The Eastern Front and Germany's lack of a long range heavy bomber.

Elmas said:

120 He 177Bs seems to me very optimistic as I already said, not to speak of carrying 6 tons of bomb each, not to speak of the 33% hit rate.
If the RAf or 8th Air Force hat an hit rate of 33% the war would have ended in 1943.
But how many acres the target? How many bombs per acre?
And, to wind it all up......
Amateurs think strategics, Professionals think logistics......

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Assuming the four engine nacelle version from the start here is the historical production numbers:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_177#Production
By June 1943 they would have that 240 aircraft number built and in service. The full payload of 6 tons could be carried to a combat radius of 900 miles, which from bases near Smolensk and around Novogrod would be well within range. The He111s and Ju88s were within range from there. Notice I said combat range, which includes the 25% fuel reserve.
The 33% hit rate was based on the fact that the facilities they would be hitting were so large, the altitude they could strike at would be pretty low (3-4k meters), which is a 45-90 meter dispersion with the Lotfe 7D, and the bombsight they were using was better than the Norden. The coal fired plants were 200 meters by 30 meters, while the hydroelectric turbines were 90 meters by 30 meters and required Fritz-X or Hs-293 bombs to avoid requiring a full Geschwader to hit. The SD500 or 1000 bombs were intended for smaller aircraft, while the He177s would use SD1000s for damaging the turbines in each facility, while the AB1000/2 cluster incendiary bombs would follow up the main attack, as experience had shown in Kiel when the RAF attacked there that incendiaries were necessary to really melt the damaged turbines and damage the facility.

https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Рыбин....82.D0.B5.D0.BB.D1.8C.D1.81.D1.82.D0.B2.D0.BE

The Americans resorted to burning down cities in their daylight raids too. They were just a little more coy about what exactly they were doing. They almost always maintained a target of some military importance, though late in the war entire cities might be designated a 'transportation target' for example.

How dispersed was the German economy really? Both allied air forces spent an awful lot of time dropping thousands of tons of bombs on a relatively few towns and cities along the Ruhr valley. Not exactly a large area when measured against Germany as a whole.

I would echo the post above. What concentration of bombs could so few aircraft hope to achieve over the target areas? Post war analyses of the results of allied bombing make for depressing reading, particularly if you only have a few aircraft to send.

Operational research found that operating unopposed and in good conditions on 10 raids in Normandy, post invasion, 100 RAF bombers would achieve a bomb density of 10 bombs per acre at the centre of their bomb pattern . Despite this less than 30% of the ground at the centre of the pattern was cratered. It was wryly noted that' in view of the fact that the destructive effect of a high explosive bomb extends little beyond the crater this seems unimpressive'.
The average radial standard deviation of the bomb pattern on these ten attacks was 620 yards. The USAAF was achieving very similar accuracy. With this order of accuracy, bomb density at the assigned aiming point and over the whole bomb pattern simply depended on the number and calibre of the bombs employed.
The Luftwaffe would do well in similar conditions, but following a significantly longer flight with all the navigational problems that might entail, to achieve this level of accuracy.

It was also established by comparison with other air forces that the bomb density, for a given number of bombs dropped on a point target by medium bombers was 2.5 times greater than that achieved by the heavies. Heavy bombers were a very blunt tool in the 1940s. To have a 50% chance of hitting an area of 1000 square feet ( a relatively small commercial building) required at least 18 medium bombers to drop their loads according to a report by the US 9th Bombardment Division. It would need, statistically, 45 heavy bombers to achieve the same.

Cheers

Steve

Stona, what altitudes were they bombing at? My understanding was that at 24000 feet there was a lot of dispersion, which is why the heavies were usually that inaccurate, plus the AAA disrupted bombing procedures. 14000 feet achieved high degrees of accuracy. In fact the Norden was meant for bombing around 10000 feet IIRC.
Daylight Precision Bombing

In everyday practice in 1940, the average score for an Air Corps bombardier was a circular error of 400 feet, and that was from the relatively forgiving altitude of 15,000 feet instead of 30,000.

The planners were not misled by pickle barrel assumptions. According to data from training and practice bombing, a heavy bomber at 20,000 feet had a 1.2 percent probability of hitting a 100-foot-square target. About 220 bombers would be required for 90 percent probability of destroying the target. AWPD-1 forecast a need for 251 combat groups to carry out the plan.

Eighth Air Force in Great Britain put 31.8 percent of its bombs within 1,000 feet of the aim point from an average altitude of 21,000 feet. Fifteenth Air Force in Italy averaged 30.78 percent of its bombs within 1,000 feet from 20,500 feet.

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The attacks were planned for around 3-4000 meters, which was 10-14000 feet. Higher altitude missions would use the Fritz-X bomb, which was highly accurate even as high as 5-6000 meters.

The targets were 200 meters by 30 meters (656 feet by 100) a 65,600 square foot area from 10-14000 feet.

If the Fritz-X was used:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fritz_X#Combat_procedure

Accuracy is the main reason for developing a weapon system of this kind, rather than continuing to use so-called "dumb bombs". A skilled bombardier could manage to guide 50% of the bombs to within a 15 m (50 ft) radius of the aiming point, and about 90% hit within a 30 m (100 ft) radius. (Other sources say 60% hits within 4.6 meters radius.)[17]

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he minimum release height was 4,000 metres (13,000 ft) and a release height of 5,500 metres (18,000 ft) was preferred assuming adequate visibility. The Fritz X had to be released at least 5 kilometres (3 mi) from the target. The plane had to decelerate upon bomb release so momentum would carry the bomb in front of the aircraft where the bombardier could see and guide it. This deceleration was achieved by making a steep climb and then level out. The bombardier could make a maximum correction of 500 metres (1,600 ft) in range and 350 metres (1,150 ft) in bearing. The bomber was vulnerable to fighter attack as well as ship-based air defense weapons while maintaining a slow, steady course so the bombardier could maintain visual contact to guide the bomb.[12] When working properly, the missile was able to pierce 130 mm (5.1 in)[3] of armor.

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The cluster bombs of 1000kg (~650 bomblets IIRC) required less accuracy, more saturation and a lower altitude open for better concentration.

Firstly
The idea of vulnerability of the Soviet electricity gird seems to have been only a product of German wishful thinking. Soviets seems to have had plenty of extra capacity.
The accuracy of Fritz X wasn't as good in 44 as Germans hoped in early Aug 44 KG 100 was unable to hit the bridges S of Avranhes, that as at least partly because of powerful defences but in Oct 44 a Fw 200 miss a bridge in Lapland with Hs 293s even if the Finns failed to act against the attack. An attack by guided missiles fired from a 4-engine bomber was totally unexpected by the Finns.

The raids around Caen were conducted from relatively low altitudes. I don't have the figures for all ten to hand, but one was from 13,000ft.
Steve

Juha said:

Firstly
The idea of vulnerability of the Soviet electricity gird seems to have been only a product of German wishful thinking. Soviets seems to have had plenty of extra capacity.
The accuracy of Fritz X wasn't as good in 44 as Germans hoped in early Aug 44 KG 100 was unable to hit the bridges S of Avranhes, that as at least partly because of powerful defences but in Oct 44 a Fw 200 miss a bridge in Lapland with Hs 293s even if the Finns failed to act against the attack. An attack by guided missiles fired from a 4-engine bomber was totally unexpected by the Finns.

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Sourcing on the Soviet electrical grid? Also bridges are a lot smaller than a power station.

stona said:

The raids around Caen were conducted from relatively low altitudes. I don't have the figures for all ten to hand, but one was from 13,000ft.
Steve

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The first part was done at night, so required the target to be marked, which was not done properly to avoid hitting Allied troops.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Charnwood#Air_attack.2C_7_July

The pathfinders of No. 625 Squadron RAF, dropping the target markers for the bombers, were instructed not to allow the target zone to "drift back" towards the Allied lines as had been the tendency in earlier operations.[57] Together with the cautious shifting of the target zone during the planning stage, the effect was that in many cases the markers were dropped too far forward, pushing the bombed zone well into Caen itself and further away from the German defences. By 22:00 on 7 July the bombers had departed, leaving 80% of the city's northern sector destroyed.[81]

Analysis by Operational Research Section Number 2 (ORS2) concluded that the bombing of the first aiming point north-west of Caen was accurate, finding that the centre of the 90% zone (the area where 90% of the bombs fell) was 200–300 yards (180–270 m) east of the aiming point, with some spillage to the south and west. Examination of the area after its capture, indicated some destruction of German equipment, including the wreckage of ten of the forty trucks believed to be in the area at the time of the raid. The 48 hours that elapsed between the bombing and the Allied occupation of the area, allowed the Germans time to recover from any shock and disorientation and to salvage some damaged equipment. Examination of the second aiming point, "Northern Caen", failed to reveal a 90% zone but it was noted that the obstructive effect of bombing a suburb was significant and had caused substantial delays to vehicles of both sides, by cratering and blocking roads. ORS2 concluded that the success of Charnwood owed little to the bombing and made recommendations including changing to instantly fused bombs, dropping larger numbers of smaller anti-personnel bombs and rapidly following-up a bombardment with ground forces to take advantage of its main effect, which was the temporary suppression of German will to resist.

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Goodwood worked out better:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Goodwood

Bluecoat too:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bluecoat

Cobra suffered from miscommunications and bombers approaching from the wrong direction, but was generally accurate from the aiming point.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Cobra

Well let's take Goodwood.

1,512 heavy bomber and 343 medium bombers delivered 6,000 one thousand pound and 9,600 five hundred pound bombs. There were five different attacks in three waves (which is where Wiki's three attacks comes from). Here are the results according to the ORS report.

The attacks were coded A1,A2,H1,H2 and M

Displacement of mean point of impact (yards) was 100, 200, 670, 610 and 390.

Radial standard deviation of bomb pattern (yards) 810, 910, 560, 560 and 680.

The displacement of the mean point of impact for A1 and A2 are by far the best achieved in any of the ten raids studied, the next best is 290 yards. In this sense the bombing in support of Goodwood on those occasions was 'good' compared with the others at Caen and Caumont.

This is not the place to debate the efficacy of the bombing in support of Goodwood. After two days seven miles had been gained, 493 allied tanks (36%) had been destroyed and 4,011 allied soldiers were casualties. Harris observed that he had dropped 1,000 tons of bombs for each mile the Army had advanced and at that rate he would have to drop 600,000 tons to get it to Berlin.

It is important to understand what we mean by accurate. Practical examples illustrate the problem best. The Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force was found to be bombing targets (with its medium bombers, much more accurate than heavies) with an overall probable radial error of 170 yards. Bomb density in the target area still does not mean the target is likely to be hit. To have a 95% probability of hitting a bridge occupying an area of 6,000 square feet the MATAF mediums had to drop 600 (that's six hundred) bombs. If you think that's bad the aircraft of the RAF desert Air Force needed to drop 2,400.

In the face of all this you wish to destroy or disable an entire nations power supplies with a few bombers and a few hundred tons of bombs.

Cheers

Steve

stona said:

Well let's take Goodwood.

1,512 heavy bomber and 343 medium bombers delivered 6,000 one thousand pound and 9,600 five hundred pound bombs. There were five different attacks in three waves (which is where Wiki's three attacks comes from). Here are the results according to the ORS report.

The attacks were coded A1,A2,H1,H2 and M

Displacement of mean point of impact (yards) was 100, 200, 670, 610 and 390.

Radial standard deviation of bomb pattern (yards) 810, 910, 560, 560 and 680.

The displacement of the mean point of impact for A1 and A2 are by far the best achieved in any of the ten raids studied, the next best is 290 yards. In this sense the bombing in support of Goodwood on those occasions was 'good' compared with the others at Caen and Caumont.

This is not the place to debate the efficacy of the bombing in support of Goodwood. After two days seven miles had been gained, 493 allied tanks (36%) had been destroyed and 4,011 allied soldiers were casualties. Harris observed that he had dropped 1,000 tons of bombs for each mile the Army had advanced and at that rate he would have to drop 600,000 tons to get it to Berlin.

It is important to understand what we mean by accurate. Practical examples illustrate the problem best. The Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force was found to be bombing targets (with its medium bombers, much more accurate than heavies) with an overall probable radial error of 170 yards. Bomb density in the target area still does not mean the target is likely to be hit. To have a 95% probability of hitting a bridge occupying an area of 6,000 square feet the MATAF mediums had to drop 600 (that's six hundred) bombs. If you think that's bad the aircraft of the RAF desert Air Force needed to drop 2,400.

In the face of all this you wish to destroy or disable an entire nations power supplies with a few bombers and a few hundred tons of bombs.

Cheers

Steve

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Not the whole electrical power grind, just that already under supplying the Moscow-Upper Volga armaments industry that was highly concentrated and vulnerable.

Source was one Russian researcher when we talked on Oper Eisenhammer and checked the Lappland episode, 2 Fw 200s fired 4 Hs 293s.

stona said:

Well let's take Goodwood....This is not the place to debate the efficacy of the bombing in support of Goodwood. After two days seven miles had been gained, 493 allied tanks (36%) had been destroyed ...

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Only knocked out, the number of total losses was much smaller, under 200 IIRC.

Juha

Juha said:

Source was one Russian researcher when we talked on Oper Eisenhammer and checked the Lappland episode, 2 Fw 200s fired 4 Hs 293s.

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I'm happy to accept the German numbers were wrong, but I'm going to need something more verifiable than a researcher you talked to once.

I cannot add anything specific, he commentrd "communism elecricity" program launched by Lenin in 20s wasn't just a propaganda slogan. The network was dense and secured by old unactivated stations working on peat or wood.

One must remember that German intelligence on SU wasn't very accurate, they usually tended to underestimate Soviet capacity, often badly. But who knows?

Juha said:

Only knocked out, the number of total losses was much smaller, under 200 IIRC.

Juha

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Well, knocked out isn't continuing with the offensive. Furthermore recovery of such vehicles imposes a further strain on resources. The point is that concentrated bombing by thousands, not hundreds, of heavy bombers at short range in day light manifestly failed to destroy the German anti tank defences. The ORS discovered that almost all the German guns destroyed were destroyed from the ground, not the air. To destroy something like an anti tank gun requires a direct hit, just like a machine tool or substantial industrial installation (like power transformers) and this, even in ideal conditions, was virtually impossible to achieve from the air with heavy bombers.

The concentrations achieved late in the war by the RAF and USAAF came as a result of a very steep learning curve and development and refinement of bombing techniques over several years. These methods were imposed on them by the realisation of the limitations of the tools to hand. As far as developing tactics and techniques for long range, heavy, strategic bombing, the Luftwaffe had barely put a foot on the first rung of the ladder.

Some of the opinions being expressed here remind me of those expressed by the proponents of strategic bombing in the 1920/30s, before the concept had been put to the test and found wanting.

Cheers

Steve

wiking85 said:

..l. Even just as a 'fleet in being' effect of forcing the Soviets to guard against the potential threat of a German strategic bombardment would cause a massive shift in resources to defense away from offense, just as the Germans had against the RAF and USAAF. Plus the Soviets had a very huge area to defend so couldn't afford to build up anything integrated, rather only point defenses on a huge number of potential targets.

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Was the Soviet industry very concentrated or was there a huge number of of potential targets?
SU had the PVO and it remained very powerful, AA defences of e.g. Moscow, Murmansk and Leningrad were very powerful and e.g. all 1000+ Spitfire IXs delivered to SU went to PVO which had plenty of other fighters as well, so I doubt that any 100+ bombers "fleet in being" formation would have forced any big shift in resources.

Juha

Hello Steve
out of 493 tanks lost during the Goodwood 132 were damaged - that is, they required less than 24 hours for repair and only 94 were total losses. I agree that much of effects of bombing were psychological, that is also true to Stuka attacks against enemy troops, and because the worst psychological effects of massive bombing wears off rather fast amongst good troops it wasn't so effective against good troops in deep deployment.

Juha

Juha said:

I agree that much of effects of bombing were psychological, Juha

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That is true. The efficacy of bombing in this respect depends very much on the quality of the troops being bombed, as you say. To elite troops it is little more than an inconvenience, unless repeated over and again. No airman would ever agree that this was an economic, effective or even valid use of air power.

The psychological effect of air attack is very difficult to quantify but can be significant. Several British ORS reports comment on the debilitating effect that attack by rocket firing Typhoons had on the target troops as evidenced by PoW interrogations, but without any means of quantifying this as there were no or few bodies to count. This is unfortunate because the hard headed officers and politicians who are justifying or paying for these weapons like some nice graphs or figures to show them what they are getting for their money. They still do.

Cheers

Steve

In today's world of perceived high tech and supposedly infalible aiming assuming the kit works as sold when not in test/lab condistions, few people can sometimes get head around the fact that statistics they find upon and the anecdotal things they've read, seen or heard are just conjecture at best, and at the worst, lie, a lot.
If General Weaver had not died in a crash, then their mioght have been some chance of the LW having a greater chance of some/more strategic medium or heavy bombers, hell for all it isn't worth, he could have asked Heinkel to build a traditional 4 engined version of the 177 earlier than they did do by the back door - hence one reason why it took them so long to get around to it in between Heinkel 'usual' production shedules and dodging politcal mandates not to do so.

As it wasn't, and so with a few scores of 177Asomethings, if they can get turncoat spy's and or people that'd pass for soviet citizens into and survive long enough to get towards, locate and observe industiral targets deep behind in commissar controlled areas where the comrades are just as much spying upon each other as the commissars are on them, they could have a chance of doing as much *cough*(little) damage as the Flying Flea Me163 unit did against the 17's 24's upon the OKL picked targets - if they A/C survived getting there that is.