USAAF 8th Army Formation Navigation Question

[gruad]

As I understand it the formation followed the lead plane which had the best navigator and later H2X instead of the belly turret.

They didn't scrap the navigator though as the plane might leave formation and have to make its own way home or to the target. Or the secondary navigation plane may have to promote to navigation leader

I assume the navigator would always be attempting to make calculations independently of the formation leader for his own comfort and as a verification of the leader.

So two questions

1. What if the individual plane or planes disagreed with the leader. What would be the protocol to resolve this?

2. How on earth did the navigator fire any 0.50 cal when surely he would need all his concentration?
(Even with GPS I find ground navigation requires a lot of attention).

Looking forward to your answers...

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

1. What if the individual plane or planes disagreed with the leader. What would be the protocol to resolve this?

I know that in the 1943 Ploesti raid, many subordinate navs recognized the nav error, followed the lead for a little bit, but then broke off to head to the correct target. I don't think there was any established protocol to resolve differences. Several bombers broke radio silence to point out the error before the dissent caused a redirect back onto Ploesti, albeit from a now-incorrect vector which screwed up the attack plan.

A similar issue arose on USS Hornet's "flight to nowhere", and in that instance LtCdr Waldron essentially had a radio argument and blunt insubordination with CHAG Stanhope Ring, resulting in Waldron flying to the target and his command being destroyed, while Ring continued on the wrong course until the subordinate commands abandoned the mission for insufficient fuel. Probably not to the gist of your question, but it does underline the issue of nav disagreements not having any resolution process.

 

[special ed]

As I recall, after that Ploesdti raid nav error a German official was amazed at the USAAF ability to attack from four separate direction at the same time.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

As I recall, after that Ploesdti raid nav error a German official was amazed at the USAAF ability to attack from four separate direction at the same time.

lol, so was the USAAF.

Now that I think about it, I seem to remember Martin Middlebrook documenting some navigation issues on the dual Schweinfurt/Regensburg raid. I'll have to go back and dig through it, it's been a few years since I read the book.

 

[gruad]

I know that in the 1943 Ploesti raid, many subordinate navs recognized the nav error, followed the lead for a little bit, but then broke off to head to the correct target. I don't think there was any established protocol to resolve differences. Several bombers broke radio silence to point out the error before the dissent caused a redirect back onto Ploesti, albeit from a now-incorrect vector which screwed up the attack plan.

A similar issue arose on USS Hornet's "flight to nowhere", and in that instance LtCdr Waldron essentially had a radio argument and blunt insubordination with CHAG Stanhope Ring, resulting in Waldron flying to the target and his command being destroyed, while Ring continued on the wrong course until the subordinate commands abandoned the mission for insufficient fuel. Probably not to the gist of your question, but it does underline the issue of nav disagreements not having any resolution process.

I suppose it must seem crazy that in broad daylight the USAF was unable to travel to its intended target with landmarks available.But the thing is the USAF was operating under a cloud cover a lot of the time and so faced same issues as bomber command.

How are wind speeds known without visibility in dead reckoning. You can use radar for fixes or breaks in the cloud or the sextant at night or sun in the day. Inertial measurements may provide a clue. Also known flak batteries might help.

IIRC there is no wind speed measurement on the aircraft only weather forecasts which may be inaccurate.

It is so easy to get lost. I think I have a poor sense of direction on the ground. Both my brothers have it good but they were motorcycle dispatch riders. So it may be possible to learn.

Now when I move to a new area I always established where North is and walk around trying to keep that North inside my head.

 

[fubar57]

I suppose it must seem crazy that in broad daylight the USAF was unable to travel to its intended target with landmarks available.But the thing is the USAF was operating under a cloud cover a lot of the time and so faced same issues as bomber command.

How are wind speeds known without visibility in dead reckoning. You can use radar for fixes or breaks in the cloud or the sextant at night or sun in the day. Inertial measurements may provide a clue. Also known flak batteries might help.

IIRC there is no wind speed measurement on the aircraft only weather forecasts which may be inaccurate.

It is so easy to get lost. I think I have a poor sense of direction on the ground. Both my brothers have it good but they were motorcycle dispatch riders. So it may be possible to learn.

Now when I move to a new area I always established where North is and walk around trying to keep that North inside my head.

I can't remember if it was the Ascension Island or the Azores but during WW2 a U.S. pilot was sent on a ferry flight across the Atlantic. He said, "How am I supposed to find the bloody thing?" and his C.O. replied, "You can't miss it, It's the only island out there"

 

[bse7entn]

2. How on earth did the navigator fire any 0.50 cal when surely he would need all his concentration?

Not sure if this exactly answers but with the H2X replacing the ball turret the H2X had its own station in the Radio Compt, in addition to the Nav station. So navigator did not have H2X radar op duties at least.

 

[MIflyer]

What if the individual plane or planes disagreed with the leader. What would be the protocol to resolve this?

I recall reading of a B-17 crew that did that very thing a couple of times, and pointed it out over the radio. And while they were proved to be correct, being right when your superiors are wrong usually is not a popular thing. So as a "reward" they were transferred to another squadron that were supposed to be trained and equipped as pathfinders. Instead they had to do the pathfinder mission without any special training or equipment.

I think that the book is the Lucky Bastard Club where a very competent 100 Bomb Group navigator failed to show up early enough and was replaced on a training flight by another guy who barely knew what he was doing. He got lucky, and the radio guy kept giving him fixes on beacons and he turned in a good performance. So, again at the last moment he was called to lead the Group on the longest mission the 8th AF had yet attempted. The wind data was way off, there were no radio fixes over Europe, and cloud cover prevented then from seeing any landmarks. But he lucked out again. The clouds broke just before they got to the target in Norway, and he spotted the target because the Germans generated a smoke screen to try to hide it, but all that did was wave "Hey bombers! We are over here!" So even though they got to the target literally hours early they hit it. He then altered the return route drastically because he knew the winds would be too unfavorable. And everybody thought he was the best nav they ever saw and they gave him the job permanently. Knowing it was all luck and improvisation he had figured he would be court martialed and sent home in disgrace.

In any military organization being the most competent typically results not in praise, thanks, and promotions but being given more work than anyone else and told not to bellyache about it.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Sounds like Harry Crosby's story to me.

 

[gruad]

Thanks for both replies.

Who is Harry Crosby?

It is difficult to resolve Technical differences with your superior publicly, but this is what the correct bomber crew would have to do.

Ok not sure about inclusion of AI content but here's one way how windspeed was calculated when reference points were available. This refers to Lancaster and presumably the Norden bombsight had similar facilities as the Mk7/14

1. Visual Observation: The "Drift"

The most basic method was watching how the ground moved relative to the aircraft. If the plane was pointed North but the ground was moving diagonally toward the Southeast, the pilot knew a wind was pushing them.
The Drift Sight: Heavy bombers had a "Drift Sight" (like the Mk. VII or XIV). The navigator looked through a lens at a fixed point on the ground.
The Wire: They would rotate a grid of parallel wires until the ground objects appeared to slide perfectly along the wires.
The Reading: The angle of those wires told them the Drift Angle.

Being the lead plane is a poison chalice as the bombardier - wireless operator - navigator team would have to concentrate more and pay less attention to their guns.

 

[Frog]

I recall reading of a B-17 crew that did that very thing a couple of times, and pointed it out over the radio. And while they were proved to be correct, being right when your superiors are wrong usually is not a popular thing. So as a "reward" they were transferred to another squadron that were supposed to be trained and equipped as pathfinders. Instead they had to do the pathfinder mission without any special training or equipment.

I think that the book is the Lucky Bastard Club where a very competent 100 Bomb Group navigator failed to show up early enough and was replaced on a training flight by another guy who barely knew what he was doing. He got lucky, and the radio guy kept giving him fixes on beacons and he turned in a good performance. So, again at the last moment he was called to lead the Group on the longest mission the 8th AF had yet attempted. The wind data was way off, there were no radio fixes over Europe, and cloud cover prevented then from seeing any landmarks. But he lucked out again. The clouds broke just before they got to the target in Norway, and he spotted the target because the Germans generated a smoke screen to try to hide it, but all that did was wave "Hey bombers! We are over here!" So even though they got to the target literally hours early they hit it. He then altered the return route drastically because he knew the winds would be too unfavorable. And everybody thought he was the best nav they ever saw and they gave him the job permanently. Knowing it was all luck and improvisation he had figured he would be court martialed and sent home in disgrace.

In any military organization being the most competent typically results not in praise, thanks, and promotions but being given more work than anyone else and told not to bellyache about it.

Nt only in the military organizations...

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Thanks for both replies.

Who is Harry Crosby?

Harry Herbert Crosby - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[MIflyer]

How on earth did the navigator fire any 0.50 cal when surely he would need all his concentration?
(Even with GPS I find ground navigation requires a lot of attention).

An undeservedly all but unknown book about flying the B-26 in the ETO, written by a navigator, offered some interesting info. First, unlike the B-25, the B-26 had both a navigator and a bombardier, even though both the men had been trained as navigators. After takeoff the navigator moved from his position behind the pilots to the nose compartment, requiring the co-pilot to slide his seat back to uncover the access to the nose. Once there the navigator had a vastly better view for spotting landmarks and was able to spend the mission arguing with the other navigator, the bombardier, over where they actually were. No seats were provided in the nose compartment for either one of them. As someone who has spent an inordinate amount of time (i.e, more than 5 min) knelling between the ribs of an aluminum airplane, I feel for those guys.

The nose .50 cal machine gun could not even be mounted, poking out through the tip of the nose bubble, if the Norden bombsight was mounted. Thus, it generally was not used during the mission. There was one mission when they were ordered to hit a target with bombs and then go in to strafe it as well. That was the only ONE mission. The bombardier was utterly delighted to finally get to use the that .50 cal, but after dropping the bombs he had to pull the pins holding the Norden in place and hand it to the Navigator to hold.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Now that I think about it, I seem to remember Martin Middlebrook documenting some navigation issues on the dual Schweinfurt/Regensburg raid. I'll have to go back and dig through it, it's been a few years since I read the book.

I am incorrect in this, after reviewing his index I've found no hint of navigation error on 17 Aug. Apologies.