The US had access to the information, the problem is always getting the information in front of the people who need to know.
The Great P-47 Range Debate on you tube now. (4 Viewers)
- Thread starter NeilStirling
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Shortround6
Lieutenant General
Or the people who would believe it.
I havnt seen any statistics but I estimate in at least half of cases the person getting the info "knew better" anyways.
special ed
1st Lieutenant
- 7,045
- May 13, 2018
From what I have read, those who thought the attack possible, believed November 30th was the date, so heightened alerts were issued for the anticipated 30th problems. After it did not happen there was some slight relief. Many U.S. leaders thought it would be some sort of riot or ground invasion, uprising. Remember, the various sub sightings were disregarded even after the USS Ward sank one.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 1,264
- Sep 30, 2021
The key is the 1943 P-47D had 305 gallons of internal fuel, deduct combat and reserves amounts as given in previous messages then decide at what height and speed the P-47 will return and in what size formations, that determines the distance it can safely escort. Also the escort radius figures are based on a single P-47 flying at the given speed in a straight line, no allowance for staying with slower bombers.
When it comes to external fuel under the fuselage is a good idea for single engine types given the weight of the fuel provided there is the room, 75 US gallons of fuel plus tank leaves little change from 500 pounds, while look how strong the P-38 wing wing was between the nacelle and engine, Adding even that weight half way along the wing at the very least requires restricted flying and possible strengthening. The P-51 benefited by the requirement the A-36 carry 500 pound bombs on wing racks, plus the design did not allow under fuselage external loads anyway
SCHWEINFURT RAIDS AND THE PAUSE IN DAYLIGHT STRATEGIC BOMBING A thesis By GREG A. GRABOW, MAJ, U.S. ARMY
Looking at the references they are mostly published works, not the original documents. It is a literature review. Much of the thesis is telling what happened.
Abstract,
"the daylight strategic bombing campaign was halted for over four months."
Richard Davis figures, 8th AF bombs on Germany, short tons, October 1943 to February 1944,
4,184.9, 5,383.5, 8,893.7, 8,287.8, 13,065.8 What were the non strategic targets being hit in Germany?
Williamson Murray notes monthly 8th AF bomber losses, even in July and August 1944 it was 13.3%, think about it, 15 mission days, 1% loss per day, 15% loss for month. Drop to 10 mission days, or partial forces and maybe 10% a month, and so on.
64 B-17 lost or written off on 17 August 1943, including 3 "Battle Damage", 3 Flak and fighter, 6 flak, 1 ran out of fuel, 1 mechanical failure, the Luftwaffe lost 24 single and 12 twin engined fighters, plus 10 single engine and 2 twin engined fighters written off, a clear win for the defences even before adding the allied fighters that were lost.
"The Regensburg-Schweinfurt raid cost Eighth Bomber Command 60 bombers and 605 crewmen (a majority as POWs)" Assuming there were 20 unscathed crew on board 2 write offs, 111 KIA, 380 PoW, 37 evaders, 20 interned, 93 returned to duty, total 641.
"It took nearly two months for the Eighth AAF to recover so it wasn't until the first week of October the Eighth AAF was ready to once again hit industrial targets inside Germany" Next mission to Germany was 6 September 1943.
69 B-17 lost or written off on 14 October 1943, including 3 "Battle Damage", 2 Flak and fighter, 5 flak, 1 ran out of fuel, 1 landing accident, 1 mechanical failure, the Luftwaffe 31 fighters lost, 12 written off.
The above 2 raids had 60 bombers MIA, another 60 were MIA on 11 January 1944, 64 MIA on both 11 and 29 April 1944 and 69 MIA on 6 March 1944. Also apparently the 5 November 1943 B-24 raid on Munster did not have escorts.
Due to Torch "The Eighth AAF was left with a skeletal force that was grounded much of the time due to the winter weather."
8th AF Raid days per month in 1942, 8 in Aug, 4 in Sep, 3 in Oct, 8 in Nov, 4 in Dec,
Raid days in 1943 were 4, 7, 10, 4, 9, 9, 10, 8, 12, 9, 17 and 18, remarkable what radar bombing does to available weather days.
"When weather cleared in July, the Eighth AAF began its "Blitz Week." In a series of daily missions, the Eighth Bomber Command unleashed raids aimed at aircraft assembly plants. Eaker hoped that multiple raids taking place at the same time would swamp the enemy defense network. The week ended with heavy loss: eighty-seven bombers with aircrew, or 6.4 percent of the total dispatched were lost and barely a scratch was made in German aircraft production" actually all up 104 B-17 MIA and write offs 25 to 30 July 1943. A total of 1,972.9 short tons of bombs dropped of which 629.9 tons were on Fw190 assembly plants, not surprising there was little effect on German aircraft production running at around 2,500 per month from multiple factories. None of the other targets were aircraft industry, 657.4 short tons on U-boat yards, 271.2 tons on tire factories.
"On the night of February 24th,1944, RAF Bomber Command targeted Schweinfurt. The next morning Eighth Bomber Command, this time escorted by long range fighters, followed up with a daylight raid. Again that night, RAF Bomber Command committed a consecutive night raid that added to a total of 3,000 tons of high explosives onto the Schweinfurt ball-bearing facilities" 8th AF 574.6 short tons 24 February 1944, then Bomber Command, 2,533.6 short tons 24/25 February 1944, 2.9 short tons 25/26 February (Mosquito). The day raid creates fires to help the night raid idea.
"Also, the USAAF's disinterest in the P-51 Mustang prevented the plane from being in action six months earlier and at a crucial time" P-51 did escort on 6 December 1943, so 6 months earlier is 6 June, there were 2 P-51B accepted by end May 1943, Packard was up to 25 2 speed 2 stage Merlins built. To get to 6 months earlier requires the majority of A-36 and all P-51A to become Merlin P-51. How did the disinterest in the US stop the RAF from flying its Merlin P-51 prototype for the first time in October 1942? Therefore way too late to influence US production until sometime in 1943?
"By June 1943, 145 P51Bs were shipped to England but served in a reconnaissance role. Sixteen days after the October Schweinfurt raid, Arnold ordered all P-51Bs in England to be withheld from the reconnaissance role, transfer to the fighter escort role" The short answer here is no, the first P-51B arrived in September 1943. It takes until sometime in August 1943 for 145 P-51B to be built. What a scandal, 145 P-51B, at least enough for 1 fighter group, longer range able to take external tanks and they do exactly what for around 6 months? Stick to reconnaissance as bombers are shot down in large numbers?
There are lots of little mistakes "It took a direct order from Air Marshall Sir Charles Porter, to RAF Chief of Staff Sir Arthur Harris" then big ones like "The CBO of 1943 did not work because one partner refused to participate while the other was temporarily stalled by the Luftwaffe" or rather in 1943 Arthur Harris had a much better understanding of the problems, as of April 1943 under 30% of night bombs aimed at cities in Germany (except Berlin) hit within 3 miles of the aiming point, up to 50% in June and hovered at 50 to 55% until April 1944 when it went to 60%. Pre war Schweinfurt had a population of around 36,000, hitting the town was precision at night in 1943. The CBO had no chance of working in 1943, lack of just about everything including knowing what actually worked. If you look at the CBO target list in 1943 Bomber Command was actually doing more than the 8th AF.
"When the Allies invaded France in the summer of 1944, they enjoyed unchallenged air superiority and a Wehrmacht crippled by fuel shortages" yes in the air but it was challenged, no on the ground, except where the air stopped tactical movement of fuel supplies.
"Axis anti-friction industry in Germany, Italy, France, and Austria was hit by more than forty CBO raids with 12,000 tons of bombs dropped – two-thirds or 8,000 tons of bombs were dropped on Schweinfurt alone" 8th AF short tons, Schweinfurt 3,442.4 (including 815.9 tons officially on the Industrial Area using H2X), Bomber Command 3,291.5 on the city. Target class bearings, 8th AF 5,478.3 short tons, 15th AF 1,930.4.
"CBO strategic bombing campaign which would of had the greatest effect on the German military would have targeted the German ammunition/explosives manufacturing industry; even with the heavy Allied bomber resources of 1943, this would have had a crippling effect." No reference is given for this and since the explosives industry was tied into the chemical industry which was tied into the synthetic oil industry the statement is simply wrong. Crippling the synthetic oil industry requires hitting places like Leuna around 500 miles from London, plus a number of other places even further. The thesis concludes bombing Schweinfurt "did not justify the enormous expenditure in man power and resources to neutralize a target. Overall, the bombing of Schweinfurt did not alter the course of the war." However picking a bigger target class some of which is as far as Schweinfurt, some closer, some further would be crippling.
The conclusion is the 1943 raids failed due to not enough escorts with range, whereas it really failed due to not enough escorts to the targets selected. In 1943 to gain more escorts for the 8th AF required taking them from active theatres, the better types, the P-38 and P-47 were being sent into combat as soon as numbers and training permitted. End June 1943 the USAAF Far East Air Forces had 144 P-38 and 59 P-47, rising to 279 and 308 end December, the Pacific Ocean areas had 83 P-47 end December, India had 42 P-38 end December, Alaska had 43 P-38 end June and 35 end December, the Mediterranean had 514 P-38 end June for its 3 fighter groups, down to 240 P-38 and 299 P-47 end December, in Britain end June it was 2 P-38 and 421 P-47, end December 380 P-38, 1,215 P-47, 266 P-51
First barrier, the amount of room under a P-47, the 108 gallon tank had a 4 inch clearance. Second barrier Republic came up with its own attachment system instead of using the USAAF standard, good in that it enabled a lot of fuel useable at ferry altitude, bad for high altitude combat missions. It meant instead of the P-47C in November 1942 the USAAF had to wait for the P-47D-6 in July 1943 for factory fitted standard attachments. Third barrier, the P-47 was say around a year behind the P-38 and P-51, which were using largely proven engines during 1942/3. The P-47 was introducing the R-2800 to high altitude fighter operations over and above any airframe issues. The P-38 had a strong wing centre section to hang tanks from, the P-51 had the A-36 in October 1942 and needed wing racks anyway, the P-47D-15 with wing racks began production in October 1943. The P-38 had a void space in the wings once cooling was changed, the P-51 void space behind the pilot, the P-47 needed a forward fuselage then wing redesign to carry more internal fuel, it also faced the reality the R-2800 fuel consumption was higher than the Merlin or Allison.
A 1943 P-47 with 200 gallons of external fuel is not going to make it to Schweinfurt from Britain and return even flying direct. In 1943 the 8th AF fighters stayed with the bombers, weaving, cutting their effective range to under 80% of theoretical. In October 1943 261 escorts are not enough to protect over 300 bombers moving through around 600 miles of hostile airspace taking around 2.5 hours before adding the number of interception sorties outnumbered the escorts by over 2 to 1. Just giving the P-47 extra range is not going to cut bomber losses to acceptable levels.
When it comes to external fuel under the fuselage is a good idea for single engine types given the weight of the fuel provided there is the room, 75 US gallons of fuel plus tank leaves little change from 500 pounds, while look how strong the P-38 wing wing was between the nacelle and engine, Adding even that weight half way along the wing at the very least requires restricted flying and possible strengthening. The P-51 benefited by the requirement the A-36 carry 500 pound bombs on wing racks, plus the design did not allow under fuselage external loads anyway
SCHWEINFURT RAIDS AND THE PAUSE IN DAYLIGHT STRATEGIC BOMBING A thesis By GREG A. GRABOW, MAJ, U.S. ARMY
Looking at the references they are mostly published works, not the original documents. It is a literature review. Much of the thesis is telling what happened.
Abstract,
"the daylight strategic bombing campaign was halted for over four months."
Richard Davis figures, 8th AF bombs on Germany, short tons, October 1943 to February 1944,
4,184.9, 5,383.5, 8,893.7, 8,287.8, 13,065.8 What were the non strategic targets being hit in Germany?
Williamson Murray notes monthly 8th AF bomber losses, even in July and August 1944 it was 13.3%, think about it, 15 mission days, 1% loss per day, 15% loss for month. Drop to 10 mission days, or partial forces and maybe 10% a month, and so on.
64 B-17 lost or written off on 17 August 1943, including 3 "Battle Damage", 3 Flak and fighter, 6 flak, 1 ran out of fuel, 1 mechanical failure, the Luftwaffe lost 24 single and 12 twin engined fighters, plus 10 single engine and 2 twin engined fighters written off, a clear win for the defences even before adding the allied fighters that were lost.
"The Regensburg-Schweinfurt raid cost Eighth Bomber Command 60 bombers and 605 crewmen (a majority as POWs)" Assuming there were 20 unscathed crew on board 2 write offs, 111 KIA, 380 PoW, 37 evaders, 20 interned, 93 returned to duty, total 641.
"It took nearly two months for the Eighth AAF to recover so it wasn't until the first week of October the Eighth AAF was ready to once again hit industrial targets inside Germany" Next mission to Germany was 6 September 1943.
69 B-17 lost or written off on 14 October 1943, including 3 "Battle Damage", 2 Flak and fighter, 5 flak, 1 ran out of fuel, 1 landing accident, 1 mechanical failure, the Luftwaffe 31 fighters lost, 12 written off.
The above 2 raids had 60 bombers MIA, another 60 were MIA on 11 January 1944, 64 MIA on both 11 and 29 April 1944 and 69 MIA on 6 March 1944. Also apparently the 5 November 1943 B-24 raid on Munster did not have escorts.
Due to Torch "The Eighth AAF was left with a skeletal force that was grounded much of the time due to the winter weather."
8th AF Raid days per month in 1942, 8 in Aug, 4 in Sep, 3 in Oct, 8 in Nov, 4 in Dec,
Raid days in 1943 were 4, 7, 10, 4, 9, 9, 10, 8, 12, 9, 17 and 18, remarkable what radar bombing does to available weather days.
"When weather cleared in July, the Eighth AAF began its "Blitz Week." In a series of daily missions, the Eighth Bomber Command unleashed raids aimed at aircraft assembly plants. Eaker hoped that multiple raids taking place at the same time would swamp the enemy defense network. The week ended with heavy loss: eighty-seven bombers with aircrew, or 6.4 percent of the total dispatched were lost and barely a scratch was made in German aircraft production" actually all up 104 B-17 MIA and write offs 25 to 30 July 1943. A total of 1,972.9 short tons of bombs dropped of which 629.9 tons were on Fw190 assembly plants, not surprising there was little effect on German aircraft production running at around 2,500 per month from multiple factories. None of the other targets were aircraft industry, 657.4 short tons on U-boat yards, 271.2 tons on tire factories.
"On the night of February 24th,1944, RAF Bomber Command targeted Schweinfurt. The next morning Eighth Bomber Command, this time escorted by long range fighters, followed up with a daylight raid. Again that night, RAF Bomber Command committed a consecutive night raid that added to a total of 3,000 tons of high explosives onto the Schweinfurt ball-bearing facilities" 8th AF 574.6 short tons 24 February 1944, then Bomber Command, 2,533.6 short tons 24/25 February 1944, 2.9 short tons 25/26 February (Mosquito). The day raid creates fires to help the night raid idea.
"Also, the USAAF's disinterest in the P-51 Mustang prevented the plane from being in action six months earlier and at a crucial time" P-51 did escort on 6 December 1943, so 6 months earlier is 6 June, there were 2 P-51B accepted by end May 1943, Packard was up to 25 2 speed 2 stage Merlins built. To get to 6 months earlier requires the majority of A-36 and all P-51A to become Merlin P-51. How did the disinterest in the US stop the RAF from flying its Merlin P-51 prototype for the first time in October 1942? Therefore way too late to influence US production until sometime in 1943?
"By June 1943, 145 P51Bs were shipped to England but served in a reconnaissance role. Sixteen days after the October Schweinfurt raid, Arnold ordered all P-51Bs in England to be withheld from the reconnaissance role, transfer to the fighter escort role" The short answer here is no, the first P-51B arrived in September 1943. It takes until sometime in August 1943 for 145 P-51B to be built. What a scandal, 145 P-51B, at least enough for 1 fighter group, longer range able to take external tanks and they do exactly what for around 6 months? Stick to reconnaissance as bombers are shot down in large numbers?
There are lots of little mistakes "It took a direct order from Air Marshall Sir Charles Porter, to RAF Chief of Staff Sir Arthur Harris" then big ones like "The CBO of 1943 did not work because one partner refused to participate while the other was temporarily stalled by the Luftwaffe" or rather in 1943 Arthur Harris had a much better understanding of the problems, as of April 1943 under 30% of night bombs aimed at cities in Germany (except Berlin) hit within 3 miles of the aiming point, up to 50% in June and hovered at 50 to 55% until April 1944 when it went to 60%. Pre war Schweinfurt had a population of around 36,000, hitting the town was precision at night in 1943. The CBO had no chance of working in 1943, lack of just about everything including knowing what actually worked. If you look at the CBO target list in 1943 Bomber Command was actually doing more than the 8th AF.
"When the Allies invaded France in the summer of 1944, they enjoyed unchallenged air superiority and a Wehrmacht crippled by fuel shortages" yes in the air but it was challenged, no on the ground, except where the air stopped tactical movement of fuel supplies.
"Axis anti-friction industry in Germany, Italy, France, and Austria was hit by more than forty CBO raids with 12,000 tons of bombs dropped – two-thirds or 8,000 tons of bombs were dropped on Schweinfurt alone" 8th AF short tons, Schweinfurt 3,442.4 (including 815.9 tons officially on the Industrial Area using H2X), Bomber Command 3,291.5 on the city. Target class bearings, 8th AF 5,478.3 short tons, 15th AF 1,930.4.
"CBO strategic bombing campaign which would of had the greatest effect on the German military would have targeted the German ammunition/explosives manufacturing industry; even with the heavy Allied bomber resources of 1943, this would have had a crippling effect." No reference is given for this and since the explosives industry was tied into the chemical industry which was tied into the synthetic oil industry the statement is simply wrong. Crippling the synthetic oil industry requires hitting places like Leuna around 500 miles from London, plus a number of other places even further. The thesis concludes bombing Schweinfurt "did not justify the enormous expenditure in man power and resources to neutralize a target. Overall, the bombing of Schweinfurt did not alter the course of the war." However picking a bigger target class some of which is as far as Schweinfurt, some closer, some further would be crippling.
The conclusion is the 1943 raids failed due to not enough escorts with range, whereas it really failed due to not enough escorts to the targets selected. In 1943 to gain more escorts for the 8th AF required taking them from active theatres, the better types, the P-38 and P-47 were being sent into combat as soon as numbers and training permitted. End June 1943 the USAAF Far East Air Forces had 144 P-38 and 59 P-47, rising to 279 and 308 end December, the Pacific Ocean areas had 83 P-47 end December, India had 42 P-38 end December, Alaska had 43 P-38 end June and 35 end December, the Mediterranean had 514 P-38 end June for its 3 fighter groups, down to 240 P-38 and 299 P-47 end December, in Britain end June it was 2 P-38 and 421 P-47, end December 380 P-38, 1,215 P-47, 266 P-51
Setting up a reason to decide the critics have problems is not a good opening.
Within limits, a thesis is a document written for a limited audience, hopefully knowledgable, reporting the results of your efforts. I have seen a thesis that in part required time travel to work but fundamentally required the US aircraft industry to deliver high quality aircraft as needed, such that an air striking force comparable to the US forces at Midway in quality and quantity could be assembled in Australia in February 1942 to defend Darwin, with relevant bases and supplies. This was considered obviously possible as in 1939 the US industry was running under capacity and eager for orders and could quickly deliver them, so the same applied to 1941.
Look at the data presented in the messages here, they tend to come from primary documents, not secondary ones.
As ultimately a 200 (actual 215) gallon under fuselage tank was created for the P-47 end 1944 it was possible to come up with the design in 1943 and modify the P-47. Easy once you know the answer in early 1942. Now convince the 8th AF to stay within that range and where the escorts are not badly outnumbered, the latter will need Luftwaffe help.
First barrier, the amount of room under a P-47, the 108 gallon tank had a 4 inch clearance. Second barrier Republic came up with its own attachment system instead of using the USAAF standard, good in that it enabled a lot of fuel useable at ferry altitude, bad for high altitude combat missions. It meant instead of the P-47C in November 1942 the USAAF had to wait for the P-47D-6 in July 1943 for factory fitted standard attachments. Third barrier, the P-47 was say around a year behind the P-38 and P-51, which were using largely proven engines during 1942/3. The P-47 was introducing the R-2800 to high altitude fighter operations over and above any airframe issues. The P-38 had a strong wing centre section to hang tanks from, the P-51 had the A-36 in October 1942 and needed wing racks anyway, the P-47D-15 with wing racks began production in October 1943. The P-38 had a void space in the wings once cooling was changed, the P-51 void space behind the pilot, the P-47 needed a forward fuselage then wing redesign to carry more internal fuel, it also faced the reality the R-2800 fuel consumption was higher than the Merlin or Allison.
A 1943 P-47 with 200 gallons of external fuel is not going to make it to Schweinfurt from Britain and return even flying direct. In 1943 the 8th AF fighters stayed with the bombers, weaving, cutting their effective range to under 80% of theoretical. In October 1943 261 escorts are not enough to protect over 300 bombers moving through around 600 miles of hostile airspace taking around 2.5 hours before adding the number of interception sorties outnumbered the escorts by over 2 to 1. Just giving the P-47 extra range is not going to cut bomber losses to acceptable levels.
Interesting.
Is it possible to give the full document references? The Australian Archives system is the series number is the archives reference, the control symbol the ID the original agency gave the document. Searching similar control symbols might turn up more details on the tanks.
Army intelligence in Washington read the things are automatically going to happen message to the Washington embassy plus decided Sunday was the most probable day of the week and came up with 30 November as start of war operations.
Holtzauge
Senior Airman
I was not planning to post anything more in this thread but since I keep getting cited in the context of Grabow's thesis I want to make the following clarifications:
I have not defended the details of Grabow's thesis, for example pertaining to the P-51 or P-38 etc. I plainly said when I first posted excerpts from it that I had filtered out and read the details pertaining to the P-47 only. But some people here seem to be unable to read what I actually wrote and keep building straw men.
What I did write was that it would be a huge academic problem if Grabow (and the peer review of his thesis) missed out on the point that escorts were able to use the 200 gallon drop tank as Greg suggest in his video but did not do so for ideological reasons. But I don't see any support for this in the thesis. And that was why I cited it and said that it would have been a serious omission not to have included such an important point (if it was true) and that that would have been a huge academic problem. So again, my point is that a peer reviewed and sanctioned thesis does not support Greg's theory and that if Greg was right about the 200 gallon tank then this would be a huge academic problem since the thesis says the exact opposite, as exemplified by the excerpts I posted earlier.
Some people then proceed to attack Grabow for being Army and not AF and that this was a master's and not doctoral thesis. In addition, then there was nitpicking about details in his thesis and a claim that it was "under researched". Frankly, I do not know who is right or wrong about those details, but even if he got some parts wrong (and which thesis does not contain minor issues?) I can't see that what has brought up as questionable in this thread so far disproves the broad picture he is painting and would disqualify his claim that escorting was provided within the range limits of the escorts and that the 200 gallon tank was simply unsuitable for escort duties.
A good rule in argumentation is not to try to strengthen your arguments by adding weaker elements to make a longer list when you have strong points, because the opposition will usually focus on your weaker points and try to shift the focus there. For example dates or if a particular drop tank was manufactured in the UK or the US etc. And IMHO there are two very strong points that sink Greg's theory about the "Bomber mafia" not wanting to escort bombers for ideological reasons:
1) Fighters did actually escort as long as they had the range. This is well documented and goes diametrically against Greg's "Bomber mafia" theory.
2) Nothing so far suggests that the 200 gallon drop tank was usable for much more than ferry missions or flying below 20,000-22,000 ft which is then far below typical B-17 raid heights.
And Grabow's thesis supports both these strong points. This was why I cited it and I said that the onus was on those who like Greg think otherwise to prove that. Not the other way around.
I have not defended the details of Grabow's thesis, for example pertaining to the P-51 or P-38 etc. I plainly said when I first posted excerpts from it that I had filtered out and read the details pertaining to the P-47 only. But some people here seem to be unable to read what I actually wrote and keep building straw men.
What I did write was that it would be a huge academic problem if Grabow (and the peer review of his thesis) missed out on the point that escorts were able to use the 200 gallon drop tank as Greg suggest in his video but did not do so for ideological reasons. But I don't see any support for this in the thesis. And that was why I cited it and said that it would have been a serious omission not to have included such an important point (if it was true) and that that would have been a huge academic problem. So again, my point is that a peer reviewed and sanctioned thesis does not support Greg's theory and that if Greg was right about the 200 gallon tank then this would be a huge academic problem since the thesis says the exact opposite, as exemplified by the excerpts I posted earlier.
Some people then proceed to attack Grabow for being Army and not AF and that this was a master's and not doctoral thesis. In addition, then there was nitpicking about details in his thesis and a claim that it was "under researched". Frankly, I do not know who is right or wrong about those details, but even if he got some parts wrong (and which thesis does not contain minor issues?) I can't see that what has brought up as questionable in this thread so far disproves the broad picture he is painting and would disqualify his claim that escorting was provided within the range limits of the escorts and that the 200 gallon tank was simply unsuitable for escort duties.
A good rule in argumentation is not to try to strengthen your arguments by adding weaker elements to make a longer list when you have strong points, because the opposition will usually focus on your weaker points and try to shift the focus there. For example dates or if a particular drop tank was manufactured in the UK or the US etc. And IMHO there are two very strong points that sink Greg's theory about the "Bomber mafia" not wanting to escort bombers for ideological reasons:
1) Fighters did actually escort as long as they had the range. This is well documented and goes diametrically against Greg's "Bomber mafia" theory.
2) Nothing so far suggests that the 200 gallon drop tank was usable for much more than ferry missions or flying below 20,000-22,000 ft which is then far below typical B-17 raid heights.
And Grabow's thesis supports both these strong points. This was why I cited it and I said that the onus was on those who like Greg think otherwise to prove that. Not the other way around.
I appreciate that this is an old thread but someone may be able to answer this.
In Greg's video, he cites this document, which seems to be the cornerstone:
"REFERENCE 6TH WRAPPER INDORSEMENT, APRIL 29, 1939, SUBJECT: "FUEL CAPACITY OF P-36A AIRPLANE, GHQ FILE 452.11, THE CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS DIRECTS THAT NO TACTICAL AIRPLANE WILL BE EQUIPPED WITH DROPPABLE AUXILIARY FUEL TANKS. THERE ARE NO OBJECTIONS TO THE CURTISS COMPANY MAKING SUCH AN INSTALLATION ON THEIR P-36 TYPE AIRPLANE WITHOUT EXPENSE TO THE GOVERNMENT."
Now, I'm not any kind of expert on this, especially when it comes to government purchasing. But it seems to me that this is little more than an administrative spat over who would pay for external tanks. But it raises few questions for me:
1) It's not clear what is meant by "no tactical airplane",
2) There was no objection to Curtiss doing it with their aircraft, as long as it's not at the cost to the government,
3) It only mentions the P-36 specifically.
If this was an outright ban - as tens of thousands of people now claim - then why does the document not only make an exception for the P-36 but give an actual reason - that the government should not have to pay for them?
What did they mean by a tactical airplane? It could have meant a lot of things.
I don't see how it has any relevance to the P-47, since the document is from early 1939. Furthermore, this argument has been consistently focused solely on the P-47 but ignores the fact that other US types, like the P-38, P-39 and P-40 which seem not to have been affected by it.
Finally – and perhaps, tellingly – it wasn't signed by Arnold himself, which I think would be a reasonable expectation in the case of a major doctrinal shift. I'd also expect a pretty significant paper trail.
It seems a pretty flimsy foundation.
In Greg's video, he cites this document, which seems to be the cornerstone:
"REFERENCE 6TH WRAPPER INDORSEMENT, APRIL 29, 1939, SUBJECT: "FUEL CAPACITY OF P-36A AIRPLANE, GHQ FILE 452.11, THE CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS DIRECTS THAT NO TACTICAL AIRPLANE WILL BE EQUIPPED WITH DROPPABLE AUXILIARY FUEL TANKS. THERE ARE NO OBJECTIONS TO THE CURTISS COMPANY MAKING SUCH AN INSTALLATION ON THEIR P-36 TYPE AIRPLANE WITHOUT EXPENSE TO THE GOVERNMENT."
Now, I'm not any kind of expert on this, especially when it comes to government purchasing. But it seems to me that this is little more than an administrative spat over who would pay for external tanks. But it raises few questions for me:
1) It's not clear what is meant by "no tactical airplane",
2) There was no objection to Curtiss doing it with their aircraft, as long as it's not at the cost to the government,
3) It only mentions the P-36 specifically.
If this was an outright ban - as tens of thousands of people now claim - then why does the document not only make an exception for the P-36 but give an actual reason - that the government should not have to pay for them?
What did they mean by a tactical airplane? It could have meant a lot of things.
I don't see how it has any relevance to the P-47, since the document is from early 1939. Furthermore, this argument has been consistently focused solely on the P-47 but ignores the fact that other US types, like the P-38, P-39 and P-40 which seem not to have been affected by it.
Finally – and perhaps, tellingly – it wasn't signed by Arnold himself, which I think would be a reasonable expectation in the case of a major doctrinal shift. I'd also expect a pretty significant paper trail.
It seems a pretty flimsy foundation.
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Shortround6
Lieutenant General
It may have been more than a spat about who would pay for droppable fuel tanks.
It may have been about the range of 'tactical' aircraft or at least ferry range (deployment range) of tactical aircraft.
End of April 1939 is just a few days after large order for the P-40 was placed and orders for 13 YP-38s, 13 YP-39s and 13 YP-43s placed. None of the these had self-sealing tanks and they all had large fuel capacities. The last of the P-36s were still being delivered in April/May of 1939. The P-36Cs were a change order on the last 31 planes of the initial 210 plane order. The P-36s held about 40 gallons less than the P-35s.
Army may have wanted more fuel/capacity (ferry range) but did not want to pay for it. Either for drop tanks or for larger tanks (structure) for internal fuel in later models?
But I believe you are right, the 1939 memo/letter/directive was tossed in the trash can in late 1940/early 1941 when the fitting of self-sealing fuel tanks dropped P-38 internal fuel capacity from 400 gal to 300 gal. Internal fuel capacity of the P-39 dropped from 170 gal to 120 gal, P-40 internal fuel dropped from 181 gal (P-40 no letter) to 160 gal (P-40B) to 135 gal (P-40C, first P-40 with a drop tank). P-43s didn't get a drop tank, mayby they thought than slinging a drop tank underneath a hot exhaust pipe and turbo was not a good idea?
P-38 with first drop tanks extended range somewhat. P-39 and P-40 drop tanks were just trying to restore range.
P-43s just suffered and even with primitive self-sealing their fuel tanks leaked.
Without a lot more memo's/correspondence putting the April 29, 1939 memo into context I think it should be placed in the bottom of the heap for evidence, if retained at all.
Was General Arnold trying to pressure Curtiss into retro fitting the P-36s to match the anticipated range of the P-40s? at little or no cost to the Army?
From what I have read this referred to tactical fighters which were for protection of the United states. This made sense as they would be operating
from bases over short range to intercept enemy aircraft (much as the Hurricane and Spitfire in the Battle of Britain).
There was no reference to use as bomber escorts etc so yes, it is a very flimsy foundation on which to base an argument about escort fighters.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
US needed a fair amount of range just to move fighters around the US.
IN 1939 the US had about 300 single engine monoplane fighters with retractable landing gear (no P-26s) to defend the entire US with.
It is over 800 miles from Boston to Charlston SC. Now if you need to defend the state of Maine and/or Georgia and Florida?
For a tactical mission they might very well only put around 2/3rds fuel in the tank/s for better performance but would have to move the aircraft hundreds if not thousands of miles to the threatened area before they flew the combat mission/s.
interesting post. Covers a lot I didn't know.
And this aligns with Arnold's decision to override the Emmons Panel in 1940 and make internal capacity the priority (because it had been affected by the move to self-sealing tanks). I have often wondered if Arnold was reacting to what was going on in the Battle of Britain vis à vis, the performance of the Bf-109.
But my point is also that such an important directive could reasonably be expected to include Arnold's signature and it doesn't. It doesn't link to other parts of a long paper trail, like what I would expect to find if a doctrinal direction was changing. This memo was sent by a mid-level functionary instead. In fact, rather than pointing to a conspiracy by the so-called "bomber mafia", as it has been framed but a part of a normal procedure. Arnold was simply doing his job and that included supervising costs.
Would you agree?
And this is an essential component. It was never intended to be a long range escort. Looking at the differences made by different size drop tanks, it's clear that the biggest gains came from the smaller tanks. After that, it was affected by the law of diminishing returns. The only way to improve things was increasing internal capacity.
drgondog
Major
The memo re-states the long standing prohibition against Carrying droppable tanks in 1935 through 1941, deemed a potential hazard. That said it also explicitly acknowledged that AAF had no problem with rack design to carry external tanks - just didn't want to pay for them. In fact, Curtiss continued to design centerline racks for P-36 and P-40 as well as designed and subcontracted 52gal drop tank to mate with fuel transfer capability. Ditto Bell and Lockheed. The Army, particularly GHQ-AF recognized extended tactical radius. Future 8th AF Fighter Commander, Cpt Kepner addressed and by signature approved the original purchase order to Wight Field, also acknowledged that drop tanks should be used.
Multiple parallel development activities, encouraged but not paid for, by Fighter Branch, Materiel Command, were in progress in 1940 after the revised Emmons Board action by Arnold for the number 1 priority for '1500 mile' fighter. Specifically the XP-49 and P-38 were proposed by Lockheed to install wing mounted droppable - multi sized tanks and fuel feel mechanism on a B-7/B-10 type bomb rack.
When Kelsey returned from London in summer 1940 he alerted Lockheed, Republic, Bell and Curtiss that droppable tanks to extend existing Ferry range to 3,000 miles would be needed.
Notably B-7 rack and mechanisms were installed on NA-50 by North American, P-49/38 by Lockheed, P-39 and P-40 by the end of 1941.
Both aluminum and composite 52, 60 and 75-gal tanks were completed in December 1941.
It wasn't. Just a convenient memo upon which to offer claim that Bomber mafia did not want long-range fighter escort.
Arnold issued the Tech Order to Increase Range of All Tactical Aircraft including Pursuit and Light Bomber March 3rd, 1942 and clarified one week later to address droppable Ferry and tactical fuel tanks. It was also understood that manufacturers were encouraged to design for more internal fuel.
Immediately afterwards, Kelsey instructed Republic to achieve 3000 mi Ferry range as well as install wing and belly racks for 75-gal tanks.
Lockheed had already complied and Kelsey ordered 150-gal drop tanks 'believed to be the largest feasible'.
North American delivered the A-36, P-51A, P-51B in 1942 - all designed for not only bomb and droppable fuel tanks but also the 150-gal Ferry tanks.
Crickets from Republic until directly ordered by MG Branshaw on June 1 1943 to install adaptors on wing and belly capable of attaching the 75 and 150-gal drop tanks left behind when the P-38s were transferred from 8th AF to 12 AF in November 1942. Up to that time only the 4 point attach 205-gal ferry tank was mounted on the P-47C skid plate. The Republic attach scheme was not compatible with any bomb or droppable tank in the AAF inventory until the D-5 was delivered with fixed wing tank mount and B-7 type belly rack in July 1943.
By that time, the P-51B could carry 2x75-gal drop tanks, or 2-150-gal ferry tanks, as well as tested with 90-gal internal fuselage tank. Ditto for P-38 which added 2x55-gal leading edge tanks while adding B-10 rack so that the new 330-gal composite tank could be carried..
It meant B-17, B-24, B-25, A-20, P-51, P-38, P-47, P-40, P-39 plus anything new on the drawing board.
He approved the reply from Materiel Command to Curtiss as written, but a lot happened during the Spanish Civil War through the Battle of Britain to convince him that interceptor Pursuit was the most dangerous defensive component against the bomber. The AWPD-1 in section 5. explicitly states the requirement for Escort Fighter capable of accompanying the bombers to the target. Unfortunately, it was envisioned as a fast twin engine pursuit with manned armament capable of convoy type escort. Even more pitiful is that MG Echols was enamored with the XP-75.
EDIT - I have to add clarity. IMO Karveli resisted all overtures to installing drag producing bomb racks on his clean Interceptor. He was not interested in a bomb truck and Republic did not respond to RFP for attack type aircraft. It took Republic 18 months from Kelsey's order to install 3x75-gal tanks in March 1942 till actually wing racks installed on P-47D-15 in October 1943. And it didn't arrive in squadron quantities until first 2x108-gal mission March 18, 1944.
Greg missed or ignored the History of Droppable Tanks and the Fighter Aircraft Range Extension Program that I sent him before our debate to get us on common ground. Once again, IMO he was seduced by the chicagoboyz (Telenko) and Stevenson and Sprey 'Arrogant Generals .. articles claiming the AAF withheld drop tanks from Republic - based on belief that escort fighters weren't necessary. There is overwhelming evidence to the contrary, but Everybody (LW, RAF, AAF) believed that a single engine fighter could not be designed with sufficient fuel fraction and still compete with s/E interceptors. R&D originating from Mat.Cmd focused on twin engine development (i.e P-61 and XP-75)
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I think Kartveli referred to the installation of wing racks as "Christmas decorations".
Thanks drgondog for that extensive reply. I have a few questions:
1) You say there were concerns about the tanks' safety. I know that Messerschmitt had serious concerns about their papier maché drop tanks. Apparently there were examples of the tank leaking fumes and the aircraft exploding in mid air. The lack of range was clearly a major problem for the 109 over London in 1940 and while that was a good example of where drop tanks might have worked. Was this part of the USAAC's concern? Or was it a release problem, aerodynamic or otherwise?
2) From what I've read, I think the first mission for the P-47 with two 108 gallon tanks was on 6 March, 1944.
3) What's your opinion about the lack of personal signature from Arnold on the memo (if it was so important)? WE know that's significant but how did others (Greg) miss it?
1) You say there were concerns about the tanks' safety. I know that Messerschmitt had serious concerns about their papier maché drop tanks. Apparently there were examples of the tank leaking fumes and the aircraft exploding in mid air. The lack of range was clearly a major problem for the 109 over London in 1940 and while that was a good example of where drop tanks might have worked. Was this part of the USAAC's concern? Or was it a release problem, aerodynamic or otherwise?
2) From what I've read, I think the first mission for the P-47 with two 108 gallon tanks was on 6 March, 1944.
3) What's your opinion about the lack of personal signature from Arnold on the memo (if it was so important)? WE know that's significant but how did others (Greg) miss it?
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ThomasP
Chief Master Sergeant
There is no significance to the lack of Arnold's signature on the memo [attached below] you are referencing. This memo is being sent to Materiel Command at Wright field for filing purposes.
This memo has the code "MA-258". MA indicates a Materiel Command memo. No idea what the number "258" means,but the Materiel Command project/subject numerical classification system starts with the 300 series. [This is incorrect, the numerical codes for filing begin with the 000 series and extend through the 900 series. Apparently, the numerical code system is a War Department system, not specific only to Material Command.]
The memo itself is dated "5-16-39", providing the date it originated, and it references the contents of an already existing file - ie "GHQ File 452.11". The code 452 refers specifically to aircraft types and projects/subjects involving the type - either for a specific airframe or a general type like bombardment, pursuit, experimental, production, etc. Unfortunately I have never run across a significant list of the number codes.
A "Wrapper Endorsement" is a typed or written summary of the contents of said file or folder (usually attached to the outer surface of the file or file box in some manner, but in the case of a lot of individual pieces of paper might be a folder attached to the inside of the box or box lid - the idea being that wherever the box goes so does the "Wrapper". The "Wrapper Endorsement" was usually placed on the outside for ease of finding by whoever went looking for it. In this case the "Wrapper" being referenced is dated "April 29, 1939".
This memo is basically part of an ongoing written timeline/historical record of a project involving the P-36A in some way, and would have been added to the file covered by the "Wrapper Endorsement" after it was received by "Air Corps Materiel Command" at "Wright Field" on "May 16 1939".
NOTE that often a 'file' as it applies in this case may have been a number of memos in a simple folder, or a numbe of simple file folders in an accordion file folder, or a box of various types of file folders, or a box with boxes of files in it, etc.
Bleh!
I think I explained this correctly but let me know if something doesn't make sense.
The memo:
[edited for clarity and additional information]
This memo has the code "MA-258". MA indicates a Materiel Command memo. No idea what the number "258" means,
The memo itself is dated "5-16-39", providing the date it originated, and it references the contents of an already existing file - ie "GHQ File 452.11". The code 452 refers specifically to aircraft types and projects/subjects involving the type - either for a specific airframe or a general type like bombardment, pursuit, experimental, production, etc. Unfortunately I have never run across a significant list of the number codes.
A "Wrapper Endorsement" is a typed or written summary of the contents of said file or folder (usually attached to the outer surface of the file or file box in some manner, but in the case of a lot of individual pieces of paper might be a folder attached to the inside of the box or box lid - the idea being that wherever the box goes so does the "Wrapper". The "Wrapper Endorsement" was usually placed on the outside for ease of finding by whoever went looking for it. In this case the "Wrapper" being referenced is dated "April 29, 1939".
This memo is basically part of an ongoing written timeline/historical record of a project involving the P-36A in some way, and would have been added to the file covered by the "Wrapper Endorsement" after it was received by "Air Corps Materiel Command" at "Wright Field" on "May 16 1939".
NOTE that often a 'file' as it applies in this case may have been a number of memos in a simple folder, or a numbe of simple file folders in an accordion file folder, or a box of various types of file folders, or a box with boxes of files in it, etc.
Bleh!
I think I explained this correctly but let me know if something doesn't make sense.The memo:
[edited for clarity and additional information]
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And his later designs were successful in bomber/fighter bomber roles. So ironic
ThomasP
Chief Master Sergeant
Addition to my last post re the filing system numerical codes.
A friend (who is a librarian) asked me what I was working on when she came over last night. She said she thought the file code in the memo looked like a form of the Dewey Decimal System. Her comment led me to a document in the National Archives titled "War Department Decimal File System", which gives a good explanation of the system and has a detailed list of the categories as they existed in 1943. The numerical code "452.11" in the memo under discussion indicates as follows:
452 is the code for Aircraft and aeronautical supplies and equipment
452.1 is the code for Airplanes (Amphibian, attack, autogyro, bombardment, cargo
(transport), fighter, gliders, observation, photographic, pursuit, rotary wing (helicopters); training
(advanced, basic, basic combat, primary).)
452.11 is the code for Parts and accessories
For anyone interested, the document can be downloaded from here:
"https://www.archives.gov/files/research/guides/war-dept/decimal-file.pdf"
A second document - listing additional "miscellaneous" categories - can be downloaded from here:
"https://www.archives.gov/files/research/guides/war-dept/additional-classifications.pdf"
Librarians Where would we be without them?
A friend (who is a librarian) asked me what I was working on when she came over last night. She said she thought the file code in the memo looked like a form of the Dewey Decimal System. Her comment led me to a document in the National Archives titled "War Department Decimal File System", which gives a good explanation of the system and has a detailed list of the categories as they existed in 1943. The numerical code "452.11" in the memo under discussion indicates as follows:
452 is the code for Aircraft and aeronautical supplies and equipment
452.1 is the code for Airplanes (Amphibian, attack, autogyro, bombardment, cargo
(transport), fighter, gliders, observation, photographic, pursuit, rotary wing (helicopters); training
(advanced, basic, basic combat, primary).)
452.11 is the code for Parts and accessories
For anyone interested, the document can be downloaded from here:
"https://www.archives.gov/files/research/guides/war-dept/decimal-file.pdf"
A second document - listing additional "miscellaneous" categories - can be downloaded from here:
"https://www.archives.gov/files/research/guides/war-dept/additional-classifications.pdf"
Librarians
Where would we be without them?
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Yeah, you did. Very clearly. Thanks.
If anything, it poses even more questions because, again, it's hardly the smoking gun evidence you'd need to establish the kind of claim that's being made. It's like blaming it on a wine label. The only question though is why a note like this would include costs. I suppose it's just a brief acknowledgement of the contents.
That's interesting. Thanks for explaining it and going to the trouble of finding out. I was a librarian once myself but in a far less complicated environment!
drgondog
Major
There were concerns about both leaking tanks as well as pressurized tanks (required for high altitude feed via slaving engine component such as vacuum pump pressure into the tank to push the fuel). Specifically mentioned in Arnold's Global Power were concerns to pilot safety of a large block of volatile aviation gasoline external to the airframe on takeoff or landing.
During survival testing, the tanks using different materials and designs were exposed to shake testing for 25 hours to ensure against leaks and/or material failures. Additionally, the Mat.Cmd embarked on science experiments for leak proof tanks vs 50 cal and 20mm.
The field commanders like Eaker and Kenney seeking local suppliers were far more practical. Will it attach successfully, will it endure one or two missions without leaks, will it pressurize to 7.5 psi (vacuum pump could provide 5psi)? Sure there was a hazard of an enemy 20mm round hitting a drop tank, but the theory was 'drop the tank' before enemy contact was made.
Sway brace requirements were immediately obvious and the different airframe contractors each provided their own designs, but the B-7/B-10 design for lugs 14" OC was universal (except for Republic's 28" OC for their skid plate attach scheme)
Might be true. The only reference I found for first 2x108-gal mission was for 56th FG on 22nd March (I misremembered date above) via Zemke recollections on page 146 of Zemke's Wolfpack. I'm pretty sure the P-47 FGs were using only 150 or 108-gal centerline tanks through mid March. I am positive that neither the 78thFg nor the 355th FG used 2x150-gal during the first Berlin raids. What is your source for March 6?
I am of the opinion that the question was raised by Echols at Mat.Div at Wright Field to AAC HQ to a higher level of authority in Washington. I have no problem believing that Arnold was aware of the question and supported the answer. That said, his style to a policy question from his subordinates was to scribble on the memo and re-send back to his subordinates. My belief is that a.) the policy of not using external fuel tanks for ferry purposes was in place beginning with Arnold's boss in 1934-1935, Westover and, b.) was unchanged until 1940.
As to Greg - For whatever reason, Greg is of the belief that Arnold was not only incompetent but also stupid. Additionally I believe based on several direct conversations that he truly believes that the P-47 was a better aircraft than the P-51 in all respects, and truly believes that there was a conspiracy to withhold droppable tanks from Republic - based on 'no requirement for extended range, because the 'bomber will always get through'.
I actually sent him a draft of my new book in which the first 1/3 is about the development of the Long-Range Escort Fighter beginning with the memo we are discussing.
There are two points in the Arnold discussion which are critical. Arnold was Very aware that the greatest danger to the heavily armed B-17 was the Pursuit aircraft, not AAA in 1939 based on Spanish Civil War and further reinforced in the Battle of Britain. Arnold relied too much on Materiel Command competence in aircraft research and development at Wright Field until mid 1942 through mid 1943 when it became apparent that only a few aircraft delivered to many RFPs for both bombardment and pursuit were worthy. When you consider either the XP-46, or P-60 or P-75 projects under tight specs and controls, compared to the P-51 and P-47 developed with either zero or low direct oversight from Wright Field, it is easy to see what he was seeing.
The other blind spots complicating his belief system include a lack of interest or knowledge regarding the history of the USAAC/AAF as written by serious and independent authors over many years, well sourced and sound. Opinions may vary but the factual basis supported by hundreds of thousands of documents researched independently should form a base of knowledge of the events and decisions made.
He is a pilot and well versed in the practice of commercial flight but demonstrated early that he did not truly understand either the published data by AAF or the calculations underlying Range and its subset Combat Radius with accompanying assumptions. He also failed to understand the limitations of the Republic 205-gal, four attach point, composite/unpressurized ferry tank for 8th AF escort operations.
He kept trying to conflate the 205-gal Ferry tank as interchangeable with either the 150 or 200-gal steel pressurized flat tanks that arrived in 1944.
When I talked to him last several months ago he was still convinced that the AAF withheld drop tanks from Republic, and had no idea that the skid plate lug attach scheme was only good for the 205-gal ferry tank, then later a specially designed 200gal steel 'Brisbane' tank in SWPA for the P-47D-4. He was not aware that 1,000s of 75 and 150-gal drop tanks for P-39 and P-38 were left in UK when the fighter groups were pulled from 8th AF for 12th AF in November 1942. Said tanks were finally used when Republic finally designed a new skid plate for standard C/L and standard B-7 rack wing tank attachments.
He was still of the opinion that Eaker was incompetent because the order he placed with Bowater for 125 gal steel tanks in March 1943 was only delivered as a 108-gal paper composite tank in prototype form in August. He did not know that RAF Ministry of Production (Sir Withold Freeman) denied Bowater-Lloyd priority for rolled steel, which forced adoption of the Hurricane paper drop tank.
He was still of the opinion that Eaker was indifferent to extending the range of the P-47 when he immediately wrote Echols in November 1942 to send him droppable tanks for the P47, when he learned that the P-47 was the replacement for the P-38s he just lost. He is still of the opinion that Eaker was indifferent to long-range escort until after August 17 1943, when he was begging for P-38s and the new P-51B in May 1943 as bomber loss % was creeping up during bomb raids to western Germany. The appeals were strident after Blitz week attacks and losses at Hamburg, Oschersleben, Kassel and Kiel.
He was not aware that Mat.Cmd. ordered Republic to install standard bomb attach racks for centerline and wings as far back as March 1942 and only responded to MG Branshaw on June 1, 1943.
Greg is a smart guy, but not a well-read guy historically speaking. That said I don't offhand know anybody as well versed in performance attributes of so many aircraft as Greg, ditto engines. And he is an excellent presenter.
I might be wrong about this but it was my impression they were used on 6 March for Mission 250. They may have used smaller tanks. I had the impression the 108 gallon tanks were fitted from Jeff Ethell and Dr Alfred Price's book "Target Berlin: Mission 250, 6 March, 1944". But when I looked for that information, I couldn't find it.
On 6 March, 1944, P-47s got as far as just north west of Magdeburg and I couldn't see how that would be possible without 2x108 gallons externally. I'm going to confess to a level of conjecture here but please hear me out. Your P-51 book gives the P-47 a radius of 475nm in April, 1944, equipped with 2x150 gallon tanks. From what I've been able to glean, while the biggest gains were made with smaller tanks, it doesn't scale linearly and sooner or later you run into a law of diminishing returns.
Johnson talked about a battle over Dümmer Lake. In the above mentioned book, it's described as "Clash over Haseluenne".
But as to the exact size of the tanks, I'm not sure. As an aside, I have been tempted to set up a spreadsheet and see if I can actually get a reasonable trend line for centreline and under wing tanks of different sizes. I don't wish to get into competition with Greg for whose calculations are better. He can have that on his own. But it might be useful to know what was and was not possible.
Sorry, this somehow ended up being two separate quotes. On the matter of Arnold's reservations about drop tanks, that tallies with what I suspected.
On the matter of Greg... What Greg is doing is building a tribalist narrative. He's deaf to history because it's lethal to his position of "standing up for the little guy and the underappreciated" and "all the commanders were self-interested dolts". These are the usual clarion calls for someone trying to appeal to a very broad base, one that's, for the most part, more invested in tee shirts than text books.
I have questioned him twice on points he was making. On the first occasion he - unusually - backed down. On the second occasion I asked for a simple historical context and he told me he was only interested in technical arguments. But this is a historical matter, not a technical one.
He knows exactly what he's doing, of course.
My background is journalism, PR and academia. I don't have any misapprehension about people's perceptions of that. But the first thing I learnt in journalism was "to get the best available version of the truth". That means getting both sides of the story but it doesn't mean equal air time for flat earthers. What Greg is doing is intellectually dishonest. Even if he truly believes the P-47 was better, his lack of willingness to defend the weak parts of his argument - "That's already settled" - his lack of willingness to correct the appalling nonsense that comes up in the comments section on his channel and his outright dismissal of historical record, mark him as a bit more than merely misguided. Everyone has their own favourite, even me but that's not the same thing. His videos have never had to be peer reviewed before he posted them.
Hundreds of thousands of people have been directly influenced by this and I note that even the IWM videos have started to lean into the hyperbole.
Thanks for your information. It's an interesting story and one that I never expected to go this deep into.
I think I'd better stop here for now!
By the way, if you need anyone to help proof read your manuscript, let me know.
