This Day in the Battle of Britain (1 Viewer)

Some observations if I may

psteel said:

The first point I don't agree with however . The British didn't know the German plan, which timed the ride to the currents either way, so the average fleet speed would have been more like 4 knots, not 1 knot. The Extreme distance mentioned is the exception as most units had 40-60 mile journeys. A two-day turnaround was planned for each part of each wave with two parts to each wave. However the towed barges only crossed on the first wave. After this they would operated from either side to speed up embarking and departure from the beaches, while motorized barges would operate in successive waves.

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I don't disagree with the distances you mention but its worth remembering that the Germans did a test of the planned towing of the barges and it was a total failure. Its quite possible that the germans would have had barges all over the place. Also to have two days between waves sound as if they were asking for trouble.

It was really difficult to sink a vessel at this point in history. Through out the war the British averaged 150 sorties for every vessel sunk, ranging from trawlers on up and this doesn't include anything about the infamous "Butt Report". In naval battles it took hundreds of shells to sink even a small vessel with small guns. Since the Germans would be armed themselves that means it would be a race to see who sank the most. In studies of naval battles through this period, the Germans had a knack for beating off allied and British naval attacks despite being out gunned and out numbered and often inflicted twice as much as they lost

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I am not aware of the Germans having the beating off allied naval and air attacks at any time let alone when outnumbere or outgunned. The point you make about the number of sorties/shells taken to an enemy vessel is a good one but I wonder how much different the German forces would have been. The RN had a good number of warships ready and able to attack any invasion beachead and to stop them the German airforces would have had to achieve an almost unbelievable hit rate. I say Airforce as the German navy simply didn't have any warsips in any numbers.

At this time the German Navy had about 10 destroyers available and that is assuming that :
a) they were all available for service
b) none had been damaged in the build up prior to the invasion
c) none had been damaged in the first stages of the invasion

All of which I believe to be very dubious assumptions

Adding to the British woes would be the mine fields/barriers. If the Germans could establish and maintain the mine barriers either side of the Dover Straits, any invading fleet would likely suffer 1/3 losses crossing such a barrier, just like at Kallinengrad.

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Germany didn't have the ships to lay the minefields and they certainly didn't have the ships to escort the minelayers if they did. The RN weren't total idiots, they also had considerable naval forces to counter any minelaying, and lay their own mines once the landings had started.

You guys need to acknowledge that the reason any invasion of UK didn't happen, was firstly because Hitler didn't want to invade the UK . He really believed the British would stand aside and let him get on with his racial strategy. All through the 1930s he adjusted the German rearmament drive to avoid conflict with the UK because he saw them as potential racial allies. Deep down Hitler believed the English were part of his Aryan race. Hitler tolerated the BoB as part of what has been referred to as 'Fright wars' to scare the British into neutrality.

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This I totally agree with.

I was less to do with a sense of innate racial ties, as a a belief that other nations would benefit more from a defeat of Britain over germany/ If Britain existed as a client, subservient kingdom to the german Reich, the German Reich would derive many of the benefits of the british Empire for nothing. Crackpot theory, but thats how he (Hitler) thought.

As far as Hitler not building a force structure to dfeat Britain, that had nothing to do with "being nice to the British because he liked them". It had much to do with concentrating on domination of Europe, and assuming that once that was achieved, and there were no more allies on the continent that Britain woiuold see logic and sue for peace. When that didnt happen, all of Hitlers assumptions came crashing down his ears.

The last factor influencing hitler, was his total lack of faith in the KM, which despite the heroic and effective battles fought by the KM in Norway, was only reinforced by the results. And whilst the wehrmacht showed some stomach when taking losses, the KM was far less willing to do so. They never were strong supporters of the plan. They were even less enthusastic after the pasting they received in Norway.

Now, there was absolutely no way that the barges plan was ever going to average 4 knots. Not least for the fact that at 50 miles (which is only the nearest port, because it inoved so many troops th average didtance is moree like 80 miles), ther would be at least two changes of tide. Moroever, because the RAF was keeping a close watch over the ports of embarkation, and it takes days to embark troops in a tactically efficient way (tactical loading) they are going to take at least a week to load onto the transport. Look at Dunkirk, the allies managed 338000 evacuations, no equipment, no tactical loading, in 8 days, an average of 40000 men loaded per day. If they were being tactically loaded, you might load 10000 men per day, given the equipment available to the Germans. There were basically 4 ports avaialable in that 80 mile radius...Dunkirk, Ostend, Boulogne and Calais. Calais was the biggest, my guesstimate for these four points of embarkation would be about 25000 men per day. That means to get a 100000 man army across the ditch the germans will need about 4 days to embark. Plenty of time for the RN and the RAF to prepare a welcome.

There was no way the Germans were going to "sneak" 100000 men across the channel.

I don't think any serious historians believe that barge-based invasion of the UK was ever going to succeed. My view is that it was political pressure seeking to induce a change of course in London. Had Fighter Command lost air superiority over SE England, there was every chance that pro-German factions in London, aided and abetted by those who wanted peace at any price, would have succeeded in fomenting yet another change of Government leadership, replacing Churchill with someone more focussed on suing for peace (Halifax, for example).

Whilst the threat of invasion wasn't real or even plausible, the threat of becoming subservient to Herr Hitler's will most certainly was. Look at what happened in Vichy France which, although supposedly neutral, was never anything of the sort. There was no way that Hitler would allow Britain to toe an entirely neutral line because political and commercial links would very rapidly blur the situation. The key issue here is the concept of "neutrality" as brought up by psteel. When confronted with a force, both political and military, as that of Nazi Germany, there is no such thing as true neutrality. Hitler didn't want a neutral Britain, he wanted a Britain that was pro-Nazi (ie willing to let Hitler do what he wanted wherever he wanted). It irked him greatly that Britain, to a large extent driven by the force of personality that was Winston Spencer Churchill, refused to follow the script.

What would have happened politically if Britain had lost the air battle is an open question, and therefore I cant say that the removal of Churchil was impossible or unlikely even. In my opinion its too hard to tell really. But my opinion is that firtsly the chances of Churchill being removed were slim indeed. I cant stress enough thats an opinion, not a fact. But the British Government at that time was a unity government, and the main parties had resolved to resist no matter what. The opinion of the dominiions was fight on no matter what, and surely that was a factor.

It may have been a different story if the Germans had actually occupied the british Isles, though I doubt even that would have swayed the British to surrender, they had already made plans to continue to fight from Canada in that situation. They had looked aghast at how the french had prostituted themselves and were unlikley to ever go down that path IMO.

So if physical occupation of the home country was not going to lead to raproachment with the nazis, how much less would the loss of air superiority. The depth of anti-nazi feeling was very strong, and no amount of loss was going to change that.

And air air superiority would, at best be a temporary and partial loss in the south and southeast of the country. A pull back for a week, or 10 days at the most and push the RAF back into the fray for yet more slaughter. That is not going to dislodge or undermine the British resolve in any way IMO and would not place Churchill at any risk of removal

The invasion of Britain has been discussed at length. I think this summarizes why the Germans would fail.

The Germans would be executing the largest amphib invasion in history, with no experience in doing such a thing. They would be doing it without strategic or tactical doctrine, without the specialized naval and army assets officers and troops, and without the specialized amphib vessels needed to pull it off.

They could land a few divisions, but would have little capability to reinforce or supply.

End of story.

".... End of story."

Agreed. If Germany had tried and failed it would have been a major set-back for Barbarossa. Would Stalin strike preemptively? {aka Icebreaker}.

MM

Parsifal,
I agree that we are "what-iffing" to a large extent but it's simply not true that the British Government was unified. If you haven't read it, I strongly recommend "Five Days in London" by John Lukacs which paints a far more variable picture than the traditional "we all stood shoulder-to-shoulder" view of British resistance to German aggression in 1940. Churchill easily survived a no-confidence vote following Tobruk but would the same have been true had Fighter Command had to pull back from Southeast England? Halifax was poised in the wings to take over, and in many respects was the preferred choice over Churchill because he was less...well, emotional. Appeasement didn't stop with the removal of Chamberlain; there were many in the halls of power who thought it better to make a deal with Hitler than to risk everything on yet another lengthy conflict.

Syscom,
I'm not suggesting that Operation Sealion was a viable military operation, rather that it was a piece of political theatre aimed at inducing the British Government to change direction and sue for peace. With a pliant government in London, Germany didn't need to invade, at least not in 1940, but there is every likelihood that Britain would have seen increasing German influence from that point forwards, perhaps not unlike Vichy France.

".... political theatre".

Bluff and blitzkrieg ....

MM

syscom3 said:

They could land a few divisions, but would have little capability to reinforce or supply.

End of story.

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From the cross channel swimming association

Why is the English Channel the top open water swim and such a hard swim?
A.There are a lot of factors that combine to make the swim hard.
The English Channel is approximately -19 nautical miles (38000 yards) or 35 kilometres (35000 mtrs) - wide at its narrowest point (actually 18.2 nm from Shakespeare Beach, Dover to Cap Gris Nez, France). Most swims are a little longer to the landing on either side.
The Tides are strong and change direction approximately every 6 hours. (See News - training - general Nav. pages)
They flow to the North East from about 1.5 hours before high water to about 4.5 hours after high water (Flood tide) -
then turn and flow South West from 4.5 hours after high water to 1.5 hours before high water (Ebb tide).
These tides can flow at up to 4 nautical miles per hour. The tide gets later every day by about 1 hour and change in height and flow speed every day.
The lowest flow/ height range is known as the NEAP TIDES and is the time most swimmers try to swim.
The highest flow/height range is the SPRING TIDES and require calm weather and good piloting for swims to be successful. (Good spring tide swims are usually a little faster the neap swims but require a lot more planning an skill from the pilot). See the channel chart on the navigation page.
The wind and the weather are an unknown quantity and the forecasts are only approximate. The Dover Straits are prone to local weather conditions that can vary considerably from that which is forecast and the weather can change very quickly (15/20 mins).
When you combined wind and tide you can have some very sudden changes in sea conditions.
Wind and tide together give a flatter sea that is "long" and more settled than wind against tide.
Wind against tide creates a "short" confused sea. The stronger the wind and tide the rougher the sea gets, (remember that the tide changes direction every 6 hours)


Germany may have landed a few divisions but the chances of them being in anything like one place are about zero.
The chances of being able to get back and re supply them with a towed barge under fire are a bit less

The problem with the Sealion as "bluff" theory is that the evidence shows it wasn't a bluff. It didn't become so until late September when Hitler called off the invasion, but said some preparations should continue as a bluff. Prior to that all orders were for actual preparations.

When looking at Hitler's state of mind, it's worth remembering in the preceding few months he had conquered Norway with an amphibious invasion, then defeated and occupied France, Belgium and the Netherlands, and driven the British off the continent. He was riding high.

You guys need to acknowledge that the reason any invasion of UK didn't happen, was firstly because Hitler didn't want to invade the UK . He really believed the British would stand aside and let him get on with his racial strategy. All through the 1930s he adjusted the German rearmament drive to avoid conflict with the UK because he saw them as potential racial allies. Deep down Hitler believed the English were part of his Aryan race. Hitler tolerated the BoB as part of what has been referred to as 'Fright wars' to scare the British into neutrality.

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Hitler saw the Dutch, Danes and Norwegians as racial allies, too. He didn't "want" to invade them, but did so anyway.

The British didn't "want" to invade Normandy, then fight their way in to Germany. They did it because it was necessary to end the war.

Hitler might not have harboured any hatred for the British, but he definitely wanted Britain out of the war, and if an air campaign didn't do it, then an invasion was the only practical way of doing so.

Hitler certainly hoped an invasion wouldn't be necessary. The idea was for the Luftwaffe to defeat the RAF and bomb Britain in to submission. Of course the Luftwaffe couldn't defeat the RAF, which made both the invasion and bombing Britain in to submission impossible.

But the invasion was certainly a "real" plan. The preparations were carried out in earnest. It wasn't until the Luftwaffe abandoned the attempt to defeat the RAF that Hitler abandoned the invasion and ordered false preparations to be made for psychological reasons (and those false preparations were on a much, much smaller scale).

Hop,

The air campaign that became the Battle of Britain was not to bomb Britain into submission. It was an attempt to achieve air superiority over southeast England so that the Luftwaffe could provide air cover over the invasion fleet. Without that air cover, the fleet was susceptible to interdiction by the RN because the inferior Kriegsmarine couldn't protect the barges adequately. Hitler needed the RAF out of the way to stand any chance of Britain collapsing. The key question is whether Sealion was intended as an opposed seaborne invasion or simply a means of concentrating force such that, if opportunity arose, Hitler could move forces into England. Given the challenges of an opposed landing, I strongly suspect the latter course of action. At the very least, it gave Hitlers divisions "something to do" whilst enjoying their French soujourn.

As to your last point, if the large-scale "actual" invasion plan didn't overthrow the British Government, the chances of a smaller-scale deception campaign achieving that goal are slim at best. In order to be successful, a deception plan must make the enemy believe that the action could (or hopefully will) take place. I don't think that was ever the case from Sep 40 onwards. It may have been promulgated as such for propaganda purposes but the intelligence services, armed with ULTRA and photo recce, almost certainly weren't fooled.

Hop said:

The problem with the Sealion as "bluff" theory is that the evidence shows it wasn't a bluff. It didn't become so until late September when Hitler called off the invasion, but said some preparations should continue as a bluff. Prior to that all orders were for actual preparations.

When looking at Hitler's state of mind, it's worth remembering in the preceding few months he had conquered Norway with an amphibious invasion, then defeated and occupied France, Belgium and the Netherlands, and driven the British off the continent. He was riding high.



Hitler saw the Dutch, Danes and Norwegians as racial allies, too. He didn't "want" to invade them, but did so anyway.

The British didn't "want" to invade Normandy, then fight their way in to Germany. They did it because it was necessary to end the war.

Hitler might not have harboured any hatred for the British, but he definitely wanted Britain out of the war, and if an air campaign didn't do it, then an invasion was the only practical way of doing so.

Hitler certainly hoped an invasion wouldn't be necessary. The idea was for the Luftwaffe to defeat the RAF and bomb Britain in to submission. Of course the Luftwaffe couldn't defeat the RAF, which made both the invasion and bombing Britain in to submission impossible.

But the invasion was certainly a "real" plan. The preparations were carried out in earnest. It wasn't until the Luftwaffe abandoned the attempt to defeat the RAF that Hitler abandoned the invasion and ordered false preparations to be made for psychological reasons (and those false preparations were on a much, much smaller scale).

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My opinion is that it was not intended as a bluff, but nevertheless it was an unworkable plan, principally arising from German inexperience in large scale amphibious operations, and secondly because of the equipment available to the germans.

I think Hitler was deadly serious. I think also that the officers tasked with organizing it could barely contain their disdain for the plan, and how far reality was from the theory.

This whole debate arose about whether the british victory in the air battle was responsible for saving Britain from invasion. Barring a total defeat of the RAF, which was very unlikely I am unconvinced that the cancellation of the seaborne component can be totally attributed to the luftwaffes defeat.

Lets say the Luftwaffe was able to win a local superiority for a few days.....which I think might be the most optimistic outcome that could be expected. Would such conditions alloow the plan to proceed. before answering that, understand what air superiority actually means. It does not mean the total dominance of the skies....there would still be a RAF presence, with the ability to undertake some operations like recon and night strikes, even some daytime strikes, There could be some aircover for the RN, and the RN would still have a very potent capability to hit the invasion fellet at night. It would have at least four nights in which to undertake barge hunting operations in the channel, much as they did in the invasion of Crete. My opinion is that the RN would destroy the invasion fleet almost in its entirety. The only variable is how many destroyers would be lost doing it, not whether it would be done. Depending on the degreee of German air superiority would determine how many destroyers were lost destroying the invasion fleet. The RN had certainly shownm that it could operate in waters where the Luftwaffe was preresent in great concentration, for an extended period, and at tolerable loss rates. One only has to look at Dunkirk to see that.

Overlooked too are:

1) The RN would be "barge hunting" in the channel at night when the LW wouldnt be operating.

2) There was no way the Germans could keep the barges grouped together in a tactically sound way. Each hour in the channel means more of a probability of a navigation error or "time on beach" error. And the worse the weather and currents, the higher the errors.

3) How was the KM going to handle fire support missions? They assume that a warship sitting still in the water wont attract attention?

4) How were the Germans going to handle the inevitable times when there was bad weather in the channel? Cross their fingers and hope a 2 or 3 day delay wont impact the logistics?

5) The Germans were not going to seize an intact port in which to easily unload heavy eqmt. and tanks. Is this invasion going to be solely foot soldiers with no heavy artillery?

Re item (4) I was on the coast at Southend today with the 50mph winds, the high tide, waves crashing onto the shore and a low tide that left a mile of thick wet sand to cross.

The air campaign that became the Battle of Britain was not to bomb Britain into submission.

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That was always part of the plan. As early as Hitler Directive 9, November 1939:

In our fight against the Western Powers England has shown herself to the animator of the fighting spirit of the enemy and the leading enemy power. The defeat of England is essential to final victory.

The most effective means of ensuring this is to cripple the English economy by attacking it at its decisive points.

Should the Heer succeed in defeating the Anglo-French armies in the field and in seizing and holding a sector of the coast of the Continent opposite England, the task of the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe to carry the war to English industry becomes paramount. Efforts will be made to secure the co-operation of the Sabotage and Fifth Column organisations.

The Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe will then carry out the following tasks, given in the order of importance.

1. Attacks on the principal English ports by mining and blocking the sea lane leading to them, and by the destruction of important port installations and locks. In this connection aircraft are extremely valuable in minelaying, particularly outside English west coast ports, in narrow waterways and in river estuaries.

2. Attacks on English merchant shipping and on enemy warships protecting it.

3. Destruction of English depots, oil storage plants, food in cold storage and grain stores.

4. Interruption of the transport of English troops and supplies to the French mainland.

5. The destruction of industrial plant whose loss would be of decisive significance for the military conduct of the war, in particular key points of the aircraft industry and factories producing heavy artillery, anti-aircraft guns, munitions and explosives.

(the directive then goes on to list the most important English (sic) ports)

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Then in August 1940, directive 17:

In order to establish the necessary conditions for the final conquest of England I intend to intensify air and sea warfare against the English homeland. I therefore order as follows :

1. The German Air Force is to overpower the English Air Force with all the forces at its command, in the shortest possible time. The attacks are to be directed primarily against flying units, their ground installations, and their supply organisations, but also against the aircraft industry, including that manufacturing antiaircraft equipment.

2. After achieving temporary or local air superiority the air war is to be continued against ports, in particular against stores of food, and also against stores of provisions in the interior of the country.

Attacks on south coast ports will be made on the smallest possible scale, in view of our own forthcoming operations.

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It was always the German intention to try to force Britain out of the war by bombing.

It was an attempt to achieve air superiority over southeast England so that the Luftwaffe could provide air cover over the invasion fleet.

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That was the other objective.

I think Hitler was in much the same position as Churchill later in the war. He hoped bombing would win the war, was apprehensive about an invasion, but wanted to win the war and knew an invasion was probably necessary.

As to your last point, if the large-scale "actual" invasion plan didn't overthrow the British Government, the chances of a smaller-scale deception campaign achieving that goal are slim at best

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The goal of the later deception operations was to keep British forces tied down defending the UK while the Germans turned their attention elsewhere.

In order to be successful, a deception plan must make the enemy believe that the action could (or hopefully will) take place. I don't think that was ever the case from Sep 40 onwards. It may have been promulgated as such for propaganda purposes but the intelligence services, armed with ULTRA and photo recce, almost certainly weren't fooled.

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I agree. British intelligence knew the invasion was off almost as soon as Hitler ordered preparations to halt. I don't think Hitler ever realised just how much success British intelligence was having reading his communications, though.

My opinion is that it was not intended as a bluff, but nevertheless it was an unworkable plan, principally arising from German inexperience in large scale amphibious operations, and secondly because of the equipment available to the germans.

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Again I agree. I don't think the invasion stood any chance of success, even if the Luftwaffe had managed to defeat the RAF.

But I'm not convinced that the German high command realised that. They grossly overestimated their own capabilities and grossly underestimated British forces. To be fair, after the previous few months they had good reason to be over confident.

Hop,

The Aug 17 directive is not about "bombing Britain into submission", it's about neutralising the RAF and then disrupting Britain's seaborne shipping. The directive clearly states that these are precursors to invasion. Bombing was a vital component, as it still is in offensive air operations, but I don't think even Hitler, oft-deluded by the ever-optimistic Goering, believed his Luftwaffe was capable of maintaining the sort of strategic air campaign necessary to bring Britain to its knees. It would have taken sustained, coordinated all-arms action to stand any chance of success. The Channel prevented the land arm from participating while the RAF limited the effectiveness of both the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine.

RAF lost at least 4 aircraft. You have to ad Spitfire Mk.Ia P9335 from 7 OTU Hawarden, Flintshire, demaged cat. 2/FA

Welcome to the forum Ankita and thanks for the info!

UPDATE: In the year since I made this thread I've found more info and especially pics - so check out the thread again to find more tidbits that I've added. Sorry for everyone who printed this out but I want to make the most complete thread on the net about the battle. As an example, check out August 10.

These are some pics of the build-up of invasion barges that I was going to use throughout the thread but didn't get a chance. So here they are all together.

Has it really been a year since you did this Chris. Wow, time flies.
Those invasion barges look pretty primitive compared to what the Allies used on D-Day. Makes you wonder if Sealion had any chance at all even if air superiority had been achieved .