The Great P-47 Range Debate on you tube now.

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I would point out, for the conversation, even after PH there remained much isolationism. For example, the "Why we fight" series was produced and several of the period movies had a character who said people who fought were suckers. That movie character was soundly defeated along with patriotic lines to refute the idea. These films would not have been produced if isolationism had been eliminated. If citizens had been adequately transformed to war thinking, all the early war movies would not have been needed. John Wayne could have continued with cowboy movies instead of "The flying tigers", "They were expendable", "Back to Bataan" and such.
 
I would point out, for the conversation, even after PH there remained much isolationism. For example, the "Why we fight" series was produced and several of the period movies had a character who said people who fought were suckers. That movie character was soundly defeated along with patriotic lines to refute the idea. These films would not have been produced if isolationism had been eliminated. If citizens had been adequately transformed to war thinking, all the early war movies would not have been needed. John Wayne could have continued with cowboy movies instead of "The flying tigers", "They were expendable", "Back to Bataan" and such.

On the other hand, the day after PH, the declaration of war passed with only one "nay", despite the fact that many Congresscritters were dyed-in-the-wool isolationists. The attack really took the wind out of isolationist sails.
 
Go on Bill!

Neil
Probably wont go down well here, to learn that there never was a "Brisbane tank." It is a fictitious name, likely introduced earlier this century by a vanity press author, and accepted uncritically ever since. It often happens in popular history forums, that a idea is repeated often enough until, eventually, it morphs into an inviolable truth. Should you have any doubts, then see for yourself if you can find a contemporary primary (not secondary) source reference to the term.
 
As I recall, she was a Representative from Washington state, however it has been decades since I read it.

Jeanine Raskin (? Top of my head answer) from Montana.

You're right that isolationism survived PH. It indeed survives to this day, and I do myself at times feel its strains. Not so much about Ukraine or our invasion of Afghanistan, which I think are both well-supported. Iraq 2003, not so much, that was a needless division of effort at a time when OBL was still on the loose. Never divide your forces in the face of the enemy. The Japanese have, I'm told, a proverb: "He who chases two hares catches neither." I was against invading Iraq 2003-version and don't recant that view at all.

There's a lot of argument in my own head about 1990 Desert Storm as well of which I am myself a veteran.

So to put it short, there's good and bad about isolationism. But with world economy being what it is nowadays, I think isolationism is not viable. I think, too, that while isols in the 30s may have some of the same thoughts springing around their heads as do I in mine own, it was less viable back then. Not too much less than now, as we see Russia, China, Iran, DPRK, and other countries lining up and taking aim at democracy. Is piecing out Czechoslovakia much different than urging Ukraine to accept any peace offer? I think not.

Sorry for the long answer, but I wanted to make sure we're straight-and-level. I've got too much respect for you to simply give your points a hand-wave, because there is truth in them.

ETA: Jeanette Rankin and not "Jeanine Raskin". God, I hate getting old.
 
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Probably wont go down well here, to learn that there never was a "Brisbane tank." It is a fictitious name, likely introduced earlier this century by a vanity press author, and accepted uncritically ever since. It often happens in popular history forums, that a idea is repeated often enough until, eventually, it morphs into an inviolable truth. Should you have any doubts, then see for yourself if you can find a contemporary primary (not secondary) source reference to the term.

So are you saying the name Brisbane Tank was never used at the time or that there was no drop tank at all at that time that corresponds with what some now refer to as the Brisbane Tank?
 
Jeanine Raskin (? Top of my head answer) from Montana.

You're right that isolationism survived PH. It indeed survives to this day, and I do myself at times feel its strains. Not so much about Ukraine or our invasion of Afghanistan, which I think are both well-supported. Iraq 2003, not so much, that was a needless division of effort at a time when OBL was still on the loose. Never divide your forces in the face of the enemy. The Japanese have, I'm told, a proverb: "He who chases two hares catches neither." I was against invading Iraq 2003-version and don't recant that view at all.

There's a lot of argument in my own head about 1990 Desert Storm as well of which I am myself a veteran.

So to put it short, there's good and bad about isolationism. But with world economy being what it is nowadays, I think isolationism is not viable. I think, too, that while isols in the 30s may have some of the same thoughts springing around their heads as do I in mine own, it was less viable back then. Not too much less than now, as we see Russia, China, Iran, DPRK, and other countries lining up and taking aim at democracy. Is piecing out Czechoslovakia much different than urging Ukraine to accept any peace offer? I think not.

Sorry for the long answer, but I wanted to make sure we're straight-and-level. I've got too much respect for you to simply give your points a hand-wave, because there is truth in them.

ETA: Jeanette Rankin and not "Jeanine Raskin". God, I hate getting old.
As memory serves, she also voted "No" in 1917 when the declaration of war against Germany was called for, however at that time she was not the only one.

While I can sympathize with the ideal of voting against war, and her vote was inconsequential in the scheme of things:

A. Your country was sneak attacked.
B. Do you REALLY think the Nazi's were going to be placated?

I get it, war sucks, but when the other side is pure evil, you're stuck with it. Sorry, off my soapbox now.
 
So are you saying the name Brisbane Tank was never used at the time or that there was no drop tank at all at that time that corresponds with what some now refer to as the Brisbane Tank?
This discussion would have been great without Marshalls' connection issues, which is understandable because he is an old geezer like me.
After 1'st page the discussion went south (Is that the proper term ?)
What I gather these posts:

With 200 gal belly tank early P-47 (pre-D25) would have had combat range of about 400 miles, not enough to reach Berlin
The 'Ford'/Brisbane belly tank of 200gal, designed by 26 Depot Squadron at Brisbane and contracted to Ford for 3000 units. It was designed to attach to the same four point suspension as the Republic 200gal paper/composite Ferry tank. The Ford tank was made of steel and was a.) reusable, and b.) designed for ejection without arming the airframe. Neither tank were compatible with the B-7 Belly Shackle introduced as production article on the P-47D-5.

And no, the same or similar 200gal tanks (or actual US 215gal delivered in fall 1944) were not sufficient by themselves to obtain a planned 400mi radius Escort mission in the Razorback P-47 with only 305gal internal fuel. The 215gal tank, however Was sufficient for the subsequent Bubble top canopy versions with 370gal iternal fuel, inclding the P-47M

The '400mi' Kearby MOH mission was flown 10-11-43 with the 200galFord/Brisbane tank was flown from Lae, nearly halfway to Wewak from Port Moresby - was a 'straght line' Fighter mission with no escort assignment - and was 326mi to Wewak Borum airdrome. The fight per the post mission briefng was '20min' and the amount of fuel remaining after return to Lae to refuel was cited as 50gal. Had they been escorting bombers over the same distance, they would not have returned to Lae.

I attached a spreadsheet prepared for the debate which litterally cites the longest ranges the 56th FG fought before D-Day to demonstrate the incremental combat (actual vs theoretical) ranges in which fights were engaged and the same aircraft returned.

Zero missions exceeding
 

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  • Exhibit B - Final P-47 Range vs tanks - 4-29-2024.xlsx
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Here is a quick synopsis from this document:

SCHWEINFURT RAIDS AND THE PAUSE IN DAYLIGHT STRATEGIC BOMBING

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE Military History

By GREG A.GRABOW, MAJ, U.S. ARMY

B.S., University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, 1990



Page 2: "The August 17, 1943 Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid was the first time in which a large American heavy bomber force would strike a target, deep in Germany, unescorted as the P-47s"

Page 3: "The force amassed to attack these targets were 376 B-17s with 268 P-47 sorties and 191 Spitfire sorties flown as escort"

Page 4: "Again, once most of the P-47 fighter escorts reached their range limit near the German border and turned back, the Luftwaffe savaged the B-17 formations. The raid ended with the loss of 77 B-17 Flying Fortresses, with 642 crewmen, while German records showed the loss of 32 fighters"

Page 33: "At the time, the Spitfire's 125 mile radius and the P-47's 225 mile radius offered little to the realm of possibilities concerning the escort range problem for missions into Germany (Ref 1)"

(Ref 1): "The current belly tank available to the P-47 was a huge, unwieldy two-hundred gallon ferrying tank made out of paper mache and lacked pressurization. In response to pleas from the head of the Eighth's technical service section, Colonel Cass Hough, plane manufacturers worked on a pressurized tank. Satisfactory drop tanks did not appear in numbers until early 1944. Source: Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan. The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History United States Air Force, 1983)."

Page 33: "An early attempt to solve the long range escort problem came by modifying the armament on existing B-17s. In May of 1943, twelve YB-40s (modified B-17s with three more machine guns, an additional ball turret, and twice as much ammunition) made their debut in raids against the submarine pens……………….. But because of the additional weight, the YB-40s could not keep up with the rest of the B-17 formation so the experiment was discontinued."

Page 52: "By late September, large quantities of 75 gallon fuel tanks began arriving in England and the P-47 escorts increased their range to 340 miles or just inside the borders of Germany."

Page 52: "One group of P-47s would provide escort to each of the air divisions while another P-47 group would give withdrawal support and two squadrons of Spitfires would sweep the withdrawal route and escort stragglers."


My note: This statement in the thesis pertains to the second Schweinfurt raid 14th October 1943 and here written in black and white is a clear intention to escort the bombers within the range capabilities of the escorts. So if the P-47 really could carry a 200 gallon tank at this time and extend the escort range even further, then why didn't they fit it? Well probably simply because it was not feasible to do so.

Page 67: "The second Schweinfurt raid changed aircraft production priority to fighter production with a focus on the P-38 and the P-47 at the time. Arnold ordered all P-38 and P-47 fighter groups deploying overseas to be sent to Britain but it took time to receive aircraft, train aircrews and emplace the necessary technical support. In the meantime, Major General Ira Eaker sent Eighth Bomber Command out on relatively short missions, within fighter escort range"

Page 67-68:" A more successful solution to answer the call for increased fighter escort range came in the form of external auxiliary fuel tanks for fighters. As early as 1942, the Eighth AAF inquired whether jettisonable fuel tanks could be made available for the P-47 but the solution was foolishly delayed by the industrial bureaucracy and the lack of emphasis by the USAAF leadership. Meanwhile, local sources in England were tapped to produce a limited quantity of 75 gallon tanks for both the Spitfire and the P-47. Due to the shortage of wartime material in Britain, these 75 gallon tanks were often made of inferior material and had mechanical issues at higher altitudes. By August of 1943, Army Material Command (AMC) was still experimenting at a slow pace with external tanks but had yet to produce its own model. It took a desperate plea by the Eighth's technical service section chief, Colonel Cass Hough, to get the external fuel tank program kick started. Due to further political pressure applied by the Combined Chiefs, a suitable 150 gallon drop wing tank was quickly developed. In September of 1943, the monthly production of 150 gallon wing tanks for the P-47 was only 300; by December it was 22,000. If the tasking was taken seriously a year earlier, this one innovation could have decreased bomber losses during the fall of 1943 but emphasis arrived too late. As Brigadier General Hume Peabody would put it, the auxiliary tank problem indicated "a lack of forward thinking. 'By early 1944, the 150 gallon wing tanks had a significant impact on the fighter escort solution'."

Page 79-80: "What was the fallout? The heavy bomber losses throughout the fall of 1943 was the fallout from the failure to obtain long range fighter escort earlier for the heavy bombers. Initially, the Eighth AAF adopted a daylight strategic bombing doctrine which did not heed the call for fighter escort once three hundred heavy bombers "punched" through the templated German fighter defenses. Too late, the P-38 was rushed in to fill a role it was not mechanically suited for and Army Material Command's (AMC) sluggish progress on expendable drop tanks was taken off the back burner. A technological impact readily accepted throughout all levels of the USAAF were the effects of additional internal and external fuel tankage on the P-47 which increased its range from an initial 175 miles to 400 miles and put it in range of most targets in western Germany. The P-47 remained the workhorse of the Eighth AAF which laid the groundwork to resume daylight strategic bombing and saved operation POINTBLANK. The P-47 was supplemented by the P-51 Mustang, in numbers by the summer of 1944, which exploited the victory. Also, the USAAF's disinterest in the P-51 Mustang prevented the plane from being in action six months earlier and at a crucial time. Expendable drop tanks and the need for long range escort fighter were requested before the initial Schweinfurt raid but the second Schweinfurt raid was a wake up call to speed up the process."


I suppose there is always a risk that those who do not like the conclusions from this document may say that an officer like Greg Grabow has a horse in this race for some reason. However, it's a thesis after all and if what is written here is not historically correct then there would not only be a problem of some isolated individuals attempting to rewrite history, but a huge academic problem.

Why? Well because in that case a masters thesis at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College has passed muster but completely missed the fact that the P-47 actually could escort all the way to Schweinfurt with a 200 gallon tank and that some dog headed Generals sabotaged this opportunity.

Granted, I have not read the whole document page by page, but the pages I have read (I have filtered using "P-47") are well formulated and all important points backed up by references.

And in summary, to me Greg Grabow makes a very strong case in his masters thesis that the P-47 was unable to provide long range escort at the time simply because a suitable drop tank was not available. And in my opinion, the onus lies on those who think this thesis is wrong (about the 200 gallon tank) to provide credible evidence to support that. Not the other way around.
 
With 200 gal belly tank early P-47 (pre-D25) would have had combat range of about 400 miles, not enough to reach Berlin

But enough to reach the Ruhr. If the 8th pounded the Ruhr by day and Bomber Command did so by night, it might have been decisive. Probably would have been a bloody fight, though.
 
Thank you for the excerpts.

My note: This statement in the thesis pertains to the second Schweinfurt raid 14th October 1943 and here written in black and white is a clear intention to escort the bombers within the range capabilities of the escorts. So if the P-47 really could carry a 200 gallon tank at this time and extend the escort range even further, then why didn't they fit it? Well probably simply because it was not feasible to do so.
The P-47 C/D/G etc. were indeed capable for carrying a 200 gal belly tank. Trick with that tank was that it was not possible to reliably pressurize it (sorta big deal when 25000+ ft operations are in question), and that there was probably a meager amount of these manufactured (see how difficult is to find a photo of it), since the role of that tank was to be used in ferrying the fighters, that did not required high altitude operation, and thus the need for pressurization was not an issue.
USAAF used to fill it to half of the volume, in order to use up the fuel before climbing up to the hi alt (= low pressure).

That tank was also found difficult to jettison.

Due to further political pressure applied by the Combined Chiefs, a suitable 150 gallon drop wing tank was quickly developed. In September of 1943, the monthly production of 150 gallon wing tanks for the P-47 was only 300; by December it was 22,000.

The P-47s outfitted with wing racks in 1943 were as rare as hen's teeth. Yes, a number of them was outfitted, and were ferried via Greenland and Iceland to the UK, but most of P-47s arrived by ships. The 150 gal drop tank was in no need to be developed by mid-1943, since both Grumman and Lockheed have these in production. Problem was that the tanks of circular cross-section and that big will not have enough of ground clearance on a P-47.

If the tasking was taken seriously a year earlier, this one innovation could have decreased bomber losses during the fall of 1943 but emphasis arrived too late.

USAAF certainly missed the train with specifying the wing tanks facility for the P-47s from day 1.

The P-47 was supplemented by the P-51 Mustang, in numbers by the summer of 1944, which exploited the victory.
Which expolited the victory? That's blatantly short-selling the P-51s.
See the impact the P-51s have had already during the Big Week, despite the low number deployed (roughly 1 per each 6 P-47s).

Also, the USAAF's disinterest in the P-51 Mustang prevented the plane from being in action six months earlier and at a crucial time.

USAAF disinterest in the P-51 was indeed a bad thing.
So was the 2-stage Packard Merlins being a bit too late, that saw about 360 engine-less P-51s to gather dust in June 1943, awaiting for engines. So we'd need also Packard to somehow hand-wave a few hundreds of the required engines, months earlier than it was the case.

I suppose there is always a risk that those who do not like the conclusions from this document may say that an officer like Greg Grabow has a horse in this race for some reason. However, it's a thesis after all and if what is written here is not historically correct then there would not only be a problem of some isolated individuals attempting to rewrite history, but a huge academic problem.

Greg Grabow was doing his thesis for the US Army, not the USAF, 45+ years after the combat. How much of a 'heavy-weight' connoisseurs were the Army officers into what is not their cup of tea in 1990?

Why? Well because in that case a masters thesis at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College has passed muster but completely missed the fact that the P-47 actually could escort all the way to Schweinfurt with a 200 gallon tank and that some dog headed Generals sabotaged this opportunity.

Note that G. Grabow says that combat radius of the P-47, after the increase of both internal and external fuel, was 400 miles*. It is about 520 miles from Dover and Schweinfurt.
Granted, P-47's will need to reach at least RAF bases in Kent, since East Anglia is too far away. This also assumes no wiggle room - ie. an ideal path to the target and back.

*wrong numbers, though

And in summary, to me Greg Grabow makes a very strong case in his masters thesis that the P-47 was unable to provide long range escort at the time simply because a suitable drop tank was not available. And in my opinion, the onus lies on those who think this thesis is wrong (about the 200 gallon tank) to provide credible evidence to support that. Not the other way around.

Trick was, partially, that "suitable drop tank was not available". Other part of the trick to reach Schweinfurt was in having more fuel internally.
 
The P-47 C/D/G etc. were indeed capable for carrying a 200 gal belly tank. Trick with that tank was that it was not possible to reliably pressurize it (sorta big deal when 25000+ ft operations are in question), and that there was probably a meager amount of these manufactured (see how difficult is to find a photo of it), since the role of that tank was to be used in ferrying the fighters, that did not required high altitude operation, and thus the need for pressurization was not an issue.
USAAF used to fill it to half of the volume, in order to use up the fuel before climbing up to the hi alt (= low pressure).

Agreed: And this was the whole point of my post: Greg's video hinges on a 200 gallon drop tank extending the P-47's range being available at the time he claims and the evidence so far as I can see does not support this.

Which expolited the victory? That's blatantly short-selling the P-51s.
See the impact the P-51s have had already during the Big Week, despite the low number deployed (roughly 1 per each 6 P-47s).

That's not what I'm saying: Those are Grabows words and the P-51 is another discussion entirely: This is about Greg's video claiming that the P-47 could provide long range escort hinged on the 200 gallon drop tank.

Greg Grabow was doing his thesis for the US Army, not the USAF, 45+ years after the combat. How much of a 'heavy-weight' connoisseurs were the Army officers into what is not their cup of tea in 1990?

I'm not sure what you are getting at here? Sounds a lot like you are discounting Grabow for being an Army officer and not being AF? And if +45 years is a problem then I guess all historian and those who post here can pack up and go home since none of us were around at the time. In addition, this is a master thesis, so I would not discount it so easily. How about pointing out what's wrong with it instead?

Note that G. Grabow says that combat radius of the P-47, after the increase of both internal and external fuel, was 400 miles*. It is about 520 miles from Dover and Schweinfurt.
Granted, P-47's will need to reach at least RAF bases in Kent, since East Anglia is too far away. This also assumes no wiggle room - ie. an ideal path to the target and back.

*wrong numbers, though

Fair enough, maybe it was 520 and not 400 miles AFTER drops tanks could be carried. But the issue of the debate was the claim that there was a "Bomber mafia" who intentionally did not make use of a supposedly available and suitable 200 gallon tank for ideological reasons. And I still don't see any evidence that there was one at the time.

Trick was, partially, that "suitable drop tank was not available". Other part of the trick to reach Schweinfurt was in having more fuel internally.

Again, no one is saying that the internal fuel did not matter. Of course it did. But again, the debate was about the supposed availability of 200 gallon tank that the "Bomber mafia" were unwilling to use for ideological reasons.
 
That's not what I'm saying: Those are Grabows words and the P-51 is another discussion entirely:
Indeed, his words, not yours.

I'm not sure what you are getting at here? Sounds a lot like you are discounting Grabow for being an Army officer and not being AF? And if +45 years is a problem then I guess all historian and those who post here can pack up and go home since none of us were around at the time. In addition, this is a master thesis, so I would not discount it so easily. How about pointing out what's wrong with it instead?

Since Grabow was an Army officer, and these are excerpts from his master (not even doctoral) thesis, and it was Army that greenlit his work - yes, I'll discount his work, not just since there is a number of factual mistakes or assumptions. Pointing them out:
- the listed radius of P-47 with increase of both internal and external tank
- P-51 was good only for simply 'exploiting the victory'
- there was a need to reinvent the wheel with the 150 gal drop tank,
- assumption that P-47s were plumbed for wing tanks,
- assumption that P-51s suitable for the ETO escort job were easy to be had without accounting for the historical production problems of the 2-stage Packard Merlins

Doing otherwise will imply that any scholarship that disagrees with his numbers and conclusions, is to be discounted by default.

Fair enough, maybe it was 520 and not 400 miles AFTER drops tanks could be carried. But the issue of the debate was the claim that there was a "Bomber mafia" who intentionally did not make use of a supposedly available and suitable 200 gallon tank for ideological reasons. And I still don't see any evidence that there was one at the time.
Again, no one is saying that the internal fuel did not matter. Of course it did. But again, the debate was about the supposed availability of 200 gallon tank that the "Bomber mafia" were unwilling to use for ideological reasons.

I'm not sure what is wrong with the 520 miles figure between Dover and Schweinfurt.
We're on the same page wrt. the 'evil Bomber Mafia'.
 
USAAF certainly missed the train with specifying the wing tanks facility for the P-47s from day 1.
Well, day 1 was before Sept 13 1940 ( near the end of the BoB) when the Army ordered 773 P-47Bs. Granted they could modify things later. P-47 already (on paper) carried almost twice the fuel of the P-40. Not twice the range but more range than the P-40 had. Once they fitted self sealing tanks to the P-38 it had about the same fuel capacity as the P-47 but had about over 30% more low speed drag. Once you go through all the more complicated calculations the the P-38G had about 15 more miles of range than a P-47C/early D on internal fuel, at best cruise for each plane and both of them were way short of what was needed to even escort a B-25.

When the "ah-ha" moment kicked in I don't know but the P-47 seems to get a lot blame for being in the wrong place at the wrong time.
It could manage about 200-300miles more range than an Allison P-40 and the P-40 could not fly high enough to escort the B-17 and B-24.
The Allison Mustang could fly 150-175 miles further than the P-47 (and 300-400 miles further than the P-40) but could not fly high enough.
Now in part the ranges here for the Allison Mustang vs the P-40 are do to the Mustang having 180 US gallons and the P-40s having 120-150 gallons.
The Mustang was streamlined, it wasn't that streamline.

It wasn't until the P-38 got drop tanks that it showed any real advantage over the P-47 in range.
In all of 1942 they built 523 P-47s, they built 1479 P-38s.
In 1943 they built almost 2000 more P-47s than they did P-38s.
If you slowed down the production of early P-47s by demanding changes were you really going to get more P-47s in Spring and Summer of 1943?
 
Well, day 1 was before Sept 13 1940 ( near the end of the BoB) when the Army ordered 773 P-47Bs. Granted they could modify things later. P-47 already (on paper) carried almost twice the fuel of the P-40. Not twice the range but more range than the P-40 had. Once they fitted self sealing tanks to the P-38 it had about the same fuel capacity as the P-47 but had about over 30% more low speed drag. Once you go through all the more complicated calculations the the P-38G had about 15 more miles of range than a P-47C/early D on internal fuel, at best cruise for each plane and both of them were way short of what was needed to even escort a B-25.

P-38Es were being retrofitted with drop tanks by May 1941. This 'surgery' did not happen without USAAC/AAF blessing and wishes. P-38Fs (with wing tanks as standard?) were being delivered earlier, Feb 1942.
Having P-47s being outfitted with wing tanks lagged by more than a year. I'll point my finger to the AAC/AAF for not specifying the P-47s with the required wing drop tanks facility ASAP.

It wasn't until the P-38 got drop tanks that it showed any real advantage over the P-47 in range.

That happened more that half a year before the 1st P-47 with external tanks (P-47C) 1st flew. Thing was also that P-38's tanks were able to be pressurized, and that external fuel quantity was greater.

If you slowed down the production of early P-47s by demanding changes were you really going to get more P-47s in Spring and Summer of 1943?

There is no need for more P-47s (10% less will do), but that those are with a much longer range.
Range + altitude performance = can kill Luftwaffe (and other Axis AFs).
Kill Luftwaffe (or at least make them less potent) = a measurable step along the lines of 'Germany 1st', to win the war for the Allies.
 
Since Grabow was an Army officer, and these are excerpts from his master (not even doctoral) thesis, and it was Army that greenlit his work - yes, I'll discount his work, not just since there is a number of factual mistakes or assumptions. Pointing them out:
- the listed radius of P-47 with increase of both internal and external tank
- P-51 was good only for simply 'exploiting the victory'
- there was a need to reinvent the wheel with the 150 gal drop tank,
- assumption that P-47s were plumbed for wing tanks,
- assumption that P-51s suitable for the ETO escort job were easy to be had without accounting for the historical production problems of the 2-stage Packard Merlins

Doing otherwise will imply that any scholarship that disagrees with his numbers and conclusions, is to be discounted by default.

Well like Grabow, I only have Masters, albeit in aeronautical engineering specializing in aerodynamics and structural engineering. But I gather from your reply you think anyone with less than a doctorate is not worth listening to. Tell me, in which field is your own PhD? Would be good for me to know so I'll know if it's worth reading your posts.
 
Well like Grabow, I only have Masters, albeit in aeronautical engineering specializing in aerodynamics and structural engineering. But I gather from your reply you think anyone with less than a doctorate is not worth listening to. Tell me, in which field is your own PhD? Would be good for me to know so I'll know if it's worth reading your posts.

I have the masters degree in the informational technology (20 years before it was called 'engineer' degree), but there is no way that I'm posit that my knowledge is of the be-all end-all category.

How do you feel about the list of the things I consider as mistakes of Grabow?
 
P-38Es were being retrofitted with drop tanks by May 1941. This 'surgery' did not happen without USAAC/AAF blessing and wishes. P-38Fs (with wing tanks as standard?) were being delivered earlier, Feb 1942.
Well, this was in part, to compensate for the reduction of 100 gallons of internal fuel by the self sealing tanks. Wither this was tactically motivated (escort) or strategic motivated ( move from one air field to another) may be a question.
There is no need for more P-47s (10% less will do), but that those are with a much longer range.
Nobody knew what they were going to run into in late 1942 and early 1943 and the US Army was not happy with the P-39 and P-40. They were buying and issuing them because they didn't have enough P-38s and P-47s.
 

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