A lot of the problems from the post-war period arose due to the USA wanting nothing to do with the reoccupation of the colonies of the European Nations with the result that power vacuums arose which various independence movements, often having been encouraged by the Japanese to take an anti-western stance, sought to take advantage of.
The OSS presence in Vietnam is therefore somewhat at odds with overall US policy. But then again, the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Until it turns around and bites you in the ass!! Are you taking a short term or long term view? Were they a bunch of naive young idealists unaware of the political fire they were playing with in their actions?
To understand what went on a map of the command structure in the region as it stood at the beginning of 1945 is helpful. Note the boundaries of the US controlled SWPA region.
In April 1945 the USA raised the question of moving the boundaries between the US controlled SWPA and the British controlled SEAC area "as soon as was feasible". Basically the objective was to remove everything in SWPA and the most southern parts of the China Theatre from US responsibility, leaving only the Philippines.
So Borneo, Java, & Celebes would transfer from SWPA to SEAC along with that part of Indochina south of latitude 16 degrees north from the China theatre. Indochina north of 16 degrees north would remain part of the China Theatre. Leaving northern Indochina under command of the China Theatre was seen as necessary as it formed a flank that would otherwise have been left exposed to Japanese predations. The remainder of the DEI territories would transfer to Australian command (i.e. the rest of SWPA outwith the Philippines and the previously named areas). But it was up to Britain to obtain the agreement of the Australian, New Zealand and Dutch Govts to this proposal.
Then on 20 July the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as part of greater planning for the SEAC Theatre, ordered that this was to be effected "as soon as practicable after the 15th August 1945". In this context it is important to note that this date was being set a month BEFORE the Japanese surrender and was therefore unconnected to it. On 24 July Mountbatten was appraised of his new orders while in Berlin, and over dinner that evening Churchill advised him of the existence of the A-bomb and the likelihood of an early Japanese surrender from mid-Aug onwards, for which he should prepare.
The SEAC Area was further increased after the Australian Govt decided that, with its front line commitments in Australian New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and New Britain and to providing an infantry division to the invasion of Japan in 1946, the area east of Celebes and Dutch New Guinea, couldn't be taken over by them.
Eventually on 9th Aug a compromise was reached. Note this is still before the Japanese indicated that they would surrender (they indicated their decision to accept the Potsdam Declaration, subject to conditions on 10th Aug to set the final surrender process in motion). The takeover by SEAC of the whole SWPA area except the Philippines would be in 3 stages:-
Now the geography. Trincomalee, Ceylon to Saigon in FIC (now Ho Chi Minh City) is nearly 1,750 miles as the crow flies, and over 2,500 miles by sea via Singapore.
Then MacArthur as Supreme Commander Allied Powers, ordered that the surrender of Japanese forces in any occupied territory couldn't occur until he had signed the main surrender documents on board the Missouri in Tokyo Bay. At that point the weather intervened. From mid-Aug to mid-Sept 1945 a series of typhoons moved through the waters off Japan. So while TF38 was on station in Japanese waters throughout, minesweeping in the approaches to Sagami Wan and Tokyo Bay could only begin on 28th Aug. The first occupation troops were flown in the same day to secure airfields. And the surrender ceremony finally took place on 2nd Sept 1945.
Meanwhile, 4,000 miles away in Ceylon, the first of the SEAC reoccupation (formerly invasion) forces began to sail on 15 Aug to carry out Operation Zipper, the already planned reoccupation of Malaya. Due to MacArthur's instructions they had to delay their advance across the Bay of Bengal and seek shelter from the monssoon weather in the Nicobar Islands and off the west coast of Sumatra. Preliminary surrender documents were signed in Rangoon on 28th Aug, but actual reoccupation forces were not put ashore at Penang until 2nd Sept with the formal surrender at Singapore taking place on the evening of 4th Sept after the fleet followed the minesweepers down the Malacca Strait.
So basically you have this 2 week window before any boots arrived anywhere near the ground and even longer in those areas further from Ceylon. Hence the power vacuum that arose.
Reoccupation of Siam represents an unusual story. While Britain was at war with them the USA was not. And clandestine forces were in touch with the Regent who placed his guerrilla army at Mountbatten's disposal. The pro-Japanese Govt was then overthrown on the Japanese surrender and the Declaration of War withdrawn. One brigade from 7th Indian Division had to be flown into Bangkok from 3rd/4th Sept to establish an air base with the remainder of the division following by sea later along with RAF squadrons in support. Operations in Siam continued until the final British personnel left in Sept 1946.
French Indochina represented a whole different scale of a problem. With French rule overthrown in March 1945 the Japanese were in control. In theory the China Theatre should have been responsible for the reoccupation of everything down to the 16th Parallel with SEAC south of that. All until the French could again take over administration of the region.
To add to the problems both the US OSS and the British Force 136 (out of India) had been operating in northern Indochina in 1945. At the end of Aug, Gen Wedemeyer, Commanding General American Forces in China told SEAC to stop operating north of the 16th parallel.
But immediately following the Japanese surrender the problems started. The Viet Minh under Ho Chi Minh, who had been getting aid and support out of the US via China, declared independence in 2 northern provinces. And they then turned their attentions south to the SEAC area. Then Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese troops moved into northern Laos where the French seem to have retained at least some measure of control from the Japanese, disarmed the French and shipped them off to India via China. Meanwhile in the south, the surviving, and inadequately trained, French tried to re-establish control over what they could, but often through "intemperate" action made matters worse. Riots broke out and the Japanese made little or no effort to maintain law & order, despite it being part of their responsibilities under the Japanese surrender terms. The one area that caused little problem was Cambodia.
While the first small British movements into southern Indochina began on 8th Sept, it was 13th Sept before General Gracey and the troops of the 20th Indian Division began to arrive with a company of French troops attached. Initially one brigade was flown in via Bangkok and supported by 2 RAF squadrons. But these proved inadequate for the task. The rest of the division followed by sea. But they faced extreme difficulties over the coming months regaining control of the region.
French troops began to arrive from France in Nov but it was Jan 1946 before the bulk of the British troops could leave. But, largely due to US demands, it was 13th May 1946 before Mountbatten finally ceased to have any responsibility for the region.
Then there was the DEI. By the time the cruiser Cumberland and supporting ships arrived at Jakarta on 15/16 Sept disturbances between Indonesian Nationalists and Japanese troops were already breaking out. The whole situation in Java then became very ugly. It was 30 November 1946 before Britain was able to extract itself from that mess after suffering over 2,136 casualties trying to oversee the return of that region to some kind of normality.
So returning to the initial proposition in post #1, the US clearly wanted nothing to do with reoccupying any of the European Colonies in the Far East. They wanted to shift responsibility for managing that to the British. Something that, for better or worse, we shouldered the responsibility for, with a commitment that lasted through most of 1946.
US interest with France seems pretty minimal at this time, in fact they seem to see them as more trouble than they were worth. Some of the pointers to that? Limited supply of US radar equipment 1943-45, with Britain filling the gap. It was British aircraft types that were supplied to the French forces immediately post-war (only come 1949/50 does America begin to supply them). It was a British light carrier that was supplied in 1946 (yes I know about the escort carrier Dixmude ex HMS Biter returned to the USA and then supplied to the French, but she was laid up due to a host of mechanical problems). It seems to me that things only change after the Communist takeover in China in 1948/49 that US attitudes to France begin to change.
So the question is, what could happen to make US attitudes change fundamentally in order to change the whole track of post-war history?
The OSS presence in Vietnam is therefore somewhat at odds with overall US policy. But then again, the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Until it turns around and bites you in the ass!! Are you taking a short term or long term view? Were they a bunch of naive young idealists unaware of the political fire they were playing with in their actions?
To understand what went on a map of the command structure in the region as it stood at the beginning of 1945 is helpful. Note the boundaries of the US controlled SWPA region.
In April 1945 the USA raised the question of moving the boundaries between the US controlled SWPA and the British controlled SEAC area "as soon as was feasible". Basically the objective was to remove everything in SWPA and the most southern parts of the China Theatre from US responsibility, leaving only the Philippines.
So Borneo, Java, & Celebes would transfer from SWPA to SEAC along with that part of Indochina south of latitude 16 degrees north from the China theatre. Indochina north of 16 degrees north would remain part of the China Theatre. Leaving northern Indochina under command of the China Theatre was seen as necessary as it formed a flank that would otherwise have been left exposed to Japanese predations. The remainder of the DEI territories would transfer to Australian command (i.e. the rest of SWPA outwith the Philippines and the previously named areas). But it was up to Britain to obtain the agreement of the Australian, New Zealand and Dutch Govts to this proposal.
Then on 20 July the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as part of greater planning for the SEAC Theatre, ordered that this was to be effected "as soon as practicable after the 15th August 1945". In this context it is important to note that this date was being set a month BEFORE the Japanese surrender and was therefore unconnected to it. On 24 July Mountbatten was appraised of his new orders while in Berlin, and over dinner that evening Churchill advised him of the existence of the A-bomb and the likelihood of an early Japanese surrender from mid-Aug onwards, for which he should prepare.
The SEAC Area was further increased after the Australian Govt decided that, with its front line commitments in Australian New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and New Britain and to providing an infantry division to the invasion of Japan in 1946, the area east of Celebes and Dutch New Guinea, couldn't be taken over by them.
Eventually on 9th Aug a compromise was reached. Note this is still before the Japanese indicated that they would surrender (they indicated their decision to accept the Potsdam Declaration, subject to conditions on 10th Aug to set the final surrender process in motion). The takeover by SEAC of the whole SWPA area except the Philippines would be in 3 stages:-
- SEAC would immediately assume responsibility for all future operational planning in his new area including planning for civil affairs and clandestine operations; BUT the provision of garrisons in the various islands should remain a joint US-Australian responsibility.
- Following the capture of Singapore and the Malacca Strait (planned to happen by the end of 1945), SEAC would assume full control of Borneo including provision of a garrison.
- Once secure lines of communication through the Java Sea were opened SEAC would assume full responsibility for the rest of the area thereby allowing withdrawal of US garrisons in the area east of Celebes.
Now the geography. Trincomalee, Ceylon to Saigon in FIC (now Ho Chi Minh City) is nearly 1,750 miles as the crow flies, and over 2,500 miles by sea via Singapore.
Then MacArthur as Supreme Commander Allied Powers, ordered that the surrender of Japanese forces in any occupied territory couldn't occur until he had signed the main surrender documents on board the Missouri in Tokyo Bay. At that point the weather intervened. From mid-Aug to mid-Sept 1945 a series of typhoons moved through the waters off Japan. So while TF38 was on station in Japanese waters throughout, minesweeping in the approaches to Sagami Wan and Tokyo Bay could only begin on 28th Aug. The first occupation troops were flown in the same day to secure airfields. And the surrender ceremony finally took place on 2nd Sept 1945.
Meanwhile, 4,000 miles away in Ceylon, the first of the SEAC reoccupation (formerly invasion) forces began to sail on 15 Aug to carry out Operation Zipper, the already planned reoccupation of Malaya. Due to MacArthur's instructions they had to delay their advance across the Bay of Bengal and seek shelter from the monssoon weather in the Nicobar Islands and off the west coast of Sumatra. Preliminary surrender documents were signed in Rangoon on 28th Aug, but actual reoccupation forces were not put ashore at Penang until 2nd Sept with the formal surrender at Singapore taking place on the evening of 4th Sept after the fleet followed the minesweepers down the Malacca Strait.
So basically you have this 2 week window before any boots arrived anywhere near the ground and even longer in those areas further from Ceylon. Hence the power vacuum that arose.
Reoccupation of Siam represents an unusual story. While Britain was at war with them the USA was not. And clandestine forces were in touch with the Regent who placed his guerrilla army at Mountbatten's disposal. The pro-Japanese Govt was then overthrown on the Japanese surrender and the Declaration of War withdrawn. One brigade from 7th Indian Division had to be flown into Bangkok from 3rd/4th Sept to establish an air base with the remainder of the division following by sea later along with RAF squadrons in support. Operations in Siam continued until the final British personnel left in Sept 1946.
French Indochina represented a whole different scale of a problem. With French rule overthrown in March 1945 the Japanese were in control. In theory the China Theatre should have been responsible for the reoccupation of everything down to the 16th Parallel with SEAC south of that. All until the French could again take over administration of the region.
To add to the problems both the US OSS and the British Force 136 (out of India) had been operating in northern Indochina in 1945. At the end of Aug, Gen Wedemeyer, Commanding General American Forces in China told SEAC to stop operating north of the 16th parallel.
But immediately following the Japanese surrender the problems started. The Viet Minh under Ho Chi Minh, who had been getting aid and support out of the US via China, declared independence in 2 northern provinces. And they then turned their attentions south to the SEAC area. Then Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese troops moved into northern Laos where the French seem to have retained at least some measure of control from the Japanese, disarmed the French and shipped them off to India via China. Meanwhile in the south, the surviving, and inadequately trained, French tried to re-establish control over what they could, but often through "intemperate" action made matters worse. Riots broke out and the Japanese made little or no effort to maintain law & order, despite it being part of their responsibilities under the Japanese surrender terms. The one area that caused little problem was Cambodia.
While the first small British movements into southern Indochina began on 8th Sept, it was 13th Sept before General Gracey and the troops of the 20th Indian Division began to arrive with a company of French troops attached. Initially one brigade was flown in via Bangkok and supported by 2 RAF squadrons. But these proved inadequate for the task. The rest of the division followed by sea. But they faced extreme difficulties over the coming months regaining control of the region.
French troops began to arrive from France in Nov but it was Jan 1946 before the bulk of the British troops could leave. But, largely due to US demands, it was 13th May 1946 before Mountbatten finally ceased to have any responsibility for the region.
Then there was the DEI. By the time the cruiser Cumberland and supporting ships arrived at Jakarta on 15/16 Sept disturbances between Indonesian Nationalists and Japanese troops were already breaking out. The whole situation in Java then became very ugly. It was 30 November 1946 before Britain was able to extract itself from that mess after suffering over 2,136 casualties trying to oversee the return of that region to some kind of normality.
So returning to the initial proposition in post #1, the US clearly wanted nothing to do with reoccupying any of the European Colonies in the Far East. They wanted to shift responsibility for managing that to the British. Something that, for better or worse, we shouldered the responsibility for, with a commitment that lasted through most of 1946.
US interest with France seems pretty minimal at this time, in fact they seem to see them as more trouble than they were worth. Some of the pointers to that? Limited supply of US radar equipment 1943-45, with Britain filling the gap. It was British aircraft types that were supplied to the French forces immediately post-war (only come 1949/50 does America begin to supply them). It was a British light carrier that was supplied in 1946 (yes I know about the escort carrier Dixmude ex HMS Biter returned to the USA and then supplied to the French, but she was laid up due to a host of mechanical problems). It seems to me that things only change after the Communist takeover in China in 1948/49 that US attitudes to France begin to change.
So the question is, what could happen to make US attitudes change fundamentally in order to change the whole track of post-war history?
