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The city was on a medieval layout, so infrastructure had grown into the city's layout.I think it could have been possible to target all of those military and military-industrial or logistical assets without incinerating the city and general population to the extent that was done.
What could we rationally say that the "tipping point" of the war was?Isn't this well past the tipping point in the war though?
But all that was layered inside of a crowded, medieval city that was heavily defended by AA and several Luftwaffe bases.It wasn't just that buildings were flammable, they were dropping incendiaries.
I say hit the bridges, hit the rail yards, hit the administrative buildings just like they did with Gestapo HQ and prisons and so on with earlier Mosquito raids. Bomb and strafe the troops on the roads. But you don't need to burn the city. That kind of thinking is counterproductive in my opinion. I hope it's time has come and gone.
This was true a year earlier as well: late winter 1944.By late winter 1945, lack of fuel, pilots and support was taking it's toll.
To bring this into a history-coherent perspective, you'd need a map of the area and surroundings, with all ALL all the targets clearly marked. Then we'd give you a set of round stickers to put on the targets you want to hit. Then you'd see that the smallest stickers represent a 100-yard wide circle of bomb damage, the larger stickers are a mile wide, the largest are 3 or 4 miles in diameter. When you're done putting circles on all the targets that need hitting, there won't be that much city area left un-stickered. Then, recalling that the Germans (who are as smart as we are and as dedicated to victory as we) put smudge pots on the upwind side of probable targets to obscure our aim and degrade our bombing abilities, we must figure on replacing each sticker with one the next size larger. Finally, we know the war is over, the Germans know the war is over, they are just in a stupid grade of stubborn (or stubborn grade of stupid) and refuse to surrender even knowing the war is over. Accordingly, we pull out the bigger hammer and say "burn it all", and it's the right thing to do warfare-wise. My opinion.
I don't recall specifics, but the RAF lost 6 Lancasters and the USAAF lost at least one B-17. I do know that there were a handful of Nachtjagers actively challenging the Lancs, but I'd have to look that up for actual numbers.
The initial raid by the RAF crippled the AA batteries, rendering the city defenseless, the Luftwaffe strength at the time was worn thin, as the Red Army was advancing from the east and along with it, the VVS.
By late winter 1945, lack of fuel, pilots and support was taking it's toll.
The firebombing of London saw twice the civilian casualties than Dresden.
The firebombing of Tokyo saw more casualties than Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.
We have the luxury today of being critical of how leaders in the past made decisions, but those decisions were made based on what they knew at the time.
And at no point in history, have civilians been exempt from the cost of war, WWII was certainly a high-water mark for that sad truth, but definately not an exception.
I don't have my books or computers available yet, so I can't provide any authors on the casualties of London, however, I do recall their numbers were in the 40,000s range compared to Dresden's 20,000's.Can you give me a source for that?
Here's my exploration: Suppose we spent the money & manpower on P-47's instead of B-17's (3:1 ration in aircraft cost) and mosquitoes instead of Lancasters (dunno the cost ratio there). Suppose we targetted power, transport, and government "critical points" instead of factories or cities. In what ways could we have fought the war better? What things (that were vital to victory) would we be unable to do?We do a lot of second guessing about tactics, strategy, equipment, training, design and every other aspect of (at least the Air) War in this forum, so I think it's worth exploring the Strategic bombing as well, even though I know it is sensitive.
I don't have my books or computers available yet, so I can't provide any authors on the casualties of London, however, I do recall their numbers were in the 40,000s range compared to Dresden's 20,000's.
Hopefully, one of the other members might be able to provide that as it'll be a few months before I get this #&!*$ remodelling done here...
Here's my exploration: Suppose we spent the money & manpower on P-47's instead of B-17's (3:1 ration in aircraft cost) and mosquitoes instead of Lancasters (dunno the cost ratio there). Suppose we targetted power, transport, and government "critical points" instead of factories or cities. In what ways could we have fought the war better? What things (that were vital to victory) would we be unable to do?
So do you avoid factories, rail yards and other vital infrastructure if there happens to be homes nearby (which was quite common) and what if the factory had shifts on the clock, plan only for holidays when workers would be gone?
The basic point of warfare is to defeat your enemy.
We live in an age where "smart" munitions can pinpoint the ventilation duct in a bunker and spare collateral damage, but 80 years ago, heavy bombing was the solution.
P-47s and Mosquitoes provided a valuable service during the war, but Germany and Japan refused to see the writing on the wall and heavy bombing was the only way to bring the war to an end.
As sad as it is that German and Japanese civilians perished, their numbers pale in comparison to the Russian and Chinese lives taken during those two nation's days of conquest.