"The case for the P-47 Thunderbolt being the greatest fighter of the Second World War "

[buffnut453]

I believe that is a common expression in the Brazilian AF

I will neither confirm nor deny that the word "Brazilian" went through my mind when I first read the comment.

 

[drgondog]

Well, across the pond, I believe the term "fanny" translates to girl parts that are directly opposite of the rear-end, as we yanks are accustomed to.

So, basically, in Jolly Olde England, that phrase could be interpreted as a Brazilian Wax Job...

Here in rural America in he 30s and 40s Fanny = butt. If you postulated that Waxing Your Fanny to Yeager or Dad implied private 'bits', you best be prepared for fisticuffs. They were intimately familiar with difference between twat and butt. Today? not so much.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I will neither confirm nor deny that the word "Brazilian" went through my mind when I first read the comment.

The other thought I had is what is a Fanny Pack

 

[pbehn]

Here in rural America in he 30s and 40s Fanny = butt. If you postulated that Waxing Your Fanny to Yeager or Dad implied private 'bits', you best be prepared for fisticuffs. They were intimately familiar with difference between twat and butt. Today? not so much.

It is a fact though that in UK the meaning is different and always has been. A definite case of divided by a common language.

 

[GrauGeist]

Here in rural America in he 30s and 40s Fanny = butt. If you postulated that Waxing Your Fanny to Yeager or Dad implied private 'bits', you best be prepared for fisticuffs. They were intimately familiar with difference between twat and butt. Today? not so much.

Yep, growing up, "fanny" meant butt.

"waxing your fanny" aka "tanning your hide" = "ass kicking".

Also, if Mom said "oh my Aunt Fanny!", there was trouble brewing!

 

[buffnut453]

Before we were married, my wife and I had this conversation regarding a new purchase I made to help my mess kit trousers stay up (they lacked provision for a belt).

Me: I got a really cool pair of braces.

What I meant:

How she interpreted:

Future Mrs. Buffnut: What's cool about braces? They're uncomfortable and aren't attractive. Anyway, your teeth are fine. Why do you even need braces?

Me: No...not braces for my mouth. Braces to hold up my trousers.

Future Mrs. Buffnut: Oh...you mean suspenders.

What she meant:

How I interpreted:

Me: Suspenders really aren't my thing...unless you're wearing them!

Future Mrs. Buffnut: You'll NEVER get me into suspenders!

Me: Why not? Don't you like wearing stockings?

Future Mrs. Buffnut: Oh...you mean a garter!



It was at this point that we both agreed to give up.

Frankly, it's a miracle we've stayed together so long given the miscommunication!

 

[Just Schmidt]

As it's become common to have youtube as the ultimate reference, I'll just point to 2:13.


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CxzfOYQnRHE

Besides, if a word appears in an unexpected place in a sentense, it's pretty safe to assume it refers to a body part...

 

[Just Schmidt]

Mrs. Buffnut

Hmm, is it just me, or does this in itself sound slightly suggestive?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I expect there are multiple possible interpretations depending on whether you understand American-English, British-English, Australian-English, or Canadian-English...and those for whom English is a second language adds even more options.

I'll retreat back into my hovel and ponder the runes some more.

I dated a gal from Ealing for some years ... I never did offer to wax her fanny, but I should have.

 

[SplitRz]

I dated a gal from Ealing for some years ... I never did offer to wax her fanny, but I should have.

The phrase 'like a bear-trappers hat' comes to mind?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The phrase 'like a bear-trappers hat' comes to mind?

I feared there might be Japanese soldiers down there who thought the war was still on.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Someone's trying to eat their cake and have it too -- and it ain't you. Asking for escort is prima facie evidence that a supposed bomber mafia is concerned that daylight missions are susceptible to fighter intercept -- a worry later events showed to be very sound.

The YB-40 was an early attempt to provide escort, albeit unsuccessful.
There may have been less priority given to escort fighter but that does not mean there was active sabotage of the concept. I don't think people realize how much effort was compressed into an incredibly short time frame. US involvement in WWII was only 3 years 8 months. Even less for Germany. If the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor today it would take that long to complete the Environmental Impact Assessment. There was a very steep learning curve and myriad competing interests. I am amazed by how many correct decisions were made under tremendous pressure.
Perhaps there could have been more emphasis on fighter range increases but there were other priorities. For example the P-47C suffered quite a few teething problems and someone may have thought it was a better to concentrate on oil system modifications to prevent engine failure rather than having the mechanics add drop tank plumbing.
On the other hand I do think that the "bomber mafia" had succumbed to a common human failing. People tend to interpret actual events through their own lens. They did realize that unescorted bomber losses had been prohibitively high but felt that with their much more substantial defensive armament and proper formations (and larger) the bombers could succeed with acceptable loss levels.
One thing you cannot do in war is wait around for perfection to be achieved. You have to put pressure on the enemy any way you can. A bad decision is better than no decision.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

A bad decision is better than no decision.

Agreed for the most part. Eisenhower, during his presidency long after the war, was once quoted as saying "Don't just do something, sit there!"

 

[pbehn]

Someone's trying to eat their cake and have it too -- and it ain't you. Asking for escort is prima facie evidence that a supposed bomber mafia is concerned that daylight missions are susceptible to fighter intercept -- a worry later events showed to be very sound.

The theory put forward in the video is that the "bomber mafia" were opposed to the idea of single engined escort fighters because they didnt believe it was possible, in that they were almost entirely right as a general philosophy. In the Pacific the strategic bombing effort ended the war and single engined fighters could not escort the bombers from take off to landing. In Europe the only plane that could escort US bombers in daylight deep into Germany from the start was the P-38 which is not a single engined fighter. The Spitfire could escort the USAAF but never deep into Germany. The P-47 could only escort US bombers deep into Germany from mid 1944, that is around 5 years after the war broke out and two and a half years after the USA was involved in the war. At the start of the US daylight offensive in 1944 the only single engined fighter that could go deep into Germany was the P-51. This relied on the British ordering it, and Rolls Royce developing an engine that would fit AND the British ordering Merlins from Packard in 1940. If none of that happened the theory hold true. If the British surrendered or did a deal with Germany it also holds true, you cannot bomb Germany and be escorted there from Iceland or North Africa with P-51s. The LW started to deploy Me 262s in June 1944, that is when the bomber mafias theory was again vindicated. A single engined piston engined fighter cold not escort bombers and prevail against the best German interceptor. History shows that the campaign did succeed but it was by weight of numbers and over running airfields. The "bomber mafia" were wrong for a period of approximately 4 months, and they prevailed because when it was shown to be possible for a single engined fighter to reach Germany it was made a top priority for US industry. The whole video is someone using 20/20 hindsight to castigate people who arent here because they couldnt exactly foresee in fine detail how the war and technology would progress in 1934-41. Immediately after the war finished the situation returned to normal, with Russia as a new enemy no single piston engined fighter could escort bombers deep into Russia, no jet fighter could either, especially when they acquired jets, however USA had and still has strategic bombers.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The theory put forward in the video is that the "bomber mafia" were opposed to the idea of single engined escort fighters because they didnt believe it was possible, in that they were almost entirely right as a general philosophy. In the Pacific the strategic bombing effort ended the war and single engined fighters could not escort the bombers from take off to landing. In Europe the only plane that could escort US bombers in daylight deep into Germany from the start was the P-38 which is not a single engined fighter. The Spitfire could escort the USAAF but never deep into Germany. The P-47 could only escort US bombers deep into Germany from mid 1944, that is around 5 years after the war broke out and two and a half years after the USA was involved in the war. At the start of the US daylight offensive in 1944 the only single engined fighter that could go deep into Germany was the P-51. This relied on the British ordering it, and Rolls Royce developing an engine that would fit AND the British ordering Merlins from Packard in 1940. If none of that happened the theory hold true. If the British surrendered or did a deal with Germany it also holds true, you cannot bomb Germany and be escorted there from Iceland or North Africa with P-51s. The LW started to deploy Me 262s in June 1944, that is when the bomber mafias theory was again vindicated. A single engined piston engined fighter cold not escort bombers and prevail against the best German interceptor. History shows that the campaign did succeed but it was by weight of numbers and over running airfields. The "bomber mafia" were wrong for a period of approximately 4 months, and they prevailed because when it was shown to be possible for a single engined fighter to reach Germany it was made a top priority for US industry. The whole video is someone using 20/20 hindsight to castigate people who arent here because they couldnt exactly foresee in fine detail how the war and technology would progress in 1934-41. Immediately after the war finished the situation returned to normal, with Russia as a new enemy no single piston engined fighter could escort bombers deep into Russia, no jet fighter could either, especially when they acquired jets, however USA had and still has strategic bombers.

I get all that. My point was that A at ease was ignoring evidence that controverted his position.

I also think that this notion of the "bomber mafia" issuing strict orders that no drop-tanks would be built at all has also been shown put-to-paid by you, D Deleted member 68059 , S Shortround6 , buffnut453 , and others.

I don't argue that the BM didn't exist. I do think that both Greg and A at ease overrate its statutory power to a point that strains credulity. And to the point Buffnut made upthread, they were asking for escorts from the very first operation they flew, which indicates that yes, they did want escorts.

 

[Deleted member 68059]

I get all that. My point was that A at ease was ignoring evidence that controverted his position.

I also think that this notion of the "bomber mafia" issuing strict orders that no drop-tanks would be built at all has also been shown put-to-paid by you, D Deleted member 68059 , S Shortround6 , buffnut453 , and others.

I don't argue that the BM didn't exist. I do think that both Greg and A at ease overrate its statutory power to a point that strains credulity. And to the point Buffnut made upthread, they were asking for escorts from the very first operation they flew, which indicates that yes, they did want escorts.

Exactly the same thing happened in Britain in the RAF between the end of WW1 and about 1935. They were not a "mafia" there were simply people who didnt have a very good vision for what was around the corner in aviation development and how it would impact air combat. They just thought bombers would get through because briefly it looked like no fighter of the era would be able to engage the latest fast bombers coming in "at" altitude, and this was combined with a dramatic overestimation of the power of bomber defensive armament, power turrets etc etc, which is all directly tied in to why the most dreadful silliness like the Defiant was even built.

During this period the notion that bombers could get through and defend themselves was an almost universal error all over the world, there was no dark room full of people plotting to get airmen killed just to bloodymindedly hammer round "but my idea MUST be made to work !" pegs into the square holes of reality.

Hugh Dowding was one of the few purveyors of the square hole idea, and all manner of damn stupid things nearly happened even with his positive influence.

 

[buffnut453]

Exactly the same thing happened in Britain in the RAF between the end of WW1 and about 1935. They were not a "mafia" there were simply people who didnt have a very good vision for what was around the corner in aviation development and how it would impact air combat. They just thought bombers would get through because briefly it looked like no fighter of the era would be able to engage the latest fast bombers coming in "at" altitude, and this was combined with a dramatic overestimation of the power of bomber defensive armament, power turrets etc etc, which is all directly tied in to why the most dreadful silliness like the Defiant was even built.

During this period the notion that bombers could get through and defend themselves was an almost universal error all over the world, there was no dark room full of people plotting to get airmen killed just to bloodymindedly hammer round "but my idea MUST be made to work !" pegs into the square holes of reality.

Hugh Dowding was one of the few purveyors of the square hole idea, and all manner of damn stupid things nearly happened even with his positive influence.

We do need to be careful not to apply the retrospectroscope, though.

In the mid/late1930s, prior to the implementation of a radar-enabled functioning IADS, it was incredibly hard to intercept ANY aircraft. Ground observers certainly helped but you required a goodly depth of friendly terrain, all populated with observers, to turn an observation into a track. That worked reasonably well in China but was simply impractical in the UK.

Employing standing air patrols might have been an option, except that (a) it's incredibly expensive in airframes and (b) no air force had the ability to defend everywhere at the same time. Even if you could maintain such a large series of standing patrols, it afforded zero defence in depth. After the initial engagement by a relatively small defending force, the bombers would be free to press onto their targets because the neighbouring defensive patrols couldn't get into position in time. Defending fighters still on the ground couldn't get to sufficient altitude in time, either.

Integration of long-range sensing (i.e. radar) with an integrated ground control capability upended the entire playing field. Whereas before the advantage was with the attackers, now, the defenders had far greater forewarning of incoming raids and could focus defensive fighters wherever the incoming raids materialized. The element of surprise was gone for the attackers.

All that being said, there was also massive over-estimation of the effectiveness of bomber aircraft and the destructive power of the bombs they carried. This is the one area where we can readily say that the "bomber mafia" were either shortsighted or deliberately avoiding an unpalatable truth: that aerial bombardment in the mid/late 1930s had precious little chance of delivering strategic effects. Much of this was undoubtedly driven by the need to chase much-diminished budgetary coffers. However, an awful lot of good men lost their lives for precious little benefit because the aircraft and weapons envisaged in the mid/late 1930s were the front-line equipment when WW2 broke out.

 

[SplitRz]

We do need to be careful not to apply the retrospectroscope, though.

In the mid/late1930s, prior to the implementation of a radar-enabled functioning IADS, it was incredibly hard to intercept ANY aircraft. Ground observers certainly helped but you required a goodly depth of friendly terrain, all populated with observers, to turn an observation into a track. That worked reasonably well in China but was simply impractical in the UK.

Employing standing air patrols might have been an option, except that (a) it's incredibly expensive in airframes and (b) no air force had the ability to defend everywhere at the same time. Even if you could maintain such a large series of standing patrols, it afforded zero defence in depth. After the initial engagement by a relatively small defending force, the bombers would be free to press onto their targets because the neighbouring defensive patrols couldn't get into position in time. Defending fighters still on the ground couldn't get to sufficient altitude in time, either.

Integration of long-range sensing (i.e. radar) with an integrated ground control capability upended the entire playing field. Whereas before the advantage was with the attackers, now, the defenders had far greater forewarning of incoming raids and could focus defensive fighters wherever the incoming raids materialized. The element of surprise was gone for the attackers.

All that being said, there was also massive over-estimation of the effectiveness of bomber aircraft and the destructive power of the bombs they carried. This is the one area where we can readily say that the "bomber mafia" were either shortsighted or deliberately avoiding an unpalatable truth: that aerial bombardment in the mid/late 1930s had precious little chance of delivering strategic effects. Much of this was undoubtedly driven by the need to chase much-diminished budgetary coffers. However, an awful lot of good men lost their lives for precious little benefit because the aircraft and weapons envisaged in the mid/late 1930s were the front-line equipment when WW2 broke out.

I agree in part, but heres a slightly contrarian view from me.

Guernica had a massive impact on global political thinking that merely confirmed a lot of the fears evolving in Europe during the 20s and 30s. Were the 'Bomber Mafia' and doomsayers like Stanley Baldwin, Lidell Hart etc. wrong only in as much that as poor as the aircraft proved as accurate delivery systems, it was the nature of the conventional the bombs they carried that was insufficient without total air superiority?

In that context, Stanley Baldwin's statement that 'the bomber would always get through' has a potentially different nuance. I think he *was* essentially right, wasn't he? There was no complete protection from a bomber attack at a strategic level. In fact, I'm unaware that any major attack on a civilian target by a bomber force was ever completely turned back by fighters and AA. The best any defence could do was nullify its effectiveness and make it a costly and uneconomic exercise in the long term. But bombers did indeed almost always 'get through'.

That retrospectroscope seems to be being used whilst forgetting that these guys had been through WW1 only two decades before. If biological and chemical weapons had been advanced as far as the aircraft that could carry them had since WW1 and had actually been widely used over densely populated areas, then perhaps we'd have a different take? What if Germans had chosen to make a maximum effort raids that included large amounts of the new nerve agents such as sarin, tabun or soman? Or even some other more deadly chemical agent, from a nation renowned for its world beating chemical and industrial capabilities? What if the Germans had been as unscrupulous as the Japanese in China in their use of biological weapons? These were known and feared potentialities. Look at any newsreels of British civilians in 1939 and 1940 carrying gas masks for the proof

I think we often forget the context of the times in our judgements. And of course, just six years after the outbreak of war, only one bomber had to get through to destroy an entire city, and two to end resistance from one of the most fanatical warrior nations of the 20th century. I'd say that made them correct, to be honest.

 

[Shortround6]

The US did try to specify a few long range escorts in the years from 1939 to 1942/43. However they all came to nothing. The Lockheed XP-58 was supposed to be a long range escort in the early part of it's trajectory but numerous engine changes and changing roles turned it into a crash and burn (or fizzle).
IN 1940, with the Allison going into production and with negotiations starting with the Merlin XX the US was considering the following engines.
Continental IV-1430
P&W XH-2600 24 cylinder liquid cooled.
Lycoming XH-2470 24 cylinder liquid cooled
Continental XH-2870 (two O-1430s stuck together)
Wright R-2160 42 cylinder engine
P & W R-2800.
Allison W-3420 fits in here.

This is because, in 1940, they didn't think the Allison or the Merlin would be able to develop enough power, even using two of them, to do the escort fighter (or high speed long range interceptor) roles. So all (most) the prototype money went to the collection of off-beat/ downright strange aircraft that filled in the US "P" numbers between the P-51 and the P-80.

Of the 7 engines on the list a few never made it off the test stands and a few powered one or two prototype aircraft/test beds. Only the R-2800 saw actual production.

Only the R-2800 was developed into an engine that could power an escort fighter and the old Allison, by using two of them, managed to sneak in there, although by 1944 it's performance was getting close to marginal for Europe. The Merlin came out of left field and in the Mustang took the American high command by surprise.

Fisher summited the XP-75 in Sept 1942 in answer to a Feb 1942 request and got funding for two XP-75s.

The idea being that by using P-40 wings, Corsair landing gear and the entire tail from an SPD Dauntless they could get the thing into production quickly, It was supposed to fly 2200 miles on internal fuel. Hey, it was late 1942, drop tanks were not proven technology
As we all know it didn't work out and with better fuel, drop tanks, and existing engines they could use single engine fighters to escort B-17s and B-24s, mostly. B-29s were a stretch.
The Merlin engine gained just under 400lbs plus prop and cooling from 1940 to 1943 but gained about 400hp at 23,000ft (?) or close to 50% in power so the power to weight ratio even for heavy plane was workable. In 1940 nobody expected to get that kind of power to weigh ratio from the engines so that is why they were going to brute force with all the H-24 engines.

Make if it what you will, it seems that the Army tech staff and most of the designers didn't think you could make a single engine long range high altitude escort fighter. They sure spent a lot of time planning, designing, and building alternatives. But my take on things sure doesn't support the Idea that "bomber Mafia" wasn't interested in the idea of long range escorts. By the time you get to the P-51H RR had used 100/150 fuel to get another 300hp out of the engine at 23,000ft for just about no weight (Bigger prop?)

 

[buffnut453]

I agree in part, but heres a slightly contrarian view from me.

Guernica had a massive impact on global political thinking that merely confirmed a lot of the fears evolving in Europe during the 20s and 30s. Were the 'Bomber Mafia' and doomsayers like Stanley Baldwin, Lidell Hart etc. wrong only in as much that as poor as the aircraft proved as accurate delivery systems, it was the nature of the conventional the bombs they carried that was insufficient without total air superiority?

In that context, Stanley Baldwin's statement that 'the bomber would always get through' has a potentially different nuance. I think he *was* essentially right, wasn't he? There was no complete protection from a bomber attack at a strategic level. In fact, I'm unaware that any major attack on a civilian target by a bomber force was ever completely turned back by fighters and AA. The best any defence could do was nullify its effectiveness and make it a costly and uneconomic exercise in the long term. But bombers did indeed almost always 'get through'.

That retrospectroscope seems to be being used whilst forgetting that these guys had been through WW1 only two decades before. If biological and chemical weapons had been advanced as far as the aircraft that could carry them had since WW1 and had actually been widely used over densely populated areas, then perhaps we'd have a different take? What if Germans had chosen to make a maximum effort raids that included large amounts of the new nerve agents such as sarin, tabun or soman? Or even some other more deadly chemical agent, from a nation renowned for its world beating chemical and industrial capabilities? What if the Germans had been as unscrupulous as the Japanese in China in their use of biological weapons? These were known and feared potentialities. Look at any newsreels of British civilians in 1939 and 1940 carrying gas masks for the proof

I think we often forget the context of the times in our judgements. And of course, just six years after the outbreak of war, only one bomber had to get through to destroy an entire city, and two to end resistance from one of the most fanatical warrior nations of the 20th century. I'd say that made them correct, to be honest.

I don't find anything you wrote even slightly contrarian, indeed the inclusion of chemical weapons was a dimension I'd completely ignored...and yet it's entirely apposite to the thinking of the time. Fortunately, it's an area where deterrence actually worked during WW2 but that was more luck than judgment.

The key challenge for defenders was attritting the incoming bombers so that effects against the defended target were minimized. It is in this area where the over-estimation of the bomber's destructive capability seemed to haunt people. Yes, "the bomber" always got through but, for the most part (Hiroshima and Nagasaki being obvious exceptions), the amount of damage wrought was minimal. Having 500 bombers getting through is an entirely different proposition.

Again, in the context of the mid-1930s, I struggle to be too indignant at the thinking of the "bomber mafia." By 1940, it was clear to all that the bomber (singular) wouldn't always get through, and that massed quantities of aircraft were necessary to deliver the required effects. Yet it still took a further 3 years for the Allies to turn that concept into a reality.