VK36.01 instead of Tiger and Panther

Panzer III specification was for 15 tons.
Panzer IV specification was for 18 tons.
VK3001 test chassis specification was for 32 tons.
VK3601 test chassis specification was for 40 tons.

davebender said:

Panzer III specification was for 15 tons.
Panzer IV specification was for 18 tons.
VK3001 test chassis specification was for 32 tons.
VK3601 test chassis specification was for 40 tons.

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In reality the 3601 quickly exceeded that 40 ton estimate, so morphed into the VK4501, but even then to keep to spec it jumped up to 55 tons. So they need to drop the weight by cutting armor down.

Part of the problem for the Tiger may have been the production rate of 25 tanks per month. Perhaps the necessary tooling (jigs/fixtures, etc) were never built to enable faster/higher volume production/lower costs?

It would still be an expensive tank but perhaps not so extreme in comparison?

You may be able to build two MK III/IV transmissions for each Tiger transmission. I doubt if you could build 3, maybe 2 1/2? Same for engines, how many 12 liter V-12s for each 23 liter V-12 can you really build?

The Tiger was never intended for general issue but more of a WW I type "Break through" tank. Something that could attack and penetrate a defended area (proof against 75-76mm field guns firing AP from the sides/rear?) allowing the smaller/faster tanks access to the the less protected enemy rear areas. This may have been a faulty doctrine and in many/most cases the Tigers were not used that way. They were too short ranged to be good in a war of movement.

The problem with coming up with hypothetical German tanks that are 10-15-20 tons lighter than the real Tiger is that you loose some of the fighting qualities of the Tiger and may not gain enough other qualities. Tank that started this thread might be more comparable to a T-34/85. Giving up hull volume to make the tank smaller and lighter means giving up ammo storage and working room. T34/85 carried 36 fewer main gun rounds and around 2000 round less MG ammo. You need more tanks to get the same amount of ammunition to the battle area. Somebody will probably quote a number for rounds fired on average before a tank is knocked out but remember, to get the average one tank had to fire a crap load of ammo to average out the tank that got knocked out after firing only one or two rounds.
What was the rate of fire for a Tiger compared to the rate of fire for a T-34/85?
Practical rate of fire for a T-34/85 is sometimes given as 3/4 rounds per minute, what is the rate of fire for a smaller more cramped "Tiger light"?
12 Tigers (if loaded to max, book figure) carried over 1100 rounds of 88mm ammo. you need 18 tanks caring 61 rounds each to equal the ammo load.

The Tiger was NOT the solution to German's tank problems but a Tiger light isn't the answer either unless you can make them in much large quantities. Even 50 a month won't do the job.

Shortround6 said:

Part of the problem for the Tiger may have been the production rate of 25 tanks per month. Perhaps the necessary tooling (jigs/fixtures, etc) were never built to enable faster/higher volume production/lower costs?

It would still be an expensive tank but perhaps not so extreme in comparison?

You may be able to build two MK III/IV transmissions for each Tiger transmission. I doubt if you could build 3, maybe 2 1/2? Same for engines, how many 12 liter V-12s for each 23 liter V-12 can you really build?

The Tiger was never intended for general issue but more of a WW I type "Break through" tank. Something that could attack and penetrate a defended area (proof against 75-76mm field guns firing AP from the sides/rear?) allowing the smaller/faster tanks access to the the less protected enemy rear areas. This may have been a faulty doctrine and in many/most cases the Tigers were not used that way. They were too short ranged to be good in a war of movement.

The problem with coming up with hypothetical German tanks that are 10-15-20 tons lighter than the real Tiger is that you loose some of the fighting qualities of the Tiger and may not gain enough other qualities. Tank that started this thread might be more comparable to a T-34/85. Giving up hull volume to make the tank smaller and lighter means giving up ammo storage and working room. T34/85 carried 36 fewer main gun rounds and around 2000 round less MG ammo. You need more tanks to get the same amount of ammunition to the battle area. Somebody will probably quote a number for rounds fired on average before a tank is knocked out but remember, to get the average one tank had to fire a crap load of ammo to average out the tank that got knocked out after firing only one or two rounds.
What was the rate of fire for a Tiger compared to the rate of fire for a T-34/85?
Practical rate of fire for a T-34/85 is sometimes given as 3/4 rounds per minute, what is the rate of fire for a smaller more cramped "Tiger light"?
12 Tigers (if loaded to max, book figure) carried over 1100 rounds of 88mm ammo. you need 18 tanks caring 61 rounds each to equal the ammo load.

The Tiger was NOT the solution to German's tank problems but a Tiger light isn't the answer either unless you can make them in much large quantities. Even 50 a month won't do the job.

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So keep the Tiger the same and drop the Panther. Update the 25 ton medium tanks with a somewhat larger and standardized unit in 1942 and have a standard chassis to work from, while having specialist light and heavy tanks in limited production. A sloped Panzer in the 25-28 ton range would have all the reliability of the standard Pz III and IV while having the same gun, be a better weapons platform, and would have greater production due to standardization and no Panther in production. The heavy tanks are more a bonus than a necessity to my scenario.

Perhaps I should just restate things as what if instead of the Panther Germany decided to just update their medium tanks and standardize on a 24-28 ton chassis from 1942 on. The Tiger stays the same.

wiking85 said:

Early in the war the Germans surprise attacked the USSR while they were in the middle of transitioning to new equipment, so still have masses of light tanks themselves, most of it without spare parts or fully mobilized troops. 1941 is a massive outlier that skewed the loss ratios for the first two years of war as the Soviets had to rebuild their institutional knowledge, as they were left with little more than a militia by 1942. By 1943 loss rates changed.
Christos military and intelligence corner: Tank strength and losses ? Eastern Front
By 1943 the big cats were available in larger numbers and their presence shows, but so too does the presence of the Soviet cat killers.


The Germans lost their ability to maneuver when on the defensive from 1943-45. They lacked air superiority and enough experienced infantry to really make an elastic defense work, plus also lacked adequate intelligence about Soviet intentions thanks to Maskirovka and huge Soviet combat strength relative to German combat strength. They could overload even an elastic defense with sheer numbers, as Deep Battle Doctrine was designed to do.

My point though is that the Tigers or a version of them were useful, but the Panther was not due to its limited reliability and numbers. I fully agree that the Pz IV or a sloped armor version that replaced the Pz III chassis entirely (along with the Pz II and 38(t)) would have been ideal when backed up by some heavy tank battalions staffed by a more reliable and lighter heavy hitter like the VK3601H weighing in at 45 tons or so instead of the historical 55 tons. The chassis could then be used for longer range big guns for SP AT like the Steuer Emil, but with a larger chassis that could accomodate the heavy gun better: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sturer_Emil
Even a 105mm high velocity StuG on the VK3601 chassis would be good too (Dicker Max, but with a bigger chassis). 10.5cm K18 auf Panzer Selbstfahrlafette IVa Dickermax

The Pz III/IV chassis was a disaster, so they needed a VK24.02 or 28.01 chassis with sloped armor and bigger layout to do the job.

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Much of the history of the relationship between the OKH and Hitler regarding the eastern Front operations 1943-5 was a deep seated conflict between whether to use static line defence or manouvre...so called mobile defence. Hitler, with his WWI experiences and no formal military operations training wanted to hold every yard of territory....the infamous "no retreat" orders. this is more or less what you are now saying was the right thing to do, and the moments when Germany enjoyed its greatest defensive successes. In a perverted sort of way, Hitler did have a point, though his reasons had nothing to do the reasons a static line in some respects was probably the only option available after 1943. And it didnt have to be that way, and building a tank park for that specification was definately not a good idea. And pertinently, Germanys greatest successes defensively were when she was able to exercise mobile defence options.

Hitlers static line was the correct thing to do in some situations, because when either the weather, and/or the military transport shortages prevented or robbed the germans of their greatest asset (ie their mobility), it was disastrous to get caught in the open. But Hitlers dogma had nothing to do with sound military thinking and no place in designing or postulating on the ideal german tank. He was an innately conservative and pedestrian thinker in military matters, and clung to the notion that firepower was the key to all his military problems. i see that thinking is alive and well in the above response. The truly great wehrmacht leaders, like Manstein knew when static line was appropriate, and knew when mobile defence was appropriate. When it came to the panzer formations, it was almost always mobile operations that were the most appropriate. Germany's greatest defensive successes occurred on those few occasions they were allowed (or just took the opportunity) to be creative and hence mobile in their operations. The best methodologies were developed by Manstein. if he got his way, there would be small tactical withdrawals by the frontline Infantry only in those areas where the Russian hammer blow was to fall (and tragically, the Germans generally knew where they about to fall, but were forbidden to act when they needed to). this Infantry would fall back to pre-prepared defences and then just sit there. It was important for the Infantry at the shoulders to of the soviet breakthrough to hold firm....something that failed at both Kursk and stalingrad....Inevitably the firepower the soviets could bring to bear would ensure breakthoughs, but it was here that the Panzer forces, held in reserve at around corps strength, had to deliver decisive counterattacksd to contain the soviet breakthroughs. When these tactics were allowed to be used, the heer enjoyed their greatest successes defensively. When not, disaster was usual outcome. the tiger was designed to reinforce a disastrous military policy, and that is rule 101 in military thinking, you dont design or prepare for a doctrine that you know is going to fail. you work to your strengths, and for the German panzer forces, it was their mobility that was their greatest asset. That was more or less universally acknowledged in the heer, and it was an advantage they could have exploited almost to the very end. They chose not to, or rather hitler chose for them, and the germans paid a heavy price for it. The tiger was built with static line warfare in mind. it had no place and was sub-optimal as a piece of kit for the panzerwaffe

The russians showed repeatedly that in a stand up fight, in which the Germans were denied mobility, they (the Russians) were at their best. they were tenacious and tough fighters, and they had the numbers to win. What they lacked were military leaders able to adapt rapidly to mobile situations. Where things changed rapidly their middle management was just not up to the task. things had to follow a rigid preset plan for success to be achieved. where the situation changed quickly, the Soviets generally fell apart (the US Army was somewhat similar...its army lacked experience and it did show on occasions) . The Germans on the other hand, were at their best in these situations. The prewar policies of overtraining recruits above their intended ranks enabled the heer to be flush with good small and medium sized unit leaders, and this enabled those formations to be flexible and effective under a wide range of situations, but best in mobile rapidly changing situations.

in other words, right up until the very end, mobility was an important factor for the germans. most of the senior leaders wanted to use it far more than they were allowed, Their greatest successes occurred when they did use mobile tactics.

And the Tiger, with its short range, lack of mobility and mechanical unreliability was not suited to that operational condition. It was developed, at least in its effect as a slightly mobile battering ram very much along the lines of Hitlers thinking, but this form of warfare was never going to deliver success. it was the kind of thinking that led to both the Stalingrad and Kursk disasters.

Its a furphy to argue that by 1943 mobility on the eastern front was dead. Either defensively or offensively there were always possibilities. Germany just suffered so many losses that she was unable to capitalise on them after 1942. Vast sections of the Russian line always remained under-defended until the very end, and the Russians could not afford to lose any more encirclement battles after 1943. they too, were running out of men by then.

How does my though of not producing the Panther and instead produce a standardized 25 ton chassis with sloped armor conflict with your last comment Parsifal? All I'm saying is to retain the Tiger and concentrate on having more lighter, reliable, maneuverable medium tanks instead of the heavy 'medium' Panther.

ive got no argument with a 25 ton tank, but its the tiger component that is the problem. A 25 ton tank is presumably a mobile, reliable long range tank with some protection good optics and communications. Despite the lure of having a heavy support component in the form of a tiger attachment to a division, this in fact is an expensive distraction to the main issue. What was needed in 43-45 was just one tank of simplified construction, able to be churned out in maximum numbers. in that regard, you are on the money. there were already two tanks that had elements of these characteristics, but unfortunately both had issues of their own, and both were not German....the t-34 and the Sherman. it was not really practical to construct or copy the T-34 for German resources....the aluminium cast engines were beyond the reach of an aluminium starved germany. And the lightweight engine meant that more could be spent on other things, like armour. still the t-34 model was probably the way to go for germany. Speer wanted to either copy the t-34 or Sherman it is claimed (not sure how true though). Building SPGs costs roughly 30% less than a turreted equivalent, so in my opinion, probably the best option was some form of redesigned MkIV, and StugIII. perhaps the standard '44 pz Div might have a Pz regt attached each with 2 x improved mkIVs Abts and 1x StugIII, or vice versa, and as heavy support and ATG (towed) battalion of 2x 75mm and 1 x 88mm bans. For the tracked compponent, that would givbe about 135 vehicles per div, only two types of AFV and a significant saving due to the use of SPGs as an integral part of the TOE.

as far as halftrack production, I would zero in on just one type, perhaps the opel and phase out all the others. they were very capable, but expensive for what they were. I would also be ruthless in yet more simplification of the truck park. I would forego short term benefits of milking the European economy dry, and try and get some sort of EU style economy going with french and dutch produced soft skinned vehicles....not great but better than nothing. Atillery i would try and reduce the number of types as well

The down part of this is that a 25 ton tank won't do what you want in 1943-45. A 25 ton tank mounting a 43-45 class gun is not going to as mobile as a 25 ton tank mounting a 1941-42 class gun. Everything in a tank is a trade off. There ain't no such ting as a free lunch.
The Sherman grew from 66,900lbs to 74,200lbs from M4 to M4A3(76) and the M4A3E8 maybe even heavier? The Sherman used 375-450hp engines and the gasoline powered versions had 636-662liters of fuel compared to the MK IVs 470 liters. Granted the Sherman used most of it's extra fuel to move it's extra weight. However the Sherman had to armor the volume needed by the extra 166+ liters (think 8-9 jerry cans under armor).
Newer guns not only weighed more but they are bulkier and use bulkier ammo. Reduced ammo capacity? reduced rates of fire?

An interesting comparison is the Post war M-41 tank, with a gun with the same performance as a 76mm Sherman they got the weight down to 51-52,000lbs and the speed way up using a 500hp engine (that had fire problems, 1/2 the engine used in the M-47 but pushing a lot more power per liter of displacement) ) and they lost very little ammo capacity, they did loose one crew member, use technology not available in WW II, and essentially armored the vehicle with cardboard. Only the hull nose and the mantlet exceeded 26mm in thickness. Good for recon? as a battle tank?

Assault guns or even jagdpanzers are NOT tanks. They cannot fulfill all the roles of tanks. Some yes, in fact perhaps many, but not ALL.

Yeah the StuGs are a defensive weapon mostly or a break in assault weapon like the Tiger.
Basically the 25 ton chassis would be more about using sloped armor with a 75mm L48 gun on a bigger chassis so that it could also act as a weapons carrier that was better than the historical Pz IV or III/IV chassis. It could have the basic 1942 L48 gun, while also having large sniper type weapons in the weapons platform version like the Nashorn to support the standard Panzers. I still think a heavy tank is necessary though as a support vehicle, especially an updated version with sloped armor, though not the historically uparmored Tiger II. Having a larger chassis for heavier weapons is crucial, as the Soviets and US demonstrated later in the war. They too had their heavy vehicles and in Germany's case they would have their utility. The Panther was a nice idea, but it wasn't practical for what it was. Too heavy, not reliable enough, and too late.

As a further consideration it is not just a question of fitting a gun to chassis. Some tanks/vehicles had more combat duration than others. Granted some of the Marders used different ammo than the MK IV tank and the Stugs but the performance was about the same.

However:

Vehicle..........7.5cm ammo.............MG ammo

Marder H............38........................600
Marder M............27........................600
Hetzer...............41........................600
Stug IIIF............44........................600
Stug IIIG ...........54?.......................600
Stug IV.............63?.......................600
Stug IV Neuer....79.........................600
MK IV G............87........................3000

How long can some of those vehicle stay in combat before having to pull out to reload?
How many more vehicles do you need to equal the SAME combat power of the MK IV tank?

Price or man hours per vehicle carrying the same gun does not tell the whole story. The lack of a co-ax gun on the vast majority of non turret vehicles means that they have trouble performing some of the infantry support role/s the tanks could do.

Germans had a problem in that the MK IV was one of the first tanks to carry a 75mm gun in a rotating turret and while it was more upgradeable than some tanks of it's generation it was getting a bit long in the tooth in 1944. Still useful but pretty much maxed out. Try putting it up against T-34/85s and see what happens, no Panthers to share the load. Or M4s with 76mm guns. The US fell down getting the M-26 into service(both in timing and engine). It was late more due to doctrine/production decisions rather than technical problems. British should have had the Comet (or equivalent) in production sooner. It is only the allies lack of introducing new types of tanks that allowed the MK IV to carry on as well as it did let alone the hodge-podge of lashups the Germans used.

Shortround6 said:

As a further consideration it is not just a question of fitting a gun to chassis. Some tanks/vehicles had more combat duration than others. Granted some of the Marders used different ammo than the MK IV tank and the Stugs but the performance was about the same.

However:

Vehicle..........7.5cm ammo.............MG ammo

Marder H............38........................600
Marder M............27........................600
Hetzer...............41........................600
Stug IIIF............44........................600
Stug IIIG ...........54?.......................600
Stug IV.............63?.......................600
Stug IV Neuer....79.........................600
MK IV G............87........................3000

How long can some of those vehicle stay in combat before having to pull out to reload?
How many more vehicles do you need to equal the SAME combat power of the MK IV tank?

Price or man hours per vehicle carrying the same gun does not tell the whole story. The lack of a co-ax gun on the vast majority of non turret vehicles means that they have trouble performing some of the infantry support role/s the tanks could do.

Germans had a problem in that the MK IV was one of the first tanks to carry a 75mm gun in a rotating turret and while it was more upgradeable than some tanks of it's generation it was getting a bit long in the tooth in 1944. Still useful but pretty much maxed out. Try putting it up against T-34/85s and see what happens, no Panthers to share the load. Or M4s with 76mm guns. The US fell down getting the M-26 into service(both in timing and engine). It was late more due to doctrine/production decisions rather than technical problems. British should have had the Comet (or equivalent) in production sooner. It is only the allies lack of introducing new types of tanks that allowed the MK IV to carry on as well as it did let alone the hodge-podge of lashups the Germans used.

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Ultimately it was the demands of war that prevented the introduction of major new types that would enable a 25 ton chassis to soldier on, provided it had sufficient upgrade potential. A chassis designed for 25 tons could probably make it up to 30 tons in weight and mount a 75mm long gun by 1944, but be stuck at 50mm sloped armor. Early German turrets for the Panther and Tiger were handicapped by being designed for other older vehicles and pushed into production to save time, so when purpose built turrets with modern designs were tested they were lower weight. Take the Panther II schamturm, it ended up saving weight and being easier to make, while also being a smaller target and eliminating the shot trap of the earlier design. An upgraded medium tank chassis would have the extra room for extra ammo, while having a better layout and upgrade potential; the Pz IV soldiered on due to the Panther being a bridge too far in terms of design, having all the modern features of a tank of the future, but lacking reliability, production numbers (for a variety of reasons including allied bombing of factories and machine tool production backlogs), and being overweight.

Germany needed to balance the need for a superior future tank design with the needs of satisfying production demands for the massive war they were in by 1942. They went overboard rather than seeking proper balance; having a modernized medium tank that would be easier to phase into production without a massive retooling that the Panther required, plus satisfying the demand for standardization and some upgradability for the near future would have been a better choice. Mobility, reliability, and survivability were all key to German tank demands, but a proper balance was needed, which the Panther did not satisfy. The Tiger was a boutique item that didn't really cost that much in resources, so could be kept to supplement German firepower and provide a tough rearguard, but they needed masses of medium tanks that met the above requirements. Ideally Germany would have had a reliable 30-35 ton medium tank that the Panther was supposed to be, but ran into all sorts of design issues that prevented it from being that tank, but a 25-30 medium could have had that by keeping the existing caliber of Pz IV tank gun and later designing a lower weight turret with proper protection like the schmalturm with a 75mm L70.

By 1944 or so a 25 ton chassis, as designed, could be upgraded to a 30 ton AFV with a Schmalturm, while in the meantime the standardization of all medium chassis vehicles on one design would offer nothing but benefits.
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/showthread.php?t=138939

3601 quickly exceeded that 40 ton estimate, so morphed into the VK4501

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VK3601 40 ton chassis morphed into 55 ton Tiger I chassis because Tiger tank program manager belatedly realized Germany had a copper shortage. Hence the otherwise perfectly adequate Porsche Tiger chassis with electric drive motors was unacceptable. That's the sort of design flaw someone in Heer ordnance department should have caught early on.

davebender said:

VK3601 40 ton chassis morphed into 55 ton Tiger I chassis because Tiger tank program manager belatedly realized Germany had a copper shortage. Hence the otherwise perfectly adequate Porsche Tiger chassis with electric drive motors was unacceptable. That's the sort of design flaw someone in Heer ordnance department should have caught early on.

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I was referring to the Henschel design that became the Tiger I.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiger_I#Design_history

Germans had a problem in that the MK IV was one of the first tanks to carry a 75mm gun in a rotating turret and while it was more upgradeable than some tanks of it's generation it was getting a bit long in the tooth in 1944. Still useful but pretty much maxed out. Try putting it up against T-34/85s and see what happens, no Panthers to share the load.

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the problem with the mkIV was that it was somewhat too light to be considered adequatetly protected. At 19 tons it was simply too light by 1944.wsomething based on the mKIV but with upgraded engine and more protection, armouring better shaped and redistributed, would have been more than adequate for the fighting in 1944-5. Even as is, the MKIV did well against the T-34 in tank versus tank engagement (something it was not designed for). The average kill loss ratio of the MKIV to all Soviet tanks (which is almost T-34) is about 4.4:1. In combat it was around 8 or 9:1. there was never a problem for the germans to win gunfights. The problems arose because they were unable to field sufficient numbers. In the actual battles, the germans were able inflict significant and generally one sided loss rates on the Russians. This occurred both before and after the wide scale introdution of Panther, against more or less the same sorts of enemy tanks. The small numbers of tigers were never statistically significant. Where the Russians redressed the loss rates was in the subsequent break throughs. once through the Soviets would keep pressing forwar, overrunning repair workshops, and preventing the recovery of disabled vehicles. it was at this point that the German loss rates reduced, on average down to that figure of 4.4:1. This was a figure remarkably consistent for all types fielded. it mattered not if the tank was a Tiger or a Panther or a MkIV or even a MkII. once through, the Soviets were going to wreak havoc on the Germans in terms of losses. And this they achieved time and again.

The solution to this was not to have ever bigger, or newer tanks. Every time you increase the size or complexity of your tank park, your availability will suffer. What they needed was numbers. Foreget the pursuit of ever increasing quality in the wartime context.find a design easy to build and churn em out like hotcakes. Once you get the numbers, the pressure on your logisitc network decreases because the Soviet breakthroughs are no longer as dramatic. Once you do that, you are on the way to stabilising your front, and from there...who knows.The germans never achieved their impressive kill/oss ratios because of their superior tanks. they achieved it because of their superior unit leadership training and all arms integration. I expect the same would apply against the Americans as well

Or M4s with 76mm guns. The US fell down getting the M-26 into service(both in timing and engine). It was late more due to doctrine/production decisions rather than technical problems. British should have had the Comet (or equivalent) in production sooner. It is only the allies lack of introducing new types of tanks that allowed the MK IV to carry on as well as it did let alone the hodge-podge of lashups the Germans used.

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I have to disagree. The allies (incl the soviets) realized that in the wartiome situation, above technical proficiency, numbers were what counted. if they could get a new type into service without affecting numbers, then fine....a better tank is a help, dont get me wrong. but better tanks are a relatively minor issue compared to numbers. Having the numbers meant you could absorb losses and your front remainined stable. Having a stable frontline meant you never suffered catastrophic losses overall, and enable you to maintain the pressure and hence put the enmy on the wrack so far as losses were concerned.

The germans never had the numbers game, but they did have a priceless advantage....experience. Kepping the numbers up meant they were actually less likley of losing that advantage, not moreso. At least slosing the numbers gap meant they had some chance of containing Allied breakthroughs, and thereby avoiding the lop sided encirclement battles that cost them the war.

The Americans, at times, were short of trained tank crewmen and were operating Shermans with less than 5 man crews in spite of drafting infantrymen to help man the tanks. Why? because of high crew losses in the numbers of tanks knocked out by the Germans. Of course using partially crewed tanks with untrained crewman just means higher losses.
You can overwhelm an enemy using poorer tanks but it cost both blood and treasure. The US didn't have 76mm armed Shermans in Numbers for far too long in Europe because of faulty doctrine, not because of manufacturing problems. The same is somewhat true for the M-26.

The trick is to build a sufficiently advanced tank without exceeding the countries ability to construct them in the numbers needed. Building the same tank for 2-3 years is a bit like building the same fighter planes for 2-3 years without improving the engine or armament.

Anybody what to argue that Spitfire MK Vs would have been "good enough" if used in large enough numbers in 1944? Bf 109Fs? P-40Es?
What cost in trained pilots?

The Germans went a step too far, the allies didn't go quite far enough.

Manpower was always THE issue for the US Army. As Napoleon once said, "we have plenty of men, but too few soldiers". The problem was that the army had grown from a force of about 100000 to several millions in under two years. The training schools had been greatly expanded, but were still not enough to cope with even normal wastage.

By comparison, the heer had started as a force in 1939 of about 60 divs, but with fully trained reserves able to expand out to 120 divs in a short space of time. Plus the Germns, since Von seekt had over trained their NCOs and Junior officers, so that they could be rapidly upskilled. this paid enormous dividends for them, though by 1944 it was starting to come apart as well. The germans found they could reduce recruit training to almost nil, but it was critical to retain solid cadres, and even more important to retain that high standard of small unit leadership. German squad, platoon, company and bn leadership was without equal . The germans found they could just about put monkeys into the recruit slots, but they needed to retain good leadeship to get much out of those raw recruits. same deal for the Panzers. in the fighting around Metz, interrogation of captured germans showed the average training time of panther crews operating there was les than three weeks and most driver training was done with static instruction. Despite this, with the crew and tank leaders, they were still able to extract a stiff toll on the Americans .

In regard to your point about matching production to capacity, i couldnt agree more. with regard to fighter aircraft, I think it a slightly different situation. In the air, it was more about the individual, and how much he could get out of the equipment provided to him. Give the man mediocre or obsolete equipment and you cannot expect outstanding results. even here though there were exceptions. In the case of the VVS, it made conscious decision retain obsolete equipment, and to implement new production of types that were barely adequate. the last i-16s were produced in 1942, the last LAGG-3 in 1943 and they were still in service in 1944. The Soviets decided that they would build their fighters as cheaply as they could, with minimal equipment, and for much of the war with absolute minimum time spent on training. The average training hours for the forces committed to Kursk was about 40-60 hours. Moreover, the Russians never made it a priority to winning air supremacy over the eastern front. it was "nice to have" but never essential to fight the war they needed to fight. All they needed to achive was effective overwhelming ground strikes over the point of main effort, and for their fighters to keep the Germans busy whilst they did that. they achieved all that, with poorly skilled pilots, and average to poor equipment. Losses were staggering, but after 1943, never critical. it was a different approach and not aceptable to anyone except the Soviets, but the Soviets configured the VVS to work to their strengths....numbers, numbers and yet more numbers!

parsifal said:

... In the case of the VVS, it made conscious decision retain obsolete equipment, and to implement new production of types that were barely adequate. the last i-16s were produced in 1942, the last LAGG-3 in 1943 and they were still in service in 1944. ..

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Sorry this is OT but I-16 was small and very nimble plane, it was a difficult opponent. In fact when VVS high command studied their a/c in early 1942 they found out that I-16 was one of the most survivalable fighter they had if not the most survivalable and thoughtat first to continue its production but then looked what the I-16 units had achieved and noted that in that kategory it did badly, so they did decide to drop it from production. Nimbleness might help pilots to survive but if the plane is weakly armed and slowish that wasn't good for effectiveness. Late LaGG-3s on the other hand were not bad fighters, La-5F/FNs were simply better and so displaced the LaGG-3s in production like P-51B displaced P-51A. What was substandard VVS fighter in 44 was Yak-9M.

On tanks IMHO 30-35 tonnes vehicles were optimal MBTs, they were more suited to the technologies and infrastructures of the time and so had greater operational mobility than the heavier and more powerful tanks.