V-22 crash

[davparlr]

Any info on V-22 crash? I saw three fly over the golf course last Monday, heading north towards the desert, just wondering if one of those was the one. We have a member who flies those things.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Son of former LA Dodger Steve Sax among 5 Marines killed

Capt. John J. Sax was among the aircrew of an Osprey tiltrotor aircraft that went down during training in a remote area in Imperial County, about 115 miles (185 kilometers) east of San Diego and about 50 miles (80 kilometers) from Yuma, Arizona.

www.kxxv.com

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

My heart aches for the grieving father, and I offer my salute to his late son.

 

[Capt. Vick]

Oh man...

 

[Old Wizard]

 

[Dash119]

 

[BlackSheep]

Last Friday, I worked with a Marine unit being assessed in it's ability to take down a large, heavily defended urban objective. All great guys, I pray none were involved, as they we're using Ospreys as transport, to and from Yuma MCAS.
Side note: Even firing Si-munitions, US Marines will ruin your day.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Any info on V-22 crash? I saw three fly over the golf course last Monday, heading north towards the desert, just wondering if one of those was the one. We have a member who flies those things.

This video and the summary provides some info on another V-22 crash. I hope training and SOPs are improved for this all V-22 ops.



Of the 21 passengers aboard mishap aircraft, seven had not received any type of helicopter emergency egress training. Two of the deceased died by drowning; they never activated their HABD (read: air) bottles. A substantial number of administrative and record-keeping failures were identified by the command investigation. None were causal, but they paint a picture:

• The flight crew was properly certified, but two of the flight crew members did not have their carrier qualification certifications properly documented.
• The checklist from the mishap aircraft's most recent functional check flight was never located.
• Policies intended to ensure tool accountability were not followed.
• The day before the mishap flight, a maintenance crew exceeded their maximum workday length by 90 minutes without authorization.
• A work order that was created and executed the morning of the mishap was never processed in the required tracking system.
• Maintenance was performed the morning of the mishap flight. Checklist steps were skipped, and the maintenance was signed off without authorization. The aircraft was even signed off as safe for flight while maintenance was still underway.
• Per squadron SOP, the aircraft commander is responsible for ensuring that all passengers are briefed on emergency egress procedures. That didn't happen. In fact, the aircraft commander had never even been trained on how to provide an egress brief.
• Eight of the 21 passengers did not secure themselves using the aircraft restraints.
• There were serious communication problems during the rescue.
• "HABD and SWET [training] were not completed for 384 BLT 3/5 personnel deployed with the 31st MEU, due to lack of training resources, competing training requirements, rapid embarkation upon arrival in Okinawa, and lost training days due to a contract expiration."
• Out of the 21 passengers aboard mishap aircraft, seven had not received any type of helicopter emergency egress training.
• Two of the passengers had attended and failed emergency egress training. One failed because he panicked and forgot steps while underwater. The other felt that the training was adequate, and that he just couldn't pass.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

This video and the summary provides some info on another V-22 crash. I hope training and SOPs are improved for this all V-22 ops.



Of the 21 passengers aboard mishap aircraft, seven had not received any type of helicopter emergency egress training. Two of the deceased died by drowning; they never activated their HABD (read: air) bottles. A substantial number of administrative and record-keeping failures were identified by the command investigation. None were causal, but they paint a picture:

• The flight crew was properly certified, but two of the flight crew members did not have their carrier qualification certifications properly documented.
• The checklist from the mishap aircraft's most recent functional check flight was never located.
• Policies intended to ensure tool accountability were not followed.
• The day before the mishap flight, a maintenance crew exceeded their maximum workday length by 90 minutes without authorization.
• A work order that was created and executed the morning of the mishap was never processed in the required tracking system.
• Maintenance was performed the morning of the mishap flight. Checklist steps were skipped, and the maintenance was signed off without authorization. The aircraft was even signed off as safe for flight while maintenance was still underway.
• Per squadron SOP, the aircraft commander is responsible for ensuring that all passengers are briefed on emergency egress procedures. That didn't happen. In fact, the aircraft commander had never even been trained on how to provide an egress brief.
• Eight of the 21 passengers did not secure themselves using the aircraft restraints.
• There were serious communication problems during the rescue.
• "HABD and SWET [training] were not completed for 384 BLT 3/5 personnel deployed with the 31st MEU, due to lack of training resources, competing training requirements, rapid embarkation upon arrival in Okinawa, and lost training days due to a contract expiration."
• Out of the 21 passengers aboard mishap aircraft, seven had not received any type of helicopter emergency egress training.
• Two of the passengers had attended and failed emergency egress training. One failed because he panicked and forgot steps while underwater. The other felt that the training was adequate, and that he just couldn't pass.

That is bad. I hope there's some criminal accountability in the pipeline for that sort of disregard for procedure.