The Fall of France 1940

[Arsenal VG-33]

Ok, the notion that France could have made all the difference in 1939 by attacking Germany head-on and end the war then and there, is not only really tiresome but it also ignores what I believe are some very unique circumstances which France was facing. Taking these circumstances into account helps to put things into perpective rather than simply denouncing the French for not having done more to help Poland.

The one thing I believe all of us can agree on is that overall is that French tactical and strategic thinking on the battlefield was outdated. Save for a few mavericks who advocated immediate and drastic changes, the French high command as well as the political scene in Paris was quite content to let things go along as before.

(Then Colonel Charles de Gaulle had published 2 books considered somewhat avant-garde among contemporary military thinkers, and which also made him many enemies. Few people will acknowledge that Guderian actually pinched a few ideas from de Gaulle's book "The Edge of the Sword" for his own "Achtung Panzer").

I'll also add that insofar as Poland is concerned, the Non-Aggression pact between the Soviets and the Germans sealed their fate. There was nothing the French or the Brits, or the world could have done about that as it took everyone by surprise. For all the French and British knew, the Russians and Germans could have been de facto allies.

Contrary to popular thinking, the Maginot Line alone was not responsible for the budget shortfalls of French military expenditure. (In fact, there are some historians who will argue that the French military budget was not in dire straits as many would suggest. A crunch? Perhaps, but it wasn't a hopeless situation in terms of monetary spending. There was still enough to go around to aircraft amd armor productions.) Interwar France was hampered mainly by declining birthrate, thanks to WW 1, and also a lot by political squabbling by extreme right and left groups. At one point governments were changing on a weekly basis. Add this to the fact that it wasn't until 1935-36 that the French army finally began to adopt more modern equipment for their troops, more modern tank and aircraft designs as well, all of which would come too late. Nevertheless, the doctrines of Gamelin (originally trained as a staff officer) and later Weygand would mire the French army in near paralysis and indecision as the Blitz would progress.

After the German attack into Poland in 1939, France launched the ill-fated Saarland offensive, capturing a few small villages and towns, but nothing more. French troops were almost immediately caught in minefields and mine detecting equipment was not to be found. Also, the further they went into Germany, the closer they came to the Seigfreid Line. Again, contrary to popular opinion, this line was not abandoned and it's artillery was fully manned and operational. The lack of French intel in these areas only reinforced their belief that much of the German army was still there, and there was no reason to doubt otherwise. Shortly afterward the French withdrew, and I believe it probably the wisest thing they could have done given their location.

Everyone who studies the European wars from Napoleon to WW2 will tell you that the easiest way to attack Germany is through Belgium and the Lowlands. The easiest way for Germany to attack France was through Belgium and the Lowlands. No one had brought entire armored divisions through the Ardennes before, so there was little reason to believe it could be done. The Saarland region is simply one of the worst places to launch an offensive from. It is in a depression surrounded by dense forests and many streams. The Maginot Line was originally supposed to cover this area and eventually go into Belgium and connect with the famous Eben Emael fortress. Belgian neutrality prevented this from happening, and it also prevented the Allies to properly cooperate with one another in order to come up with a plan they could all agree on. Obviously, the Germans had no problem violating the neutral countries, but France could not and would not.

This then takes us back to that very interesting episode in 1936 when Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, a flagrant violation of the Versailles Treaty. When this happened, the French were the only ones ready and willing to launch an invasion to expel the German army. However, wary of starting another world war, the French sought assurances that the US and UK would back them. The US said "NO". The UK, waiting to hear what the US said on the matter (nothing changes, eh?) also said "NO". Their arguement? Well, it actually made a lot of sense: The US-UK would in no way help France should she invade Germany to expel the German army from the Rhineland, because this was a percieved threat which could not be fully justified, and for France to launch herself into a pre-emptive strike could have severe ramifications for the French. (funny, how in the past 4 years, the whole concept of pre-emptive warfare has been called into question again). After that rebuttal from what she thought were her closest Allies, the French then demanded that economic sanctions be levied against Germany. Again, the answer was no. A member of UK's goverment even wondered why the German's should be punished at all for taking back what was essentially theirs to begin with. At this point, I should mention that sometimes between 1900 and 1908, there was a study within the French military command that France could not win any fight on their soil alone, and that allies would be needed. Faced with the fact that the US and UK would not follow, and quite possibly even punish France for striking, it's no wonder the French were reluctant to do anything much.

Yes, the French could have and should have revised their strategic thinking. Yes, they should have implemeted changes and modifications sooner at all levels. Yes, they probably should have paid more attention to their Class B troops as well, since they were the ones that would face the breakthrough at Sedan. Certainly, they should have been improving communications everywhere. (This flaw existed because the French were distrustful of radio communications, fearing the enemy could listen in. This many frontline troops were obliged to use public phone to relay information and orders.)

However, considering the challenges France faced on the military and geopolitical fronts during the years preceeding the war, I find it quite naive to suggest that France could have done more in 1939-40. The French, simply put, were stuck between a rock and hard place and had little choice but accept being brutally run over by a German army that, while not necessarily more modern or better equipped, simply knew what it was doing and knew what it was supposed to do from day 1. The German success in the West in 1940 was almost guaranteed before the shooting even started.

 

[Arsenal VG-33]

Ok, the notion that France could have made all the difference in 1939 by attacking Germany head-on and end the war then and there, is not only really tiresome but it also ignores what I believe are some very unique circumstances which France was facing. Taking these circumstances into account helps to put things into perpective rather than simply denouncing the French for not having done more to help Poland.

The one thing I believe all of us can agree on is that overall is that French tactical and strategic thinking on the battlefield was outdated. Save for a few mavericks who advocated immediate and drastic changes, the French high command as well as the political scene in Paris was quite content to let things go along as before.

(Then Colonel Charles de Gaulle had published 2 books considered somewhat avant-garde among contemporary military thinkers, and which also made him many enemies. Few people will acknowledge that Guderian actually pinched a few ideas from de Gaulle's book "The Edge of the Sword" for his own "Achtung Panzer").

I'll also add that insofar as Poland is concerned, the Non-Aggression pact between the Soviets and the Germans sealed their fate. There was nothing the French or the Brits, or the world could have done about that as it took everyone by surprise. For all the French and British knew, the Russians and Germans could have been de facto allies.

Contrary to popular thinking, the Maginot Line alone was not responsible for the budget shortfalls of French military expenditure. (In fact, there are some historians who will argue that the French military budget was not in dire straits as many would suggest. A crunch? Perhaps, but it wasn't a hopeless situation in terms of monetary spending. There was still enough to go around to aircraft amd armor productions.) Interwar France was hampered mainly by declining birthrate, thanks to WW 1, and also a lot by political squabbling by extreme right and left groups. At one point governments were changing on a weekly basis. Add this to the fact that it wasn't until 1935-36 that the French army finally began to adopt more modern equipment for their troops, more modern tank and aircraft designs as well, all of which would come too late. Nevertheless, the doctrines of Gamelin (originally trained as a staff officer) and later Weygand would mire the French army in near paralysis and indecision as the Blitz would progress.

After the German attack into Poland in 1939, France launched the ill-fated Saarland offensive, capturing a few small villages and towns, but nothing more. French troops were almost immediately caught in minefields and mine detecting equipment was not to be found. Also, the further they went into Germany, the closer they came to the Seigfreid Line. Again, contrary to popular opinion, this line was not abandoned and it's artillery was fully manned and operational. The lack of French intel in these areas only reinforced their belief that much of the German army was still there, and there was no reason to doubt otherwise. Shortly afterward the French withdrew, and I believe it probably the wisest thing they could have done given their location.

Everyone who studies the European wars from Napoleon to WW2 will tell you that the easiest way to attack Germany is through Belgium and the Lowlands. The easiest way for Germany to attack France was through Belgium and the Lowlands. No one had brought entire armored divisions through the Ardennes before, so there was little reason to believe it could be done. The Saarland region is simply one of the worst places to launch an offensive from. It is in a depression surrounded by dense forests and many streams. The Maginot Line was originally supposed to cover this area and eventually go into Belgium and connect with the famous Eben Emael fortress. Belgian neutrality prevented this from happening, and it also prevented the Allies to properly cooperate with one another in order to come up with a plan they could all agree on. Obviously, the Germans had no problem violating the neutral countries, but France could not and would not.

This then takes us back to that very interesting episode in 1936 when Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, a flagrant violation of the Versailles Treaty. When this happened, the French were the only ones ready and willing to launch an invasion to expel the German army. However, wary of starting another world war, the French sought assurances that the US and UK would back them. The US said "NO". The UK, waiting to hear what the US said on the matter (nothing changes, eh?) also said "NO". Their arguement? Well, it actually made a lot of sense: The US-UK would in no way help France should she invade Germany to expel the German army from the Rhineland, because this was a percieved threat which could not be fully justified, and for France to launch herself into a pre-emptive strike could have severe ramifications for the French. (funny, how in the past 4 years, the whole concept of pre-emptive warfare has been called into question again). After that rebuttal from what she thought were her closest Allies, the French then demanded that economic sanctions be levied against Germany. Again, the answer was no. A member of UK's goverment even wondered why the German's should be punished at all for taking back what was essentially theirs to begin with. At this point, I should mention that sometimes between 1900 and 1908, there was a study within the French military command that France could not win any fight on their soil alone, and that allies would be needed. Faced with the fact that the US and UK would not follow, and quite possibly even punish France for striking, it's no wonder the French were reluctant to do anything much.

Yes, the French could have and should have revised their strategic thinking. Yes, they should have implemeted changes and modifications sooner at all levels. Yes, they probably should have paid more attention to their Class B troops as well, since they were the ones that would face the breakthrough at Sedan. Certainly, they should have been improving communications everywhere. (This flaw existed because the French were distrustful of radio communications, fearing the enemy could listen in. This many frontline troops were obliged to use public phone to relay information and orders.)

However, considering the challenges France faced on the military and geopolitical fronts during the years preceeding the war, I find it quite naive to suggest that France could have done more in 1939-40. The French, simply put, were stuck between a rock and hard place and had little choice but accept being brutally run over by a German army that, while not necessarily more modern or better equipped, simply knew what it was doing and knew what it was supposed to do from day 1. The German success in the West in 1940 was almost guaranteed before the shooting even started.

 

[Arsenal VG-33]

You are right about that, the French were capable, unfortunately many of them had lost the will to fight. And they did not have strong political or military leadership either.

You should read Julian Jackson's "The Fall of France". While I would agree that strong and decisive political and military leadership was severely lacking, most of the lowly French grunts in the dugouts were actually quite ready to fight. They were indeed bored during the Phoney War, and many of their officers didn't seem to care much about them, but J. Jackson's book gives sufficient evidence that the regular French soldier was actually quite happy that the Blitz was on at last, and that he might finally see some action.

 

[Arsenal VG-33]

You are right about that, the French were capable, unfortunately many of them had lost the will to fight. And they did not have strong political or military leadership either.

You should read Julian Jackson's "The Fall of France". While I would agree that strong and decisive political and military leadership was severely lacking, most of the lowly French grunts in the dugouts were actually quite ready to fight. They were indeed bored during the Phoney War, and many of their officers didn't seem to care much about them, but J. Jackson's book gives sufficient evidence that the regular French soldier was actually quite happy that the Blitz was on at last, and that he might finally see some action.

 

[mkloby]

You should read Julian Jackson's "The Fall of France". While I would agree that strong and decisive political and military leadership was severely lacking, most of the lowly French grunts in the dugouts were actually quite ready to fight. They were indeed bored during the Phoney War, and many of their officers didn't seem to care much about them, but J. Jackson's book gives sufficient evidence that the regular French soldier was actually quite happy that the Blitz was on at last, and that he might finally see some action.

Arsenal - you have good points in your post, but nothing to sustain the notion that the French couldn't have launched a successful invasion.

They were indeed bored during the Phoney War, and many of their officers didn't seem to care much about them, but J. Jackson's book gives sufficient evidence that the regular French soldier was actually quite happy that the Blitz was on at last, and that he might finally see some action.

Now how in God's name can you say that French officer's didn't seem to care about their troops???? Come on - no basis for saying regardless of what someone wrote in a book.

 

[mkloby]

You should read Julian Jackson's "The Fall of France". While I would agree that strong and decisive political and military leadership was severely lacking, most of the lowly French grunts in the dugouts were actually quite ready to fight. They were indeed bored during the Phoney War, and many of their officers didn't seem to care much about them, but J. Jackson's book gives sufficient evidence that the regular French soldier was actually quite happy that the Blitz was on at last, and that he might finally see some action.

Arsenal - you have good points in your post, but nothing to sustain the notion that the French couldn't have launched a successful invasion.

They were indeed bored during the Phoney War, and many of their officers didn't seem to care much about them, but J. Jackson's book gives sufficient evidence that the regular French soldier was actually quite happy that the Blitz was on at last, and that he might finally see some action.

Now how in God's name can you say that French officer's didn't seem to care about their troops???? Come on - no basis for saying regardless of what someone wrote in a book.

 

[Freebird]

I've decided to start a new thread here about the "Fall of France" I hope one of the Mod's can move all the relevant posts from "British Debts" to the new thread. The discussion was about what the Allies could have done in 1939-1940, would it have been better for the French the BEF to attack right away in Sept 1939, while the bulk of the German army was in Poland.

Quote below from the other thread.

Ok, the notion that France could have made all the difference in 1939 by attacking Germany head-on and end the war then and there, is not only really tiresome but it also ignores what I believe are some very unique circumstances which France was facing. Taking these circumstances into account helps to put things into perpective rather than simply denouncing the French for not having done more to help Poland.

The one thing I believe all of us can agree on is that overall is that French tactical and strategic thinking on the battlefield was outdated. Save for a few mavericks who advocated immediate and drastic changes, the French high command as well as the political scene in Paris was quite content to let things go along as before.

(Then Colonel Charles de Gaulle had published 2 books considered somewhat avant-garde among contemporary military thinkers, and which also made him many enemies. Few people will acknowledge that Guderian actually pinched a few ideas from de Gaulle's book "The Edge of the Sword" for his own "Achtung Panzer").

I'll also add that insofar as Poland is concerned, the Non-Aggression pact between the Soviets and the Germans sealed their fate. There was nothing the French or the Brits, or the world could have done about that as it took everyone by surprise. For all the French and British knew, the Russians and Germans could have been de facto allies.

Contrary to popular thinking, the Maginot Line alone was not responsible for the budget shortfalls of French military expenditure. (In fact, there are some historians who will argue that the French military budget was not in dire straits as many would suggest. A crunch? Perhaps, but it wasn't a hopeless situation in terms of monetary spending. There was still enough to go around to aircraft amd armor productions.) Interwar France was hampered mainly by declining birthrate, thanks to WW 1, and also a lot by political squabbling by extreme right and left groups. At one point governments were changing on a weekly basis. Add this to the fact that it wasn't until 1935-36 that the French army finally began to adopt more modern equipment for their troops, more modern tank and aircraft designs as well, all of which would come too late. Nevertheless, the doctrines of Gamelin (originally trained as a staff officer) and later Weygand would mire the French army in near paralysis and indecision as the Blitz would progress.

After the German attack into Poland in 1939, France launched the ill-fated Saarland offensive, capturing a few small villages and towns, but nothing more. French troops were almost immediately caught in minefields and mine detecting equipment was not to be found. Also, the further they went into Germany, the closer they came to the Seigfreid Line. Again, contrary to popular opinion, this line was not abandoned and it's artillery was fully manned and operational. The lack of French intel in these areas only reinforced their belief that much of the German army was still there, and there was no reason to doubt otherwise. Shortly afterward the French withdrew, and I believe it probably the wisest thing they could have done given their location.

Everyone who studies the European wars from Napoleon to WW2 will tell you that the easiest way to attack Germany is through Belgium and the Lowlands. The easiest way for Germany to attack France was through Belgium and the Lowlands. No one had brought entire armored divisions through the Ardennes before, so there was little reason to believe it could be done. The Saarland region is simply one of the worst places to launch an offensive from. It is in a depression surrounded by dense forests and many streams. The Maginot Line was originally supposed to cover this area and eventually go into Belgium and connect with the famous Eben Emael fortress. Belgian neutrality prevented this from happening, and it also prevented the Allies to properly cooperate with one another in order to come up with a plan they could all agree on. Obviously, the Germans had no problem violating the neutral countries, but France could not and would not.

This then takes us back to that very interesting episode in 1936 when Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, a flagrant violation of the Versailles Treaty. When this happened, the French were the only ones ready and willing to launch an invasion to expel the German army. However, wary of starting another world war, the French sought assurances that the US and UK would back them. The US said "NO". The UK, waiting to hear what the US said on the matter (nothing changes, eh?) also said "NO". Their arguement? Well, it actually made a lot of sense: The US-UK would in no way help France should she invade Germany to expel the German army from the Rhineland, because this was a percieved threat which could not be fully justified, and for France to launch herself into a pre-emptive strike could have severe ramifications for the French. (funny, how in the past 4 years, the whole concept of pre-emptive warfare has been called into question again). After that rebuttal from what she thought were her closest Allies, the French then demanded that economic sanctions be levied against Germany. Again, the answer was no. A member of UK's goverment even wondered why the German's should be punished at all for taking back what was essentially theirs to begin with. At this point, I should mention that sometimes between 1900 and 1908, there was a study within the French military command that France could not win any fight on their soil alone, and that allies would be needed. Faced with the fact that the US and UK would not follow, and quite possibly even punish France for striking, it's no wonder the French were reluctant to do anything much.

Yes, the French could have and should have revised their strategic thinking. Yes, they should have implemeted changes and modifications sooner at all levels. Yes, they probably should have paid more attention to their Class B troops as well, since they were the ones that would face the breakthrough at Sedan. Certainly, they should have been improving communications everywhere. (This flaw existed because the French were distrustful of radio communications, fearing the enemy could listen in. This many frontline troops were obliged to use public phone to relay information and orders.)

However, considering the challenges France faced on the military and geopolitical fronts during the years preceeding the war, I find it quite naive to suggest that France could have done more in 1939-40. The French, simply put, were stuck between a rock and hard place and had little choice but accept being brutally run over by a German army that, while not necessarily more modern or better equipped, simply knew what it was doing and knew what it was supposed to do from day 1. The German success in the West in 1940 was almost guaranteed before the shooting even started.

 

[Watanbe]

France obviously placed to much emphasis on the Maginot line...it was obvious that France and Britain were going to be fighting a war so I would of thought that they should have attacked into Germany and put pressure on them to fight a defensive style war rather than just site behind a wall and wait for them to attack!

 

[merlin]

The success of the German attack on France took everyone by surprise - even the Germans !

The policy of the French was to wait it out, when their re-equipement programme would take effect.
For example French orders placed in the US for engines and aircraft, kick-started the US aircraft industry. It gave the US a good six-month start when it came to their own re-arming.
Many of the 'modern' French aircraft designs needed more time to get to the squadrons, and others to go from development to production e.g. MB-157.
France needed more time to harness the capabilities of the Empire, but German knew that to - that in part why Hitler wanted an autumn '39 campaign!

Yet, while the Ardenne was seen as a 'wild-card' for a substantial attack route, it shouldn't have been too difficult to have mined it, felled trees at choke points etc.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Here I will be moving all the relevent threads over from the other thread.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Okay bare with me here. When I moved them over it did not work out right.

 

[Freebird]

Originally posted on the "Did the US save Europe thread"

As long as we are playing what if on the course of Britain, USSR, Germany and Japan - take into account possible course of action for Britain (and France) not declaring War in September 1939.

Possibility exists that while Germany consolidates Poland - that he decides NOT to attack westward. There were enough Generals that didn't want the war to continue arguing against it. So say Britain says 'not me'.

France continues to build, expecting war. US already in wartime increase of military capability. US declares alliance with France and USSR

What if Hitler strikes East earlier than he did and does not declare war on France? He might have defeated USSR with few reserves in West.. but France was capable military force - just outflanked in 1940. What if France strikes Germany in middle of Russian campaign?

So who knows what the public mood is in the US. In this scenario I think it is higher probability that Germany defeats USSR, then consolidates and defeats France, then attains complete control of the air over channel.

Next question, who protects oil in Middle East from Germany? or Rumania?

If Britain is still neutral and refuses an overture as 'peaceful partner' from Hitler - hitler plays trump card and cuts off Britain from ME oil and as Britain isn't an ally of the US, US doesn't supply Britain but continues to assist France if they are still fighting..

Does Britain survive 'neutrality?

Key point to ponder - US basically went from zero to lightspeed in 2 years relative to taking prototypes and mobilizing huge capable forces with weight of weapons and manpower surpassing Germany. USN essentially defeated Japanese Navy single handedly with major forces and resources going to ETO.

US has better chance of keeping Russia in the war than Britain had we engaed Germany in 1939 (i.e replace Britain scenario).. the supply lines were long but we could put more tonnage into Eastern Siberia (except winter) than we did via Murmansk... have to sort out whether Russia, US and China could put together a cohesive strategy to align 700,000,000 people together to defeat 60,000,000 in west and about same in east.

Think it could be done but all speculation on pivotal political and military decisions in 1940 after fall of Poland.

Interesting to contemplate Britain and France not declaring war in sept 1939 and Germany deciding to not attack? But US declare war as soon as Germany attacks either USSR or France. Gives Germany time to continue U-Boat build up, US to consolidate ties with USSR (forget politics in this game - just one big happy family on both sides but Allies replace Britain with France and have more time to build up..

Even this scenario favors Axis with Britain out - Britain a tougher strategic problem for Germany with 26 miles of water separating them and far easier to build for an invasion than go theough USSR

Good to chat

 

[Freebird]

From other thread -

I've already stated my reasons for France not being able to take the offensive in 1939-40 in previous posts. When it comes to the defense of France, I have a slightly differing view.

As for the FR and UK declaration of war against Germany, they were honor-bound to do so by previous treaties with Poland. Hitler himself stated he was surprised that the French and British would actually honor this agreement. Poland's geographical situation prevented any direct aid to affect the outcome. Furthermore, the fact that the invasion of Poland was a COMBINED invasion by Germany and Soviet Russia was more than enough reason for the French and British to be reluctant in attacking Germany directly. Given the strong communist movements in both countries, especially in France in the labor unions, there was a genuine fear of popular upheaval in the event of a war against both the Germans and the Soviets.

As for the Maginot Line, it's primary fault lie in the fact that Belgium's neutrality prevented it from becoming the the real defensive wall it was meant to be. Initial plans were to have it go into Belgium and eventually connect with the fortress of Eben Emael. Not only did Belgium's declaration to remain neutral put a stop to this, it also prevented their French and British counterparts from holding joint exercises and conferences to ensure some kind of unison. This would never happen. As a result, the French were forced to improvise defenses along the Franco-Belgian border, defenses which amounted to nothing more than a series of trenches, ditches, and fortified ground defenses. Certainly nothing like the Maginot Line. Even with the Ardennes left exposed, had the FULL plan of the Maginot Line been realized, I seriously doubt the Germans would have attempted a two pronged attack in the North AND the East.

Also keep in mind that the Maginot Line troops consisted not only of fortress garrisons, but also of special interval troops between actual forts. These troops were meant to fight off any attack attempting to exploit the areas between the forts. Unfortunately, as the German breakthrough in the Meuse-Sedan region progressed, these interval troops were withdrawn from the line to help plug in the gaps being created by the breakout. Nonetheless, they were effective in inflivting damage on the Germans: One of these gaps was at the hinge of the line, at the Northern most part in a town called Stonne, where the German suffered over 10% of all their casualties of the Battle of France.

In my opinion, the greatest fault in the Allies (FR and UK) lay in the fact that despite the failure of the Norway campaign, they learned nothing from it in terms of joint operations, communications, and in trusting one another. Instead, the failure of the overall campaign only led to more distrust and suspicion of eachother. Also, contrary to post-war myth-making, most French troops along the Franco-Belgian border (1er Armee, Class A troops) and Maginot Line troops were fairly regularly trained and drilled (as opposed to their Class B and reserve troops counterparts in the Ardennes sector.). They also saw the British presence in northern France simply as one taking up space and taking residence in defensive works already made prepared before their arrival.

At which point I'd like to comment on the statements below as hilarious, and with all due respect to drgondog, I must wholeheartedly disagree with his assesment, on a point by point basis:



I would say just the exact opposite. What saved the BEF in 1940 was NOT superior technical competence, tenacity, or the question of France's ability to hold off the Germans in the West. The BEF was saved for one reason and one reason only: the envious fact that there is a 21 miles (34Km) moat of cold deep water between England and France. The decision to put General Gort in charge of the BEF was disastrous one for the French and Belgians, particulary for the Belgians. Most European historians view Gort's decision to withdraw the BEF before even the 6th full day of the Blitz as nothing less than cut-'n-run. The premise of the decision to withdraw, that France has already lost the battle, is astonishing since Gort and the BEF had no appreciation yet of what had happened at Sedan. Secondly, given that the BEF was on Belgian's right , their withdrawal insured that the Belgians would be forced with their backs to the sea and no alternative but to capitulate. Given that the both the French and the Belgians did everything they could to accomodate Gen. Gort to give the BEF only a small portion of the Dyle Line to defend, a mere 20 km. of it, I find that the British explaination to withdraw was based on their assumption that the French and Belgians had "thrown in the towel" to be nothing less than preposterous. If there was anyone running away as fast as they could, it was the BEF, with the French and Belgians forced to somehow close and defend the gap, which they would not be able to do.



I can only reiterate what I stated above, that the Maginot Line was to complement the Belgian defenses. If we are to extrapolate, then we can blame the French for not thinking far enough ahead into the furture, as Belgium's neutrality was the obvious sticking point to a coordinated defense by the three main allies.



Now this IS an interesting question. One must be reminded however, that Germany had no problems attacking 3 neutral countries without a declaration of war - Belgium, Holland, and Denmark.




I would argue the opposite. The presence of the BEF gave the Germans no deterence in invading Beglium-France, and did not affect the overall outcome in anyway. I'm of the opinion that the French and Belgians could have improvised a better defense on the go without the BEF suddenly withdrawing and leaving a 20 km. gap in the Allied lines. Thus I would say that, in hindsight, there was no reason for the French and Belgians to rely on the British. The Allied epedition on Norway ended in a fiasco, and France should have made plans to look out after herself first, damned the BEF.

The whole debacle in the North can be summed up, IMO, in an analogy I've created. We have 3 guys in a leaky boat in the middle of the ocean. They're all screwing it up in some way or another, and not one will listen to the other. Before any of the three can determine what the future has in store for them, one decides prematurely that all is lost, and he pulls his plug and dives overboard, being fairly sure he will be rescued. He is, and when he's back on land, he is surrounded by hoardes of reporters asking why the boat sank. What do you think he'll say? Since he's the only survivor, safe bet to say that he'll fault the sinking entirely on his drowned shipmates before taking any blame for himself.

 

[Freebird]

As for the Maginot Line, it's primary fault lie in the fact that Belgium's neutrality prevented it from becoming the the real defensive wall it was meant to be. Initial plans were to have it go into Belgium and eventually connect with the fortress of Eben Emael. Not only did Belgium's declaration to remain neutral put a stop to this, it also prevented their French and British counterparts from holding joint exercises and conferences to ensure some kind of unison.

In this point you are correct, if the Belgians did not want to prepare a joint defence, the French British should have stayed on the French border in the positions they had spent all winter preparing, instead of a forward shift into Belgium, where there were no hard points, anti-tank ditches, foxholes or anything. If the Belgians gambled on the Germans respecting their neutrality lost, then they would be defending Belgium on their own. (until they retreated into France)


At which point I'd like to comment on the statements below as hilarious, and with all due respect to drgondog, I must wholeheartedly disagree with his assesment, on a point by point basis:



I would say just the exact opposite. What saved the BEF in 1940 was NOT superior technical competence, tenacity, or the question of France's ability to hold off the Germans in the West. The BEF was saved for one reason and one reason only: the envious fact that there is a 21 miles (34Km) moat of cold deep water between England and France.

Correct. Whichever British King had ordered the Channel dug was thinking ahead.

The decision to put General Gort in charge of the BEF was disastrous one for the French and Belgians, particulary for the Belgians. Most European historians view Gort's decision to withdraw the BEF before even the 6th full day of the Blitz as nothing less than cut-'n-run.

Which historians are you citing that think it would have been better for the BEF to stay put where they were?

The premise of the decision to withdraw, that France has already lost the battle, is astonishing since Gort and the BEF had no appreciation yet of what had happened at Sedan.

The British were well aware of the collape of the French 9th army that Germans had breached the Meuse river, as on May 16th they had began exchanging fire with German armoured units TO THEIR REAR, meaning that the Germans had already gotten behind the French 1st army on their drive westward



Secondly, given that the BEF was on Belgian's right , their withdrawal insured that the Belgians would be forced with their backs to the sea and no alternative but to capitulate.

This is not correct, the BEF began a withdrawl because the Fr. 1st army had already begun to pull back, as they had been flanked and Hoth's Kleist's Panzers were already behind them and heading west. The Belgians the BEF and the FR. 1st on May 17th withdrew from the Dyle and pulled back to the Charleroi canal


Given that the both the French and the Belgians did everything they could to accomodate Gen. Gort to give the BEF only a small portion of the Dyle Line to defend, a mere 20 km. of it, I find that the British explaination to withdraw was based on their assumption that the French and Belgians had "thrown in the towel" to be nothing less than preposterous. If there was anyone running away as fast as they could, it was the BEF, with the French and Belgians forced to somehow close and defend the gap, which they would not be able to do.

There was no assumption, we have both British AND GERMAN reports of the lack of resistance by some French Belgian units

I can only reiterate what I stated above, that the Maginot Line was to complement the Belgian defenses. If we are to extrapolate, then we can blame the French for not thinking far enough ahead into the furture, as Belgium's neutrality was the obvious sticking point to a coordinated defense by the three main allies.


I would argue the opposite. The presence of the BEF gave the Germans no deterence in invading Beglium-France, and did not affect the overall outcome in anyway. I'm of the opinion that the French and Belgians could have improvised a better defense on the go without the BEF suddenly withdrawing and leaving a 20 km. gap in the Allied lines. Thus I would say that, in hindsight, there was no reason for the French and Belgians to rely on the British. The Allied epedition on Norway ended in a fiasco, and France should have made plans to look out after herself first, damned the BEF.

The main problem in the Fall of France is that Gen. Gamelin had no strategic reserve, so that he had nothing to stop or even slow down the German blitzkrieg, one they had broken through the French lines. Since the French Belgians had as many divisions as the Germans, outnumbered them in tanks, and had elaborate defensive positions for at least half the frontier, they should have been able to hold out for more than 42 days.

Assuming that the BEF had stayed on the Dyle river in front of Brussels, How would the French have prevented their 1st 7th armies (and the Belgians BEF) from being cut off, considering that they had no strategic reserve to mount a counterattack?

The only serious attack was made by Gen. Franklyn's British 5th division + 2 tank battalions at Arras on May 20th.

 

[plan_D]

VG, you've read Panzer Battles; it's references to the BEF are all of retreats under pressure. Hoppners Panzer Corps pressed the French at Gembloux on the 13th 14th May, and Gort did request French aid in the counter-attack at Arras to close the gap between there and Peronne on the 20th.

If you want to defend the French then feel free, but don't start trying to imply that the British were cowards - especially after Great Britain went to the aid of France (a country that should be able to defend itself). The BEF evacuated from the nation because it was hopeless - the French were practically useless in armoured tactics and that was key to winning the battle.

 

[drgondog]

The main problem in the Fall of France is that Gen. Gamelin had no strategic reserve, so that he had nothing to stop or even slow down the German blitzkrieg, one they had broken through the French lines. Since the French Belgians had as many divisions as the Germans, outnumbered them in tanks, and had elaborate defensive positions for at least half the frontier, they should have been able to hold out for more than 42 days.

Assuming that the BEF had stayed on the Dyle river in front of Brussels, How would the French have prevented their 1st 7th armies (and the Belgians BEF) from being cut off, considering that they had no strategic reserve to mount a counterattack?

The only serious attack was made by Gen. Franklyn's British 5th division + 2 tank battalions at Arras on May 20th.

Good points and Post Freebird

 

[AL Schlageter]

I would argue the opposite. The presence of the BEF gave the Germans no deterence in invading Beglium-France, and did not affect the overall outcome in anyway. I'm of the opinion that the French and Belgians could have improvised a better defense on the go without the BEF suddenly withdrawing and leaving a 20 km. gap in the Allied lines. Thus I would say that, in hindsight, there was no reason for the French and Belgians to rely on the British. The Allied epedition on Norway ended in a fiasco, and France should have made plans to look out after herself first, damned the BEF.

The BEF (with 9 Div) had the French 1st Army (with 22 Div) on its right and the Belgium Army (with 18 Div) on its left. The German breakthrough was on the line held by the French 9th Army (steamrolled) which had the French 1st Army on its left.

 

[Arsenal VG-33]

Which historians are you citing that think it would have been better for the BEF to stay put where they were?

Precisely my point, using post-war 20/20 hindsight to find justification for maneuvers which were at the time questionable does not make a valid arguement. As for my statement on Gen. Gort, "...General Lord Gort, the BEF commander, was a most unfortunate choice. Although he is usually spared any serious blame for the debacle that followed, it would seem that he was pesimistic from the very first moment he arrived in France, and by May 1940 his only instinct was to cut and run".

John Mosier, The Blitzkrieg Myth pg. 140-142. Not Mozier's word, he is citing from a British source no less, author Hamilton in his book Monty, pgs. 328-30.

The British were well aware of the collape of the French 9th army that Germans had breached the Meuse river, as on May 16th they had began exchanging fire with German armoured units TO THEIR REAR, meaning that the Germans had already gotten behind the French 1st army on their drive westward

I find this astonishing, since all of my sources indicate the Germans had still not gotten past the Oise and Sambre rivers! All of my maps clearly show that on the 16th of May, remnants of Corap's 9th Armee were still engaged with the enemy between Beaumont and Vervins, with Touchon's 6th Armee arriving in Laon. The BEF at this stage is shown well to the North, West of Brussels. How on earth is the BEF engaging the enemy to it's REAR behind the French 1st Armee?

West Point Atlas for the Second World War, Europe and Med. Theatres, Maps #11-#12.

Another of my books "Sixty Days that Shook the West" by Jacques Benoist-Mechin (Map #3, pg. 111) also shows the BEF still East of Lille on the 18th.

This is not correct, the BEF began a withdrawl because the Fr. 1st army had already begun to pull back, as they had been flanked and Hoth's Kleist's Panzers were already behind them and heading west. The Belgians the BEF and the FR. 1st on May 17th withdrew from the Dyle and pulled back to the Charleroi canal.

I've been kind to have spent all night digging out all of my books to give you my sources of information, I can only hope you will return the courtesy.

Here is an interesting exerpt from Mosier's book, Chapter 6: The German Assault and the Fall of France: May-June 1940, pg. 143:

(After receiving Reynaud's panicked phone call)

"..Churhill took the French at face value and decided that the BEF should think seriously about the possibility of evacuation. Given the nervousness of the senior British commanders, the mere hint of the possibility was enough. Ostensibly the order given on the 16th was simply to retreat, but this would precipitate the collapse."

"The BEF was in a position on the RIGHT of the Beglian army, not it's left. So a British withdrawal would not only force the Belgians back into a position along the seacoast, it would make it impossible for them to maintain a base inside their country sufficient to defend it. Of all the leaders, military and civilian, it was the king of the Belgians, Leopold III, who saw this the most clearly: if the British retreated, the Belgian army would be cut off and forced to surrender. Without those two armies, the French could not hope to defeat the Germans. So the British decision guaranteed that the Germans would win."

Don't like it, write to the author,his words not mine. I think he makes a lot of sense.

There was no assumption, we have both British AND GERMAN reports of the lack of resistance by some French Belgian units.

There are also plenty of GERMAN reports detailing their bravery. What exactly is your point here?

The main problem in the Fall of France is that Gen. Gamelin had no strategic reserve, so that he had nothing to stop or even slow down the German blitzkrieg, one they had broken through the French lines. Since the French Belgians had as many divisions as the Germans, outnumbered them in tanks, and had elaborate defensive positions for at least half the frontier, they should have been able to hold out for more than 42 days.

Hard to do when their ally in the middle decides to pull out.

Assuming that the BEF had stayed on the Dyle river in front of Brussels, How would the French have prevented their 1st 7th armies (and the Belgians BEF) from being cut off, considering that they had no strategic reserve to mount a counterattack?

Well, this could be thrown into the "what if" category. But I'd bee willing to venture and say that had the BEF stayed alongside it's allies, EVEN while in a retreat, the Belgians may have been able to hold out longer, the withdrawal and evacuations more organized and less chaotic, and perhaps the French
1er Armee would not have been cut off and encircled at Lille.

The only serious attack was made by Gen. Franklyn's British 5th division + 2 tank battalions at Arras on May 20th.

This was of no more of importance than Col. de Gaulle's 2 counter attacks towards Montcornet. One is overly glorified by British historians while the other hardly gets any mention. Considering they both failed in their objectives, I find this rather amusing.

 

[Arsenal VG-33]

The BEF (with 9 Div) had the French 1st Army (with 22 Div) on its right and the Belgium Army (with 18 Div) on its left. The German breakthrough was on the line held by the French 9th Army (steamrolled) which had the French 1st Army on its left.

That was ONE of the breakthroughs. We've already discussed this and it's common knowledge. What is your point?

 

[Arsenal VG-33]

VG, you've read Panzer Battles; it's references to the BEF are all of retreats under pressure. Hoppners Panzer Corps pressed the French at Gembloux on the 13th 14th May, and Gort did request French aid in the counter-attack at Arras to close the gap between there and Peronne on the 20th.

The French tanks arrived late, nevertheless they did engage with Rommel the following day. Why is this never mentioned in British souces?

If you want to defend the French then feel free, but don't start trying to imply that the British were cowards - especially after Great Britain went to the aid of France (a country that should be able to defend itself). .

I feel you're trying to put words into my mouth. I NEVER stated that the British were cowards (soldiers, troops, etc.). I am implying however, that the BEF commanders were no less panicky than their French counterparts, and ALSO share some blame for the debacle of 1940, something which for the past 60+ years British historians have refused to deal with, despite comparative research in the past 10 years indicating there was enough blame to go around. That was the whole premise of my original posting, and somehow it evolved into a heated discussion of the entire battle of 1940.

Furthermore, despite the fact that there is MUCH evidence to the contrary, British historians/authors (and their readers) continue to delight in labeling the French cowards. It would seems that the recieved wisdom of the past 60+ years was a bit erroneous. I feel my analogy of the 3 men in the leaky boat is quite appropriate.

The BEF evacuated from the nation because it was hopeless - the French were practically useless in armoured tactics and that was key to winning the battle.

This is where your are wrong. Again, quoting from Mosier's Chapter 6: The German Assault and the Fall of France, pgs. 131-132:

On battle of Gembloux Gap:

"Over the course of the battle, the French had more than one hundred tanks destroyed outright, but they gave somewhat better than they recieved - the German 3rd and 4th Amd. between them lost more than 150 vehicles, with many more being damaged. By the evening of the 15th (May), the Germans had abandonded the battlefield. Given the size ofthe armored forces involved on the German side, 2 division with slightly more than 250 tanks apiece, and given the usual ratio of completely destroyed to unserviceable tanks, the Germans had basically lost one entire armored division in this engagement."

"The Battle of Gembloux Gap epitomizes the paradoxical nature of May 1940. In the firt (and only) serious battle, the only large-scale tank-versus-tank egagement, the French prevailed and forced the Germans to retreat."

"So much for the idea that the French had no notion how to deploy armor."

Here there was a serious French miscalculation, since Gen. Prioux (the architect of this victory) was ordered to withdraw after the Germans had left. With proper intelligence, this could have been exploited.