, or that their nation couldn't hit back equally (at least to begin with), they managed to psychologically include themselves as being in 'the front line' and doing their bit too. Studies in both Britain and Germany showed ironically and counter to the received wisdom, that if anything, resolve and determination often actually strengthened after a city had been bombed. But I don;t think you can sit through those aerial low-level films of devastated city after city destroyed by bombing and really claim the damage was minimal. It was colossal. I think the difference in interpretation we might agree on is that it didn't meet its strategic objective outright and on its own. Though that impact can't be underestimated. There is of course that famous quote from Speer:
"
It was quite a surprise to us when the first Hamburg raid took place because you used some new device [chaff] which was preventing the anti-aircraft guns to find your bombers, so you had a great success and you repeated these attacks on Hamburg several times and each time the new success was greater and the depression was larger, and I have said, in those days, in a meeting of the Air Ministry, that if you would repeat this success on four or five other German towns, then we would collapse. Albert Speer – The Secret War"
Speer may himself have been seeing the ghost haunting him too when he said that. But from '43 onwards, hundreds of bombers in formation or a stream bombers 'getting through' across Axis targets was an increasingly common event.
The likes of Harris, Spaatz LeMay were wrong in their most didactic claims about air power and bombing. Neither area bombing nor strategic precision strikes alone won the war. But neither did any other single arm or service until Hiroshima. But they
were massive contributors to it - and I think its become fashionable to down-play their massive role in contributing to the final victory and peace.
An interesting 'what if' exercise to conduct would be to ponder the strategic outcomes if the UK had entirely concentrated its combat aircraft production on coastal patrol, strike, fighters and fighter bombers from 1940 onwards. What would the strategic impact have been upon the overall war in Europe if there had been no strategic bombing from the UK for the three years before the 8th airforce started operations in number?