The real combat history of the P-39 Airacobra in the Pacific (4 Viewers)

[GrauGeist]

Well, we are talking about two different aircraft. The B-26s deployed to the Pacific were early, short wing birds with the R-2800-5 engines.
The B-26Bs and Cs sent to the ETO had the longer wing and more powerful R-2800-43s. They also got heavier and slower.
The pilots that flew in the Pacific loved the B-26, preferred it to the B-25, but the brass was not satisfied with it. Long take-off requirements restricted its availability, and planes often flew light to shorten the take off run. 13th AF B-26Bs rarely carried more than 2000 lbs of bombs because max take off weight was restricted to 36,500 lbs.
Even the early, short wing B-26B was heavier than the B-26, which was a factor in the decision to equip the 19th BS with refurbished "straights" and convert the few B-26Bs in theater to fat cats.
I think the additional weight (extra guns, bigger scoops for tropical dust filters, etc.) added to the short wing B-26Bs sent to North Africa played a role in their poor performance in that theater.
The planes sent to the UK were mostly long wing models and had the luxury of longer runways. Mission lengths were shorter too, compared to the Pacific and MTO. So 4000 lb bomb loads were quite common vs European targets.

Thanks for that info!

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Greg Boeser I'm reading Claringbould's new book on the JAAF in the South Pacific and he mentions one squadron which seems to still be flying B-26 on combat missions around the Solomons and New Guinea in later 1943, I'll go back and find the reference tomorrow and post it.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Well, we are talking about two different aircraft. The B-26s deployed to the Pacific were early, short wing birds with the R-2800-5 engines.
The B-26Bs and Cs sent to the ETO had the longer wing and more powerful R-2800-43s. They also got heavier and slower.
The pilots that flew in the Pacific loved the B-26, preferred it to the B-25, but the brass was not satisfied with it. Long take-off requirements restricted its availability, and planes often flew light to shorten the take off run. 13th AF B-26Bs rarely carried more than 2000 lbs of bombs because max take off weight was restricted to 36,500 lbs.
Even the early, short wing B-26B was heavier than the B-26, which was a factor in the decision to equip the 19th BS with refurbished "straights" and convert the few B-26Bs in theater to fat cats.
I think the additional weight (extra guns, bigger scoops for tropical dust filters, etc.) added to the short wing B-26Bs sent to North Africa played a role in their poor performance in that theater.
The planes sent to the UK were mostly long wing models and had the luxury of longer runways. Mission lengths were shorter too, compared to the Pacific and MTO. So 4000 lb bomb loads were quite common vs European targets.

So are you saying here that there are both short and long-wing versions of the B-26B?

I am not so sure B-26 had a poor record in the MTO from what I've read. They were still using them over Sardinia, Sicily and Italy pretty prominently.

 

[andrewgeorge]

No, not entirely. Most of the biplanes for example (like the Japanese were fighting in China and Manchuria, and the Finns in Russia) had lower wing loadings. As did the Hawk 75 (or roughly identical, apparently, to the Ki-43-I). The I-16 also had a very low wing-loading.

Of course! CR 42s and such as well.

No, not entirely. Most of the biplanes for example (like the Japanese were fighting in China and Manchuria, and the Finns in Russia) had lower wing loadings. As did the Hawk 75 (or roughly identical, apparently, to the Ki-43-I). The I-16 also had a very low wing-loading.

Anyway wing loading is just a function of wing area and weight so when we give you weight and wing area that is essentially your wing loading. Wing shape and engine power have something to do with turn rate as well but a lot of it is just that. The relevant exception here being the Ki-43 with it's additional maneuvering flaps giving it an extra boost in turn rate.



View attachment 896418

The P-40 was also little to a lot (10-50 mph) faster than the F2A (depending on which exact types you are comparing and at what altitude) and had one of the best roll-rates of any fighter in the world, up around 100-130 degrees per second depending on the specific test, the variant, and the speed (P-40s rolled best at higher speed). F2A had a roll rate around 70-80 degrees per second though that would vary a lot depending on weight in the wings (like guns, fuel), speed, and possibly some other factors. P-40 also had a much higher dive speed of 460-480 mph depending on subtype, vs about 360 mph for the F2A (again, depending on the type).

Certainly agree the P-40 was a more capable fighter than the Buffalo—in almost every way, frankly. I was just pointing out that the issues with the Buffalo in the far east had more to do with being underpowered than wing size. The performance of the engines in Southeast Asia in 1941 and 1942 was described by RAF pilots as "pathetic." Not just a design problem, but probably a quality problem.

 

[GrauGeist]

So are you saying here that there are both short and long-wing versions of the B-26B?

I am not so sure B-26 had a poor record in the MTO from what I've read. They were still using them over Sardinia, Sicily and Italy pretty prominently.

The MTO presented similar issues that the SWP had, especially the heat and dust, however, extended runways were much easier to make in the desert than on many of the islands in the PTO.

 

[andrewgeorge]

So are you saying here that there are both short and long-wing versions of the B-26B?

I am not so sure B-26 had a poor record in the MTO from what I've read. They were still using them over Sardinia, Sicily and Italy pretty prominently.

That is correct. B-26Bs switched to the extended wing with the block 10s.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

The MTO presented similar issues that the SWP had, especially the heat and dust, however, extended runways were much easier to make in the desert than on many of the islands in the PTO.

I'm just remembering from reading through the operational histories in Shores that you see plenty of B-26 missions going on through 1943, and once they had regular escort they seemed to take quite low losses. This is just a guess but I suspect fewer than the B-24 units were.

 

[Greg Boeser]

So are you saying here that there are both short and long-wing versions of the B-26B?

I am not so sure B-26 had a poor record in the MTO from what I've read. They were still using them over Sardinia, Sicily and Italy pretty prominently.

B-26, B-26A, and B-26B to B-26B-4 were short wing. B-26C-5 and B-26B-10 and up, including B-26F and G, were long wing.
The BGs sent to North Africa (319th, 320th, 17th) were originally equipped with short wing B-26Bs. The long wing B-26Bs and Cs started showing up as replacements in May '43.
The BGs sent to England, arriving later, were nearly all equipped with long wing B-26Bs and Cs. The exception was the 322nd BG, whose first arriving squadrons were still equipped with short wing B-26Bs. Many of these were lost or damaged during it's first two low level missions to Ijmuiden.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Greg Boeser I'm reading Claringbould's new book on the JAAF in the South Pacific and he mentions one squadron which seems to still be flying B-26 on combat missions around the Solomons and New Guinea in later 1943, I'll go back and find the reference tomorrow and post it.

Well, there were two squadrons, 69th and 70th BS, flying early B-26B, initially from Fiji and New Caledonia, also Efate, that operated from Guadalcanal briefly in late '42- early '43. The 70th got stuck in first when it flew in to help against the Tokyo Express run November 14-15. They flew in with torpedoes but traded them for bombs and hit the transports and beaches on the 15th. Flew out the next day as there wasn't enough fuel to operate effectively. Brass probably didn't want to risk them getting shelled at Henderson. They deployed forward again around New Year's and both squadrons flew several missions against Munda, Buin and shipping in the upper Solomons. Cpt John Sharp shot down a Mavis while on a patrol in early February. By late February, both squadrons pulled back to their permanent stations. Shortly thereafter they turned in their Marauders for strafer B-25s.
The 22nd BG in Australia stood down in January '43 and all their remaining B-26s were refurbished and consolidated in the 19th BS, which went back into action in July, while the other squadrons converted to B-25s. They flew missions until January '44, when the B-26 was retired in the Pacific. The entire 22nd BG then converted to B-24s.

 

[drgondog]

B-26, B-26A, and B-26B to B-26B-4 were short wing. B-26C-5 and B-26B-10 and up, including B-26F and G, were long wing.
The BGs sent to North Africa (319th, 320th, 17th) were originally equipped with short wing B-26Bs. The long wing B-26Bs and Cs started showing up as replacements in May '43.
The BGs sent to England, arriving later, were nearly all equipped with long wing B-26Bs and Cs. The exception was the 322nd BG, whose first arriving squadrons were still equipped with short wing B-26Bs. Many of these were lost or damaged during it's first two low level missions to Ijmuiden.

The 322nd first mission was uneventful, save 10/11 all suffered flak damage. The second on May 17 resulted in 10/11 shot down at Ijmuiden. The survivor aborted.
Eaker ordered the 322nd to stand down for more training and they didn't fly another mission until July 28 near end of Blitz Week.

Always escorted after May 17. The primary reason the B-26 had the lowest loss rate per sortie of all US combat aircraft.

 

[Greg Boeser]

The 322nd first mission was uneventful, save 10/11 all suffered flak damage. The second on May 17 resulted in 10/11 shot down at Ijmuiden. The survivor aborted.
Eaker ordered the 322nd to stand down for more training and they didn't fly another mission until July 28 near end of Blitz Week.

Always escorted after May 17. The primary reason the B-26 had the lowest loss rate per sortie of all US combat aircraft.

Yes. Primarily escorted by lots of RAF Spitfires.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

15th Air Force, B-26 units November and December 1943, effective usually means bombed, non effective entered contested airspace but did not bomb, non sorties did not enter contested airspace, average bomb load is total tons divided by effective sorties

Month

Eff

Neff

Non

Dest

Miss

Damg

Cause

E/a Des

E/a Prob

E/a Dam

H.E. Tons

Frag Tons

Tons

Av load, lb

November

488​

210​

185​

3​

5​

23​

0​

3​

0​

5​

659.5​

46.38​

705.88​

2892.95​

December

1,102​

248​

122​

1​

0​

35​

0​

1​

1​

0​

1537.52​

34.98​

1572.50​

2853.90​

All

1,590​

458​

307​

4​

5​

58​

0​

4​

1​

5​

2197.02​

81.36​

2278.38​

2865.89​

12th Air Force, B-26 and B-25 units, pilot sorties are usually effective + non effective sorties, average bomb load is total tons divided by pilot sorties, which means they are an underestimate but should do for a B-25 versus B-26 comparison.

B-26

Pilot

Bombs

Av Bomb

Ammo

Enemy a/c

Losses

Losses

Losses

Losses

Losses

Operational

Units

B-26

Sorties

Tons

Load lbs.

Rounds

destroyed

Shot Down

Missing

Other

non Oper

Total

Days

Units

Jan-44​

1,799​

2,591.08​

2880.58​

123,936​

11​

9​

6​

4​

0​

19​

23​

17, 319, 320

Feb-44​

1,143​

1,116.02​

1952.79​

64,570​

3​

5​

3​

4​

3​

15​

16​

17, 319, 320

Mar-44​

1,675​

2,619.28​

3127.50​

76,736​

2​

1​

1​

4​

0​

6​

23​

17, 319, 320

Apr-44​

1,448​

2,221.25​

3068.02​

99,823​

0​

0​

0​

2​

1​

3​

18​

17, 319, 320

May-44​

2,538​

3,964.23​

3123.90​

161,886​

1​

2​

0​

8​

0​

10​

24​

17, 319, 320

Jun-44​

1,973​

3,309.00​

3354.28​

116,926​

0​

2​

0​

1​

2​

5​

20​

17, 319, 320

Jul-44​

2,024​

3,031.00​

2995.06​

123,282​

0​

4​

0​

4​

1​

9​

23​

17, 319, 320

Aug-44​

2,592​

3,942.45​

3042.01​

135,890​

0​

13​

0​

10​

7​

30​

28​

17, 319, 320

Sep-44​

1,813​

2,337.22​

2578.29​

43,914​

0​

3​

1​

4​

5​

13​

18​

17, 319, 320

Oct-44​

1,284​

1,642.55​

2558.49​

40,610​

2​

1​

4​

2​

2​

9​

12​

17, 319, 320

Nov-44​

1,070​

1,537.91​

2874.60​

93,419​

7​

4​

2​

1​

0​

7​

12​

17, 320 (1st to 20th only, then to ETO)

Total

19,359​

28,312​

2924.94​

1,080,992​

26​

44​

17​

44​

21​

126​

217​

B-25

Pilot

Bombs

Av Bomb

Ammo

Enemy a/c

Losses

Losses

Losses

Losses

Losses

Operational

Units

B-25

Sorties

Tons

Load lbs.

Rounds

destroyed

Shot Down

Missing

Other

non Oper

Total

Days

Units

Jan-44​

1,759​

2,453.57​

2789.73​

66,747​

3​

1​

8​

4​

1​

14​

25​

12, 321, 340

Feb-44​

1,079​

1,180.77​

2188.64​

38,108​

9​

3​

5​

4​

3​

15​

22​

321, 340 (12th to India)

Mar-44​

1,280​

1,948.94​

3045.22​

55,472​

1​

1​

2​

0​

2​

5​

11​

310 (20th onwards), 321, 340

Apr-44​

1,875​

2,883.21​

3075.42​

86,124​

0​

2​

2​

0​

1​

5​

26​

310, 321, 340

May-44​

3,171​

5,052.45​

3186.66​

159,870​

0​

3​

3​

12​

10​

28​

24​

310, 321, 340

Jun-44​

2,603​

4,627.37​

3555.41​

130,374​

0​

5​

1​

2​

0​

8​

22​

310, 321, 340

Jul-44​

2,376​

3,805.59​

3203.36​

137,859​

1​

2​

2​

4​

3​

11​

24​

310, 321, 340

Aug-44​

3,164​

4,574.00​

2891.28​

145,320​

0​

5​

2​

1​

3​

11​

28​

310, 321, 340

Sep-44​

2,636​

3,924.47​

2977.59​

126,012​

0​

3​

2​

1​

2​

8​

19​

310, 321, 340

Oct-44​

1,467​

2,020.79​

2755.00​

69,746​

0​

3​

2​

3​

2​

10​

11​

310, 321, 340

Nov-44​

2,813​

3,951.88​

2809.73​

153,618​

0​

9​

2​

1​

0​

12​

20​

310, 319, 321, 340

Dec-44​

2,510​

3,315.58​

2641.90​

163,213​

3​

6​

2​

0​

2​

10​

17​

310, 321, 340 (319th to USA)

Jan-45​

2,023​

2,896.09​

2863.16​

104,900​

0​

4​

1​

4​

n/a

9​

18​

310, 321, 340

Feb-45​

2,841​

3,662.00​

2577.97​

166,130​

1​

4​

10​

2​

0​

16​

22​

310, 321, 340

Mar-45​

3,471​

5,358.00​

3087.29​

188,475​

4​

8​

6​

5​

n/a

19​

25​

310, 321, 340

Apr-45​

4,638​

6,510.00​

2807.24​

243,829​

0​

4​

2​

6​

n/a

12​

25​

310, 321, 340

Total

39,706​

58,165​

2929.77​

2,035,797​

22​

63​

52​

49​

29​

193​

339​

9th Air force, B-26 units, Credit sorties are another name for pilot sorties, average bomb load is total tons divided by effective sorties

B-26

Total Effort

Bombing

Losses

Air claims

B-26

Total

Credit

Effective

tons on

MIA

CAT E

Total

Rate

Dest-

Prob-

Dam-

Average

Month

Sorties

Sorties

Sorties

target

MIA

CAT E

Total

Rate

royed

able

aged

bomb load

Oct-43​

792​

517​

265​

424.500​

3​

2​

6​

3203.77​

Nov-43​

1,561​

1,346​

877​

1571.650​

6​

6​

4.5​

10​

5​

6​

3584.15​

Dec-43​

2,067​

1,909​

911​

1474.580​

2​

5​

7​

3.7​

3237.28​

Jan-44​

1,711​

1,440​

1,041​

1546.000​

3​

3​

6​

4.2​

6​

6​

2​

2970.22​

Feb-44​

3,881​

3,555​

2,328​

3368.900​

14​

6​

20​

5.6​

2​

1​

3​

2894.24​

Mar-44​

3,820​

2,870​

2,870​

4980.830​

9​

7​

16​

5.6​

2​

10​

3470.96​

Apr-44​

5,857​

5,233​

4,413​

8340.075​

23​

10​

33​

6.3​

2​

3779.78​

May-44​

8,648​

8,179​

6,557​

12739.700​

29​

18​

47​

5.7​

2​

3885.83​

Jun-44​

8,282​

7,660​

6,463​

12287.025​

30​

14​

44​

5.7​

2​

1​

2​

3802.27​

Jul-44​

5,623​

5,107​

4,219​

7911.965​

24​

15​

39​

7.6​

3​

3​

5​

3750.64​

Aug-44​

6,307​

5,862​

4,587​

8137.245​

30​

26​

56​

9.6​

2​

3547.96​

Sep-44​

3,881​

3,638​

2,422​

4325.250​

4​

8​

12​

3.3​

3571.64​

Oct-44​

2,438​

2,055​

1,276​

2380.625​

11​

10​

21​

10.2​

1​

3731.39​

Nov-44​

3,894​

3,307​

2,367​

4218.175​

13​

8​

21​

6.4​

3564.15​

Dec-44​

4,738​

4,244​

3,249​

5942.825​

47​

35​

82​

19.3​

23​

18​

31​

3658.25​

Jan-45​

2,643​

2,112​

1,650​

2905.875​

7​

18​

25​

11.8​

3522.27​

Feb-45​

5,455​

5,229​

4,647​

8275.675​

37​

29​

66​

12.6​

1​

1​

4​

3561.73​

Mar-45​

9,668​

9,429​

8,751​

15411.995​

16​

31​

47​

5.0​

2​

4​

6​

3522.34​

Apr-45​

4,436​

4,089​

3,792​

7239.691​

15​

10​

25​

6.1​

2​

2​

6​

3818.40​

May-45​

4​

4​

1​

0.200​

0​

0.0​

400.00​

1943​

4,420​

3,772​

2,053​

3470.730​

8​

5​

13​

3.4​

13​

7​

12​

3381.13​

1944​

59,080​

53,150​

41,792​

76178.615​

237​

160​

397​

7.5​

42​

29​

56​

3645.61​

1945​

22,206​

20,863​

18,841​

33833.436​

75​

88​

163​

7.8​

5​

7​

16​

3591.47​

Grand

85,706​

77,785​

62,686​

113482.781​

320​

253​

573​

7.4​

60​

43​

84​

3620.67​

1st TAF, B-26 units, average bomb load is total tons divided by effective sorties

B-26	Total	Credit	Effective	Ineffect	Tons	bombs	on	target	Average
Month	Sorties	Sorties	Sorties	Sorties	HE	IB	Frag	Total	bomb load
Dec-44​	928​	844​	446​	482​	814.5​	13.5​	26.0​	854.0​	3829.60​
Jan-45​	510​	393​	245​	265​	406.5​	48.2​	0.0​	454.7​	3711.84​
Feb-45​	1109​	950​	828​	281​	1579.2​	27.0​	16.4​	1622.6​	3919.32​
Mar-45​	1905​	1722​	1466​	439​	2564.5​	21.0​	147.0​	2732.5​	3727.83​
Apr-45​	2523​	2474​	1961​	562​	2574.8​	102.0​	854.0​	3530.8​	3601.02​
May-45​	69​	63​	25​	44​	46.0​	0.0​	0.0​	46.0​	3680.00​
Total	7044​	6446​	4971​	2073​	7985.5​	211.7​	1043.4​	9240.6​	3717.80​

USAAF Statistical Digest Far East Air forces, unfortunately counts light and medium bombers together

Month	effective	bomb tons	Av bomb load
Jan-43​	416​	254​	1221.15​
Feb-43​	257​	96​	747.08​
Mar-43​	276​	86​	623.19​
Apr-43​	229​	63​	550.22​
May-43​	347​	114​	657.06​
Jun-43​	532​	158​	593.98​
Jul-43​	1,297​	946​	1458.75​
Aug-43​	974​	609​	1250.51​
Sep-43​	1,080​	749​	1387.04​
Oct-43​	991​	685​	1382.44​
Nov-43​	1,620​	1,280​	1580.25​
Dec-43​	3,148​	2,994​	1902.16​
Jan-44​	2,414​	2,195​	1818.56​
Feb-44​	2,058​	2,177​	2115.65​
Mar-44​	2,950​	2,959​	2006.10​
Apr-44​	3,660​	3,288​	1796.72​
May-44​	4,469​	3,572​	1598.57​
Jun-44​	3,566​	2,762​	1549.07​
Jul-44​	2,131​	1,514​	1420.93​
Aug-44​	1,474​	812​	1101.76​
Sep-44​	2,364​	1,573​	1330.80​
Oct-44​	2,795​	1,840​	1316.64​
Nov-44​	2,497​	1,601​	1282.34​
Dec-44​	2,450​	1,526​	1245.71​
Jan-45​	3,561​	2,074​	1164.84​
Feb-45​	3,757​	2,168​	1154.11​
Mar-45​	4,356​	2,722​	1249.77​
Apr-45​	3,827​	2,691​	1406.32​
May-45​	4,940​	3,543​	1434.41​
Jun-45​	3,042​	1,924​	1264.96​
Jul-45​	1,075​	745​	1386.05​
Aug-45​	971​	886​	1824.92​
1943​	11,167​	8,034​	1438.88​
1944​	32,828​	25,819​	1572.99​
1945​	25,529​	16,753​	1312.47​
Total	69,524​	51,440​	1479.78​

 

[Greg Boeser]

The light bomb loads for the FEAF in 1943 is probably a reflection of the use of parafrags. Also, the A-20s sometimes did pure strafing missions.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

As a pilot (GA/VFR), I had to learn and understand "Air Density" and actively flying in Southern California for the most part, it was extremely critical to know and understand it based on the conditions between coastal and high desert environments that exist in that area.

Here is a source that will help explain how air temperature and relative humidity can be a huge factor in flight behavior:
https://www.aopa.org/training-and-safety/active-pilots/safety-and-technique/weather/density-altitude

Thanks. And to be clear, when i wrote "Hasn't really been proven" I only mean to the extent that it caused a detriment to performance of planes like the P-39 and F2A.

One thing I don't really understand as relates to this is why Hurricanes (large, thick wing) seemed to perform a bit worse in Tropical climates, although that may be mainly down to the tropical filter i.e. Vokes.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

The light bomb loads for the FEAF in 1943 is probably a reflection of the use of parafrags. Also, the A-20s sometimes did pure strafing missions.

Parafrags, incendiaries and other light bombs (especially when modified to detonate above ground level) seemed to work best against airfields and against troops and small supply caches in the jungle areas. It seemed like a wide spread of light munitions was better than a few big craters.

Which may be why some of the Japanese bombers like Ki-21 and Ki-48 and G4M seemed to be pretty effective at striking Allied airfields.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

The B-26 unit in question is the 19th Bomber Squadron of the 22nd Bomb Group, "Silver Fleet", so named for stripping paint off of the skin of their aircraft.

Looks like they were still flying B-26 into later 1943.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Yes. Last missions were in early January '44. To illustrate the changed fortunes between '42 and '43, the 22nd BG lost at least 35 aircraft to enemy action between April '42 and January '43. 14 to fighters, 14 to AA, 5 to bombing, 2 to strafing. Others suffered damage that ended their combat careers, though they might have served on in a utility role. Rarely did the group get 12 or more planes in the air for a single mission.
In the second half of '43, 19th BS was routinely putting 18 aircraft in the air, and suffered just one or two combat losses between July '43 and January '44.

 

[Shortround6]

Thanks. And to be clear, when i wrote "Hasn't really been proven" I only mean to the extent that it caused a detriment to performance of planes like the P-39 and F2A.

One thing I don't really understand as relates to this is why Hurricanes (large, thick wing) seemed to perform a bit worse in Tropical climates, although that may be mainly down to the tropical filter i.e. Vokes.

Vokes filters seemed to be a double wammy. A lot of external drag and reduced RAM effect (or even hurting intake pressure at low speeds).
Most of the American air filter systems didn't seem to hurt things as much although some of the bomber intakes look like they were high drag.
But then a couple of big scoops on top a Martin Baltimore/s engines is a small percentage change to the total drag of the entire airplane.
US might have been more willing to trade performance for shorter engine life?
Merlin air intakes were in about the worst possible position for dust/dirt intake while taxing than any aircraft in any air force.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Yes. Last missions were in early January '44. To illustrate the changed fortunes between '42 and '43, the 22nd BG lost at least 35 aircraft to enemy action between April '42 and January '43. 14 to fighters, 14 to AA, 5 to bombing, 2 to strafing. Others suffered damage that ended their combat careers, though they might have served on in a utility role. Rarely did the group get 12 or more planes in the air for a single mission.
In the second half of '43, 19th BS was routinely putting 18 aircraft in the air, and suffered just one or two combat losses between July '43 and January '44.

What made the difference? Allied fighters were still certainly taking heavy losses on some missions in the third and fourth quarters of 1943.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Quantity has a quality all its own. A formation of 18 planes is a much more formidible foe than a formation of three.
Also, if the interceptors were mixing it up with the escort, then the bombers get through. A big improvement was the establishment of airfields on the northern side of New Guinea. This put the Allied air units closer to Japanese bases and reduced the need to cross the Owen Stanley Mountians. The supply situation was greatly improved, as well as the build up of Allied air power.